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Abstract
This  thesis  studies  the  impact  of investor  protection  and  bank  regulation  on  the
shareholder wealth around merger and acquisition announcements in the banking industry
during the period 1995-2005. The analysis is based on 508 targets, 1,424 bidders and 388
combined firms covering over 30 countries. Using the event study methodology, the results
show  that  targets,  bidders  and  combined  firms  obtain  13.25%, -0.63%  and  0.39%
cumulative abnormal returns over a 3 day (-1,+1) event window, respectively.
In addition, cross-sectional analysis reveals that target cumulative abnormal returns
are positively related to investor protection measured as the antidirector rights and rule of
law  in  a  target  country.  The  findings  also  indicate  that  targets  gain  more  when  bank
regulation in a target country has more restriction on bank activity, official supervisors
have more power to intervene the deals and supervisors have more power to correct the
problem in mergers and acquisitions separately.
Furthermore, the results show that bidders have lower gains when investor protection
in a bidder country measured as rule of law is strong. The results also find that bidders gain
less  when  bank  regulation  in  a  bidder  country  has  more  restriction  on  bank  activity.
However, the findings show that bidders gain more when supervisory authority in a bidder
country  is  more  independent. With  respect  to  combined  firms,  the  results  find  that
combined firms obtain higher announcement returns when investor protection measured as
the combination of the antidirector rights index in a target and bidder country is strong.iii
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Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 Background and motivation
Over the last decade, the banking industry has experienced significant changes all
over  the  world.  These  changes  may  derive  from  several  broad  forces,  including
deregulation,  globalization,  and  technological  development  (DeLong (2001);  Kiymaz
(2004); Ismail and Davidson (2007); Ekkayokkaya et al. (2007); DeYoung et al. (2009)).
DeLong (2001) argues that banks are allowed to expand geographically due to regulatory
changes. Ismail and Davidson (2007) also argue that regulation changes remove product
and  geographical  restrictions  on  banks.  Accordingly,  banks  can  increase  their  product
services and enlarge their market shares by reaching different markets.
In addition, technological development enables the financial firms to reform their
service  systems,  such  as  back-office  processing  and  payment  systems  (Berger  (2003);
Humphrey et al. (2006); DeYoung et al. (2009)). These changes have significantly altered
the competitive conditions faced by financial firms (Frame and White (2004); DeYoung
(2007); DeYoung et al. (2009)). Thus, the financial market becomes more competitive.
Consequently, a number of banking firms experience a decrease in profitability and an
increase  in  operating  costs.  Some  banking  firms  attempt  to  solve  these  disadvantages
through mergers and acquisitions.
The economic rationale of mergers and acquisitions is based on the belief that the
benefits can be obtained through the reduction of expense and earning volatility and the
increase of the market power and economies of scale and scope (Pilloff and Santomero
(1996); Kiymaz (2004)). Pilloff and Santomero (1996) argue that merger and acquisition
activities can significantly reduce operating costs if economies of scale or scope can be
achieved. This may derive from the fact that larger firms can be more efficient if redundant
facilities are eliminated.
On the other hand, Berger and Hannan (1998) and DeYoung et al. (2009) argue that2
mergers and acquisitions can increase firm size. Firms with large size can increase market
power  in  determining  higher  prices  or  generating  profits.  In  addition,  Pilloff  and
Santomero  (1996)  also  argue  that  mergers  may  enhance  value  through  products  and
services diversification. Greater diversification provides value to stabilise earning volatility
and thus increases firm value and shareholder wealth.
Merger and acquisition activities have drawn much attention in academic research.
One stream of research investigates whether mergers and acquisitions can create or destroy
value  to  shareholders,  and  prior  empirical  studies  apply  event  study  methodology  to
examine  the  market  reaction  around bank  merger  and  acquisition  announcements
(Cybo-Ottone  and  Murgia (2000);  Cornett et  al. (2003);  Ismail  and  Davidson (2007)).
Lensink and Maslennikova (2008) argue that the event study methodology is based on the
Efficient Market Hypothesis, in which the market reacts to the newly released information
quickly. If there is no event, such as the announcements of bank mergers and acquisitions,
the return of the stock should not deviate from its normal returns. If any abnormal return
can  be  detected,  the  level of  the  abnormal  return  can  be  regarded  as  the  impact  on
shareholder wealth around bank merger and acquisition announcements.
However, prior  empirical studies do not provide a clear picture of the impact of
shareholder wealth on bank mergers, as the empirical evidence is mixed. Toyne and Tripp
(1998) argue that the empirical findings appear to be sensitive to the time period selected.
In  addition,  the  empirical  results  also  vary  depending  on  the  market  studied.  Prior
empirical studies have examined shareholder wealth of bank mergers in the U.S. market
(e.g., Neely (1987); DeLong (2001); Cornett et al. (2003); Akhigbe et al. (2004); Becher
and Campbell (2005)), in the EU market (e.g., Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000); Beitel et
al. (2004); Ismail and Davidson (2007); Lensink and Maslennikova (2008)), and in the
international market
1  (e.g.,  Biswas et al. (1997); DeLong (2003); Fields et al. (2007);
1 The international market means that the market covers both the U.S. and EU market and/or markets from
the rest of the world.3
Valkanov and Kleimeier (2007)). Overall, these studies report that targets earn positive
announcement returns and combined firms obtain slightly positive announcement returns
around bank merger and acquisition announcements.
However, the empirical results for bidding firms are inconsistent. Bidding firms are
normally found to experience negative announcement returns in the U.S. studies and obtain
in general slightly positive announcement returns in the EU studies. However, few studies
analyse both U.S. and European banks involved in M&As and there is thus little prior
comparison of the wealth effects of bank mergers and acquisitions in different markets. In
addition, the existing literature in the international studies is limited and does not use a
large  international  sample  of  bank  mergers  from  a  number  of  countries. The  limited
evidence and inconclusive results offer an opportunity to carry out further research in this
area. As a consequence, this thesis starts from investigating whether bank mergers and
acquisitions create or destroy value to shareholders. The analysis specifically examines the
impact of shareholder wealth for targets, bidders and combined firms covering from over
30 countries.
In addition to examining the impact of shareholder wealth, prior empirical studies
also employ cross-sectional regression analysis in an attempt to explain the cross-sectional
variations  in  cumulative  abnormal  returns  around  bank  merger  and  acquisition
announcements. In this aspect, prior empirical studies aim to explore the determinants that
may affect shareholder wealth in bank mergers. As will be discussed in chapter 2, the
existing literature has demonstrated that the deal and firm specific characteristics have its
importance to explain the cumulative abnormal returns. However, little is known about
whether the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms can influence shareholder
wealth in bank mergers.
According to agency theory, there are likely to be conflicts between managers and
shareholders. The conflicts occur in that managers may pursue their own purpose at the
expense of shareholders. Mergers and acquisitions can cause significant conflicts between4
managers and shareholders as mergers and acquisitions are major corporate investments to
the firms. Poor bank governance may allow insiders to use bank resources for their own
purposes and give shareholders disappointing returns on their investments (Morck et al.
(1990);  Shleifer  and  Vishny  (1997);  Hagendorff et  al.  (2007)).  Thus,  the  presence  of
corporate governance mechanisms provides a function to monitor managerial behaviour. If
corporate  governance  mechanisms  can  effectively  monitor  managerial  behaviour,  the
interests between managers and shareholders may be more closely aligned. This is due to
the fact that corporate governance mechanisms can limit managerial discretion and thus
protect  minority  shareholders.  In  other  words,  the  existence  of  corporate  governance
mechanisms is to mitigate the conflicts between managers and shareholders and reduce the
expropriation by managers. In turn, the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms
can be expected to enhance shareholder wealth in bank mergers and acquisitions.
A number of prior empirical studies have explored the value effects of bank mergers
and  governance  variables,  such  as  executive  compensation  (Bliss  and  Rosen  (2001);
Becher and Campbell (2005)), managerial ownership (Hughes et al. (2003)) and board
composition  (Brickley  and  James  (1987);  Subrahmanyam et  al.  (1997);  Cornett et  al.
(2003)). However, these prior empirical studies only focus on the variables from firm level
corporate governance mechanisms.
It may be argued that the country level corporate governance mechanisms can also
affect the value effects of bank mergers. La Porta et al. (1998) argue that the legal system
is an important determinant to protect shareholders. Hagendorff et al. (2007) argue that
investors in low protection environments may require compensation for lower governance
standards and a higher risk of expropriation by insiders. Anderson et al. (2009) also argue
that strong investor protection in a target country offers higher bargaining power to targets.
However,  it  is  largely  ignored  whether the  country  level corporate  governance
mechanisms in terms of the legal and regulation system can explain the variations of the
announcement returns in mergers and acquisitions. Several prior empirical studies have5
explored the relationship between investor protection and the cumulative abnormal returns
of the firms (e.g., Kuipers et al. (2003); Bris and Cabolis (2004); Stark and Wei (2004);
Rossi and Volpin (2004); Freund et al. (2008); Martynova and Renneboog (2008)). These
prior empirical studies above only look at the industrial firms. Hagendorff and Keasey
(2008) argue that there is limited evidence exploring the valuation effects of mergers in
different investor protection regimes for banking firms. It is not clear as to whether the
empirical evidence from industrial firms can be applicable to the banking firms.
In addition to the legal system of investor protection, Caprio et al. (2007) argue that
investor protection laws may not provide an effective corporate governance mechanism to
protect  minority  shareholders.  Thus,  bank  regulation  may  serve  as  an  alternative
mechanism  to  discipline  managerial  behaviour. Strong  bank  regulation  can  reduce  the
opportunity to be expropriated by managers through mergers and acquisitions. Thus, the
strength of bank regulation can be expected to affect shareholder wealth of bank mergers.
However, due  to  limited  evidence, little  is  known  as  to  whether  bank  regulation  can
influence shareholder wealth in bank mergers as will be discussed in chapter 3. It remains a
question  to  determine  as  to  whether  bank  regulation  can  also  have  an  influence  on
shareholder wealth of bank mergers.
While this thesis covers a wide range of countries in terms of international studies,
the  cross-country  approach  makes  the  current  study  to  investigate  the  effect  of  the
differences in legal environment in terms of investor protection and bank regulation on the
shareholder wealth in bank mergers and acquisitions. In addition, due to limited evidence
in the academic research, this thesis can provide more evidence to address whether investor
protection and bank regulation can be important determinants to explain the cumulative
abnormal returns around bank merger and acquisition announcements.
1.2 Objectives
The  aim  of  this  thesis  is  to  explore  the  impact  of  investor  protection  and  bank6
regulation on the shareholder wealth around bank merger and acquisition announcements
from 1995 to 2005. From this perspective, this thesis examines whether bank mergers
create  or  destroy  value  to  shareholders  and  further  explores  as  to  whether  investor
protection and bank regulation can be important determinants to explain the cross-sectional
variations  of  the  cumulative  abnormal  returns  around  bank  merger  and  acquisition
announcements.
Prior empirical studies examining shareholder wealth of bank mergers mainly focus
on the U.S. market, or the EU market, with only a few studies also analysing markets from
the rest of the world, as will be discussed in chapter 2. However, prior empirical studies do
not use a large international sample of bank mergers from a number of countries and the
results are inconclusive. The existing literature does not provide a clear picture to address
whether bank mergers create or destroy value to shareholders. In this study, I use a large
sample of 508 targets and 1,424 bidders from 36 and 39 countries to carry out the analysis,
respectively.
In addition, as will be discussed in chapter 3, there is limited evidence to explore the
relationship between investor protection and bank regulation and shareholder wealth in
bank mergers. If investor protection and bank regulation can serve as effective corporate
governance mechanisms to monitor managerial behaviour, bank mergers can be expected
to  create  value  for  shareholders.  This  is  because  managers  may  have  less  ability  to
expropriate  shareholders.  Consequently,  minority  shareholders  can  be  well  protected  if
investor protection and bank regulation in a country are strong. However, due to limited
evidence in academic research, little is known as to whether investor protection and bank
regulation  can  be  important  determinants  to  explain  the  cumulative  abnormal  returns
around bank merger and acquisition announcements.
While little is known regarding whether bank  mergers  create or destroy  value to
shareholders  and  whether  investor  protection  and  bank  regulation  can  be  important
determinants  to  explain  the  cumulative  abnormal  returns  around  bank  merger  and7
acquisition announcements, more evidence and a clearer understanding of these issues in
academic research are valuable. This thesis attempts to fill this gap.
1.3 Findings
The  aim  of  this  thesis  is  to  explore  the  impact  of  investor  protection  and  bank
regulation on the shareholder wealth around bank merger and acquisition announcements
from 1995 to 2005. First, this thesis examines the impact of shareholder wealth in bank
mergers. In this aspect, this thesis measures the abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal
returns  for  targets,  bidders  and  combined  firms.  Furthermore,  this  thesis  employs  the
cross-sectional regression analysis to explore as to whether investor protection and bank
regulation can be important determinants to explain the cross-sectional variations of the
cumulative abnormal returns around bank merger and acquisition announcements. In the
regression analysis, this thesis also controls for the deal and firm specific characteristics
and the country level specific characteristics in order to accurately explore the relationship
between  investor  protection  and  bank  regulation  and  the  cumulative  abnormal  returns.
Hence, the empirical results are presented in chapter 6, 7 and 8 for targets, bidders and
combined firms, respectively. The empirical findings are summarised as follows.
With regard to target shareholder wealth, the empirical results show that targets on
average earn 13.25% cumulative abnormal returns over a 3-day (-1,+1) event window.
Splitting the sample based on the market, the results show cumulative abnormal returns of
16.47% to U.S. targets, 8.88% to EU targets and 2.57% to targets from other markets over
a 3-day (-1,+1) event window. The results suggest that U.S. banking takeover market is
more competitive as a result of higher announcement returns to U.S. targets. Taking into
account the type of deals, the results show that targets obtain cumulative abnormal returns
of  13.66%  and  11.26%  for  focusing  and  diversifying  deals,  respectively.  The  findings
suggest that the market is more favourable of focusing deals to targets in that managers do
not need to manage more types of risks after the transactions.8
In  the  cross-sectional  regression  analysis,  the  results  show  that  target  cumulative
abnormal returns are positively and significantly related to the level of investor protection
in a target country, measured as the antidirector rights index and the rule of law. The results
suggest that targets have higher bargaining power when targets are in a country with strong
investor protection. The results indicate that targets gain more when investor protection in
a target country is strong.
In  addition,  the  results  also  reveal  that  target  cumulative  abnormal  returns  are
positively and significantly associated with bank regulation in a bidder country measured
as overall activities restrictiveness, official supervisory power and prompt corrective power.
The results suggest that targets earn higher announcement returns when bank regulation in
a bidder country has more restriction on bank activity, official supervisors have strong
power to intervene the transactions and bank regulation has more power to correct the
problem  from  the  transactions.  This  suggests  that  bank  regulation  in  a  bidder  country
allows bidders to closely evaluate the transactions. This can be expected to increase future
gains to targets. With regard to control variables, the results only show that targets obtain
higher gains when target size is small.
Furthermore, the results find that targets gains more when the difference of the rule
of law in a bidder and target country is small. The results show that targets gain more when
targets come from a country with strong investor protection. The findings also uncover that
target cumulative abnormal returns are negatively and significantly associated with the
difference of prompt corrective power in a bidder and target country. When bank regulation
in a target country has more power to correct the problem in the transactions, targets can
obtain higher announcement returns in that bank regulation in a target country can be
expected to better protect target shareholders.
Turning to bidder shareholder wealth, the results show that bidding firms on average
experience -0.63% cumulative abnormal returns over a 3-day (-1,+1) event window. The
results are statistically significant at the 0.01 level. This illustrates that bidders experience9
negative announcement returns, showing losses to bidder shareholders. This can also be an
indication of wealth transfer from bidders to targets.
Taking into account the market, the results show that bidders obtain -0.91%, -0.10%
and -0.39% cumulative abnormal returns over a 3-day (-1,+1) event window in the U.S.,
EU  market  and  other  markets,  respectively. The  findings  reveal  that  U.S.  bidders
experience  more  losses  as  a  result  of  more  competitive  banking  takeover  market. In
addition, the findings reveal that bidders obtain -0.89% and 0.05% cumulative abnormal
returns over a 3-day (-1,+1) event window for focusing and diversifying deals, respectively.
The  results  are  statistically  significant  at  the  0.01  level  for  focusing  deals  only.  The
difference is statistically significant.
In the cross-sectional regression analysis, the results show that bidder cumulative
abnormal returns are negatively and significantly related to investor protection in a bidder
country  measured  as  the  rule  of  law. A  possible  explanation  is  that  strong  investor
protection can limit bidder manager’s ability to pursue risky investment projects through
mergers and acquisitions. This can reduce the future gains to bidders. Thus, bidders obtain
lower announcement returns when investor protection in a bidder country is strong.
With respect to bank regulation, the results show that bidder cumulative abnormal
returns are negatively and significantly associated with overall activities restrictiveness.
When bank regulation in a bidder country has more restriction on bank activity, bidders
can also be expected to obtain lower gains in mergers and acquisitions.
On the other hand, the  results show that bidder cumulative  abnormal  returns are
positively and significantly related to bank regulation in a bidder country measured as
independence of overall supervisory authority. The findings suggest that bidders obtain
higher announcement returns when supervisory authority is more independent. Supervisory
authority  can be  expected  to  reduce  the  external  influence,  such  as  the  political
consideration.  They  can  fairly  evaluate  the  transactions.  This  can  thus  benefit  bidder
shareholders.10
With  regard  to  control  variables,  the  results  show  that  higher  bidder  cumulative
abnormal returns are associated with cash payment, with higher growth potential measured
as the market to book ratio, and with a higher capital ratio. The results reveal that bidders
gain more in cash payment. When bidders with higher growth potential engage in mergers
and acquisitions, they can be expected to create higher synergies after the transactions.
Thus, bidders gain more when bidders have higher growth potential. In addition, when
bidders have higher capital ratio, their capital can serve a cushion to against unexpected
losses in mergers and acquisitions. Bidders gain more when bidders have higher capital
ratio.
In contrast, the results show that higher cumulative abnormal returns to bidders are
correlated to smaller relative size of the target to bidder, lower profitability measured as
ROA,  smaller  bidder  size  and  less  competitive  banking  market  in  a  bidder  country
measured as net interest margin. A further analysis reveals that bidder cumulative abnormal
returns are positively and significantly related to the difference of bank regulation in a
bidder and target country measured as prompt corrective power.
This thesis uses the weighted average approach to measure the announcement returns
to combined firms, and the results show that combined firms on average obtain 0.39%
cumulative abnormal returns over a 3-day (-1,+1) event window. Positive announcement
returns to combined firms indicate that bank mergers overall create value to shareholders.
The results also show that combined firms on average obtain 0.42% and 0.23% cumulative
abnormal returns over a 3-day (-1,+1) event window for focusing and diversifying deals,
respectively. However, the difference is not statistically significant.
In  the  cross-sectional  regression  analysis,  the  results  show  that  combined  firms
cumulative  abnormal  returns  are  positively  and  significantly  associated  with  investor
protection measured as the combination of the antidirector rights index in a target and
bidder country. The results suggest that strong investor protection in a target and bidder
country can be better to protect shareholders. Combined firms can then earn higher gains11
when investor protection in a target and bidder country is strong. In addition, the results
show that higher cumulative abnormal returns to combined firms are related to smaller
bidder  size  and  less  competitive  banking  market  in  a  bidder  country  measured  as  net
interest margin.
1.4 Contributions
This thesis makes contributions in different dimensions for academic research and
practices. In academic research, this thesis firstly provides more evidence to address the
impact of shareholder wealth in bank mergers and acquisitions. Using a large international
sample of bank mergers to examine shareholder wealth of bank mergers, the empirical
evidence in this thesis can be expected to provide a clearer picture to academic researchers.
In addition, as mentioned previously, the empirical evidence is extended to explore
the effectiveness of the country level corporate governance mechanisms in terms of the
legal and regulation system on the impact of shareholder wealth in bank mergers. The
empirical  findings  in  this  thesis  contribute  to  our  knowledge  and  understanding  as  to
whether investor protection and bank regulation can be important determinants to explain
the variations of the announcement returns in bank mergers. The results assist academic
researchers not only to reveal how investor protection and bank regulation play a role in
the  decision  making  of  bank  mergers  and  acquisitions,  but  also  to  uncover  how  the
announcement  returns  of  bank  mergers  can  be  affected  by  the  strength  of  investor
protection and bank regulation.
With regard to the practical implications, the empirical findings in this thesis are of
relevance to investors, managers and policymakers/regulators. The empirical evidence in
the current study can assist investors to realise how the announcements of bank mergers
and  acquisitions  can  affect  their  shareholder  wealth.  Investors  may  establish different
investment strategies in order to increase/reduce a positive/negative impact of their wealth
from bank merger and acquisition announcements.12
The  empirical  evidence  can  also  help  managers  to  understand  how  the  level  of
investor protection and bank regulation can influence their decisions making on the impact
of  shareholder  wealth  in  bank  mergers. Managers  may  be  able  to  carry  out  different
strategies  to  protect  shareholders  and  increase  shareholder  wealth. In  addition,  the
empirical evidence in this thesis can also assist policymakers/regulators to improve and
design  their  investor  protection  and  bank  regulation  laws  in  order  to  protect  minority
shareholders.
1.5 The organisation of this thesis
This thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 presents the review of literature in bank
mergers and acquisitions. Chapter 3 reviews the prior empirical studies related to corporate
governance.  Research  questions  and  hypotheses  are  provided  in  chapter  4.  Chapter  5
describes the sample selection and methodology. The empirical results are presented in
chapter 6, 7 and 8 for targets, bidders and combined firms, respectively. Finally, chapter 9
presents conclusion and suggestion.13
Chapter  2  Literature  review  on  bank  mergers  and
acquisitions
2.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to review empirical studies with respect to bank mergers
and acquisitions. As can be seen from Bruner’s (2003) and Martynova and Renneboog’s
(2008) reviews of the existing literature on takeover activities, academic researchers in the
area of mergers and acquisitions mainly concentrate on non-financial firms. However, the
empirical evidence from non-financial firms may not necessarily be applied to financial
firms  as  more  regulations  are  imposed  on  financial  firms.  Hence,  the  review  of prior
empirical studies in this chapter is limited to bank mergers and acquisitions.
This chapter starts with reviewing the motives of mergers and acquisitions. This not
only provides an understanding of the theoretical background, but also distinguishes the
competing  motives  and  its  implication  of  takeover  gains.  While  reviewing  the  prior
empirical studies on bank mergers, the main focus is to highlight the main findings, while
also taking into account the models and the event windows, as such choices may have an
impact on the level of abnormal returns. Furthermore, the review of the prior studies also
considers factors that influence the level of abnormal returns. The review of prior empirical
studies can not only help our understanding of how prior studies conduct their studies and
what empirical findings they report, but also point out the limitations from prior empirical
studies. This allows this thesis to further explore the impact of the shareholder wealth on
bank mergers.
To uncover what is known regarding the wealth effects of bank mergers, this chapter
will review prior empirical studies for targets, bidders and combined firms, respectively.
Thus, this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the motives of takeovers.
Section  2.3  reviews  the  empirical  evidence  for  target  firms.  The  empirical  studies  for
bidding firms are discussed in section 2.4. The empirical evidence for combined firms is14
presented in section 2.5. Finally, the conclusion is discussed in section 2.6.
2.2 The motives of takeovers
In theory, three major motives of takeovers have been documented in the existing
literature (Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993); Zhang (1998)). These motives include the
synergy  motive,  the  hubris  motive  and  the  agency  motive.  Each  motive  has  its  own
implication in association with the gains to the participant of the firms in mergers and
acquisitions.  The  discussion  can  be  expected  to  offer  a  clear  picture  to  illustrate  the
motives of takeovers in relation to the gains of the participated firms.
2.2.1 The synergy motive
The synergy hypothesis has been widely documented in the existing literature in an
attempt  to  explain  the  motive  of  mergers  and  acquisitions  (Berkovitch  and  Narayanan
(1993); Zhang (1998); Becher (2000); Lensink and Maslennikova (2008); Carline et al.
(2009)). The synergy motive suggests that takeovers occur when the combination of the
two firms results in economic gains. Managers of targets and acquirers engage in takeover
activity when the transaction results in gains to the firms. In this aspect, managers aim to
maximise shareholder wealth (Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993)). This implies that both
targets and bidders gain during the takeover activity. While both targets and bidders gain, it
can be expected that combined firms also obtain the benefits after the transaction.
2.2.2 The hubris motive
An  alternative  hypothesis  for  mergers  and  acquisitions  is  the  hubris  motive.  The
hubris hypothesis suggests that managers may overpay to targets as a result of valuation
errors  (Roll  (1986);  Berkovitch  and  Narayanan  (1993);  Zhang  (1998); Becher  (2000);
Lensink and Maslennikova (2008)). Lensink and Maslennikova (2008) argue that “The
acquirer mistakenly (because of hubris or self-confidence) believes that the value of the15
target is higher than its actual market value. As a result, the bidder overpays and realises
negative gains while shareholders of the target realise a profit.” (p. 186). When targets gain
and bidders lose, it may not clearly quantify the gains to combined firms depending on the
level of gains or losses to targets and bidders, respectively, although joint abnormal returns
may be expected to approximately approach to zero.
2.2.3 The agency motive
Several papers apply the agency hypothesis to account for the motives of takeovers
(Berkovitch  and  Narayanan  (1993);  Zhang  (1998); Lensink  and  Maslennikova (2008);
Carline et al. (2009)). Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) argue that managers pursue their
own interests to engage in takeover activity at the expense of shareholders. Carline et al.
(2009) also argue that managers may aim to their own interests by increasing firm size.
Managers may also increase perquisite consumption that may damage firm value.
If mergers and acquisitions are motivated by managers’ self-interests, the transactions
may not necessarily create value to bidders.  Although targets still obtain gains due to
higher bargaining power, the gains to combined firm may be expected to be negative as a
result of the gains to targets and losses to bidders.
2.3 Target firms
This section aims to review prior empirical studies for target firms in bank mergers.
The review of prior empirical studies can provide insights to the impact of shareholder
wealth for target firms. To fully appreciate the impact of shareholder wealth, this section
discusses the empirical evidence for target firms in terms of U.S. studies, EU studies and
international studies, respectively. The review of prior studies can uncover the differences
in the impact on shareholder wealth from M&As in different markets. This allows this
thesis to further investigate shareholder wealth in different markets.16
2.3.1 Empirical evidence from U.S. studies
Neely (1987) studies the effects on shareholder returns of merger and acquisition
announcements for publicly traded banks and bank holding companies from 1979 to 1985.
There are 26 acquisitions in the final sample.
Applying the market model
2, the model parameters are estimated from week -119 to
week -11, where week 0 is the announcement week. Neely finds significant cumulative
abnormal returns of 8.45% over a 2-week (-2,-1) pre-event window, followed by further
abnormal returns of 15.04% during the announcement week, week 0. As the cumulative
abnormal returns are 15.10% for the seven weeks prior to the announcement week, Neely
documents  that  information  leakage  may  have  played  a  role  in  the  abnormal  returns.
However,  the  author  argues  that  information  leakage  may  not  exist  for  all  of  the
acquisitions. Information for a few mergers may be leaked and cause significant positive
returns for the entire sample.
In another study with similar sample size, Baradwaj, Fraser and Furtado (1990) use
daily  data  to investigate  the  wealth  effects  of  hostile  bids  for  publicly  traded  banking
organisations during the period of 1980-1987. The final sample contains 23 acquiring and
24 target banks. In addition, the authors also analyse a control sample of friendly bank
mergers  in  order  to  compare  wealth  effects  with  the  hostile  bids.  The  control  sample
includes 30 bidders and 30 targets.
Applying the market model with parameters estimated from day -210 to day -61,
Baradwaj et al. find that target firms in hostile bids earn 17.29% cumulative abnormal
returns over a 2-day (-1,0) event window relative to 10.92% for friendly bank mergers,
both  significant  at  the  0.01  level.  The  difference  between  hostile  and  friendly  bids  is
significant at the 0.05 level.
Extending the investigation period to the early 1990s, Houston and Ryngaert (1994)
study the stock market reaction of bank mergers from 1985 to 1991. Their final sample
2 The market model will be further discussed in chapter 5 in the section on the methodology.17
contains  153  merger  announcements,  of  which  131  are  completed  deals  and  22  are
cancelled deals. Their sample is significantly larger than those in the studies of Neely
(1987) and Baradwaj et al. (1990). This may reflect the fact that there was a boom in bank
merger activities between the middle of the 1980s and the early 1990s.
The market model is utilised with parameters estimated from day -230 to day -31,
where  day  0  is  the  leakage  date.
3  The  authors  find  that  target  firms  earn  positive
cumulative abnormal returns of 14.39% over a 5-day (-4,0) event window, significant at
the 0.01 level.
Further  analysis  shows  that  target  firms  in  the  completed  deals  obtain  14.77%
cumulative abnormal returns over the event window compared to 9.79% for cancelled
deals, both significant at the 0.01 level. The difference between completed and cancelled
deals is significant at the 0.10 level. Houston and Ryngaert (1994) suggest that “target
managements and/or shareholders may choose to back out of deals where merger premia
are too small.” (p. 1162).
In the cross-sectional regression analysis, Houston and Ryngaert aim to explain the
cross-sectional  variation  in  cumulative  abnormal  returns  by  looking  at  several  factors,
including  the  operating  performance  of  the  bidder  and  target,  the  extent  to  which  the
operations of the target and bidder overlap, the financing of the deal, and the size of the
deal. The authors find that there is a positive relation between target cumulative abnormal
returns and the measure of overlap.
4  The authors argue that “the results suggest that the
target bank generally receives a larger portion of the benefits resulting from the potential
for future cost-cutting as a result of the merger.” (p. 1171).
Controlling for the method of payment and the relative size of the target to bidder,
Houston and Ryngaert find that stock payment has a negative but insignificant impact on
3 Houston and Ryngaert (1994) argue that “The leakage date for the target is the first announcement that the
target was a takeover candidate.” (p. 1160).
4 Houston and Ryngaert (1994) state that the measure of overlap indicates how many offices are closed after
a merger.18
the level of target cumulative abnormal returns. The relative size of the target to bidder is
negatively and significantly related to target cumulative abnormal returns.
Zhang (1995) examines U.S. bank takeovers from 1980 to 1990 by  applying the
size-adjusted  return  model  to  a  sample  of  107  pairs  of  target  and  bidding  banks.  To
measure the wealth gains from a takeover, the mean-adjusted return model multiplied by
the market value of the firm in terms of the size-adjusted abnormal returns is applied. The
author argues that the mean-adjusted return model is not affected by inconsistent model
parameters due to the problem of infrequent trading.
5
The author reports that target firms gain an insignificant 0.78% abnormal returns on
the announcement date, although the results show that the cumulative abnormal returns for
target firms are 5.60% over a 2-day (-1,0) event window, significant at the 0.01 level.
However,  the  abnormal  returns  on  the  announcement  date  are  rather  low  compared to
significant  5.60%  cumulative  abnormal  returns  over  a  2-day  (-1,0)  event  window,
suggesting a problem in classifying the event date. If a wrong announcement date is used,
the abnormal returns cannot truly reflect the impact of bank mergers  during the event
period.
Siems (1996) examines the impact on shareholder wealth from 19 bank megamerger
deals in 1995. Megamerger deals are defined as transactions where the value exceeds 500
million U.S. dollars. Applying the market model with parameters estimated from day -150
to day -15
6, Siems reports that target banks gain cumulative abnormal returns of 13.04%
over a 3-day (-1,+1) event window, significant at the 0.01 level.
However, Siems’s (1996) study only looks at relatively large deals of 500 million U.S.
dollars or above in 1995, resulting in a small sample size. Instead, Houston and Ryngaert
(1994) focus on deals above 100 million U.S. dollars, using a large sample size. The results
5 Zhang (1995) notes that the size-adjusted return model is adopted to avoid the infrequent trading problem.
However, the use of the mean adjusted return model may be inappropriate in that this model does not take
into account the risk factor as will be discussed in chapter 5.
6 However, the estimation period is so close to the event date. It can be argued that the model parameters
may be influenced by any bid speculation.19
from  the  studies  of  Siems  (1996)  and Houston  and  Ryngaert  (1994)  do  not  show  a
significant difference. It can, therefore, be argued that the deal value and sample size can
influence shareholder wealth of bank mergers.
Grullon, Michaely and Swary (1997) analyse what determines the payment method
and the announcement date change in equity value for target and bidding banks in bank
mergers between 1981 and 1990. The final sample contains 146 bank mergers. Using the
market model with parameters estimated from day -62 to day –2, Grullon et al. find that
target firms earn positive abnormal returns of 2.68% on the announcement date, significant
at the 0.01 level.
However, it can be argued that such a short parameter estimation period could affect
the analysis of abnormal returns in that inaccurate parameters could enlarge or narrow
down the abnormal returns. In addition, their estimation period is so close to the event date
that the model parameters may be influenced by any bid speculation. However, a strength
of their study is that the authors use alternative approaches as a robust check.
7
When analysing subgroups based on the method of payment, the authors find that
target firms obtain positive cumulative abnormal returns of 9.74%, 10.95% and 9.82%,
respectively,  over  a  3-day  (-1,+1)  event  window  for  stock  offers,  cash  offers  and
combination  of  stock  and  cash  offers.  The  differences  are  statistically  insignificant.
However,  as  can  be  seen,  there  is  a  large  difference  of  target  announcement  returns
between the announcement date and a 3-day (-1,+1) event window. This may, therefore,
suggest  that Grullon et  al.  may  have  a  problem  to  classify  the  announcement  date  to
measure the announcement returns.
In  the  cross-sectional  regression  analysis,  Grullon et  al.  aim  to  explain  target
announcement  returns  by  controlling  for  factors,  such  as  the  method  of  payment,  the
capital ratio of the firm measured as the equity to assets value and the relative size of the
7 Grullon et al. (1997) report that the results are practically identical when using the mean-adjusted returns
model  and  the  market-adjusted  returns  model.  This  can  assist  to  conclude  that  their  results  are  robust.
Similarly, this thesis also applies these two models as a robustness check, where the model specifications are
discussed in chapter 5.20
target to bidder measured as target assets to bidder assets. The results show that stock
payment is negatively, but insignificantly, correlated to target cumulative abnormal returns.
The authors report that the effect of the capital ratio and the relative size are negative and
significant, indicating that the stock price reaction is more favourable when the capital
ratio of the target is lower and the size is relatively small. These results indicate that target
wealth gains are sensitive to the capital ratio and the relative size of the target and bidder.
In  a  study  with  a  relatively  large  sample size,  Becher  (2000)  investigates  the
valuation effects for bank mergers from 1980 to 1997. The final sample consists of 583
bank mergers. Abnormal returns are calculated by subtracting a market index from the
firm’s raw returns, and Becher finds that target firms gain 22.64% and 17.10% cumulative
abnormal returns over a 36-day (-30,+5) and 11-day (-5,+5) event window, respectively,
both significant at the 0.01 level.
8
When analysing the method of payment, the results show that target firms obtain
20.84% and 15.88% cumulative abnormal returns over a 36-day (-30,+5) and 11-day (-5,+5)
event window for stock offers, respectively. For cash with mixed offers, target cumulative
abnormal returns are 25.38% and 19.07%. The difference between stock payment and cash
with mixed payment is statistically significant. Becher’s findings are consistent with the
study of Grullon et al. (1997) that targets paid in stock receive lower announcement returns
than those in other payment methods.
While  Grullon et  al.’s  results  regarding  the  payment  effects  were  insignificant,
Becher (2000) reports a significant difference in the level of abnormal returns depending
on the method of payment. This may imply that the results can be influenced by sample
size.
In  a  recent  paper,  DeLong  and  DeYoung  (2007)  examine  216  domestic  U.S.
8 As can be seen, the level of the announcement returns depends on the event window interval selected. A
longer event window can be better to fully capture the shareholder wealth of bank mergers during the event
period. Thus, this thesis applies various event windows, e.g. 61-day (-30,+30) event window, to capture the
drift of the announcement returns in bank mergers as will be presented in the empirical section (chapter 6,7
and 8).21
acquisitions over the 1987 to 1999 period, where both the target and the bidder are either
commercial banks or bank holding companies. Applying the market model with the model
parameters estimated from day -300 to day -50, their findings show that target banks gain
positive cumulative abnormal returns of 13.92% and 14.96% over a 11-day (-5,+5) and
21-day (-10,+10) event window, respectively, both significant at the 0.01 level.
2.3.1.1 Geography vs. activity diversification
In addition to the empirical studies of U.S. bank mergers as discussed above, several
studies  specifically  analyse  bank  mergers  with  respect  to  geography  and  activity
diversifications. Becher  and  Campbell (2005)  argue  that  legislation  that  significantly
reduced barriers to interstate banking allows banks to make decisions free of geographic
restrictions. However, Adkisson and Fraser (1990) argue that targets have a protected niche
to earn excess profits if geographic expansion restrictions form a barrier. “These excess
profits become part of the premium in merger negotiations.” (p. 145).
In addition to geographical diversification, Cornett et al. (2003) argue that activity
diversification allows banks to engage in different types of risk. Thus, studying the value
effects of geographical and activity diversification mergers “allows us to make inferences
on the desirability of various organisational structures in the banking industry.” (DeLong
(2001), p. 223).
Trifts and Scanlon (1987) investigate the wealth effects of interstate bank mergers in
the U.S. market. The final sample includes 21 mergers prior to December 1985.
9 The
market model is applied with parameters estimated over the 20 weeks ending on week -41
before the announcement date.
10
Trifts and Scanlon find that acquired banks earn 21.37% cumulative abnormal returns
over a 61-week (-40,+20) event window, significant at the 0.05 level. With significant
9 However, Trifts and Scanlon (1987) do not specify the starting date for the sample period and their sample
is small. A small sample can influence the power of the statistical analysis.
10 Trifts  and  Scanlon  (1987)  acknowledge  that  the  model  parameters  do  not  change  significantly  when
estimating from the post-estimation period. However, the use of the post-estimation period cannot be applied
in this thesis in that targets may be delisted soon after the transactions. If targets are delisted soon after the
transactions, it is not possible to obtain target share price to measure target shareholder wealth.22
cumulative abnormal returns of 16.15% over a 40-week (-40,-1) pre-event window, Trifts
and  Scanlon  conclude  that  “This  is  evidence  of  significant  leakage  during  the
pre-announcement period.” (p. 307).
Cornett  and  De  (1991a)  use  daily  data  to  examine  stock  market  reactions  to  the
announcements of interstate bank mergers over the period of 1982-1986. The final sample
consists of 152 interstate bank acquisition bids made by 59 bidding banks. Applying the
market model, the model parameters are estimated from day +16 to day +75.
11 The authors
find that target banks gain cumulative abnormal returns of 8.10% for a 2-day (-1,0) event
window, significant at the 0.01 level.
In another paper, Cornett and De (1991b) study the role of the medium of payment in
interstate bank mergers between 1982 and 1986. The final sample contains 132 interstate
bank acquisitions. Using the market model with parameters estimated from day -75 to day
-16, their findings show that target banks gain significant abnormal returns of 7.69% on the
announcement date, significant at the 0.01 level. Further analysis shows that target banks
obtain  significant  positive  abnormal  returns  of  8.14%,  9.04%  and  5.66% on  the
announcement date for stock, cash and mixed payment, respectively, all significant at the
0.01 level. The differences in abnormal returns depending on the method of payment are
not statistically significant.
While examining the method of payment, Cornett and De (1991b) and Grullon et al.
(1997)  report  that targets  with cash  payment  obtain  higher  announcement  returns  than
those  with other  payment  methods.  Although  the  results  show higher  target  abnormal
returns for cash payment, Cornett and De argue that any conclusions in their study should
be drawn with care due to the small number of observations.
Toyne  and  Tripp  (1998)  examine  interstate  merger  activity  in  the  U.S.  banking
industry during the period 1991-1995. The final sample consists of 68 matched targets and
11 However, their estimation period is rather short and so close to the event date. If the estimation period is
so close to the event date, the model parameters may be influenced by any bid speculation.23
bidders. Using the market model, the model parameters are estimated from day +16 to day
+75. Toyne and Tripp find that target firms gain 10.97% cumulative abnormal returns over
a 3-day (-1,+1) event window, significant at the 0.01 level. However, similar to Cornett and
De (1991a,b), of some concern is the short estimation period, as this may have an impact
on the accuracy of the estimation of the model parameters.
Becher  and Campbell  (2005)  examine  the  valuation  effect  of  full  interstate
deregulation on merger announcements during the period 1990-1999. The final sample
contains 443 bank mergers. Applying the market model with parameters estimated from
day -120 to day -31, Becher and Campbell report that cumulative abnormal returns for
targets amount to 16.70% over a 7-day (-5,+1) event window, significant at the 0.01 level.
So far, some papers with regard to interstate bank mergers have been discussed above.
However, in a paper, Cornett and Tehranian (1992) examine both interstate and intrastate
acquisitions over the period of 1982 to 1987. Bids are included where the transaction value
exceeds 100 million U.S. dollars. Their final sample is constituted of 15 interstate and 15
intrastate bank acquisitions.
The market model is applied with parameters estimated from day -136 to day -16.
Cornett  and  Tehranian  find  that  the  level  of  cumulative  abnormal  returns  for  the  full
sample of targets is 8.00% over a 2-day (-1,0) event window, significant at the 0.01 level.
In addition, the results indicate that there are 4.70% cumulative abnormal returns over a
2-day  (-1,0)  event  window  for  interstate  mergers  compared  to  11.00%  for  intrastate
mergers, both significant at the 0.01 level.
Although there is a substantial difference of cumulative abnormal returns between
interstate and intrastate bank mergers, the authors do not test the significance level for the
difference of cumulative abnormal returns. Furthermore, their study covers both interstate
and intrastate acquisitions, but their sample size is small. Thus, it is necessary to exercise
caution when comparing their results to those of other empirical studies. On the other hand,
as Cornett and Tehranian (1992) report a large difference of target announcement returns24
between  interstate  and  intrastate  acquisitions,  their  results  suggest  that  geographic
differences can cause different levels of target cumulative announcement returns. Thus,
when the deals take place in the form of cross-border transactions, it can be expected that
bank mergers generate different levels of target announcement returns.
Several studies extend their analysis to different markets in terms of cross-border
deals.  The  review  of  these  studies  also  offers  additional  insights  to  target  shareholder
wealth. Hudgins and Seifert (1996) investigate whether there are gains to shareholders of
U.S. financial firms involved in domestic or cross-border acquisitions over the period from
1968 to 1989. The final sample of financial firms comprises 72 American targets and 88
American acquirers. In addition, the final sample of banks contains 50 American targets
and 66 American bidders.
Applying the market model with the Scholes and Williams (1977) approach to take
into account the problem of nonsynchronous trading, parameters are estimated from day
-90 to day -16.
12 In cross-border deals, targets earn 7.30% cumulative abnormal returns
over a 3-day (-1,+1) event window when foreign firms acquire U.S. financial firms. The
results are significant at the 0.01 level. In addition, when foreign firms acquire U.S. banks,
targets obtain 8.95%  cumulative abnormal  returns over a 3-day  (-1,+1) event  window,
significant at the 0.01 level.
With regard to domestic deals for U.S. targets, the results show that targets earn
6.44% cumulative abnormal returns over a 3-day (-1,+1) event window when U.S. firms
acquire U.S. financial firms. The results are significant at the 0.01 level. However, the
authors document that “a matched comparison between the announcement gains for the
U.S.  targets  acquired  by  foreigners  and  those  acquired  by  domestic  firms  reveals  no
significant differences.” (p. 175).
12  Hudgins and Seifert’s (1996) estimation period is so close to the event date. The model parameters may be
influenced by any bid speculation. In addition, their estimation period is short that can be sensitive to reflect
any unexpected shock in a short period as a result of incorrect model parameters.25
Kiymaz (2004) examines the impact of mergers and acquisitions on U.S. targets and
bidders  involved  in  cross-border  mergers  of  financial  institutions  over  the  period  of
1989-1999. The final sample includes 207 foreign acquisitions by U.S. bidders and 70
cross-border acquisitions of U.S. targets.
Using the market model with parameters estimated from day -316 to day -61, Kiymaz
finds  that  U.S.  target  firms in  these  cross-border  acquisitions gain  3.41%  cumulative
abnormal returns for a 3-day (-1,+1) event window, significant at the 0.01 level.
In the cross-sectional regression analysis, Kiymaz reports that targets earn higher
announcement  returns  if  the  relative  size  of  the  bidder  to target  is  large.  However,
controlling  for  the  method  of  payment,  cash  payment  is positive  but not  statistically
significant.
In  addition  to  the  empirical  studies  with  respect  to geographical  acquisitions
discussed above, DeLong (2001) investigates the wealth effect of bank mergers during the
period 1988-1995, analysing activity focus and diversifying mergers. Bids are included if a
firm acquires more than 50% or adds to a lower percentage in order to reach more than
50% of the voting shares of another firm. The final sample includes 280 mergers.
Applying the market model with parameters estimated from day -300 to day -51,
DeLong reports that target firms obtain cumulative abnormal returns of 16.61% over a
12-day  (-10,+1) event window, significant at the 0.01 level. DeLong further finds that
target firms in activity focus mergers gain 17.61% cumulative abnormal returns compared
to 15.94% in activity diversification transactions, both significant at the 0.01 level. The
difference  between  activity  focus  and  activity  diversification  mergers is  statistically
insignificant.
As discussed above, prior empirical studies report that targets in U.S. bank mergers
receive positive announcement returns. The level of target announcement returns depends26
on  the  investigation  period,  the  model  and  the  choice  of  event  window.  Positive
announcement  returns  suggest  that  targets  obtain  benefits  during  bank  mergers  and
acquisitions.
Although targets obtain positive announcement returns in geographic and activity
acquisitions, targets earn lower announcement returns in interstate acquisitions than those
in intrastate acquisitions in domestic U.S. market. In addition, Kiymaz (2004) also reports
lower announcement returns to targets in cross-border deals. This may suggest that the
transactions  involved  in  geographical  diversification  appear  to  generate  lower  gains  to
targets,  although Hudgins  and  Seifert  (1996) find  no  significant  difference  between
domestic and cross-border deals.
Besides, DeLong (2001) finds that targets obtain higher announcement  returns in
activity focusing acquisitions than those in activity diversifying acquisitions, suggesting
that the market may not precisely value the risk diversification effects through activity
diversification  acquisitions.  While  the  existing  literatures  in  U.S.  studies  are  discussed
above, it is unclear whether the results in U.S bank mergers can be applicable to those in
EU bank mergers. As a result, the empirical evidence for target firms in EU bank mergers
is reviewed in the next section.
2.3.2 Empirical evidence from EU studies
Beitel, Schiereck and Wahrenburg (2004) examine 98 large M&As in the European
financial sector between 1985 and 2000 to determine the factors that drive shareholder
wealth for merger entities. Bids are included if the transaction value is larger than 100
million U.S. dollars.
13
In addition, bids are only included if the bidder controls over 50% of target shares
after the transaction. Using the market model, parameters are estimated from day -272 to
13 Beitel et al. (2004) state that Europe is defined as EU-15, including Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the UK
plus Norway and Switzerland.27
day -21.
14 The results show that targets obtain 12.39% cumulative abnormal returns over a
3-day  (-1,+1)  event  window,  significant  at  the  0.01  level.  Beitel et  al.  confirm  that
European banks involved in M&A transactions clearly benefit target shareholder, which is
consistent with the majority of the primarily U.S.-focused research.
In the cross-sectional regression analysis, the authors find that target cumulative
abnormal returns are lower if the relative size of the target to bidder is large. In addition,
the results show that the target stock performance, measured as the difference of target
stock performance and the industry index performance, is negatively correlated with target
cumulative abnormal returns. Thus, the authors argue that “the shareholders of a target
benefit from the transfer of corporate control from the former management of a target to
the management of a bidder if the target was poorly managed prior to a transaction.” (p.
132).
In another study with similar investigation period from 1987 to 2000, Ismail and
Davidson (2007) study the determinants of target returns in European bank mergers. Their
final sample contains 76 matched targets and bidders. Applying the market model with
parameters estimated from day -210 to day -21, Ismail and Davidson report that target
cumulative abnormal returns are 3.31% over a 21-day (-20,0) event window, significant at
the 0.01 level.
In the cross-sectional regression analysis, the authors find that the method of payment
in terms of cash offers and mixed offers has a positive and significant association with
target  cumulative  abnormal  returns  in  comparison  to  stock  financed  acquisitions.  In
addition,  the  evidence  shows  that  target’s  profitability,  measured  as  return  on  average
assets prior to the transaction, is also positively and highly significantly related to target
cumulative abnormal returns. When controlling for the capitalisation, measured as the total
14  Beitel et al. (2004) argue that as their study concentrates on large scale bank transactions, the stocks are
liquid  and  display  very  active  trading  activity.  Thus,  the  adjustment  of  the  model  parameters  for
non-synchronous trading is not taken into account in their study. However, their argument cannot be applied
in this thesis in that the sample does not require the deals to be larger than 100 million U.S. dollars in the
current study. Thus, this thesis takes into account the problem of thin trading when analysing the shareholder
wealth of bank mergers.28
capital ratio of the target bank, the results are negative and significant. Accordingly, Ismail
and Davidson argue that “acquirers see high capitalisation as implying that targets with
high Total Capital Ratios are not using their capital efficiently.” (p. 629).
Their  findings  also  indicate  that  there  is  a  positive  but  insignificant  relationship
between the relative size of the bidder to target and target cumulative abnormal returns.
Additionally, target cumulative abnormal returns are positively and significantly related to
the  relative  asset  growth  of  target  to  acquirer.  Ismail  and  Davidson  claim  that  “this
suggests that a target’s growth history is a determinant factor for earning higher excess
returns.” (p. 630).
2.3.2.1 Geography vs. activity diversification
Several papers further examine target shareholder wealth with respect to geographic
and activity diversification acquisitions in EU bank mergers. Ismail and Davidson (2005)
argue that diversification outside the national borders provides an opportunity to access
into  new  markets.  In  addition,  activity  diversification  acquisitions  may  also  offer  an
opportunity to diversify the risk. Thus, the review of these studies provides additional
insights to target shareholder wealth and also makes a comparison to those in the U.S.
studies.
Rad  and  Beek  (1999)  analyse  the  wealth  effect  of  cross-border  mergers  in  the
European banking sector between 1989 and 1996. Bids are included only if European
banks are involved in cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Their final sample contains
17  target  banks  and  56  bidding  banks. The  market  model  is  utilised  with  parameters
estimated  from  day -240  to  day -41. The  authors  report  that  target  banks  gain  4.65%
cumulative abnormal returns over a 3-day (-1,+1) event window, significant at the 0.05
level.
Campa  and  Hernando  (2006)  investigate  the  success  in  mergers  and  acquisitions
activity in the European financial industry from 1998 to 2002. Bids are excluded if the29
bidder owns more than 50% of the target share before the merger announcement. Their
final sample consists of 172 transactions from 15 EU markets.
15  Using the CAPM model
to calculate the expected returns during the 6 months prior to the event window, the results
show that target firms gain 3.24% cumulative abnormal returns over a 3-day (-1,+1) event
window, significant at the 0.05 level.
Further  analysis  shows  that  target  firms  in  cross-border  deals  gain  cumulative
abnormal returns of 3.82% over  a 3-day  (-1,+1) event window  compared to 2.99% in
domestic  deals,  both  significant  at  the  0.05  level.  However,  the  difference  between
cross-border and domestic deals is not significant.
In the cross-sectional regression analysis, the authors include some variables to gain
insights into target cumulative abnormal returns, including a domestic dummy, a bank to
bank dummy and the relative size. The results show that the relative size, measured as
target  market  value  to  the  sum  of  target  and  bidder  market  value, is  positively  and
significantly related to target cumulative abnormal returns.
Furthermore, several papers extend the analysis to examine the effects of activity
diversifications. Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) examine the stock market valuation of
mergers and acquisitions in the European banking industry between 1988 and 1997. Bids
are included if the transaction is larger than 100 million U.S. dollars. The final sample
includes targets and bidders in 54 deals.
The  market  model  is  applied  with  parameters  adjusted  for  the  problem  of
nonsynchronous  trading  by  using  the  Scholes-Williams  (1977)  approach and  estimated
from day -270 to day -21.
16  The results show that the level of cumulative abnormal returns
15 Their sample covers 15 EU markets, including Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and UK.
16 However, Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) argue that “the large size of the average and median deal
contained  in  our  sample  should  signal  that  the  stocks  we  analysed  are  generally  liquid  ones.”  (p.  840).
Consistently,  both  Cybo-Ottone  and  Murgia  (2000)  and  Beitel et  al.  (2004)  argue  that  the  problem  of
nonsynchronous trading may not be a problem when focusing on large transactions as a result of frequently
trading stock.30
for target firms is 12.93% over a 3-day (-1,+1) event window, significant at the 0.01 level.
In addition, focusing on an 11-day (-10,0) event window, the authors find that target banks
in cross-border deals obtain higher cumulative abnormal returns than those in domestic
deals, at 22.22% and 14.28%, respectively, both significant at the 0.01 level.
Cybo-Ottone  and  Murgia  also  report  that  cross-products  (bank  to  other  financial
institution) deals for target firms generate higher cumulative abnormal returns at 18.11%
than one-line business (bank to bank) deals at 15.26%, respectively, both significant at the
0.01 level. However, the difference between each subgroup is not significant.
Ismail and Davidson (2005) examine shareholder wealth effects for both domestic
and  cross-border  deals in  European  banking  from  1987  to  1999.  Their  final  sample
contains  89  targets  and  89  bidders  from  102  deals. Applying  the  market  model  with
parameters estimated from day -210 to day -21,
17  Ismail and Davidson find that target
firms  gain  positive  cumulative  abnormal  returns  of  2.35%  over  a  3-day  (-1,+1)  event
window, significant at the 0.01 level.
However, the authors also report additional analysis for different types of deals based
on an 11-day (-10,0) event window. The evidence shows that targets in cross-border deals
obtain higher cumulative abnormal returns than those in domestic deals, at 5.16% and
1.72%, respectively, significant at the 0.05 and 0.01 level.
Furthermore, the authors report that the deals with bank to bank transactions generate
higher cumulative abnormal returns than cross-products deals, at respectively 2.43% and
1.79%, only significant for bank to bank deals. The difference between bank to bank and
cross-products  deals  is  not  significant. The  results further show  that  target  firms  gain
cumulative abnormal returns of 3.43%, 3.83% and 0.24% for cash, mixed and stock offers,
respectively, only significant for cash and mixed payment deals. The difference among the
method of payment is only significant between mixed and stock payment.
17 Ismail and Davidson (2005) report that the results are very similar when applying different indices to
compute the returns. In addition, the results are little changed when employing the Scholes-Williams (1977)
method to adjust the beta estimate in order to take into account the problem of non-synchronous trading.31
As discussed above, the empirical evidence for EU bank mergers is consistent with
that of U.S. studies, reporting positive announcement returns to targets. However, the level
of target announcement returns is in general lower in EU bank mergers than in U.S. studies,
suggesting that EU banking takeover market is less competitive.
Further analysis in EU bank mergers shows that targets in cross-border deals obtain
higher announcement returns than those in domestic deals, suggesting that targets obtain
higher  gains  when  the  transactions  take  place  over  different  markets.  These  findings
contradict to those of U.S. studies, reporting that targets earn higher announcement returns
in domestic deals than those in cross-border transactions.
When analysing activity diversifying acquisitions, Ismail and Davidson (2005) find
that  target  announcement  returns  in  bank  to  bank  deals  are  higher  than  those  in
cross-product deals, which are consistent with DeLong’s (2001) findings in the U.S. study.
In contrast, Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) report that targets in cross-products deals earn
higher announcement returns than those in bank to bank deals.
While prior empirical evidence in U.S. and EU studies is discussed above, it can be
argued that these results may not be applicable to other markets in that the U.S. and EU
markets  are  relatively  highly  developed.  In  addition,  none  of  the  prior  studies  above
analyses  both  U.S.  and  EU  bank  mergers. The  lack  of  direct  comparative  evidence
indicates  that  it  might  be  useful  to  review prior  empirical  evidence from  international
studies. As a result, the next section reviews several papers with respect to international
studies.
2.3.3 Empirical evidence from international studies
18
Biswas, Fraser and Mahajan (1997) study the impact of international acquisitions on
the shareholder wealth during the period of 1977-1987. Bids are classified as international
18 The international markets mean that the sample of bank mergers and acquisitions are collected from a
number of different markets, including U.S., EU and/or markets from the rest of the world.32
bank  acquisitions  from  different  countries.
19  Their  final  sample  is  composed  of  125
bidders and 81 targets from 171 merger and acquisition announcements.
Applying the market model with parameters estimated from day -90 to day -20
20, the
results  show  that  the  magnitude  of  cumulative  abnormal  returns  for  target firms  in
international acquisitions is 6.23% over a 2-day (-1,0) event window, significant at the 0.05
level. Further analysis shows that cumulative abnormal returns of U.S. and non-U.S. target
firms in international acquisitions are 7.75% and 3.51% over a 2-day (-1,0) event window,
respectively, both significant at the 0.05 level. The difference between U.S. and non-U.S.
target firms in international acquisitions is not significant.
On the other hand, the authors find that target firms in U.S. domestic deals realise
cumulative abnormal returns of 10.70% over a 2-day (-1,0) event window, significant at
the  0.05  level.  Biswas et  al.  claim  that  the  international  market  is  more  competitive,
resulting in lower cumulative abnormal returns. However, the authors do not report the
significance level for the difference between domestic and international acquisitions.
In the cross-sectional regression analysis, the authors only find that payment in cash
is positively and significantly related to target cumulative abnormal returns. This finding
demonstrates  that  the  method  of  payment  is  an  important  factor  to  explain  target
shareholder wealth in bank mergers.
DeLong  (2003)  investigates  the  market  reaction  of  non-U.S.  domestic  mergers
compared with U.S. domestic mergers from 1988 to 1999. The final sample comprises 438
mergers, of which 397 are domestic U.S. transactions and 41 are non-U.S. domestic bank
mergers.
The market model is applied with parameters estimated over a period extending to
approximately one year prior to the merger announcement. The evidence shows that target
19  Biswas et al.’s (1997) sample covers 14 countries, including Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Hong
Kong, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Singapore, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States.
20 However, such a short estimation period may result in biased model parameters. If there is any unexpected
shock during  this  short  estimation  period,  the  model  parameters  cannot  entirely  reflect  the  movement
between the stock price and the  market index.  When applying biased  model parameters to estimate the
abnormal returns, the results cannot fully reflect the impact of bank mergers.33
firms  earn  14.76%  cumulative  abnormal  returns  for  the  entire  sample  over  a  12-day
(-10,+1) event window, significant at the 0.01 level. Further analysis shows that U.S. and
non-U.S. target firms earn 15.39% and 8.60% cumulative abnormal returns, respectively,
both significant at the 0.01 level. The difference between domestic non-U.S. and U.S.
mergers is significant at the 0.01 level.
In  the  cross-sectional  regression  analysis,  DeLong  aims  to  explain  the  market
reaction of a bank merger by controlling for various factors, including the relative size of
the bidder to target and the method of payment. The results show that the relationship
between target cumulative abnormal returns and the relative size of the bidder to target is
negative and significant. However, the effect of payment in cash is positively, but not
significantly, related to target cumulative abnormal returns.
Fields, Fraser and Kolari (2007) examine wealth changes in bancassurance mergers
from  1997  to  2002.  Their  study  investigates  mergers  between  commercial  banks  and
insurance companies in the United States and internationally (primarily Europe). Bids are
included if the bidding firm does not control over 50% of target shares prior to the merger
announcement and holds more than 50% of target shares after the transaction. Their final
sample contains 129 transactions.
Applying the mean adjusted returns approach
21, the estimation period is from day
-200 to day -52. The results show that target firms gain 2.98% over a 2-day (-1,0) event
window, significant at the 0.01 level. When analysing the pre-announcement (-51,-2) event
window, the level of cumulative abnormal returns is 7.25%, significant at the 0.10 level.
Fields et al. state that the results may suggest the existence of information leakage, which
is consistent with the evidence from studies in the U.S. (Neely (1987); Trifts and Scanlon
(1987); Zhang (1995)) and EU (Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000)).
21  Fields et al. (2007) argue that the mean adjusted returns approach “avoids potential bias introduced from
exchange rate movements when the sample includes a number of cross-border events (and does not require
the selection of the “appropriate” market index.” (p. 3654). However, it is not clear how exchange rate
movement can affect the measure of abnormal returns. In addition, the mean adjusted returns model does not
take into account the risk factor to estimate the abnormal returns that this model may be unrealistic. The
mean adjusted returns model will be further discussed in chapter 5.34
2.3.3.1 U.S. vs. EU
In  addition  to  international  studies  discussed  above, two  papers examine  target
shareholder wealth to compare with the sample of U.S. and EU bank mergers. Scholtens
and de Wit (2004) explore the announcement effect of large bank mergers in the European
and U.S. stock market over the period 1990-2000. The final sample consists of 81 bidding
banks and 78 target banks, in which 61 targets and bidders are in the U.S. and 17 targets
and 20 bidders are in Europe.
Comparing the stock returns to the benchmark of the market index, the authors report
that European (U.S.) target banks gain 9.28% (12.65%) cumulative abnormal returns over
a  35-day  (-3,+31)  event  window,  significant  at  the  0.05  (0.01)  level. However,  the
difference between European and U.S. target banks is not significant, possibly due to the
relatively small sample of EU bank mergers.
Valkanov  and  Kleimeier  (2007)  examine  the  role  of  regulatory  capital  in  bank
mergers and acquisitions during the period 1997-2003. Bids are included if the bidder
controls over 50% of target shares after the transaction. The final sample contains 105
matched targets and bidders in 100 domestic M&As and 5 cross-border M&As.
22
Applying the market model with parameters estimated from day -240 to day -41,
Valkanov and Kleimeier find that target banks earn 19.06% cumulative abnormal returns
for a 3-day (-1,+1) event window, significant at the 0.01 level. Valkanov and Kleimeier
further report that U.S. target banks obtain 20.15% cumulative abnormal returns over a
3-day (-1,+1) event window relative to 14.74% cumulative abnormal returns for European
target banks, both significant at the 0.01 level. Thus, Valkanov and Kleimeier conclude that
bank mergers and acquisitions in both U.S. and European markets create significant wealth
for  targets.  However,  Valkanov  and  Kleimeier  do  not  report  whether  the  difference
between U.S. and EU target banks is significant or not.
22 Valkanov  and  Kleimeier  (2007)  state  that  the  majority  of  the  final  sample  is  domestic  mergers  and
acquisitions although their sample covers 10 countries, including U.S., Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany,
Greece, Italy, Norway, Sweden and the UK.35
In the cross-sectional regression analysis, the authors find that higher target abnormal
returns are associated with higher excess capital, measured as the capital over and above
the regulatory requirements. The authors argue that “This can reflect the probability of the
merger being approved by regulators.” (p. 64). In addition, the results also indicate that
target abnormal returns are negatively, but insignificantly, related to the size of the target.
The relative size of the target to bidder is negatively and significantly associated with
target abnormal returns.
Several papers related to international studies are discussed above, and the results are
consistent with those in U.S. and EU studies, reporting positive announcement returns to
targets.  The  results  in international  studies  also  show  that  U.S.  targets  earn  higher
announcement  returns  than  EU  targets.  These  findings  lend  support  to  the  previous
discussion of U.S. and EU studies.
However, prior international studies mainly cover the sample in the U.S. and EU
market. Additionally, these studies do not incorporate a large sample of bank mergers to
investigate  target  shareholder  wealth  and  the  prior  empirical  evidence  in  international
studies is limited.
Furthermore, prior empirical evidence shows a degree of variation in the abnormal
returns  to  targets.  It  does  not  provide  a  clear  conclusion  regarding  the  level  of  target
announcement returns in bank mergers. This suggests a need to further investigate target
shareholder wealth of bank mergers.
2.4 Bidding firms
This section aims to review prior studies with respect to bidder shareholder wealth in
bank mergers. The review of prior empirical studies for bidding firms can also assist to
reveal whether target shareholder wealth is transferred from bidder shareholder wealth.
Similar to the discussion of target firms, the empirical evidence for bidders is reviewed36
with regard to U.S. studies, EU studies and international studies, respectively. This also
sheds lights on the difference of bidder shareholder wealth in bank mergers from different
markets.
2.4.1 Empirical evidence from U.S. studies
As discussed in section 2.3.1 on targets, Neely (1987) studied domestic U.S. bank
mergers by using weekly data during the 1979-1985 period. Based on a sample of 26
bidding banks, the author finds that acquiring firms experience abnormal returns of -1.23%
during the announcement week 0, significant at the 0.05 level.
In  a  study  with  similar  sample  size,  Baradwaj et  al.  (1990)  analysed  23  and  30
bidding firms from 1980 to 1987 involved in hostile and friendly bids, respectively. The
authors find bidders earn cumulative abnormal returns of -1.28% and -1.27% over a 2-day
(-1,0) event window in hostile and friendly bids, respectively, both significant at the 0.01
level.  The  difference  between  hostile  and  friendly  bids  is  not  significant.  Although
Baradwaj et al. find no difference between hostile and friendly bids, this may be due to a
small sample size. It is necessary to exercise care to interpret the results in that Baradwaj et
al.’s results may not be applicable to a large sample size.
Instead of analysing hostile and friendly bids, Louis (2004) studies how the stock
market reaction to a merger announcement is affected when a merger is used as a defensive
mechanism. The final sample comprises 227 mergers over the 1993-1999 period, where 50
mergers are classified as targeted acquirers and 177 mergers are categorised as nontargeted
acquirers.
23
Using the market model with parameters estimated from day -259 to day -60, the
author finds that the level of cumulative abnormal returns is -1.21% over a 2-day (-1,0)
event window for the acquirers in mergers involving nontargeted banks, significant at the
23 Louis (2004) argues that if banks do not want to be acquired and use a defensive mechanism, they are
classified as targeted banks. For example, targeted banks may increase their size to the point where they are
no longer viable takeover candidates. If banks do not display a defensive mechanism during the process of
the takeover, they are categorised as nontargeted banks.37
0.01  level. When  targets  deploy  defensive  mechanisms,  acquiring  firms  obtain -2.51%
cumulative abnormal returns over a 2-day (-1,0) event window, significant at the 0.01 level.
The difference between targeted acquirers and nontargeted acquirers is significant at the
0.05 level. Thus, the results indicate that the market responds more negatively to defensive
acquisitions.
In the cross-sectional regression analysis, Louis controls for several factors, including
a dummy for interstate mergers, relative capital adequacy, the method of payment and the
relative size of the target to bidder as well as several other factors. The author finds that the
relationship between cash finance and acquirer cumulative abnormal returns is positive and
significant. In addition, the results show that there is a negative and significant relationship
between the relative size of the target to bidder and acquirer cumulative abnormal returns.
The  relative  capital  adequacy  of  the  target  to  bidder  is  positively,  but  insignificantly,
correlated to acquirer cumulative abnormal returns. The interstate dummy is positive but
again insignificant. The author argues that “One possible explanation is that, as more states
were allowing interstate mergers, entry into another state became easier and entry rights
less valuable.” (p. 302).
In a study based on 153 bank acquisitions to cover the early 1990s, Houston and
Ryngaert (1994) analysed the stock market reaction to bank mergers during the period of
1985-1991. The authors find that bidding firms experience -2.32% cumulative abnormal
returns over a 5-day (-4,0) event window, significant at the 0.01 level. In addition, bidding
firms in cancelled deals obtain -2.93% cumulative abnormal returns compared to -2.25% in
completed deals, both significant at the 0.01 level. The difference between cancelled and
completed  deals  is  not  statistically  significant.    While  the  market  does  not  respond
favourably to completed deals, the market reaction is even worse for cancelled deals. This
may be due to the fact that acquiring banks fail to achieve their company strategy. However,
the difference is not significant.
In  the  cross-sectional  regression  analysis,  Houston  and  Ryngaert  find  that  bidder38
cumulative abnormal returns are positively influenced by the measure of market overlap.
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In addition, the results show that bidder cumulative abnormal returns are positively and
significantly related to payment in stock. Their results thus contradict Louis’ findings of a
positive relationship for cash payment. The results also show that the relative size of the
target to bidder has a negative and significant impact.
Based on a sample of 107 bank mergers from 1980 to 1990, Zhang (1995) used the
size-adjusted  return  approach  to  analyse  bank  mergers.  The  author  reports  negative
abnormal returns of 0.02% on the announcement date, but positive cumulative abnormal
returns of 0.53% over the 2-day (-1,0) event window, neither statistically significant.
Siems  (1996)  analysed 19 bank  megamergers  in  1995
25,  and  finds  that acquiring
banks experience -1.96% cumulative abnormal returns over a 3-day (-1,+1) event window,
significant at the 0.01 level. Siems argues that,
“…acquiring  banks  received  negative  average  abnormal  returns  because
management was either attempting to maximize its own utility, and not that of
its shareholders, or it simply paid too much for the target institutions.” (p. 6).
In a study to examine the impact of the method of payment, Grullon et al. (1997)
analysed 146 bank mergers from 1981 to 1990. The authors find that acquiring banks
experience abnormal returns of -0.40% on the announcement date, significant at the 0.01
level. However, the authors further analyse bidder announcement returns for the method of
payment based on a 3-day (-1,+1) event window, showing that bidders obtain cumulative
abnormal  returns  of -2.46%, -0.87%  and -1.93%  for  stock  offers,  cash  offers  and
combination of stock and cash offers, respectively. However, Grullon et al. do not report
any statistical test for the significance of the differences in abnormal returns between each
group with respect to the method of payment.
In the cross-sectional regression analysis, Grullon et al. find that bidder cumulative
24 Houston and Ryngaert (1994) state that the measure of overlap indicates how many offices are closed after
a merger.
25  Megamerger deals are defined as transactions where the deal value exceeds 500 million U.S. dollars.39
abnormal returns have a negative and significant relationship with stock payment. Grullon
et al. state that “at least in bank mergers, the method of payment is an important factor in
the merger decision.” (p. 120). In addition, the capital ratio of the bidder is positively, but
insignificantly,  related  to  bidder  cumulative  abnormal  returns.  The  relative  size of  the
target to bidder has a negative impact but is not significant.
Analysing a relatively large sample of 583 bank mergers with a longer investigation
period  from  1980  to  1997,  Becher  (2000)  reports  that  bidding  firms  experience
insignificant cumulative abnormal returns of -0.10% over a 36-day (-30,+5) event window
but a significant -1.08% over an 11-day (-5,+5) event window.
In addition, the results show that bidding firms obtain -1.04% and 0.65% cumulative
abnormal returns over a 36-day (-30,+5) event window for stock and cash with mixed
offers, respectively. For an 11-day (-5,+5) event window, bidding firms obtain -1.55% and
-0.32% cumulative abnormal returns for stock and cash with mixed offer, respectively. The
difference between stock offers and cash with mixed offers is statistically significant, and
is consistent with the study of Grullon et al. (1997) that payment in stock earns lower
announcement returns compared to other payment methods.
In a study with a similar longer investigation period from 1987 to 1999, DeLong and
DeYoung  (2007)  analysed  the  effects  of  bank  mergers  based  on  a  sample  of  216
transactions. The authors find that acquiring banks earn cumulative abnormal returns of
-3.15% and -3.09% over a 11-day (-5,+5) and 21-day (-10,+10) event window, respectively,
both significant at the 0.01 level.
2.4.1.1 Geography vs. activity diversification
In addition to domestic U.S. studies reviewed above, several papers also examine
bidder shareholder wealth in geography and activity diversification acquisitions. A review
of prior studies with respect to geography and activity diversification is beneficial in that
these studies shed light on bidder shareholder wealth for different types of bank mergers.40
This enables this thesis to further uncover bidder announcement returns with respect to
geographical and activity diversification acquisitions.
As discussed in section 2.3, Trifts and Scanlon (1987) analysed 21 interstate bank
mergers prior to December 1985. The authors find that abnormal returns for acquiring
banks are -1.73% during the announcement week, significant at the 0.05 level. Trifts and
Scanlon suggest that “the market for interstate bank acquisitions is sufficiently competitive
to eliminate the opportunity for excess returns for acquiring firms.” (p. 308).
In a study analysing bank mergers from 1982 to 1986, Cornett and De (1991a) used
daily data to analyse 152 interstate bank mergers made by 59 bidding banks. Applying the
market model, the model parameters are estimated from day +16 to day +75 for bidders.
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The authors report that bidding firms obtain 0.55% cumulative abnormal returns over a
2-day (-1,0) event window, statistically significant.
In the cross-sectional regression analysis, the authors find that payment in stock and
the relative size of the bidder to target are negatively, but insignificantly, related to bidder
cumulative abnormal returns. However, Cornett and De claim that their model does not
have statistical explanatory power to explain bidder cumulative abnormal returns.
In a related paper to analyse interstate bank mergers from 1982 to 1986, Cornett and
De (1991b) analysed the role of the medium of payment. Using the market model with
parameters estimated from day +16 to day +75, the authors report that bidding banks gain
0.89% abnormal returns on the announcement date, significant at the 0.01 level.
In addition, Cornett and De find that bidding banks reap abnormal returns of 0.93%,
0.88% and 0.80% on the announcement date for stock, cash and mixed offers, respectively.
Cornett and De state that “it appears that stockholders of bidding banks benefit from the
announcement of the acquisition bid regardless of the proposed method of financing.” (p.
774).  The  results  are  consistent  with  their  pervious (1991a) study  reporting  positive
26  Cornett and De (1991a) argue that the use of model parameters from the post-announcement estimation
period for bidding firms would not be biased due to a period of abnormal price increases. However, their
estimation period is so short that the model parameters may not precisely reflect the co-movement of the
share price and the market price.41
announcement  returns  to  bidding  firms. However,  positive  announcement  returns  with
respect to stock offers are clearly opposite to the findings in the studies of Grullon et al.
(1997) and Becher (2000).
In a short paper, Toyne and Tripp (1998) investigated interstate bank mergers from
1991 to 1995 based on a sample of 68 transactions. The authors find that bidder cumulative
abnormal returns are -2.24% over a 3-day (-1,+1) event window, significant at the 0.01
level. Becher and Campbell (2005) extended this to analyse interstate bank mergers with a
large sample of 443 acquisitions from 1990 to 1999. The authors report that bidding firms
generate negative cumulative abnormal returns, amounting to -1.29% over a 7-day (-5,+1)
event window, significant at the 0.01 level. The results in the study of Toyne and Tripp
(1998) and Becher and Campbell (2005) contradict those of the studies of Cornett and De
(1991a,b), but lend support to the study of Trifts and Scanlon (1987).
So far, several papers related to interstate acquisitions have been discussed above.
Extending the analysis to both interstate and intrastate bank mergers, Baradwaj, Dubofsky
and Fraser (1991) investigate the returns for bidders between 1981 and 1987. Their final
sample  contains  108  acquisitions,  of  which  37  are  interstate  acquisitions  and  71  are
intrastate acquisitions.
Applying  the  market  model,  parameters  are  adjusted  for  the  problem  of
nonsynchronous trading using the Scholes and Williams’ approach from day -60 to day -11
and from day +11 to day +60. A strength in their study is that the authors also apply a
longer  pre-event  estimation  period  from  day –120  to  day –61  and  find  insignificant
difference in the results. Baradwaj et al. report that bidding banks on average experience
cumulative abnormal returns of -1.38% over a 2-day (-1,0) event window, significant at the
0.01 level.
In addition, the results show that acquiring firms earn -1.11% and -1.91% cumulative
abnormal returns over a 2-day (-1,0) event window for intrastate and interstate acquisitions,42
respectively, both significant at the 0.01 level. However, the difference between intrastate
and interstate acquisitions is not significant.
When  conducting  the  cross-sectional  regression  analysis  to  explain  the  abnormal
returns, Baradwaj et al. acknowledge that payment in cash has a positive and significant
impact on the level of bidder cumulative abnormal returns. In addition, the results show
that bidder cumulative abnormal returns are, respectively, negatively and positively related
to the relative size of the bidder to target and the capitalisation measured as the percentage
of the equity to total assets.
In a paper based on 15 interstate and 15 intrastate bank mergers from 1982 to 1987,
Cornett and Tehranian (1992) document that the magnitude of cumulative abnormal returns
for the full sample is -0.80% over a 2-day (-1,0) event window, significant at the 0.05 level.
Their findings also show that acquiring banks in interstate mergers reap 0.34% cumulative
abnormal returns over  a 2-day  (-1,0) event window compared to -1.90% for intrastate
mergers.  However,  the  authors  do  not  report  the significance  of the difference in
cumulative abnormal returns between interstate and intrastate bank mergers.
Cornett, Hovakimian,  Palia  and  Tehranian  (2003) study  whether  corporate
governance  mechanisms  assist  in  reducing  the  managerial  incentive  to  enter
value-destroying bank acquisitions. Their focus of corporate governance mechanisms is the
internal  corporate  governance  mechanisms.  However,  the  authors  also  analyse  bidder
shareholder  wealth  with  respect  to  interstate  and  intrastate  bank  mergers. 177  bidding
banks involved 423 in acquisition announcements over the 1988 to 1995 period constitute
the final sample.
Applying the market model with parameters estimated from day -136 to day -16, the
results show that bidding firms experience cumulative abnormal returns of -0.74% over a
3-day (-1,+1) event window, significant at the  0.05 level. The authors also report that
cumulative abnormal returns of bidding firms in intrastate and interstate acquisitions are
-0.40%  and -1.06%  over  a  3-day  (-1,+1)  event  window,  respectively.  The  difference43
between interstate and intrastate bank mergers is significant at the 0.05 level.
Turning to the issue of corporate governance, Cornett et al. find that the abnormal
returns to the bidding bank shareholders are higher when the CEO owns a higher stake of
the firm. The authors also find that a higher percentage of outside directors results in
higher abnormal returns for the bidding banks. Other control variables are also found to be
significant.  In particular, cash payment is positively and significantly related to bidder
announcement returns.
With regard to the primary capital ratios
27, the results show this to have an inverse
but insignificant relation with bidding bank cumulative abnormal returns. However, the
authors only look at internal corporate governance mechanisms. The current study further
examines the external governance mechanisms in terms of investor protection and bank
regulation on the impact of the shareholder wealth as will be discussed in chapter 3.
As Baradwaj et al. (1991), Cornett and Tehranian (1992), Cornett et al. (2003) report
that bidders obtain higher announcement returns in intrastate acquisitions than in interstate
acquisitions although the results generally show negative bidder announcement returns.
These findings suggest that bidder shareholder wealth can be affected by geographical
differences. Thus, when the transactions involve different markets in terms of cross-border
deals, it can be expected that bank mergers create different levels of bidder announcement
returns.
While  several  papers  with  respect  to  interstate  and  intrastate  acquisitions are
discussed above, these studies only look at the domestic U.S. market. However, several
studies extend their studies to various markets in terms of cross-border deals. As discussed
in section 2.3.1.1, Hudgins and Seifert (1996) examined domestic and cross-border deals to
shareholders of U.S. financial firms from 1968 to 1989.
27  Cornett et al. (2003) state that primary capital ratios for the bank holding companies are derived from
FDIC Call Reports the year prior to the initial acquisition announcement from the FDIC Call Report tapes.
The computation of primary capital ratio can be found at:
http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/6000-2000.html  (Sources:  FDIC  (Federal  Deposit  Insurance
Corporation))44
In cross-border deals, the authors find that the level of cumulative abnormal returns
for acquiring firms is -0.25% over a 3-day (-1,+1) event window when U.S. financial firms
acquire  foreign  firms.  However,  the  results  are  not  statistically  significant. The  results
show that acquiring firms earn cumulative abnormal returns of -0.34% over a 3-day (-1,+1)
event  window,  not  statistically  significant, when  U.S.  banks acquire  foreign  firms. In
domestic deals, acquiring firms obtain 0.49% cumulative abnormal returns over a 3-day
(-1,+1)  event window  when U.S. financial firms acquire U.S. firms.  The difference in
abnormal returns between foreign acquirers and domestic acquirers is not significant.
In  another  study,  extending  the  investigation  period  from  1989  to  1999,  Kiymaz
(2004) analysed cross-border deals and finds that the level of cumulative abnormal returns
for U.S. bidders is 0.38% over a 3-day (-1,+1) event window, significant at the 0.10 level.
In the cross-sectional regression analysis, Kiymaz finds that payment in cash is negative
and significant in association with bidder cumulative abnormal returns. The results also
show that there is a reverse relation between the size of the bidder and the bidder wealth
gains.
In addition to the empirical studies with regard to geographical acquisitions discussed
above,  several  papers  also  examine  bidder  shareholder  wealth  related  to  activity
diversifying acquisitions. For a sample of 280 bank mergers from 1988 to 1995, DeLong
(2001)  finds  that  bidding  firms  experience -0.95%  and -2.17%  cumulative  abnormal
returns in activity focus and activity diversification over the 12-day (-10,+1) event window,
respectively, significant at the 0.05 and 0.01 level. The difference between activity focus
and activity diversification is significant at the 0.10 level.
Looking at the same period of 1988-1995, Cornett et al. (2003) analysed 177 bidding
banks and find that bidders obtain -1.31% and -0.17% cumulative abnormal returns over a
3-day  (-1,+1)  event  window  in  activity  diversification  and  focusing  acquisitions,45
respectively.
28  The  difference  between  activity  diversifying  and  activity  focusing  is
significant  at  the  0.05  level. With  respect  to  the  analysis  of  diversifying  and  focusing
acquisitions, Cornett et al. claim that bank acquisitions in activity diversification produce
significantly lower announcement period AR than acquisitions that focus activities.
Akhigbe and Madura (2004) examine the effects of bank acquisitions of security
firms  during  the  period  1986-2000.  The  final  sample  contains  28  banks that  acquire
security firms and 28 banks that acquire other commercial banks. Applying the market
model with parameters estimated from day -300 to day -20, the authors find that bidders
obtain 0.24% cumulative abnormal returns over a 2-day (-1,0) event window when they
acquire security firms, and -0.78% when acquiring other commercial banks. The difference
is not statistical significant.
As discussed above, prior empirical evidence from U.S. studies show that bidders
obtain negative announcement returns in bank mergers, except for Cornett and De (1991a,b)
and Zhang (1995) who report positive cumulative abnormal returns to bidders. Negative
announcement returns to bidders may be an indication of wealth transfer from bidders to
targets as targets earn significant positive announcement returns.
Taking  into  account  geographical  diversification,  the  results  suggest  that  bidders
obtain higher announcement returns in intrastate acquisitions than in interstate acquisitions
although the results  generally show negative announcement  returns. Analysing  activity
diversifying  acquisitions,  bidders  obtain  higher  announcement  returns  in  focusing
acquisitions  than  those  in  diversification  acquisitions,  although  bidders  normally
experience  negative  announcement  returns  in  both  activity  focusing  and  diversifying
acquisitions. In contrast, Akhigbe and Madura (2004) find higher announcement returns to
bidders in bank to bank deals.
28  Cornett et al. (2003) argue that a merger or acquisition is classified as activity focusing if the bidding and
target banks are engaged in similar types of risk and therefore similar types of activities. Otherwise, a merger
or acquisition is grouped as activity diversification.46
However, prior empirical studies in U.S. bank mergers may not be applicable to those
in EU studies as EU targets in general obtain lower announcement returns than U.S. targets.
Thus, the following section reviews prior empirical evidence for bidders in EU studies.
2.4.2 Empirical evidence from EU studies
Focusing on 15 EU markets plus Norway and Switzerland from 1985 to 2000, Beitel
et al. (2004) investigated 98 transactions of EU bank mergers and find that bidding banks
obtain -0.01% cumulative abnormal returns over a 3-day (-1,+1) event window, statistically
insignificant.
In a paper with a sample of 76 bank mergers, Ismail and Davidson (2007) used a
similar  investigation  period  from  1987  to  2000  to  analyse  the  wealth  effects  of  bank
mergers. Their sample also covers the 15 EU markets plus Norway and Switzerland. The
authors  report  that  acquiring  firms  obtain  0.10%  cumulative  abnormal  returns  over  a
21-day (-20,0) event window, significant at the 0.01 level.
2.4.2.1 Geography vs. activity diversification
Two  empirical  studies  analyse  bidder  shareholder  wealth  related  to  geographic
acquisitions in terms of domestic and cross-border deals. In a study examining 56 bidding
banks from 1989 to 1996, Rad and Beek (1999) report that acquiring banks on average
experience -0.33%  cumulative  abnormal  returns  over  a  3-day  (-1,+1)  event  window,
statistically insignificant.  Rad  and  Beek  argue  that  insignificant  abnormal  returns  for
bidding banks are the results from the existence of a competitive market.
Further  analysis  indicates  that  cumulative  abnormal  returns  of  bidding  firms  are
-0.37% and -0.29% over a 3-day (-1,+1) event window for cross-border and domestic deals,
respectively.  However,  the  difference  between  cross-border  and  domestic  deals  is  not
significant.
In a paper with a relatively shorter investigation period from 1998 to 2002, Campa47
and Hernando (2006) analysed 172 bank mergers in 15 EU markets. The authors find that
the magnitude of cumulative abnormal returns for bidding firms is -0.87% over a 3-day
(-1,+1) event window, significant at the 0.05 level. Further analysis shows that acquiring
firms in cross-border deals experience -0.39% cumulative abnormal returns over a 3-day
(-1,+1)  event  window  compared  to -1.08%  for  national  deals.  The  difference  between
cross-border and national deals is not significant.
In addition to analysing domestic and cross-border deals, several papers also extend
their analysis to cover the extent of diversifying activities acquisitions. Focusing on large
transactions from 1988 to 1997, Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) analysed a sample of 54
bank mergers from 14 European banking markets.
29  The authors report that cumulative
abnormal  returns  of  bidding  firms  are  0.99%  over  a  3-day  (-1,+1)  event  window,
significant at the 0.01 level. Cybo-Ottone and Murgia state that the results for acquiring
banks  are  significantly  different  from  those  for  U.S.  bank  mergers  as  U.S.  bidders  in
general experience negative announcement returns.
In addition, cumulative abnormal returns of acquiring firms in cross-borders deals are
higher than those in domestic deals, at 2.00% and 0.19%, respectively, over an 11-day
(-10,0)  event  window, although neither is statistically  significant.  The  difference in
cumulative abnormal returns between domestic and cross-border deals is not significant.
The results are in contrast to the study of Rad and Beek (1999) and Campa and Hernando
(2006),  who  find  negative  announcement  returns  to  bidders  for  both  domestic  and
cross-border deals.
Furthermore, the authors report that acquiring firms in cross-products deals generate
higher cumulative abnormal returns than those in commercial banking  deals, at 1.54%
versus 0.26% over an 11-day (-10,0) event window, respectively. However, the difference
29 14  European  banking  markets  include  Austria,  Belgium,  Denmark,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Italy,
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and UK.48
between each group is not significant.
For a sample of 89 bank mergers from 1987 to 1999, Ismail and Davidson (2005)
document  that  acquiring  firms  gain  0.03%  cumulative  abnormal  returns  over  a  3-day
(-1,+1)  event  window,  not  statistically  significant. However,  the  authors  use  a  longer
11-day (-10,0) event window to analyse different types of deals. The results show that
bidders earn 0.06% cumulative abnormal returns for both domestic and cross-border deals.
Furthermore, the authors report that acquiring firms earn 0.15% cumulative abnormal
returns over an 11-day (-10,0) event window for bank to bank deals compared to -0.14%
for cross-product (bank to other financial company) deals. The difference for each group is
not statistically significant.
While focusing on EU bank mergers, two recent papers extend their investigation
period  to  2004.  Ekkayokkaya,  Holmes  and  Paudyal  (2007)  explore  the  impact  on
announcement period gains during the period 1990-2004. The deal value is restricted to be
at least one million U.S. dollars. Their final sample comprises 963 bids. Applying the
market-adjusted returns model
30, the results show that the level of cumulative abnormal
returns for acquiring banks is 0.03% over a 3-day (-1,+1) event window, not statistically
significant.
In addition, the authors report that acquiring firms obtain insignificant cumulative
abnormal returns of 0.11% and -0.03% over a 3-day (-1,+1) event window for cross-border
and domestic acquisitions, respectively. The difference between cross-border and domestic
acquisitions is not significant.
Furthermore, cumulative abnormal returns of acquiring banks in diversification (bank
to other financial company) acquisitions are 0.55% over a 3-day (-1,+1) event window
compared to -0.33% for focused bids. The difference between focused and diversification
30 Ekkayokkaya et al. (2007) argue that their sample does not have a long time series of data as a result of
multiple bids. Thus, the market adjusted returns model does not require a long estimation period prior to the
event. In addition, the market adjusted returns model does not require to compute the model parameters. The
results are not affected by the difference of the model parameters. However, as will be discussed in chapter 5,
the market adjusted returns model may be unrealistic in that it assumes that the beta is 1. It is arguable that
not each stock has the same risk factor to measure the abnormal returns.49
acquisitions is significant. Ekkayokkaya et al. claim that “diversifying deals announced by
European banks continue to be value enhancing.” (p. 16).
Lensink  and  Maslennikova  (2008)  examine  value  gains  to  acquirers  in  European
bank mergers and acquisitions during the period from 1996 to 2004. Their final sample
contains 107 deals, with 16 transactions by a single acquirer. This suggests that bidders
may have multiple bidding activities if they have past good experience for the transactions.
Applying the Fama-French three-factor model
31  estimated from day -270 to day -21,
the results show that acquiring firms obtain 0.39% cumulative abnormal returns over a
3-day  (-1,+1)  event  window,  not  statistically  significant.  Further  analysis  shows  that
acquiring firms in domestic activity diversifying deals earn 0.22% cumulative abnormal
returns  over  a  3-day  (-1,+1)  event  window  compared  to  1.14%  for  domestic  but
nondiversifying  transactions.  On  the  other  hand,  acquiring  firms  in  cross-border
diversifying deals experience -0.29% cumulative abnormal returns compared to 0.45% for
cross-border but non-diversifying transactions. However, Lensink and Maslennikova do
not report the significance levels of the differences between the various groups.
As discussed in the review of papers on EU studies above, the results for bidders are
inconclusive. The inconclusive results for EU bidders may derive from the composition of
the  sample  and  the  investigation  period  as  well  as  the  choice  of the  event  window.
However, the results show that EU bidders in general obtain higher announcement returns
than U.S. bidders. The higher announcement returns to EU bidders may imply that EU
banking takeover market is less competitive.
As the results are mixed, it is not clear to determine whether bank mergers create or
destroy bidder shareholder wealth. This suggests a need to review prior empirical evidence
in international studies. The review of prior empirical evidence in international studies
31 The Fama-French  three-factor  model  controls  for  two  other  risk  factors,  the  size  factor  and  the
book-to-market factor. While the current study covers a number of countries in terms of the international
study, it may not be clear to find a universal method to determine the measure of the variables employed to
Fama-French three-factor model. Thus, this model may not be applicable to the current study.50
sheds further lights on bidder shareholder wealth in bank mergers.
2.4.3 Empirical evidence from international studies
32
In a study of 125 bidding firms from 1977 to 1987, Biswas et al. (1997) find that
cumulative abnormal returns for acquiring firms in international acquisitions
33  are 0.13%
over a 2-day (-1,0) event window, not statistically significant. The authors also report that
U.S. and non-U.S. acquiring firms in international acquisitions reap 0.28% and 0.02%
cumulative  abnormal  returns  over  a  2-day  (-1,0)  event  window,  respectively, neither
statistically significant.
In the cross-sectional regression analysis, the authors find a positive but insignificant
relationship between bidder cumulative abnormal returns and cash payment. The results
show that bidder cumulative abnormal returns are positively, but insignificantly, related to
bank to bank deals.
DeLong (2003) studied both domestic U.S. and non-U.S. bank mergers from 1988 to
1999. Using a sample of 438 transactions, the author finds that acquiring firms for the
entire sample on average experience cumulative abnormal returns of -1.89% over a 12-day
(-10,+1) event window, significant at the 0.01 level. However, in the analysis of domestic
U.S.  versus  non-U.S.  mergers,  the  results  show  that  cumulative  abnormal  returns  of
acquiring  firms  are -2.10%  and  0.17%,  respectively.  The  difference  between  domestic
non-U.S. and U.S. mergers is significant at the 0.01 level.
Using a sample of 129 acquisitions from 1997 to 2002, Fields et al. (2007) find that
bidding firms that acquire public targets obtain 1.07% cumulative abnormal returns over a
2-day (-1,0) event window, significant at the 0.05 level. On the other hand, bidding firms
earn insignificant cumulative abnormal returns of 0.05% over a 2-day (-1,0) event window
32 The international studies mean that the sample of bank mergers and acquisitions are collected from a
number of different markets, including U.S., EU and/or the markets from the rest of the world.
33 Biswas et al. (1997) document that their sample covers 14 countries, including Australia, Canada, France,
Germany, Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Singapore, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom
and United States.51
while acquiring private targets.
In  the  cross-sectional  regression  analysis,  the  results  show  that  stock  payment  is
positively, but insignificantly, correlated to bidder abnormal returns. The size of the bidder
is negatively, but insignificantly, related to bidder abnormal returns.
2.4.3.1 U.S. vs. EU
Examining 81 bidding banks during the period from 1990 to 2000, Scholtens and de
Wit (2004) find that bidding banks in Europe  (U.S.) bank mergers receive cumulative
abnormal  returns  of  2.56%  (-1.86%)  over  a  35-day  (-3,+31)  event  window,  neither
statistically  significant. The  results  are  consistent  with DeLong’s  (2003)  findings  that
domestic  U.S.  bidders  experience  more  losses  than  their  non-U.S.  counterparts.  The
difference between Europe and U.S. is significant at the 0.10 level.
Extending the period from 1997 to 2003, Valkanov and Kleimeier (2007) analysed a
sample  of  105  acquisitions
34  and  find  that  acquiring  banks obtain -0.99%  cumulative
abnormal returns over a 3-day (-1,+1) event window, significant at the 0.01 level. The
results  also  show  that  U.S.  acquiring  banks  experience -1.50%  cumulative  abnormal
returns for a 3-day (-1,+1) event window, significant at the 0.01 level. Thus, Valkanov and
Kleimeier  (2007)  “confirm  that  US  bank  M&As  destroy  value  for  acquiring  bank
shareholders.” (p. 61).
In  addition,  their  findings  indicate  that  European  acquiring  banks  obtain  1.04%
cumulative abnormal returns for a 3-day (-1,+1) event window, significant at the 0.05 level.
The results are in sharp contrast to their results for U.S. bidders.
In the cross-sectional regression analysis, the results show that the relation between
bidder cumulative abnormal returns and the size of the acquiring firms is negative and
significant. Valkanov and Kleimeier argue that “A possible explanation for this finding is
34 Valkanov  and  Kleimeier  (2007)  state  that  the  majority  of  the  final  sample  is  domestic  mergers  and
acquisitions although their sample covers 10 countries, including U.S., Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany,
Greece, Italy, Norway, Sweden, UK.52
the existence of economies of scale in banking.” (p.64). The findings imply that smaller
acquirers have a higher potential to realise economies of scale from acquisitions.
In addition, their findings indicate that higher bidder cumulative abnormal returns are
associated  with  smaller  relative  size  of  the  target  to  bidder.  Valkanov  and  Kleimeier
suggest that “a possible explanation for this finding is that by acquiring smaller banks,
which  are  presumably  less  efficient  and  sophisticated,  acquiring  banks  can  benefit  by
improving the efficiency of the target.” (p. 66).
In a recent paper focusing on the 1996-2004 period, Hagendorff, Collins and Keasey
(2008)  examine  the  bidder  returns  associated  with  U.S.  and  European  bank  merger
announcements. Bids are included if the bidder acquires over 50% of target shares after the
transaction, and if the deal value is at least 100 million U.S. dollars. Their final sample
contains 204 acquisitions.
Using the market model with parameters estimated from day -121 to day -21, their
findings show that acquiring firms experience -0.50% cumulative abnormal returns over a
3-day  (-1,+1)  event  window,  significant  at  the  0.01  level. Further  analysis  shows  that
cumulative abnormal returns of bidding firms in European (U.S.) bank mergers are 0.09%
(-0.70%). The difference between EU and U.S. mergers is also significant at the 0.01 level.
Furthermore, the level of cumulative abnormal returns for the full sample is -0.03%
and -0.61%  over  a  3-day  (-1,+1)  event  window  in  terms  of  diversifying  and  focusing
acquisitions, respectively. The difference between diversifying and focusing acquisitions is
significant at the 0.01 level. Thus, Hagendorff et al. argue that “We refer to the difference
in  abnormal  returns  between  diversifying  and  focusing  M&A  as  the  ‘value  effect’  of
product diversification.” (p. 1340).
As  discussed above,  prior  empirical  evidence from  international  studies  similarly
report  mixed  results  to  bidders.  The  mixed  results  to  bidders  in  international  studies
suggest prior empirical studies cannot conclude whether bank mergers create or destroy
shareholder wealth in bank mergers. This could suggest that there is a need to further53
investigate shareholder wealth of bidders.
However, the results from international studies show that EU bidders obtain higher
announcement returns than U.S. bidders. The direct comparison of the results between U.S.
bidders and EU bidders from international studies reveals that EU bidders obtain higher
announcement returns than U.S. bidders. These findings also lend support to the discussion
in U.S. and EU studies, implying that EU banking takeover market is less competitive as a
result of higher announcement returns.
2.5 Combined firms
So far, empirical studies with regard to targets and bidders have been discussed in
section 2.3 and 2.4, respectively. However, several papers also examine wealth effects of
combined firms in bank mergers. The  review of these studies for combined firms can
further  reveal  whether  bank  mergers  overall  create  value  to  shareholders.  Thus, the
empirical evidence related to combined firms shareholder wealth is reviewed in the next
section.
2.5.1 Empirical evidence from U.S. studies
Houston and Ryngaert (1994) used 153 acquisitions during the 1985-1991 period to
measure  combined  firms  shareholder  wealth.  The  authors  use  the  weighted  average
approach to measure combined firms abnormal returns. Combined firms abnormal returns
are  calculated  by  weighting  the  market  capitalisation  at  the  end  of  month  before  the
announcement date to target and bidder abnormal returns. The advantage of the weighted
average approach not only takes into account the abnormal returns for targets and bidders,
but also considers the size effects of targets and bidders. Thus, this thesis also uses the
weighted average approach to compute combined firms abnormal returns. Houston and
Ryngaert find that combined firms gain 0.38% cumulative abnormal returns over a 5-day
(-4,0) event window, statistically insignificant.54
In  the  cross-sectional  regression  analysis,  Houston  and  Ryngaert  report  that  the
measure of market overlap has a positive and significant relation with cumulative abnormal
returns of combined firms. The results also show that the payment in stock has a negative
and significant impact. However, the relative size is positively and significantly correlated
to cumulative abnormal returns of combined firms.
In a paper analysing 68 bank mergers from 1991 to 1995, Toyne and Tripp (1998)
report  that  combined  firms  reap  cumulative  abnormal  returns  of -0.70%  over  a  3-day
(-1,+1) event window, significant at the 0.01 level. Their findings are in contrast to the
study  of  Houston  and  Ryngaert  (1994),  who  report  marginally  positive  announcement
returns to combined firms.
Focusing on a longer period from 1980 to 1997, Becher (2000) examined the wealth
effects to combined firms based on 558 mergers. The author finds that combined firms gain
3.03% and 1.80% cumulative abnormal returns over a 36-day (-30,+5) and 11-day (-5,+5)
event window, respectively, both significant at the 0.01 level.
In another paper with 443 bank mergers from 1990 to 1999, Becher and Campbell
(2005) find that cumulative abnormal returns for combined firms are 0.93% over a 7-day
(-5,+1)  event  window,  significant  at  the  0.01  level.  In  the  cross-sectional  regression
analysis, the authors find that cash payment is positively and significantly associated with
combined firms’ cumulative abnormal returns.
As  discussed  above,  prior  empirical  evidence from  U.S.  studies  indicates  that
combined firms obtain marginal positive announcement returns although Toyne and Tripp
(1998)  find  slightly  negative  announcement  returns.  Marginal  positive  announcement
returns to combined firms suggest that bank mergers in U.S. studies overall create value to
combined firms.
2.5.2 Empirical evidence from EU and international studies
Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) analysed 54 bank mergers from 1988 to 1997 and55
find that cumulative abnormal returns of combined firms are 4.03% for a 3-day (-1,+1)
event window, significant at the 0.01 level.
Focusing on 98 large transactions from 1985 to 2000, Beitel et al. (2004) report that
the level of cumulative abnormal returns for combined firms is 1.40% for a 3-day (-1,+1)
event window, significant at the 0.01 level.
Ismail  and  Davidson  (2005)  based  their  study  on  a  sample  of  76  transactions to
measure combined firms announcement returns from 1987 to 1999. The authors report that
combined firms earn cumulative abnormal returns of 0.49% over a 3-day (-1,+1) event
window, significant at the 0.01 level.
In another paper using a longer 21-day (-20,0) event window, Ismail and Davidson
(2007) investigated a sample of 89 mergers from 1987 to 2000. The authors document that
cumulative abnormal returns for combined firms are 0.30%, not statistically significant.
In addition to examining combined firms shareholder wealth in EU bank mergers,
two  studies  focus  on  international  studies. DeLong  (2003)  analysed a  sample  of  438
mergers from  1988  to  1999 and  report  that  combined  firms  earn  positive  cumulative
abnormal  returns  of  0.12%  over  a  12-day  (-10,+1)  event  window,  statistically
insignificant.
35  With respect to domestic U.S. and non-U.S. mergers, combined firms earn
cumulative abnormal returns of 0.00% and 1.32% over a 12-day (-10,+1) event window,
respectively. The difference between non-U.S. and U.S. domestic mergers is statistically
insignificant.
Examining 129 transactions from 1997 to 2002, Fields et al. (2007) indicate that
combined  firms  obtain  1.89%  cumulative  abnormal  returns  over  a  2-day  (-1,0)  event
window, significant at the 0.10 level. Their findings support the empirical evidence from
35 DeLong  (2003)  measures  combined  firms’  shareholder  wealth  by  using  the  percentage  change  in
combined value. However, it can be argued that this approach does not take into account the abnormal returns
for  the  target  and  bidder.  It  can  be  argued  that  the  level  of  target  and  bidder abnormal  returns  can  be
components to measure joint abnormal returns. Thus, DeLong’s (2003) approach may not entirely value
combined firms announcement returns in bank mergers.56
EU  bank  mergers  and  also  support  the  majority  of  empirical  studies  from  U.S.  bank
mergers.
As  discussed  above,  prior  empirical  evidence from  EU  and international  studies
shows that combined firms obtain positive announcement returns in bank mergers. These
findings are consistent with those of U.S. studies, indicating that combined firms in EU
and international studies overall gain value in bank mergers.
However,  prior  empirical  studies  do  not  use  a  large  sample  of  bank  mergers  to
measure shareholder wealth of combined firms. In addition, due to the limited evidence
from international studies, this suggests a need to further examine shareholder wealth of
combined firms in bank mergers.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter has discussed prior empirical evidence for targets, bidders and combined
firms, respectively. As can be seen from prior empirical studies, the level of cumulative
abnormal returns depends on the market, the investigation period, the model and the choice
of the event window.
Overall, prior empirical studies show that targets earn positive announcement returns.
However, targets in general obtain higher announcement returns in the U.S. studies than
those  of the EU  and  international  studies.  These  findings  suggest that  U.S.  banking
takeover market is more competitive than EU and the market from the rest of the world.
Positive announcement returns to targets also lend support to the motives discussed in
section 2.2 (e.g., Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993); Biswas et al. (1997); Zhang (1998)),
suggesting that bank mergers create value to the shareholders.
With regard to bidder shareholder wealth, the results of prior empirical studies are
inconclusive. While the empirical evidence in U.S. studies shows negative announcement
returns to bidders, bidders in EU and international studies obtain either positive or negative57
announcement returns. The mixed results suggest a need to further examine shareholder
wealth of bank mergers.
Overall, the results of prior empirical studies show that bidders in U.S. studies obtain
lower announcement returns than those in EU and international studies. This implies that
U.S. banking takeover market is more competitive where bidders need to pay more to
targets. While positive announcement returns to bidders support the synergy hypothesis,
negative announcement returns to bidders are consistent with the expectation either the
hubris or agency theory ((Roll (1986); Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993)), suggesting that
bidders may overpay for targets. As targets earn positive announcement returns, negative
announcement returns to bidders may also indicate wealth transfer from bidders to targets.
Furthermore,  the  empirical  evidence  shows  that  combined  firms  obtain  slightly
positive announcement returns in bank mergers. These findings indicate that bank mergers
create  overall  value  to  shareholder  wealth.  Similar  to  the  discussion  above, positive
announcement returns to combined firms are consistent with the synergy theory, indicating
that bank mergers create value to the shareholders of combined firms.
However, several papers provide the cross-sectional regression analysis to explain the
announcement returns of the firms. These papers highlight the importance of controlling
for various bid characteristics and firm specific characteristics as discussed below.
With respect to target firms, Houston and Ryngaert (1994), Beitel et al. (2004) and
Valkanov and Kleimeier (2007) find a negative relationship between target announcement
returns and the relative size of the target to bidder. However, Campa and Hernando (2006)
find that target announcement returns are positively and significantly related to the relative
size of the target to bidder.
Grullon et al. (1997) and Ismail and Davidson (2007) find that target announcement
returns are negatively and significantly correlated to the capital ratio. Biswas et al. (1997),
DeLong (2003) and Kiymaz (2004) find that cash payment is positively and significantly
associated  with  target  announcement  returns. Ismail  and  Davidson  (2007)  find  that58
profitability is positively and significantly related to target announcement returns.
Taking into account bidding firms, the results show that bidder announcement returns
are negatively related to the relative size of the target to bidder (Houston and Ryngaert
(1994); Grullon et al. (1997); Louis (2004); Valkanov and Kleimeier (2007)). Baradwaj et
al. (1991), Biswas et al. (1997), Cornett et al. (2003) and Louis (2004) find that cash
payment is positively correlated to bidder announcement returns. However, Kiymaz (2004)
reports that bidder announcement returns are negatively, but insignificantly, related to cash
payment.
In addition, Baradwaj et al. (1991) and Grullon et al. (1997) find that the capital ratio
is positively associated with bidder announcement returns. On the contrary, Cornett et al.
(2003) report that the capital ratio is negatively, but insignificantly, associated with bidder
announcement returns. Kiymaz (2004), Fields et al. (2007), Valkanov and Kleimeier (2007)
find that the size of the bidders is negatively related to bidder announcement returns.
To sum up, prior empirical studies report that targets earn positive announcement
returns and combined firms obtain slightly positive announcement returns in bank mergers.
The level of target announcement returns depends on the market, the investigation period,
the model and the event window. However, prior empirical studies do not use a large
international sample of bank mergers to investigate target shareholder wealth. Thus, while
the average abnormal returns to targets seem to be different in studies from the U.S., the
EU and other markets, few studies include targets from more than one region in their
sample. There is a general lack of robust evidence as to whether target abnormal returns
vary  significantly  between  markets.  In  addition,  due  to  wide  variations  of target
announcement returns, the prior empirical evidence cannot provide a clear conclusion to
determine the level of the impact of bank mergers on the shareholder wealth. This suggests
a need to further investigate target shareholder wealth of bank mergers.
Furthermore,  the  results  for  bidders  are  inconclusive,  reporting  either  positive  or59
negative announcement returns. Due to the inconclusive results for bidding firms, this is a
gap to be filled in the study of bidder shareholder wealth on bank mergers. Thus, this thesis
also explores the impact of bidder shareholder wealth on bank mergers.
While  taking  into  account  prior  empirical  evidence  of  international  studies,  the
evidence is limited and these studies mainly cover the U.S. and EU market. It is not clear
whether these findings will be replicated in a study that covers a variety of developing and
developed countries.
Due  to  inconclusive  results  and  limited  evidence from  international  studies,  this
thesis  further  investigates  shareholder  wealth  of  bank  mergers  covering  a  large
international sample of bank mergers, as will be discussed in chapter 5. It is expected that
this thesis can provide more evidence, contributing to prior academic research.
On the other hand, as discussed in chapter 1, one of the aims in this thesis is to
explore the impact of investor protection and bank regulation on the shareholder wealth in
bank mergers.  As will  be discussed in chapter 3, very  few prior studies have tried to
explore the impact of investor protection and bank regulation on the shareholder wealth in
bank mergers. Due to limited evidence, little is known about whether investor protection
and bank regulation has an impact on shareholder wealth in bank mergers. Hence, prior
empirical studies do not provide a clear picture to address the impact of investor protection
and  bank  regulation  on  the  shareholder  wealth  in  bank  mergers.  This  thesis  further
provides the cross-sectional regression analysis to explore the impact of investor protection
and bank regulation on the shareholder wealth, as will be presented in chapter 6, 7 and 8.60
Chapter  3  Literature  review  of  investor  protection  and
bank regulation
3.1 Introduction
In chapter 2, a number of prior empirical studies with respect to bank mergers are
discussed. Some of these prior empirical studies provide cross-sectional regression analyses
to explain the announcement returns of targets  and bidders. As  has  been  discussed  in
chapter 1,  some  prior  empirical  studies  have  explored  internal  corporate  governance
mechanisms in terms of ownership and board structure on the impact of shareholder wealth
in bank mergers. These prior empirical studies only focus on the variables related to firm
level corporate governance mechanisms.
Alternatively, the country  level corporate  governance mechanisms  as the external
corporate  governance  mechanisms  may  also  play  an  important  role  to  influence
shareholder wealth of bank mergers. However, prior empirical studies do not pay much
attention to explore whether the country level corporate governance mechanisms in terms
of investor protection and bank regulation can affect shareholder wealth in bank mergers.
Little is known about whether investor protection and bank regulation can be important
determinants to explain the announcement returns of the firms in bank mergers. Thus, this
thesis attempts to explore the relationship between the announcement returns of the firms
and  investor  protection  and  bank  regulation  in  a  country.  This  chapter  discusses  the
theoretical  background  of  corporate  governance  and  the  linkage  with  mergers  and
acquisitions first. Then, the prior empirical studies related to investor protection and bank
regulation are also discussed in this chapter.
This  chapter  is  organised  as  follows. Section  3.2  discusses  agency  theory  and
corporate governance. Then, the prior empirical studies with respect to investor protection
and bank regulation are discussed in section 3.3 and 3.4, respectively. Section 3.5 presents
conclusion. The limitations of the prior empirical studies are discussed in section 3.6.61
3.2 Agency theory vs. corporate governance
The separation of ownership and control has been widely debated in the academic
research  (Berle  and  Means  (1933); Jensen  and  Meckling  (1976);  Brickley  and  James
(1987); Brook et  al.  (2000);  Weir et  al. (2002)). Brook et  al. (2000)  argue  that  the
widespread separation of ownership and control may result in agency conflicts. Jensen and
Meckling (1976) propose the agency theory, indicating the conflicts between managers and
shareholders. The conflicts occur when managers pursue their own interests at the expense
of the interests of shareholders. For example, managers may increase their perquisite and
compensation package regardless of corporate performance.
Weir et al. (2002) also argue that managers may prefer to pursue their own interests
because  of  job  security  and  remuneration.  Thus, the  conflicts  between  managers  and
shareholders result in agency problems, also known as agency costs (Jensen and Meckling
(1976); Weir et al. (2002); Masulis et al. (2007); Hagendorff and Keasey (2008)). The
presence of the conflicts between managers and shareholders may affect firm value and
impact on shareholder wealth.
Specifically,  the  conflicts  between  managers  and  shareholders  may  be  significant
when the firm is making large investment decisions, such as mergers and acquisitions.
Byrd and Hickman (1992) argue that acquisitions, as major investments, may alter the
strategic direction of the firm. Masulis et al. (2007) also indicate that “acquisitions are
among the largest and most readily observable forms of corporate investment.” (p. 1852).
However, Harford (2003) points out that mergers or takeovers are events where managers’
interests  often  diverge  severely  from  those  of  shareholders.  Managers  may  have  more
ability  to  obtain  private  benefits  at  the  expense  of  shareholders  through  mergers  and
acquisitions.
When proceeding with mergers and acquisitions, managers may increase firm size in
order  to  secure  their  jobs  (Amihud  and  Lev  (1981);  Ben-Amar  and  Andre  (2006))  or
increase managerial compensation and prestige (Firth (1991); Avery et al. (1998)). For62
example, target managers may be replaced after the transactions if the firms have poor
performance prior to the transactions. Hence, the increase of firm size through mergers and
acquisitions increases the probability to secure their jobs.
Cox  (2006)  also  argues  that  managers  in  large  firms,  on  average,  earn  higher
compensation  and  consume  greater  perquisites  relative  to  those  in  small  firms.  Thus,
managers may have incentives to pursue their own interests by engaging in mergers and
acquisitions. From this perspective, the decisions to undertake mergers and acquisitions
may, therefore, hurt the value of the firms and the wealth of bidding firm shareholders.
Datta et al. (2001) argue that “Corporate investment decisions are important to the
creation of shareholder wealth.” (p. 2299). Brook et al. (2000) argue that managers acting
as the agents are hired to run their firms. When the interests of shareholders and managers
diverge,  the  monitoring  function  becomes  more  important  to  shareholders  (Fama  and
Jensen (1983); Hagendorff and Keasey (2008)).
A  number  of  corporate  governance  mechanisms have  been designed  to  mitigate
agency  conflicts  and  reduce  agency  costs  (Jensen  and  Meckling  (1976);  Fama  (1980);
Fama and Jensen (1983); Weir et al. (2002); Cornett et al. (2003); Masulis et al. (2007)).
Corporate governance  mechanisms  can  be  classified  as  internal  and  external  corporate
governance mechanisms (Weir et al. (2002); Denis and McConnell (2003)). Denis and
McConnell  (2003)  argue  that  internal corporate governance  mechanisms  include
ownership and board structure and external corporate governance mechanisms include the
legal system. These mechanisms offer monitoring functions to shareholders in order to
monitor and/or discipline managerial behaviour.
As  was  indicated  in  chapter  1,  some  prior  empirical  studies  have  examined  the
effectiveness  of  internal  corporate  governance  mechanisms  in  terms  of  ownership  and
board structure on the shareholder wealth in mergers and acquisitions. However, these
prior empirical studies only focus on firm level corporate governance mechanisms. Prior
empirical studies are less concerned to explore the impact of the country level corporate63
governance  mechanisms  in  terms  of  investor  protection  and  bank  regulation  on  the
shareholder wealth in mergers and acquisitions.
La  Porta et  al.  (1998)  argue  that  “Law  and  the  quality  of  its  enforcement  are
potentially important determinants of what rights security holders have and how well these
rights are protected.” (p. 1114). The strength of investor protection laws in a country can
offer mechanisms to protect minority shareholders against expropriation by insiders (La
Porta et al. (1997); Kuipers et al. (2003)). Anderson et al. (2009) also argue that strong
investor protection offers greater bargaining power to targets. Thus, bidders may need to
pay more to targets.
Hagendorff et al. (2007) also argue that investors in low protection environments
may  require  compensation  for  lower  governance  standards  and  a  higher  risk  of
expropriation by insiders. They report that bidders obtain higher announcement returns
when acquiring targets in a lower investor protection country.
While several prior empirical studies undertake cross-country analysis to explore the
effects of the country level corporate governance mechanisms on the shareholder wealth of
mergers and acquisitions, as will be discussed below, these studies mainly focus on the
industrial firms. However, Hagendorff and Keasey (2008) argue that “The evidence on the
valuation effects of mergers in different investor protection regimes is rather limited for
banking firms.” (p. 1334). The need to investigate the impact of investor protection on the
shareholder wealth of bank merger is addressed in the current study.
However, investor protection in a country may sometimes not generate an effective
function to protect shareholders. Caprio et al. (2007) argue that “investor protection laws
alone may not provide a sufficiently powerful corporate governance mechanism to small
shareholders.”  (p.  585).  Managers  may  have  more  ability  to  expropriate  minority
shareholders  if  investor  protection  cannot  effectively  discipline  managerial  behaviour.
Bank regulation may provide an alternative mechanism to monitor managerial behaviour in
banks in reducing the expropriation by managers. The existence of bank regulation can64
then  be  expected  to  protect  shareholders.  Hence, “effective  regulation  may  increase
investor confidence regarding expropriation and boost market valuations” (Caprio et al.
(2007), p.585). This also suggests a need to undertake the current study in order to further
explore the impact of bank regulation on shareholder wealth in bank mergers.
As will be discussed in the section on the sample selection in chapter 5, this thesis
uses a large international sample of bank mergers to examine shareholder wealth around
bank merger and acquisition announcements. Little is known about whether the country
level corporate governance mechanisms in terms of investor protection and bank regulation
can  explain  the  cumulative  abnormal  returns  of  the  firms  around  bank  merger  and
acquisition  announcements.  This  provides  a  good  opportunity  to  explore  cross-country
differences of investor protection and bank regulation in explaining the variations of the
abnormal returns in bank mergers and acquisitions as discussed in chapter 1.
However, a limitation of this study is that, given the large sample size, it has not been
possible to also collect and analyse firm-specific corporate governance variables. Such data
is  not  readily  available  from  financial  database,  and  would  therefore  have  had  to  be
hand-collected from annual reports. Given the large sample, spanning over 36 countries,
this would not be possible within the time limits of a PhD.
To  the  extent  that  internal  and  external  corporate  governance  mechanisms  may
interact,  it  is  acknowledged  that  not  including  corporate  governance  variables  may
potentially  cause  some missing  variable  bias  in  the  analysis  in  this  study.  However,  a
number of firm and bid characteristics are controlled for in the cross-sectional analysis, in
order to minimise the potential for any missing variable bias. An area for future research
may  be  to  analyse  the  joint  impact  of  internal  and  external  corporate  governance
mechanisms, although the data requirements for such a study are considerable.
To better understand what have been found and what have been done in the existing
literature, the following sections review prior empirical studies with respect to investor
protection and bank regulation.65
3.3 Investor protection
Several prior empirical studies have explored the impact of investor protection on
corporate valuation  and  shareholder  wealth  of  mergers  and  acquisitions  as  will  be
discussed below. To measure the level of investor protection in a country, prior empirical
studies mainly rely on La Porta et al.’s (1998) index. While La Porta et al.’s (1998) index
has encountered some criticism by researchers, Djankov et al. (2006) and Martynova and
Renneboog (2008) develop their own index to measure the scale of investor protection in a
country.  Thus,  the  review  of  the  existing  literature  related  to investor  protection  is
presented as below.
3.3.1 Investor protection measured from La Porta et al.’s (1998) index
3.3.1.1 Empirical evidence relating to investor protection to corporate valuation
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (LLSV) (1998) examine legal rules
to protect corporate shareholders in 49 countries around the world using 1993 data. The
authors  argue  that  “Law  and  the  quality  of  its  enforcement  are  potentially  important
determinants of what rights security holders have and how well these rights are protected.”
(p. 1114). La Porta et al. (1998) argue that the antidirector rights index has six components.
These six components include
“(1) the country allows shareholders to mail their proxy vote to the firm, (2)
shareholders  are  not required  to  deposit  their  shares  prior  to  the  general
shareholders’ meeting, (3) cumulative voting or proportional representation of
minorities  in  the  board  of  directors  is  allowed,  (4)  an  oppressed  minorities
mechanism is in place, (5) the minimum percentage of share capital that entitles
a shareholder to call for an extraordinary shareholders’ meeting is less than or
equal to 10 percent (the sample median), or (6) shareholders have pre-emptive
rights than can be waived only by a shareholders’ vote. The index ranges from
zero to six.” (p. 1123).66
Among  the  antidirector  rights  index,  the  highest  score was  5  out  of  6,  indicating  the
strongest shareholder protection in a country, such as United States and United Kingdom.
In  addition,  La  Porta et  al.  (1998)  also  argue  that  “a  strong  system  of  legal
enforcement could substitute for weak rules since active and well-functioning courts can
step in and rescue investors abused by the management.” (p. 1140). The authors indicate
that the legal enforcement proxied as the rule of law captures the information as below.
“Assessment  of  the  law  and  order  tradition  in the  country  produced  by  the
country risk rating agency International Country Risk (ICR). Average of the
months of April and October of the monthly index between 1982 and 1995.
Scale from zero to 10, with lower scores for less tradition for law and order (we
changed the scale from its original range going from zero to six).” (p. 1124).
The highest score indicates the strongest legal enforcement, for example United States is
scored 10. La Porta et al. find that English-origin and French-origin countries generally
have strongest and weakest legal protections for investors, respectively.
La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2002) further examine the effects
of investor protection on corporate valuation. Their sample includes 539 large firms from
27 countries over the 1995-1997 period. The authors find that better protection of minority
shareholders  is  associated  with  higher  valuation  of  firms,  where  valuation  of  firms  is
measured  as  Tobin’s  Q.  Hence,  La  Porta et  al.’s  finding  suggests  that  better  investor
protection in a country can reduce expropriation by managers and reduce agency costs.
Thus, strong investor protection can be better to protect minority shareholders.
In  a  paper  particularly  looking  at  the  banks, Caprio,  Laeven  and  Levine  (2007)
investigate the impact of shareholder protection laws on bank valuations for 244 banks
from 44 countries in 2001. The authors find that the valuation of banking firms measured
as Tobin’s Q is positively and significantly related to investor protection in a country. The
results indicate that higher valuation of banks is associated with better legal protection of
minority  shareholders  rights.  Thus,  Caprio et  al.  argue  that  “laws  can  play  a  role  in67
restraining this expropriation.” (p. 615).
As  discussed  above, La  Porta et  al. (2002)  and Caprio et  al. (2007)  focus  on
industrial firms and banks, respectively, and report that the valuation of firms is high when
firms are in a country with better investor protection. If firms in a country with strong
investor protection engage in mergers and acquisitions, managers may have less ability to
expropriate minority shareholders, aiming at satisfying the interests of shareholders. Thus,
higher valuation of the firms may be expected to generate higher value to shareholders of
bidders.
However, prior empirical studies related to investor protection discussed above do
not  analyse  shareholder  wealth  of  mergers  and  acquisitions.  It  remains  a  puzzle  as  to
whether investor protection in a country can affect the announcement returns of the firms
in mergers and acquisitions. Thus, the following section reviews prior empirical studies
related to shareholder wealth in mergers and acquisitions.
3.3.1.2 Empirical evidence related to shareholder wealth
Prior empirical studies pay less attention to cross-country  analysis to explore the
relationship  between  shareholder  wealth  in  mergers  and  acquisitions  and  investor
protection in a country. Due to limited evidence and to better understand academic research
in  this  field,  the  review  of  prior  empirical  studies  covers  the  empirical  evidence  from
industrial firms and financial firms, respectively.
3.3.1.2.1 Empirical evidence from industrial firms
3.3.1.2.1.1 Target shareholder wealth
Several prior empirical studies focus on industrial firms to explore the relationship
between investor protection and bid premium or the cumulative abnormal returns of the
firms in cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Rossi and Volpin (2004) focus on target
firms  to examine  the  determinants  of  mergers  and  acquisitions  in  49  major  countries68
between 1990 and 1999. Their final sample contains 4,007 observations.
Rossi and Volpin find that target takeover premium is positively and significantly
related to the level of shareholder protection in a target country, where premium is the bid
price as a percentage of the target closing price four weeks before the announcement of the
deal and shareholder protection is measured at the target country level. Rossi and Volpin
explain that “shareholder protection reduces the cost of capital and therefore increases
(potential) competition among bidders and the premium paid by the winning bidder.” (p.
293).
In addition, Rossi and Volpin find no statistically significant relationship between
target premium and the difference between the acquirer and target shareholder protection,
suggesting that “acquiring firms from countries with better shareholder protection do not
need to pay more than acquiring firms from countries with weaker shareholder protection
in  cross-border  deals.”  (p.  295). Based  on their  findings,  Rossi  and  Volpin  state  that
“domestic  investor  protection  is  an  important  determinant  of  the  competitiveness  and
effectiveness of the market for mergers and acquisitions within a country.” (p. 300).
Kuipers,  Miller  and  Patel  (2003)  examine  the  legal  environment  and  corporate
governance structures in the countries of foreign bidders from 1982 to 1991 in order to
explain the value creation in cross-border acquisitions. Their final sample contains 181
tender offers for U.S. target firms by 150 foreign acquirer firms covering 16 countries.
Kuipers et  al.  find  that  target  cumulative  abnormal  returns  are  positively  and
significantly related to the rule of law in the bidder country, where the rule of law is
measured  from  La  Porta et  al.  (1998).  The  results  also  show  that  target  cumulative
abnormal returns are positively, but insignificantly, correlated with the antidirector rights
index in the bidder country, where the antidirector rights index are measured from La Porta
et al. (1998). Accordingly, their results indicate that higher target cumulative abnormal
returns  are  associated  with  acquisitions  by  firms  in  a  country  with  stronger  legal
environment.69
Bris  and  Cabolis  (2004)  study the  relationship  between  investor  protection  in  a
country and the announcement effect of the firm from 1989 to 2002. The final sample
contains  506  cross-border  mergers  and  506  corresponding  domestic  mergers  from  39
countries. Bris and Cabolis find that target cumulative abnormal returns are positively, but
insignificantly,  correlated  with  shareholder  protection  in a  target  country,  where
shareholder protection is measured by the product of the shareholder rights index and the
rule of law from La Porta et al. (1998). Their findings also show that target cumulative
abnormal returns are positively, but insignificantly, related to the difference of shareholder
protection between the bidder and target countries.
In another paper with the same investigation period and sample size, Bris and Cabolis
(2008)  find  that  cumulative  abnormal  returns  of  target  firms  are  negatively,  but
insignificantly, related to shareholder protection in the target country, where shareholder
protection is measured as the product of the shareholder rights index and the legal system
from La Porta et al. (1998). These findings are inconsistent with their previous study. A
possible explanation may be the different construction of model specification. However, no
significant impact of investor protection in either of their studies can be found.
Stark and Wei (2004) investigate whether differences in corporate governance affect
firm valuation in cross-border mergers from 1980 to 1998. The targets are restricted to be
U.S. firms. Bids are excluded if bidding firms do not control over 50% of target shares
after the transactions. The authors argue that “inclusion of small deals adds substantial
noise  to  the  analysis  without  adding  insight.”  (p.  9).  Thus,  bids  are  included  if  the
transaction value is larger than one million U.S. dollars. Their final sample consists of 371
cross-border mergers.
Stark  and  Wei find  that  target  cumulative  abnormal  returns  are  negatively,  but
insignificantly, related to the antidirector rights index in a bidder country measured from
La Porta et al. (1998).
In addition, Stark and Wei find that target cumulative abnormal returns is negatively70
and  significantly  correlated  with  shareholder  protection,  measured  as  the  product  of
antidirector rights index and the rule of law in the bidder country from La Porta et al.
(1998). The results suggest that “target abnormal returns are decreasing in the quality of
the  bidders’  home  country  governance.”  (p.  20).  The  results  suggest  that  target  firm
shareholders  are  compensated  as  a  result  of  inferior  corporate  governance  regimes  of
foreign acquirers.
Anderson,  Marshall  and  Wales  (2009)  examine  the  relationship  between  investor
protection and target takeover returns within Europe from 1997 to 2004. Their final sample
contains  534  announcements  in  24  countries.  The  authors  find  that  target  cumulative
announcement  returns  are  positively  and  significantly  associated  with  the  dummy  of
investor protection in a target country, where the dummy of investor protection is equal to
1 if the country is from a strong investor protection country.
36  The results indicate that
targets in stronger investor protection countries can extract higher announcement returns
relative to those in weak investor protection countries.
As Anderson et al. (2009) argue that “strong investor protection environments endow
targets  with  greater  bargaining  power  compared  to  environments  with  weak  investor
protection”  (p.  303),  their  findings  indicate  that  targets  in  strong  investor  protection
countries  obtain  larger  takeover  announcement  returns.  Their  findings  imply  that
“acquirers  need  to  offer  larger  premiums  if  they  want  to  successfully  acquire  target
companies with greater bargaining power.” (p. 303).
As discussed above, most of prior empirical studies focus on exploring target bid
premium or target announcement returns in association with investor protection in a target
country (Rossi and Volpin (2004); Bris and Cabolis (2004,2008); Anderson et al. (2009)).
This suggests that target shareholder wealth can be affected by investor protection in a
target country although Kuipers et al. (2003) and Stark and Wei (2004) analyse target
36 Anderson et al. (2009) document that “we refer to English- and Scandinavian-origin countries as having
strong  investor  protection  and  French-origin  and  Eastern  European  countries  as  having  weak  investor
protection.” (p. 293). The classification of country origin is based on La Porta et al.’s (1998) study.71
announcement returns in relation to investor protection in a bidder country. As Rossi and
Volpin (2004), Bris and Cabolis (2004,2008), Anderson et al. (2009) focus on investor
protection  in  a  target  country,  these  studies  indicate  that  the  importance  of  investor
protection  in  a  target  country  may  have  an  influence  on  target  announcement  returns.
Following  these  studies,  this thesis  also  examines target  announcement  returns  in
conjunction with investor protection in a target country.
In addition, Bris and Cabolis (2004,2008) also analyse target announcement returns
in relation to the difference of investor protection between the bidder and target countries.
This may also suggest that the difference of investor protection between the bidder and
target countries may have an impact to target shareholder wealth. However, due to the lack
of the empirical evidence, the current study also examines the relationship between target
announcement returns and the difference of investor protection between the bidder and
target countries as will be presented in the empirical section in chapter 6. This provides
additional insights to reveal whether the difference of investor protection in a bidder and
target country on the impact of target shareholder wealth in bank mergers.
However, without reviewing prior empirical evidence for bidder shareholder wealth,
it may not be clear to understand the impact of investor protection on bidder announcement
returns. As a result, the following section discusses prior empirical evidence for bidder
shareholder wealth.
3.3.1.2.1.2 Bidder shareholder wealth
Turning to the analysis of bidder shareholder wealth, Kuipers et al. (2003) find that
cumulative  abnormal  returns  of  acquiring  firms  are  negatively,  but  insignificantly,
correlated to the rule of law in a bidder country. In contrast, the results show that bidder
cumulative  abnormal  returns  are  positively  and  significantly  related  to the antidirector
rights  index  in  the  bidder  country.  Kuipers et  al.  argue  that  “When  shareholders  are
protected, the alignment of interests between managers and shareholders is strong, and72
managers pursue wealth-creating investment policies for their shareholders as a result.” (p.
25).
Bris and Cabolis (2004) report that bidder cumulative abnormal returns is positively,
but  insignificantly,  associated  with  shareholder  protection  in  the  bidder  country. Their
findings  also  show  that  bidder  cumulative  abnormal  returns  are  negatively,  but
insignificantly, related to the difference of shareholder protection between the bidder and
target  countries.  As  a  result,  the  authors  report  that  the  market  with  poorer  corporate
governance  positively  values  the  change  of  better  corporate  governance  through
cross-border mergers, but the results are not significant.
Stark and Wei (2004) find that bidder cumulative abnormal returns are positively, but
insignificantly, associated with both shareholder rights and shareholder protection in the
bidder country.
As discussed above, Kuipers et al. (2003), Bris and Cabolis (2004) and Stark and Wei
(2004)  analyse  the  relationship  between  bidder  announcement  returns  and  investor
protection in a bidder country. While the results are often not significant, there is some
evidence of a positive association between bidder announcement returns and the level of
investor  protection  in  a  bidder  country.  Following  these  studies,  this  thesis  also  uses
investor  protection  in  a  bidder  country  to  examine  the  relationship  with  bidder
announcement returns.
Although Bris  and  Cabolis  (2004)  also  explore  the  relationship  between  bidder
announcement returns and the difference of investor protection between the bidder and
target countries, limited empirical evidence offers an opportunity to further look into the
difference of investor protection between the bidder and target countries on the impact of
bidder  announcement  returns.  Thus,  the  current  study  can  provide  more  evidence  in
academic research.
While prior empirical studies have been discussed above with respect to target and
bidder shareholder wealth, it is uncertain as to whether investor protection in a country can73
affect the announcement returns of combined firms. Thus, the following section reviews
prior empirical evidence for shareholder wealth of combined firms in order to provide a
clear picture to address the impact of investor protection on combined firms shareholder
wealth.
3.3.1.2.1.3 Combined firms shareholder wealth
In addition to the analysis of target and bidder shareholder wealth, Kuipers et al.
(2003)  also  analyse  combined  firms  and  find  that cumulative  abnormal  returns  of
combined firms are positively, but insignificantly,  associated with the rule of law in a
bidder  country.  Additionally,  there  is  a  positive  and  significant  relationship  between
combined  firms’  cumulative  abnormal  returns  and the antidirector  rights  index  in  the
bidder country. The results indicate that higher cumulative abnormal returns for combined
firms  are  associated  with  acquisitions  by bidders from  a  country  with  better  legal
environment. However, Stark and Wei (2004) report “no significant relation between the
combined portfolio return and the corporate governance proxies.” (p. 28).
As discussed above, both Kuipers et al. (2003) and Stark and Wei (2004) analyse
combined firms announcement returns in relation to investor protection in a bidder country.
This may indicate that investor protection in a bidder country may be expected to have an
influence on combined firms announcement returns. However, due to the lack of prior
empirical evidence, the impact of the level of investor protection in a bidder country on
shareholder  wealth  for  combined  firms  is  not  clear.  This  suggests  a  need  to  further
investigate  the  impact  of  investor protection  in  a  bidder  country  on  combined  firms
shareholder wealth.
Overall,  several  prior  empirical  studies  discussed  above  have  explored  the
relationship between the cumulative abnormal returns of the firms and investor protection
in a country. The results suggest investor protection in a country can be expected to affect74
the announcement returns of the firms. However, these prior empirical studies only focus
on industrial firms in mergers and acquisitions. Prior empirical evidence from industrial
firms  may  not  be  applicable  to  financial  firms.  It  is  not  clear  as  to  whether  investor
protection in a country can affect the announcement returns of the firms in bank mergers
and acquisitions. As a result, the following section reviews the prior empirical evidence
from financial firms.
3.3.1.2.2 Empirical evidence from financial firms
Boubakri, Dionne and Triki (2008) examine the potential determinants of the long
run performance of acquirers in association with the level of investor protection in a target
country. Bidders are restricted to be U.S. insurance companies. Their final sample contains
177 transactions from 1995 to 2000.
Boubakri et al. find that bidder buy and hold abnormal returns are negatively and
significantly  associated  with  investor  protection  in  the  target  country, where  investor
protection is measured from La Porta et al.’s (1998) index. The results indicate that poorer
investor protection in the target country results in higher bidder buy and hold abnormal
returns. Thus, Boubakri et al. argue that “shareholders seem to receive a positive premium
for this additional risk.” (p. 67).
In addition, Boubakri et al. also document that bidder buy and hold abnormal returns
are negatively correlated to the difference of investor protection between the bidder and
target countries. However, their study focuses on the long run performance of the acquirer
instead of looking at short term announcement effects. In addition, the focus in the study of
Boubakri et al. is insurance firms instead of banking firms.
Hagendorff, Collins and Keasey (2007) similarly use La Porta et al’s (1998) index to
explore the relationship between the level of investor protection in the target country and
bidder abnormal returns around bank merger announcements from 1996 to 2004. Investor
protection is measured as the product of the antidirector rights index and the rule of law75
from La Porta et al.’s (1998) study. As discussed in chapter 2, their final sample comprises
204 bank mergers.
Applying univariate analysis, Hagendorff et al. report that bidders earn higher returns
when targets are located in a country with a low protection environment. The authors argue
that  “In  low  protection  environments,  investors  may  demand  compensation  for  lower
governance standards and a higher risk of expropriation by insiders.” (p. 1339).
Furthermore, using regression analysis, Hagendorff et al. find that bidder cumulative
abnormal returns are negatively and significantly related to investor protection in the target
country. However, the authors do not analyse the relationship between target cumulative
abnormal returns and investor protection in a country.
In  addition,  both  studies  discussed  above  restrict  their  analysis  to  bidder
announcement returns. Boubakri et al. (2008) look at long run announcement returns in the
insurance  firms  rather  than  short  term  announcement  returns  in  the  banking  firms.
Although Hagendorff et al. (2007) focus on short term announcement returns for the banks,
their study only covers a sample from the U.S. and EU markets. Their findings may not be
applicable to other developed or developing countries.
As  discussed  earlier,  prior  empirical  studies  focused  on  industrial  firms  have
suggested the importance of investor protection in a home country in association with
bidder announcement returns. However, both Hagendorff et al. (2007) and Boubakri et al.
(2008) analyse bidder announcement returns in association with investor protection in a
target country. Their studies do not analyse bidder announcement returns in relation to
investor protection in a host country. It remains an open question as to whether bidder
announcement returns in bank mergers and acquisitions can be affected by the level of
investor protection in a bidder’s home country.
In  addition,  prior  studies  do  not  examine the  impact  of investor  protection  in  a
country on either target and combined firms announcement returns in bank mergers and
acquisitions.  This  suggests  a  need  to  further  explore  the  relationship  between  the76
announcement  returns  of  the  firms  in  bank  mergers  and  acquisitions  and  investor
protection in a host country.
The prior empirical studies discussed above with respect to investor protection in a
country rely on La Porta et al.’s (1998) index to measure the level of investor protection in
a country. La Porta et al.’s (1998) index is based on historic data to construct the index,
possibly raising questions as to whether the index is still valid. However, La Porta et al.’s
(1998) index is still applied in empirical studies, suggesting the importance of La Porta et
al.’s (1998) index continue to be recognised in the empirical research. Following prior
empirical studies, the current study also uses La Porta et al.’s (1998) index to carry out the
empirical test as will be presented in chapter 6, 7 and 8.
In addition, this thesis uses the antidirector rights index and the rule of law from La
Porta et  al.’s  (1998)  index  to  measure  the  level  of  investor  protection  in  a  country
separately. This allows the current study to provide additional insights to the importance of
each variable regarding to investor protection in a country. Using La Porta et al.’s (1998)
index also enables this thesis to make a comparison with prior empirical studies. However,
La Porta et al.’s (1998) index has also encountered some criticism by researchers, as will
be discussed below. The following section reviews prior empirical studies with respect to
an alternative measurement of investor protection in a country.
3.3.2 Investor protection measured from alternative index
La  Porta et  al.’s  (1998)  antidirector  rights  index  has received  some  criticism  by
researchers (Pagano and Volpin (2005); Spamann (2005); Djankov et al. (2006, 2008)).
Djankov et al. (2006, 2008) argue that La Porta et al.’s (1998) antidirector rights index has
its limitation due to conceptual ambiguity in the definitions of some of its components.
Thus, Djankov et al. (2006, 2008) develop their revised antidirector rights index to deal
with  these  concerns. Djankov et  al.  (2008)  present  that “….a revised  index  of
anti-director rights for 72 countries based on laws and regulations applicable to publicly77
traded  firms  in  May  2003.  The  revised  index  relies  on  the  same  basic  dimensions  of
corporate law, but defines them with more precision.” (p. 453).
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Freund, Nguyen and Vasudevan (2008) use the revised antidirector rights index to
study the effects of target country shareholder protection on acquirer returns. Their study
focuses on cross-border transactions during the 1984-2005 period. Acquiring firms are
restricted to be U.S. industrial firms and target firms are limited to be non-U.S. firms. Their
final sample contains 1,525 takeovers.
The authors find that firms acquiring public targets in high shareholder protection
countries earn -0.76% cumulative abnormal returns over a 3-day (-1,+1) event window
compared to 0.94% cumulative abnormal returns for firms that acquire public targets in
low shareholder protection countries, both statistically significant. The difference between
high and low shareholder protection in the target country is statistically significant at the
0.05 level. Freund et al. argue that “The shareholders of the public-target company receive
more of the value created by these takeovers because of the high-level of protection offered
to these investors and acquirer shareholders realize less of the benefits.” (p. 17).
Freund et  al.  find  that  bidder  cumulative  abnormal  returns  are  negatively  and
significantly  related  to  shareholder  protection  in  the  target  country,  where  shareholder
protection is measured as the revised antidirector rights index from Djankov et al. (2006).
The results imply that bidder cumulative abnormal returns are lower when the target is
located in a country with better shareholder protection, which lend support to their findings
in the univariate analysis. However, the results depend on definition of investor protection
used. Although Freund et al. (2008) use Djankov et al.’s (2006) revised antidirector rights
37 The  revised  antidirector  right  index  in  Djankov et  al.  (2006)  is  formed  by  summing  six  component
variables, each of which can increment the antidirector rights index by one if: (1) the law of the country
explicitly mandates proxy vote; (2) shareholders are not required to deposit their shares prior to a general
shareholders’  meeting;  (3)  the  law  explicitly  mandates  cumulative  voting;  (4)  an  oppressed  minority
mechanism is in place; (5) listing rules explicitly mandate pre-emptive rights for shareholders; and (6) when
the minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call for an extraordinary meeting is less
than  10  percentage.”  (p.  28).  Djankov et  al.  (2008)  point  out  that “The  general  principle  behind  the
construction of the revised anti-director rights index is to associate better investor protection with laws that
explicitly mandate, or set as a default rule, provisions that are favorable to minority shareholders.” (p. 454).78
index to measure investor protection, limited evidence based on this index may suggest a
need for further research applying this index. Thus, this thesis also uses Djankov et al.’s
(2006)  revised  antidirector  rights  index  as  a  robustness  check.  This  can  also  test  the
sensitivity of the results to alternative definition of investor protection.
In another paper, Martynova and Renneboog (2008) construct their own index to
measure  the  quality  of  corporate  governance  standards.  The  authors  argue  that “these
indices overcome some of the limitations of the LLSV indices. First, our indices are based
on a broader definition of corporate governance regulation than that used by LLSV. Second,
our indices are dynamic: they capture the many regulatory reforms on a yearly basis since
1990.”  (p.  205).  However, Martynova  and  Renneboog’s  (2008)  index  only  covers  EU
countries instead of a number of developing and developed countries.
Martynova and Renneboog employ their index to study whether the value creation
can be explained by differences in the quality of corporate governance standards between
the bidder and target countries in cross-border takeovers between 1993 and 2001. Their
final  sample  contains  2,419  domestic  and  cross-border  deals,  where  737  deals  are
cross-border transactions.
The  authors  find  that  target  cumulative  abnormal  returns are  positively  and
significantly  related  to  the  target  shareholder  rights  index,  suggesting  that  “target
companies  from  countries  with  better  shareholder  protection  are  able  to  extract  higher
premiums from the bidding firms.” (p. 214).
Further analysis shows that target cumulative abnormal returns are positively and
significantly  associated  with  the  difference  between  the  bidder  and  target  shareholder
rights  index.  Martynova  and  Renneboog  explain  that  bidder  corporate  governance
standards will be imposed on the target firm as a result of higher target announcement
returns when a bidding firm comes from a country with higher shareholder protection than
the target.
In addition, the results show that bidder cumulative abnormal returns are positively,79
but insignificantly, related to the shareholder rights index in the bidder country. The results
also  show  that  bidder  cumulative  abnormal  returns  are  positively,  but  insignificantly,
correlated  to  the  difference  between  the  bidder  and  target  shareholder  rights  index.
However, the authors do not provide their indices in their study and their indices only
cover  European  countries.  Due  to limited data  availability,  this  thesis  cannot  apply
Martynova and Renneboog’s index in the analysis. On the other hand, Martynova and
Renneboog’s findings are in general consistent with prior empirical studies discussed from
industrial firms although the results are not statistically significant.
Prior empirical studies have used alternative indices to measure the level of investor
protection  in  a  country,  as  discussed  above.  However,  these  two  studies  only  look  at
industrial firms instead of financial firms. This suggests a need to apply these indices in the
study of financial firms as a robustness check.
On the other hand, due to the unavailability of Martynova and Renneboog’s (2008)
index, this thesis only relies on Djankov et al.’s (2006) revised antidirector rights index as
an alternative measurement of investor protection as a robustness check in the empirical
test in chapter 6, 7 and 8.
3.4 Bank regulation
Caprio et  al.  (2007)  argue  that “One  standard  rationale  for  heavy  government
regulation  on  banks  is  that  shareholders  and  creditors  lack  sufficient  mechanisms  for
exerting sound governance over extraordinarily complex, opaque banks.” (p. 585). Caprio
et al. argue that effective regulation may exert a positive influence on bank valuations in
that it may reduce the expropriation. Managers may reduce the risk-taking behaviour that
may affect bank valuation. Specifically, when banks engage in mergers and acquisitions,
bank regulation might effectively impede expropriation and reduce the conflicts between
managers and shareholders. As a result, the strength of bank regulation in a country may
have an influence on the outcome of mergers and acquisitions in increasing bank valuation80
and shareholder wealth.
To measure the strength of bank regulation in a country, Barth et al. (2001, 2003)
conduct a survey of national regulatory agencies to obtain information for bank regulation
and supervisory practices in 107 countries published by the World Bank. Barth et al. (2004)
argue  that “The  data,  primarily  from  1999,  used  to  assess  which  regulations  and
supervisory practices are associated with greater bank development, better performance,
and increased stability as well as those that are not.” (p. 206). A number of prior empirical
studies apply Barth et al.’s (2001, 2003) database to examine the effects of bank regulation
in relation to bank risk-taking, bank performance and mergers and  acquisitions. These
studies are discussed below.
3.4.1 Empirical evidence related to bank risk taking
Some prior empirical studies argue that regulations can have an impact on the risk
taking behaviour of banks (Besanko and Kanatas (1996); Demirguc-Kunt and Kane (2002);
Fernandez  and  Gonzalez  (2005);  Gonzalez  (2005);  Pennacchi  (2006);  Pasiouras et  al.
(2008)). Pasiouras et al. (2008) argue that “the regulatory environment can play a role in
the M&As activity.” (p. 137). Amihud, DeLong and Saunders (2002) analyse bank risk to
investigate the effects of cross-border bank mergers on the risk and returns of acquiring
banks between 1985 and 1998. Bids are included if bidders acquire more than 50% of
target shares after the transactions. Their final sample consists of 214 mergers.
The  results  show  that  cumulative  abnormal  returns  of  bidders  are  positively,  but
insignificantly,  related  to  the  total  risk  as  measured  by  the  variance  of  a  bank’s  stock
returns relative to the home bank index. Thus, Amihud et al. argue that “even if significant
risk  shifting  opportunities  exists,  via  cross-border  mergers,  stockholders  do  not  expect
acquiring banks to exploit them, or that such risk shifting opportunities are limited.” (p.
876).
Buch and DeLong (2008) study whether supervisory systems influence changes in81
the riskiness of banks. Their final sample contains 81 cross-border bank mergers from
1998  to  2002. The  authors  find  that  bank  risk  after  a  cross-border  bank  merger  is
negatively and significantly related to deposit insurance in the bidder country, indicating
that lower risk after cross-border bank merger is associated with the existence of deposit
insurance in the bidder country. Buch and DeLong argue that banks realise that “a strong
supervisory  system  implies  they  will  receive  greater  scrutiny  when  they  engage  in
cross-border  merger.”  (p.  35).  The  authors report  that  “Acquirers  from  countries  with
strong supervisory systems tend to reduce risk-taking while banks from countries with
weaker supervisory systems tend to increase risk-taking after a cross-border merger.” (p.
35).
Furthermore, Buch and DeLong conduct additional analysis in order to examine the
market  reaction  in  relation  to  bank  supervision. The  authors  do  not  find  evidence  to
support the relationship between cumulative abnormal returns of bidding bank and bank
supervision, implying that investors do not value potential risk-shifting in cross-border
bank mergers.
Although both Amihud et al. (2002) and Buch and DeLong (2008) analyse bank risk
in relation to the announcement returns of the firms in mergers and acquisitions, these two
papers  do  not  analyse  the  link  between  bank  regulation  and  bank  performance.  Bank
performance can be expected to have an impact on the announcement returns of the firms
in bank mergers. Thus, the following section reviews some papers in this respect.
3.4.2 Empirical evidence related to bank performance
Barth, Dopico, Nolle and Wilcox (2002) examine the relationship between banking
performance  and  bank  supervision  and  regulation  in  1999, covering  70  countries. The
authors find that bank regulation, measured as restrictions on securities activities from
Barth et al. (2001), is positively and significantly related to bank performance as measured
by  ROA.  The  results  indicate  that  stronger  bank  regulation  results  in  higher  bank82
performance.
Caprio,  Laeven  and  Levine  (2007)  used 244  banks  in  44  countries  in  2001  to
investigate the relationship between bank valuations and bank regulations. Caprio et al.
find  that  the  valuation  of  the  banks  is  negatively,  but  insignificantly,  correlated  to
regulatory restrictions on bank activities from Barth et al. (2004, 2006)
38, showing that
higher bank valuation is associated with weaker bank regulation. In addition, the results
also show that the valuation of the banks is positively, but insignificantly, correlated to
bank regulations, as measured by official supervisory power
39, the stringency of capital
requirements, and independence of the supervisory authority
40, denoting that higher bank
valuation is associated with stronger bank regulation.
However, as Caprio et al. (2007) report an insignificant relationship between bank
performance and bank supervision, the authors state that “we do not find robust evidence
that the stringency of capital requirements or official supervisory power influences bank
regulations, nor do we find the regulatory restrictions on bank activities affect the market’s
valuation of banks.” (p. 32). Caprio et al. conclude that they find no evidence that bank
valuation can be influenced by bank regulation.
Barth, Nolle, Phumiwasana and Yago (2008) investigate the relationship between the
structure, scope and independence of bank supervision and bank performance from 1996 to
1999. The final sample includes 2,300 individual banks in 55 countries. The results show
that bank profitability, measured as profit before tax to total assets, is in general positively,
but insignificantly, associated with restrictions on bank activities. Thus, the authors argue
that “tighter restrictions on bank activities are not related to bank profitability.” (p. 112).
38 Caprio et al. (2007) document that regulatory restrictions on bank activities are “index of regulatory
restrictions on banks ability to engage in securities market activities, the insurance business, conduct real
estate activities, or own non-financial firms.” (p. 592).
39 Caprio et al. (2007) document that “Index of official supervisory power. Adds one for an affirmative
response to each for the following 14 questions. 1. Does the supervisory agency have the right to meet with
external auditors to discuss their report without the approval of the bank?...” (p.592).
40 Caprio et al. (2007) document that independence of the supervisory authority is “the degree to which the
supervisory authority is independent from the government and legally protected from the banking system.
(p.592).83
In addition, the results also show that independence of the supervisory authority is
negatively, but insignificantly, correlated to bank profitability. With regard to their findings,
Barth et al. argue that “Our results indicate, at most, a weak influence for the structure of
supervision on bank performance.” (p. 115).
As discussed above, these studies have reported empirical evidence with respect to
the relationship between bank performance/valuation and bank regulation. However, these
studies do not particularly focus on mergers and acquisitions to investigate the relationship
between shareholder wealth of bank mergers and bank regulation. As banks with better
performance may obtain higher value of the transactions that may also affect shareholder
wealth of bank mergers, it is not clear whether the level of bank regulation has an impact
on shareholder wealth of bank mergers. Consequently, the following section discusses prior
empirical studies related to shareholder wealth of bank mergers.
3.4.3 Empirical evidence relating to shareholder wealth in bank mergers
In a paper analysing shareholder wealth of bank mergers, Ongena and Penas (2008)
examine the effects of bank supervisory regime on both bondholder and shareholder wealth
in bank mergers between 1998 and 2002. Bids are included if the transaction involves a
change of corporate control after the transaction and the deal value is larger than 100 U.S.
million dollars. Their final sample includes 127 bidders and 71 targets.
The authors explore the relationship between the bank supervisory regime and the
difference of cumulative abnormal returns for domestic and cross-border bank mergers in
terms of bondholders’ wealth. The results show that the difference in cumulative abnormal
returns between domestic and cross-border bank mergers is positively and significantly
correlated  to  bank  supervision  measured  as  prudential  forbearance
41. Thus,  the  results
indicate that higher bondholder returns are obtained if “the acquirer bank engages a target
41  Ongena and Penas (2008) indicate that prudential forbearance relies on Barth et al.’s (2006) dataset in the
World  Bank  survey.  The  data  evaluates  whether “bank  restructuring  and  reorganization,  the  supervisory
agency or any other government agency [can] forbear certain prudential regulations?” (p. 8).84
bank located in a country with fewer institutions that can forbear prudential regulations
(compared to the acquirer’s country).” (p. 14).
42
On the other hand, Ongena and Penas also explore the association between bank
supervisory regime and the difference in cumulative abnormal returns for domestic and
cross-border bank mergers in terms of shareholders’ wealth. The results show that the
difference in cumulative abnormal returns is negatively and significantly associated with
bank  supervision  measured  as  prudential  forbearance.  The  results  suggest  that
equityholders earn lower returns if “a bank engages a partner bank located in a country
with  fewer  institutions  that  can  forbear  prudential  regulations  (compared  to  the  own
country).” (p. 15).
With respect to their findings, Ongena and Penas argue that “while a lower likelihood
of prudential forbearance benefits bondholders, it hurts equityholders.” (p. 16). However,
the authors do not analyse the impact of bank regulation on the shareholder wealth for
targets  and  bidders  separately.  In  addition,  their  study  only  looks  at  bank  mergers  in
Europe.
Due to limited prior evidence, it is not clear whether bank regulation in a country can
have an influence to shareholder wealth of the firms in bank mergers and acquisitions. This
suggests a need to further examine the impact of bank regulation on the shareholder wealth
of the firms in bank mergers and acquisitions.
Overall, as discussed above, several prior empirical studies have explored the effects
of bank regulation on bank risk taking and bank performance. However, only one prior
empirical study investigates bank regulation on the impact of shareholder wealth of bank
mergers. Due to limited empirical evidence, this suggests a need to further investigate the
impact of bank regulation on the announcement returns of the firms in bank mergers.
On the other hand, it can be seen that prior empirical studies use different aspects of
42 Due to data availability, this thesis does not analyse bondholder wealth.85
bank regulation from Barth et al. (2001, 2003) to carry out their research. While focusing
on cross-country analysis in this thesis, I do not cover all aspect of bank regulation from
Barth et al.’s (2003) dataset due to data availability issues. Thus, the variables employed to
the  current  study  include  overall  activities  restrictiveness,  official  supervisory  power,
prompt corrective power and independence of supervisory authority-overall. This allows
the current study to obtain sufficient observations to carry out the regression analysis in the
empirical section in chapter 6, 7 and 8. The variables of bank regulation used in the current
study will be specified in chapter 4.
In additional, this thesis only relies on the data of bank regulation from Barth et al.
(2003) as can be argued that this is an update data relative to that from Barth et al. (2001).
While bank regulation published by the World Bank may be revised in 2007, it should be
taken into account the investigation period from 1995 to 2005 in this thesis. Thus, an
update data after the year of 2007 may not be suitable to be applied in the current study.
3.5 Conclusion
This  chapter  discusses  the  theoretical  background  of  corporate  governance,  the
theoretical  linkage  of  investor  protection  and  bank  regulation  on  the  impact  of  the
announcement  returns  of  the  firms  in  bank  mergers,  and  the  empirical  evidence  with
respect to investor protection and bank regulation. According to agency theory, there are
conflicts  between  managers  and  shareholders.  When  the  firms engage  in  mergers  and
acquisitions,  managers  may  pursue  their  own  interests  at  the  expense  of  shareholders
through mergers and acquisitions. Hence, the existence of agency costs may affect the
wealth of shareholders.
The  presence  of  corporate  governance  mechanisms  is  to  mitigate  the  conflicts
between managers and shareholders and to align interests of managers and shareholders.
From this perspective, the existence of corporate governance mechanisms can provide a
function to monitor managerial behaviour and protect minority shareholders. If corporate86
governance  mechanisms  are  effective  to  monitor  managers,  these  mechanisms  can  be
expected to enhance the value of the firms and the wealth of shareholders.
As has been discussed previously, prior empirical studies pay little attention to the
country level corporate governance mechanisms in terms of investor protection and bank
regulation in relation to mergers and acquisitions. This suggests a need to provide more
evidence in this area. Thus, this thesis looks at the country level corporate governance
mechanisms in terms of investor protection and bank regulation to explore the impact of
shareholder wealth in bank mergers.
While  a  small  number  of  prior  empirical  studies analyse  target (bidder)
announcement returns in relation to investor protection in a target (bidder) country, these
studies  would  suggest  that  investor  protection  in  a  home  country  can  be  important  to
influence the announcement returns of the firms. However, the majority of prior empirical
studies focus on industrial firms, and the empirical evidence for financial firms is limited.
Furthermore, prior empirical studies do not use a large international sample of bank
mergers, covering  a  variety  of  developing  and  developed  countries  to  investigate  the
relationship between investor protection in a country and the announcement returns of the
firms. This thesis aims to fill this gap.
In addition, there is a lack of prior empirical evidence to explore the relationship
between bank regulation and the announcement returns of the firms as bank regulation can
be an alternative corporate governance mechanisms to reduce agency conflicts and protect
shareholders. Although Ongena and Penas (2008) study the impact of bank regulation on
the announcement returns of bidding firms in bank mergers, their study does not include an
analysis of targets or combined firms.
Due  to  the  lack  of  empirical  evidence  to  study  the  relationship  between  the
announcement returns of the firms and bank regulation, no direct empirical evidence to
reveal the impact of bank regulation on the shareholder wealth of bank mergers. This is
also a gap to be filled in this thesis.87
On the other hand, as bidders may exert more control power to target firms after
the transactions, the level of bank regulation in a bidder country may be expected to have
more influence on bid premium. Moreover, bank regulation is more important to have an
influence on banks instead of the financial firms. As will be discussed in chapter 5, bidding
firms are restricted to be banks in the current study. This thesis uses bank regulation in a
bidder country  to study the impact of shareholder wealth of bank mergers for targets,
bidders and combined firms.
Finally, this thesis uses a large international sample of bank mergers to study the
impact  of  investor  protection  and  bank  regulation  on  the  shareholder  wealth  of  bank
mergers. Due to the financial crisis recently, a number of countries attempt to reform their
financial system by imposing more bank regulation to monitor managers. This may allow
the financial firms to reduce their risk and maintain their stability.
Furthermore,  due  to  the  competitiveness  of  the  financial  market  globally,  some
banking  firms  intend  to  enhance  their  competitive  advantage  in  generating  higher
profitability through mergers and acquisitions. Thus, the number of merger and acquisition
activities  in  the  banking  industry  significantly  increases.  However,  there  is  limited
evidence to explore the effects of the country level corporate governance mechanisms in
terms of bank regulation on the shareholder wealth of bank mergers. It remains a puzzle to
illustrate the importance of bank regulation on the impact of the announcement returns of
the firms.
On  the  other  hand,  a  number  of  countries  also  attempt  to  strength  their investor
protection law in order to protect minority shareholders. This can further enlarge their
financial market in that foreign firms may want to invest their funding in a country with
strong  investor  protection.  Accordingly,  this  may  also  increase  merger  and  acquisition
activities. Due to limited evidence, it remains an open question as to whether investor
protection can have an influence on the announcement returns of the firms.
Prior empirical studies largely focus on the industrial firms instead of the financial88
firms. However, the results from the industrial firms may not be applicable to the financial
firms.  This  further  illustrates  the  need  to  explore the  relationship  between  the
announcement  returns  of the  firms  and  investor  protection  and  bank  regulation  in  the
banking industry. Using a historical data from 1995 to 2005 to undertake the current study,
my results can explain the influence of investor protection and bank regulation on the
shareholder  wealth  of  bank  mergers. The  results  in  the  current  study  can  provide  the
empirical  evidence  to  reveal  the  importance  of  the  legal  system  to  affect  shareholder
wealth  of  bank  mergers.  The  empirical findings  in the  current  study  can  also  benefit
investors,  managers  and  regulators/policymakers  when  making  their  investment  or
supervising decisions.
3.6 Limitations of existing empirical studies
The  aim  of  this  thesis  is  to  explore  the  impact  of  investor  protection  and  bank
regulation on the shareholder wealth around bank merger and acquisition announcements
from 1995 to 2005. As has been discussed in chapter 2 and 3, a number of prior empirical
studies have been reviewed with respect to shareholder wealth of bank mergers and the
relationship between the cumulative abnormal returns of the firm and investor protection
and bank regulation in a country. However, prior empirical studies appear to suffer from
various limitations that enable the current study to make a contribution to this area of
research.
With respect to shareholder wealth in bank mergers discussed in chapter 2, it is not
possible to draw a clear conclusion regarding the level of target announcement returns in
that  targets  generally  obtain  a  wide  variation  of  the abnormal  returns. Bidder
announcement  returns  are  inconclusive,  suggesting  a  need  to  further  explore  bidder
shareholder wealth.  In addition, there are  few prior international empirical studies and
these do  not  cover  a  large  international  sample  of  bank  mergers  from  a  number  of
developing and developed countries. This is a gap to be filled in the current study, where I89
will explicitly test whether abnormal returns, to targets, bidders and to targets and bidders
combined, vary systematically between the U.S., the EU and other markets.
Furthermore,  prior  empirical  studies  to  explore  the  relationship  between  the
cumulative abnormal returns of the firms and investor protection and bank regulation in a
country are limited. This drawback is particularly apparent in the study of financial firms.
Although Hagendorff et al. (2007) have presented the empirical evidence to explore the
relationship between bidder cumulative abnormal returns and investor protection in a target
country, their study does not cover a wide range of developing and developed countries.
In addition, their study does not analyse targets and combined firms as well. So, there
is no direct evidence to explore whether investor protection can be important determinants
to explain the announcement returns of the firms in bank mergers and acquisitions. Thus,
this  thesis  also  intends  to  fill  this  gap  to  explore  the  relationship  between  investor
protection in a country and the cumulative abnormal returns of the firms around bank
merger and acquisition announcements for targets, bidders and combined firms.
Turning to the analysis of bank regulation, Ongena and Penas (2008) explore the
relationship between bank regulation and shareholder wealth in bank mergers. However,
Ongena and Penas’s study only looks at the difference of the cumulative abnormal returns
in domestic and cross-border bank mergers. Their study does not analyse the impact of
bank regulation on shareholder wealth of bank mergers for targets, bidders and combined
firms, respectively.
Due to the lack of the empirical evidence, it is not clear as to whether bank regulation
can affect the cumulative abnormal returns of the firms during bank merger and acquisition
announcements.  It remains  an  open  question as  to  whether  bank  regulation  can be
important determinants to explain shareholder wealth in bank mergers. Hence, this thesis
also attempts to fill up this gap in the academic research. As a result, this thesis investigates
the impact of investor protection and bank regulation on the shareholder wealth around
bank merger and acquisition announcements for targets, bidders and combined firms.90
Chapter 4 Research Questions and Hypotheses
4.1 Introduction
The  aim  of  this  thesis  is  to  explore  the  impact  of  investor  protection  and  bank
regulation on the shareholder wealth around bank merger and acquisition announcements
during  the  1995-2005  period. Limitations of  the  existing  empirical  studies  have  been
pointed out in chapters 2 and 3. This chapter aims to address the research questions and
develop the hypotheses in the current study. This allows the current study to carry out the
empirical tests in chapters 6, 7 and 8.
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 addresses the research questions.
The  development  of  hypotheses  is  presented  in  section  4.3.  Finally,  conclusions  are
provided in section 4.4.
4.2 Research questions
Several prior empirical studies related to bank mergers and acquisitions have been
discussed  in  chapter  2.  The  existing  literature  involving  investor  protection  and  bank
regulation has also been reviewed in chapter 3. However, the existing empirical literature
discussed in chapters 2 and 3 in general contains limitations to carry out the empirical
research.
As can be seen in chapter 2, these prior empirical studies report a wide variation of
positive announcement returns to targets. The degree of positive announcement returns
depends on the market, the investigation period and the choice of the event window. In
addition, the existing empirical evidence shows inconclusive results to bidders. Thus, prior
literature is unable to draw a clear conclusion regarding the impact on shareholder wealth
of bank mergers.
Furthermore, while prior empirical studies mainly focus on the U.S. and EU market,
the existing empirical evidence in international studies is thin. Besides, these international91
studies do not use a large international sample of bank mergers to carry out their research.
So, the empirical findings from existing international studies may not be applicable to a
study covering a wide range of developed and developing countries. Hence, prior empirical
studies do not provide a clear picture to address the impact of shareholder wealth in bank
mergers.  Covering  a  large  sample  from  a  number  of  both  developing  and  developed
countries allows the current study to analyse the impact of the country level corporate
governance  mechanisms  in  terms  of  investor  protection  and  bank  regulation  on  the
cumulative abnormal  returns  of  the  firms  in  bank  mergers.  Thus,  it  may  remain  an
empirical question as to whether bank mergers create or destroy value to shareholders. As a
result, I impose the first research question with three parts:
“Do bank mergers create or destroy value to targets, bidders and combined firms?”
This research question enables the current study to undertake the empirical test and also to
compare the empirical results to prior empirical evidence reported in chapter 2. This thesis
can provide more empirical evidence to address the impact on shareholder wealth using a
large international sample of bank mergers.
In  addition  to  examine  shareholder  wealth  in  bank  mergers,  a  number  of  prior
empirical studies provide cross-sectional regression analyses to determine the factors that
can explain the cumulative abnormal returns of the firms in bank mergers. As demonstrated
by prior empirical studies in chapter 2, the cumulative abnormal returns of the firms can be
affected by the deal and firm specific characteristics. This suggests the importance of the
deal and firm specific characteristics in explaining shareholder wealth of bank mergers.
However, prior studies largely neglect to explore the effectiveness of the country
level corporate  governance  mechanisms  on  the  impact  of  shareholder  wealth  in  bank
mergers.  While  some  prior  empirical  studies  focus  on internal  corporate  governance
mechanisms to explore the relationship with the cumulative abnormal returns of the firms
(e.g., Subrahmanyam et al. (1997); Cornett et al. (2003); Becher and Campbell (2005)),
these studies only look at the firm level corporate governance mechanisms instead of the92
country level corporate governance mechanisms.
Thus,  little  is  known  about  whether  the  legal and  regulation  system  as external
corporate governance mechanisms can be important determinants to explain shareholder
wealth in bank mergers. The legal and regulation system in the current study particularly
focuses on investor protection and bank regulation in a country, also known as the country
level corporate governance mechanisms. As a result, I further raise the second research
question:
“Are investor protection and bank regulation in a country important determinants of
shareholder wealth in bank mergers?”
This research question further allows the current study to reveal how the country level
corporate  governance  mechanisms  in  terms  of  investor  protection  and  bank  regulation
affect shareholder wealth in bank mergers. This also assists the current study to understand
how  the  country  level  corporate  governance  mechanisms  can  generate  an  influence  to
protect shareholders in bank mergers.
Overall, this thesis imposes two research questions. While this thesis includes a large
international sample of bank mergers, the analysis will go beyond this by controlling for
other factors as  will be discussed below. This  not only provides additional insights to
analyse the impact of shareholder wealth of bank mergers, but also allows the current study
to additionally determine factors that can affect shareholder wealth. In this aspect, this
thesis controls for factors, such as the country level specific characteristics and the deal
and firm specific characteristics, when undertaking the regression analysis.
In other words, when controlling for other factors, the regression analysis can be
expected  to  accurately  capture  the  relationship  between  investor  protection  and  bank
regulation and the announcement returns of the firms as will be presented in chapters 6, 7
and  8.  To  undertake  the  empirical  tests,  the  following  section  develops  the  specific
hypotheses related to these research questions and the variables in the regression analysis.93
4.3 Hypotheses
This section aims to develop hypotheses to test the empirical results in this thesis.
Hypotheses  related  to  the  announcement  returns  of  the  firms  and  the  variables  in  the
regression analysis are  discussed separately. First,  I establish hypotheses related to the
announcement returns of the firms in order to answer the first research question. This
enables the current study to carry out the empirical test to reveal the impact of shareholder
wealth in bank mergers. Then, the second research question can be dealt with when setting
out the hypotheses  regarding the variables in the regression analysis.  Furthermore, the
construction of the variables is also discussed in the following section.
4.3.1 Hypotheses relating to the abnormal returns
4.3.1.1 Target shareholder wealth
As  discussed  in  chapter  2,  prior  empirical  studies  have  found  that  targets  obtain
significant  positive  announcement  returns  around  bank  merger  and  acquisition
announcements.  According  to the  discussion  of the  motive of  takeovers in  chapter  2,
targets can be expected to obtain gains regardless of whether the motive of the bidder was
synergies, or whether the bidder suffered from agency or hubris. If so, it can therefore be
expected that targets obtain positive abnormal returns around bank merger and acquisition
announcements.
Hypothesis 1: Target shareholder wealth
H 0 :  Targets  do  not  obtain  positive  abnormal  returns  around  bank  merger  and
acquisition announcements.
H1: Targets obtain positive abnormal returns around bank merger and acquisition
announcements
Prior empirical studies with respect to the U.S., EU studies and international studies94
were discussed in chapter 2. The existing evidence has shown that U.S. targets in general
earn higher announcement returns than EU targets. This view can be supported by the
empirical evidence from international studies (e.g., Scholtens and de Wit (2004); Valkanov
and Kleimeier (2007)). Conn and Connell (1990) and Aybar and Ficici (2009) argue that
U.S. targets can obtain high bid premia due to a highly competitive U.S. takeover market.
A competitive takeover market may contain lots of bidders and targets that may have lots
of  transactions.  If  targets  are  in  a  more  competitive  takeover  market  with  many
transactions, targets may have more ability to abstract higher premium from bidders. Thus,
bidders need to pay more to targets. It can therefore be expected that U.S. targets earn
higher  abnormal  returns  than  EU  targets  and  targets  from  outside  the  U.S.  and  EU
market.
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Hypothesis 2: Target shareholder wealth with respect to the market
H 0: U.S. targets do not obtain higher abnormal returns than EU targets and targets
from outside the U.S. and EU market.
H1:  U.S.  targets  earn  higher abnormal  returns  than  EU  targets  and  targets  from
outside the U.S. and EU market.
Prior  empirical  studies  have  examined  target  shareholder  wealth  with  respect  to
diversifying and focusing deals, as discussed in chapter 2. The existing empirical evidence
shows that targets in focusing deals earn higher cumulative abnormal returns than those in
diversifying  deals  (DeLong  (2001);  Ismail  and  Davidson  (2005)).
44  One  argument  put
43 The term of the competitive market in this thesis focuses on the perspective of the transactions from
takeovers. If the takeover market is more competitive, targets may have more bargaining power to negotiate
higher premium. Thus, bidders may need to pay more to targets. However, it can also be argued that higher
premium may also derive from the aspect of the competitive banking market. A competitive banking market
may reduce the profitability to targets and bidders. Bidders may want to pay higher premium to complete the
transactions. However, this is beyond the scope of this study. It should bear in mind that the term of the
competitiveness in this study focuses on the aspect of takeover market only.
44 Focusing deals mean that bidding banks acquire other banks in terms of bank to bank deals. Diversifying
deals denote that the transactions take place in the form of bank to other financial firm deals, also known as
cross-product  deals.  However,  it  should  be  acknowledged  that  this  is  the  definition  of  focusing  and95
forward to explain the difference of target cumulative abnormal returns in diversifying and
focusing deals relates to risk diversification. If bidding banks acquire other financial firms
to engage in a larger variety of activities through mergers and acquisitions, bidding banks
may need to manage relatively more types of interest risks after the transactions (DeLong
(2001); Lensink and Maslennikova (2008)). Hence, bidding banks may not want to pay
higher premium in diversifying deals to targets.
However, not all prior empirical studies report higher cumulative abnormal returns to
targets  in  focusing  deals.  Instead,  Cybo-Ottone  and  Murgia  (2000)  find  that  targets  in
cross-product deals obtain higher cumulative abnormal returns than those in bank to bank
deals.
On the contrary, managers of bidding banks may find it relatively easy to manage
similar  bank  risks  after  the  transactions  when  engaging  in  bank  to  bank  deals.  Thus,
bidding banks may be likely to pay more to targets in focusing deals. Thus, it can be
predicted that targets in focusing deals obtain higher cumulative abnormal returns than
those in diversifying deals.
Hypothesis 3: Target shareholder wealth in diversifying and focusing deals
H 0:  There  are  no  differences  in  target abnormal  returns  in  activity  focusing  and
diversifying deals.
H 1 :  There  are  differences  in  target  abnormal  returns  in  activity  focusing  and
diversifying deals.
4.3.1.2 Bidder shareholder wealth
Prior  empirical  studies discussed  in  chapter  2 have  reported  that  targets  obtain
significant  positive  cumulative  abnormal  returns  around  bank  merger  and  acquisition
announcements. However, the empirical findings for bidders are inconclusive. Bidders in
diversifying deals in this study instead of a general definition applied to prior empirical studies.96
general experience negative cumulative abnormal returns although some prior EU based
empirical studies find slightly positive cumulative abnormal returns to bidders. Negative
cumulative  abnormal returns  to  bidders  may  be  an  indication  of  wealth  transfer  from
bidders to targets.
According to the hubris and agency theory discussed in chapter 2 (e.g., Roll (1986);
Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993)), managers may overpay to targets. This may attribute to
the fact that managers may not precisely evaluate the synergies after the transactions. Due
to  evaluation  errors,  managers  of  bidding  firms  may  therefore  hurt  firm  value  and
shareholder wealth in the process of mergers and acquisitions. If so, it can therefore be
predicted  that  bidders  experience  negative  cumulative  abnormal  returns  around  bank
merger and acquisition announcements.
Hypothesis 4: Bidder shareholder wealth
H 0: Bidder abnormal returns around bank merger and acquisition announcements are
not statistically significantly negative.
H1: Bidder abnormal returns around bank merger and acquisition announcements are
statistically significantly negative.
Due to the highly competitive U.S. takeover market, U.S. targets have been found to
earn high bid premia in that bidders need to pay more to U.S. targets (Conn and Connell
(1990); Aybar and Ficici (2009)). However, bidders may obtain lower cumulative abnormal
returns if bank mergers take place in a more competitive banking takeover market. On the
other hand, if there are lots of bidders in a more competitive banking takeover market, the
competitive bidding activities may cause potential bidders to leave the transactions. This
may allow successful bidders to pay lower premium when completing the transactions.
This can be a good news to the market. Thus, this may allow bidders to obtain higher
announcement returns in mergers and acquisitions.97
As  discussed  in chapter  2,  prior  empirical  studies  have  demonstrated  that U.S.
bidders experience negative cumulative abnormal returns (e.g., Neely (1987); Baradwaj et
al. (1990); Houston and Ryngaert (1994); Becher (2000); Cornett et al. (2003); DeLong
and DeYoung (2007)) and EU bidders obtain slightly positive cumulative abnormal returns
(e.g., Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000); Beitel et al. (2004); Ismail and Davidson (2007)).
This can be an indication of U.S. bidders performing worse due to a competitive banking
takeover market.
With regard to bidders from the market outside the U.S. and EU market, it may not
be clear  as  to  whether  bidders  from  other  markets  obtain  higher  or  lower  cumulative
abnormal returns than U.S. and EU bidders. This is because other markets also include
highly  developed  countries,  such  as  Canada,  Japan,  etc.  These  countries  may  also  be
regarded as more competitive banking markets. If so, bidders in these markets may need to
pay more to targets. Thus, I expect that there are differences of bidder abnormal returns
between the market.
Hypothesis 5: Bidder shareholder wealth with regard to the market
H 0: There  are  no  differences in  bidder abnormal  returns  between bidders  from
different markets.
H1: There are differences in bidder abnormal returns between bidders from different
markets.
Prior empirical studies have examined bidder shareholder wealth for diversifying and
focusing deals, as discussed in chapter 2. Several empirical studies find that bidders in
diversifying deals obtain lower cumulative abnormal returns than those in focusing deals
(DeLong (2001); Cornett et al. (2003); Ismail and Davidson (2005); Ekkayokkaya et al.
(2007);  Lensink  and  Maslennikova  (2008)).  As  mentioned  earlier,  bidding  banks  in
diversifying  deals  may  have  more  ability  to  achieve  risk diversification.  In  contrast,98
bidders in focusing deals cannot diversify their risk through mergers and acquisitions. If so,
the market may be more favourable to diversifying deals for bidders.
However, not all prior empirical studies report similarly results. Akhigbe and Madura
(2004)  report  that  bidding  banks  obtain  higher  cumulative  abnormal  returns  when
acquiring security firms relative to when they acquire commercial banks. Due to the mixed
prior evidence, it can therefore be predicted that there are differences of bidder abnormal
returns between activity focusing and diversifying deals.
Hypothesis 6: Bidder shareholder wealth in diversifying and focusing deals
H 0: There are no differences in bidder abnormal returns between activity focusing
and diversifying deals.
H1: There are differences in bidder abnormal returns between activity focusing and
diversifying deals.
4.3.1.3 Combined firms shareholder wealth
Prior  empirical  studies  have  reported  that  combined  firms  earn  slightly  positive
cumulative abnormal returns around bank merger and acquisition announcements (Cornett
and Tehranian (1992); Houston and Ryngaert (1994); Toyne and Tripp (1998); Beitel et al.
(2004); Becher and Campbell (2005); Ismail and Davidson (2005, 2007)). Slightly positive
cumulative abnormal returns to combined firms indicate that bank mergers overall create
value  to  shareholders. Thus,  it  can  therefore be expected  that  combined  firms  obtain
positive abnormal returns around bank merger and acquisition announcements.
Hypothesis 7: Combined firms shareholder wealth
H 0: Combined firms do not obtain positive abnormal returns around bank merger and
acquisition announcements.
H 1:  Combined  firms  obtain  positive  abnormal  returns  around  bank  merger  and99
acquisition announcements.
As  discussed  previously,  bidding  banks  may  achieve  risk  diversification  through
diversification acquisitions. Bidders may obtain higher gains after the transactions. Thus,
bidders may want to pay higher premiums to targets. On the other hand, bidding banks
may  not  obtain  higher  gains  in  focusing  deals  in  that  they  cannot  achieve  risk
diversification after the transactions. So, bidders may not want to pay higher premium to
targets.
Alternatively,  combined  firms  may  obtain  higher  gains  in  focusing  deals  in  that
focusing deals can be expected to generate more cost savings. If so, bidders may need to
pay more to targets. Thus, I expect that there are differences in the abnormal returns for
combined firms between activity focusing and diversifying deals.
Hypothesis 8: Combined firms shareholder wealth in diversifying and focusing deals
H 0: There are no differences in the abnormal returns of combined firms between
activity focusing and diversifying deals.
H1: There are differences in the abnormal returns of combined firms between activity
focusing and diversifying deals.
4.3.2 Hypotheses relating to the variables in the cross-sectional regression analyses
As indicated in chapter 1, the overall objective of this thesis is to explore the impact
of investor protection and bank regulation on the shareholder wealth around bank merger
and acquisition announcements from 1995 to 2005. To determine as to whether investor
protection and bank regulation in a country can be important determinants to influence the
cumulative  abnormal  returns  of  the  firms  in  bank  mergers,  cross-sectional  regression
analyses are applied in the current study, as will be presented in the empirical section of
chapters 6, 7 and 8.100
Prior  empirical  studies  have  demonstrated  the  importance  of  the  deal  and  firm
specific characteristics in explaining the cumulative abnormal returns of the firms. Thus,
this thesis also controls for the deal and firm  specific  characteristics in the regression
analyses. The variables include the method of payment, cross-border vs. domestic deals,
the relative size of the target to bidder, performance, growth potential, the capital ratio, and
firm size.
While focusing on the country level corporate governance mechanisms in terms of
investor protection and bank regulation to explain shareholder wealth of bank mergers, this
thesis also controls for the country level specific characteristics in the regression analysis,
including the competitiveness of the banking market and the size of the banking market.
Controlling for the country level specific characteristics, the analysis in the current study
can reduce the omitted variable bias. Additionally, controlling for these factors also allows
the current study to look at different facets that can affect the announcement returns of the
firms in bank mergers. Thus, the following section develops the hypotheses of the variables
in the regression analysis.
4.3.2.1 Investor protection
Several prior empirical studies have examined the importance of investor protection
in a country on the influence of bid premium or the cumulative abnormal returns of the
firms in mergers and acquisitions. Countries with strong investor protection legislation
tend to have more effective enforcement mechanisms (La Porta et al. (1998); Anderson et
al. (2009)). La Porta et al. (1998) argue that a strong system of legal enforcement can
protect  investors  from  being  expropriated  by  the  managements. Thus, “regulation
increasing  investor  protection  of  target  shareholders  results  in  an  improvement  in
bargaining power for targets.” (Marshall and Anderson (2008); Anderson et al. (2009)). In
the study of bidding firms, Hagendorff et al. (2008) similarly argue that strong investor
protection can reduce private benefits of control enjoyed by insiders. Thus, managers can101
be expected to be more inclined to make good merger and acquisition decisions resulting in
higher value of the firms and shareholder wealth.
A  number  of  prior  empirical  studies  have  explored  the  linkage  between  the
cumulative abnormal returns of the firms and investor protection in a country. Rossi and
Volpin (2004) find that higher target premium is related to stronger investor protection in a
target country. Bris and Cabolis (2004), Martynova and Renneboog (2008) and Anderson
et  al.  (2009)  similarly  find  that  target  cumulative  abnormal  returns  are  positively
associated with shareholder protection in a target country.
Anderson et al. (2009) argue that targets in strong investor protection environments
have greater bargaining power relative to those in weak investor protection environments.
Target managers can be expected to aim at shareholders’ interests in negotiating the deals.
This may be due to the existence of strong enforcement mechanisms. Thus, bidders need to
offer higher premiums when they acquire targets in strong investor protection countries
with greater bargaining power. If so, it can therefore be expected that targets in a strong
investor protection country earn higher cumulative abnormal returns than those in a weak
investor protection country.
In addition to analyse target cumulative abnormal returns, several prior empirical
studies also examine bidder cumulative abnormal returns in relation to investor protection
in  a  country.  Bris  and  Cabolis  (2004),  Stark  and  Wei  (2004)  and  Martynova  and
Renneboog (2008) find that investor protection in a bidder country has a positive impact to
bidder cumulative abnormal returns. Kuipers et al. (2003) argue that the legal environment
provides  an  incentive  mechanism  to  managers  aimed  at  shareholders’  interests.  Thus,
strong investor protection in a bidder country can reduce the expropriation by managers.
When  managers  in  a  country  with  strong  investor  protection  make  investment
decisions of mergers and acquisitions, they may tend to aim at the interests of shareholders,
pursuing value maximisation to the firm and shareholders. Thus, bidders in a country with
strong investor protection can be expected to have higher cumulative abnormal returns. If102
so,  it  can  therefore  be  predicted  that  there  is  a  positive  relationship  between  bidder
cumulative abnormal returns and investor protection in a bidder country.
However, not all prior empirical studies report a positive relationship between bidder
cumulative  abnormal  returns  and  investor  protection  in  a  bidder  country.  In  contrast,
Kuipers et  al.  (2003)  report  that  bidder  cumulative  abnormal  returns  are  negatively
associated with the rule of law in a bidder country. Freund et al. (2008) also find a negative
relationship between bidder cumulative abnormal returns and the revised antidirector rights
index in a target country.
Furthermore, both Kuipers et al. (2003) and Stark and Wei (2004) find that combined
firms’  cumulative  abnormal  returns  are  positively  correlated  to  the  rule  of  law  and
shareholder  protection  in  a  bidder  country  respectively.  The  results  suggest  that
shareholders of combined firms gain more if bidders are in a country with strong investor
protection. Similarly, when targets are in a country with strong investor protection, targets
earn higher announcement returns in that targets may have more bargaining power. When
aggregating the level of investor protection in a bidder and target country, combined firms
can be expected to obtain higher cumulative abnormal returns. Thus, it can be expected
that higher cumulative abnormal returns to combined firms are associated with higher level
of combination of investor protection in a target and bidder country.
To measure investor protection in a country, the current study uses La Porta et al.’s
(1998) index to explore the relationship between investor protection in a country and the
cumulative abnormal returns of the firms. The variables of investor protection from La
Porta et  al’s  (1998)  index  include  the  antidirector  rights  index  and  the  rule  of  law  as
discussed in chapter 3. In order to test the sensitivity of the results, the antidirector rights
index  is  also  replaced  as  Djankov et  al.  (2006)  revised  antidirector  rights  index  as  a
robustness check.
To clearly determine the importance of investor protection in a country on the impact
of  shareholder  wealth,  target  cumulative  abnormal  returns  are  analysed  by  looking  at103
investor protection in a target country. Bidder cumulative abnormal returns are examined in
relation  to  investor  protection  in  a  bidder  country.  This  indicates  the  importance  of
domestic investor protection in a country in explaining shareholder wealth of the firms.
Combined  firms’  cumulative  abnormal  returns  are  investigated  in  association  with  the
combination of the level of investor protection between the target and bidder country.
45
This measurement simultaneously takes into account investor protection in the both target
and bidder country.
Hypothesis 9: Investor protection
Target shareholder wealth
H 0: There is not a positive relationship between target cumulative abnormal returns
and investor protection in a target country.
H1: There is a positive relationship between target cumulative abnormal returns and
investor protection in a target country.
Bidder shareholder wealth
H 0: There is not a positive relationship between bidder cumulative abnormal returns
and investor protection in a bidder country.
H1: There is a positive relationship between bidder cumulative abnormal returns and
investor protection in a bidder country.
Combined firms shareholder wealth
H 0 :  There  is  not  a  positive  relationship  between  combined  firms’  cumulative
abnormal returns and the combination of the level of investor protection between the target
and bidder country.
45 The combination of the level of investor protection between the target and bidder country means that the
level of investor protection in a target country plus the level of investor protection in a bidder country.104
H1: There is a positive relationship between combined firms’ cumulative abnormal
returns and the combination of the level of investor protection between the target and
bidder country.
4.3.2.2 Bank regulation
A growing number of prior empirical studies use indicators of bank regulation from
Barth et al. (2001, 2003) to examine the impact of bank supervision on corporate finance
and bank performance (e.g., Barth et al. (2002); Caprio et al. (2007); Barth et al. (2008)).
Barth et al. (2002) and Barth et al. (2008) report that bank performance and profitability
are positively related to bank regulation measured as restriction of bank activities, although
Caprio et al. (2007) find a negative relationship between bank valuation and restriction of
bank activities. In addition, Caprio et al. (2007) also find that higher bank valuation is
associated  with  stronger  bank  regulation,  measured  as  official  supervisory  power  and
independence of the supervisory authority.
Caprio et al. (2007) argue that bank regulation restricts bank managers’ ability to
expropriate  or  misallocate  bank  resources.  “Thus,  effective  regulation  may  increate
investor confidence regarding expropriation and boost market valuations.” (p. 585). From
this perspective, strong bank regulation can reduce the expropriation by managers. It can
be expected that effective bank regulation can closely monitor managers to aim at the
interests  of  shareholders.  In  other  words, the effective  bank  regulation  can  align  the
interests of managers and shareholders. Accordingly, this can reduce the conflicts between
managers and shareholders when making the decisions to the firm.
Specifically, when managers make investment decisions of mergers and acquisitions,
strong bank regulation may generate a better monitoring system to discipline managerial
behaviour. Their decisions incline to increase firm value and shareholder wealth in the
presence of strong bank regulation.
The sample of bidders in this study is all banks as will be discussed in chapter 5. To105
measure the effectiveness of bank regulation on the shareholder wealth in bank mergers,
this thesis uses bank regulation in a bidder country. If bidding banks in a country with
strong  bank  regulation  engage  in  mergers  and  acquisitions,  bidder  managers  may  be
expected  to  carefully  evaluate  the  transactions.  Thus,  targets  may  obtain  higher
announcement returns in that higher synergy effects may be generated in association with
strong bank regulation in a bidder country. It can therefore be expected that higher target
cumulative abnormal returns are related to strong bank regulation in a bidder country.
However, it should be acknowledged that there is no direct empirical evidence from prior
empirical studies. This analysis can be a major contribution in the academic research.
On  the  other  hand,  strong  bank  regulation  in  a  bidder  country  may  reduce  the
expropriation by managers when engaging in mergers and acquisitions. Bidder managers
may then be more likely to aim at maximising firm value and shareholder wealth. When
announcing bank mergers and acquisitions, the market may respond favourably generating
higher bidder cumulative abnormal returns.
However, strong bank regulation in a bidder country may limit bidder managers’
ability to pursue higher growth potential through bank mergers and acquisitions. From this
viewpoint, strong bank regulation in a bidder country may impede managers’ ability to
create future gains by increasing firm value and shareholder wealth. Thus, the market may
respond  unfavourably  showing  lower  bidder  cumulative  abnormal  returns.  Due  to
contradictory  expectations, no  clear  prediction  can  be  made  regarding  the  relationship
between bidder cumulative abnormal returns and bank regulation in a bidder country.
While bank regulation in a bidder country may be expected to have a positive impact
on target cumulative abnormal returns but an unclear effect on bidder cumulative abnormal
returns, it is similarly not clear what effect bank regulation in a bidder country can be
expected to have on combined firm’s cumulative abnormal returns. As a result, I test for
whether there is a relationship between combined firm’s cumulative abnormal returns and
bank regulation in a bidder country, without a clear expectation regarding the direction of106
the effect.
To measure bank regulation, the current study follows prior empirical studies to use
Barth et  al.’s  (2003)  dataset.  The  variables  of  bank  regulation  include  overall  activity
restrictions, official supervisory power, prompt corrective power and overall independence
of  supervisory  authority. This  thesis  analyses  these  four  variables  separately  in  that  it
reduces the correlation among these variables.
  The variable of overall activity restriction includes three components: “(1) security
activities:  the  ability  of  banks  to  engage  in  the  business  of  securities  underwriting,
brokering, dealing, and all aspects of the mutual fund industry; (2) insurance activities: the
ability of banks to engage in insurance underwriting and selling; (3) real estate activities,
the ability of banks to engage in real estate investment, development, management.” (Barth
et  al.’s  (2004), p.  215).  The  variable  is  measured  by  adding  the  level  of  regulatory
restrictiveness for each component. The scale ranges from 3 to 12. Higher values indicate
greater restrictiveness of bank activities.
The variable of official supervisory power measures “the extent to which official
supervisory authorities have the authority to take specific actions to prevent and correct
problems.” (Barth et al.’s (2004), p. 216). The variable is measured by adding the assigned
values, where the scale ranges from 4 to 14. Higher values indicate greater supervisory
power.
The  variable  of  prompt  corrective  power  measures  “the  extent  to  which  the  law
establishes  pre-determined  levels  of  bank  solvency  deterioration  that  force  automatic
enforcement actions, such as intervention, and the extent to which supervisors have the
requisite,  suitable  powers  to  do  so.”  (Barth et  al.’s  (2004), p.  216).  The  variable  is
measured by summing the assigned values for the items multiplied by 1 if there is a legally
predetermined level of solvency deterioration forcing automatic actions and by 0 if not.
The scale ranges from 0 to 6. Higher values indicate greater power.
The  variable  of  overall  independence  of  supervisory  authority  includes  three107
components: “(1) independence of supervisory authority-political: the degree to which the
supervisory authority is independent within the government from political influence; (2)
independence  of  supervisory  authority-banks:  the  degree  to  which  the  supervisory
authority is protected by the legal system from the banking industry; (3) independence of
supervisory authority-fixed term: the degree to which the supervisory authority is able to
make decisions independently of political considerations.” (Barth et al.’s (2004), p. 216).
The variable is measured by adding the value of each question. The scale ranges from 0 to
3. Higher values signify greater independence.
Hypothesis 10: Bank regulation
Target shareholder wealth
H 0: Higher target cumulative abnormal returns are not associated with strong bank
regulation in a bidder country.
H 1:  Higher  target  cumulative  abnormal  returns  are  associated  with  strong  bank
regulation in a bidder country.
Bidder shareholder wealth
H 0: There is no relationship between bidder cumulative abnormal returns and bank
regulation in a bidder country.
H1: There is a relationship between bidder cumulative abnormal returns and bank
regulation in a bidder country.
Combined firms shareholder wealth
H 0: There is no relationship between combined firm’s cumulative abnormal returns
and bank regulation in a bidder country.
H1: There is a relationship between combined firm’s cumulative abnormal returns
and bank regulation in a bidder country.108
4.3.2.3 Deal characteristics
Prior empirical studies discussed in chapter 2 have shown the importance of the deal
characteristics in explaining shareholder wealth of the firms in bank mergers. To determine
as to whether investor protection and bank regulation can be important determinants to
explain  shareholder  wealth  of  bank  mergers,  this  thesis  also  controls  for  the  deal
characteristics  in  the  regression  analysis,  including  the  variables  of  cross-border  vs.
domestic deals, the method of payment and the relative size of the target to bidder. These
variables and hypotheses are discussed below.
4.3.2.3.1 Cross-border vs. domestic deals
Ismail and Davidson (2005) argue that “diversification outside the national borders
offers an opportunity to smooth earnings volatility, diversify the existing risk and generate
more revenues from new markets.” (p. 24). In addition, cross-border deals can spread risk
and achieve risk reduction (Biswas et al. (1997); Ismail and Davidson (2005)). In the study
of bank acquisitions, Hudgins and Seifert (1996) find that targets earn higher cumulative
abnormal returns in cross-border deals than those in domestic deals. Similar results are
reported in the studies of Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000), Ismail and Davidson (2005) and
Campa  and  Hernando  (2006). It  can  therefore  be  predicted  that  there  is  a  statistically
significant positive relationship between target abnormal returns and cross-border deals.
However, not all prior studies report such findings. Kiymaz (2004) find that targets in
domestic deals earn higher cumulative abnormal returns than those in cross-border deals.
With regard to bidder shareholder wealth, Hudgins and Seifert (1996) find that bidder
shareholders  experience  few  losses  in  their  wealth  when  foreign  firms  acquire  U.S.
financial firms. Instead, bidder shareholders experience more losses in their wealth when
U.S. financial firms acquire U.S. firms. In the study of EU bank mergers, Cybo-Ottone and
Murgia (2000) and Ekkayokkaya et al. (2007) find that bidders in cross-border deals earn
higher cumulative abnormal returns than those in domestic deals. Similarly, Campa and109
Hernando (2006) find that bidders in domestic deals experience more losses in their wealth.
It can thus be expected that there is a statistical significant positive relationship between
bidder abnormal returns and cross-border deals.
However, not all prior studies report such findings. Rad and Beek (1999) find that
bidders  in  domestic  deals  obtain  higher  cumulative  abnormal  returns  than  those  in
cross-border deals, while Ismail and Davidson (2005) find that bidders in both domestic
and cross-border deals  obtain 0.06% cumulative abnormal return in EU bank mergers.
Furthermore, Ismail and Davidson (2005) report that combined firms in domestic deals
earn higher cumulative abnormal returns than those in cross-border deals. I can therefore
expect that the level of the abnormal returns for combined firms is statistically positively
related to cross-border deals.
To measure the impact of cross-border vs. domestic deals on the shareholder wealth
of  the  firms,  this  thesis  follows  Hagendorff et  al.’s  (2008)  study  and  uses  a  dummy
variable  of  cross-border  deals  in  the  cross-sectional  regression  analyses.  The  dummy
variable equals to 1 if the deal is classified as cross-border, and 0 in domestic transactions.
Hypothesis 11: cross-border vs. domestic deals
Target shareholder wealth
H 0: There is no positive relationship between the cumulative abnormal returns of
targets and cross-border deals.
H1:  There  is  a positive relationship  between  the  cumulative  abnormal  returns  of
targets and cross-border deals.
Bidder shareholder wealth
H 0: There is no positive relationship between the cumulative abnormal returns of
bidders and cross-border deals.
H1:  There  is  a positive relationship  between  the  cumulative  abnormal  returns  of110
bidders and cross-border deals.
Combined firms shareholder wealth
H 0: There is no positive relationship between the cumulative abnormal returns of
combined firms and cross-border deals.
H1:  There  is  a positive relationship  between  the  cumulative  abnormal  returns  of
combined firms and cross-border deals.
4.3.2.3.2 The method of payment
Prior empirical studies have demonstrated that the method of payment is an important
determinant to explain the cumulative abnormal returns of the firms around bank merger
and acquisition announcements. According to the tax implication hypothesis, this theory
suggests that cash payment may be taxable immediately ((Hansen (1987); Travlos (1987);
Shawky et al. (1996); Cornett et al. (2003)). If cash is used to pay the transactions of
mergers and acquisitions, this may suggest that targets may require higher premium to
compensate for their tax liability.
Alternatively, several prior studies argue that the management of bidding firms may
have private information with regard to the performance of their firms. The managers tend
to offer stock payment when the stock is overvalued (Myers and Majluf (1984); Cornett
and De (1991); Houston and Ryngaert (1994); Toyne and Tripp (1998)). If the stock is
overvalued, bidders may use smaller volume of stocks in exchange for target shares during
the transactions. Thus, if bidders offer stock payment in the transactions, this may signal to
the market that bidder’s stock is overvalued. So, the market may drive down bidders’ stock
price.
Empirically,  several  prior  studies  report  that  targets  receiving  cash  payment  earn
higher cumulative abnormal returns than those receiving other forms of payment (Cornett
and De (1991b); Grullon et al. (1997)). Similarly, Ismail and Davidson (2005) find that111
targets  in  cash  payment  earn  higher  cumulative  abnormal  returns  than  those  in  stock
payment. In addition, Biswas et al. (1997) and DeLong (2003) report that target cumulative
abnormal returns are positively related to cash payment. It can thus be expected that targets
in  cash  payment  earn  higher abnormal  returns  than  those  in  stock  payment  or  mixed
payment.
With respect to bidder shareholder wealth, several studies, such as Baradwaj et al.
(1991), Cornett et al. (2003), Louis (2004), find that bidder cumulative abnormal returns
are positively and significantly related to cash payment. It can therefore be predicted that
bidders in cash payment obtain higher abnormal returns than those in stock payment or
mixed  payment. However,  Kiymaz  (2004)  finds  that  payment  in  cash  is  negatively
associated with bidder cumulative abnormal returns.
Furthermore, Houston and Ryngaert (1994) report that combined firm’s cumulative
abnormal returns are negatively and significantly associated with stock payment. Becher
and Campbell (2005) look at payment in cash and find that payment in cash is positively
and significantly related to combined firm’s cumulative abnormal returns. Thus, I expect
that combined firms in cash payment obtain higher abnormal returns than those in stock
payment or mixed payment.
To measure the method of payment, the current study follows Cornett et al.’s (2003)
study  and  uses  a  dummy  variable  for  cash  payment  in  the  cross-sectional  regression
analyses. A dummy variable equals to 1 if the payment is cash only, and 0 for other forms
of payment.
Hypothesis 12: The method of payment
Target shareholder wealth
H 0: Targets receiving cash payment do not earn higher cumulative abnormal returns
than those receiving stock payment or mixed payment.
H1: Targets receiving cash payment earn higher cumulative abnormal returns than112
those receiving stock payment or mixed payment.
Bidder shareholder wealth
H 0: Bidders offering cash payment do not obtain higher cumulative abnormal returns
relative to those in stock payment or mixed payment.
H 1:  Bidders offering  cash  payment  obtain  higher  cumulative  abnormal  returns
relative to those in stock payment or mixed payment.
Combined firms shareholder wealth
H 0 :  Combined  firms  in  acquisitions  with  cash  payment  do  not  obtain  higher
cumulative abnormal returns than those in stock payment or mixed payment transactions.
H1: Combined firms in  acquisitions with cash payment obtain higher cumulative
abnormal returns than those in stock payment or mixed payment transactions.
4.3.2.3.3 The relative size of the target to bidder
Asquith et al. (1983) argue that large target firms may have greater impact on small
bidding firms. This may be because the large target firms may create higher synergy effects
after the transactions. On the other hand, small bidding firms may have difficulties in
transferring their technology and business culture to large target firms. Thus, small bidding
firms may have difficulties to integrate their new companies (Akhigbe and Madura (2004);
Ismail and Davidson (2007)).
Studies such as Houston and Ryngaert (1994), Grullon et al. (1997), DeLong (2003),
Beitel et al. (2004), Valkanov and Kleimeier (2007) have found that target cumulative
abnormal returns have a negative relationship with the relative size of the target to bidder.
The  results  suggest  that  targets  obtain  higher  announcement  returns  when  targets  are
smaller than bidders. It can therefore be expected that the level of target abnormal returns
is statistically negatively associated with the relative size of the target to bidder.113
Turning  to bidder  shareholder  wealth,  several  prior  empirical  studies  report  a
negative relationship between bidder cumulative abnormal returns and the relative size of
the target to bidder (Houston and Ryngaert (1994); Grullon et al. (1997); Louis (2004);
Valkanov and Kleimeier (2007)). Subrahmanyam et al. (1997) find that bidder cumulative
abnormal returns are negatively and significantly related to the relative size of the bid to
the bidder’s value. Thus, I predict that there is a statistical negative relationship between
bidder abnormal returns and the relative size of the target to bidder.
Furthermore,  Houston  and  Ryngaert  (1994)  find  that  combined  firm’s cumulative
abnormal returns are positively associated with the relative size of the target to bidder.
Becher and Campbell (2005) report that combined firm’s cumulative abnormal returns are
positively associated with the relative size measured as target assets divided by the sum of
target and bidder assets. It can thus be predicted that the level of the abnormal returns for
combined firms is statistically positively association with the relative size of the target to
bidder.
Following Grullon et al.’s (1997) study, the relative size of the target to bidder is
measured as the relative size of target assets to bidder assets. Due to an unmatched sample
as will be discussed in chapter 5, this thesis uses a proxy of the deal value to bidder assets
as the relative size of the target to bidder in bidder regression analysis in order to avoid
significantly reducing the number of observations.
Hypothesis 13: The relative size of the target to bidder
Target shareholder wealth
H 0: The level of target abnormal returns is not statistically negatively associated with
the relative size of the target to bidder.
H1: The level of target abnormal returns is statistically negatively associated with the
relative size of the target to bidder.
Bidder shareholder wealth114
H 0: There is no statistical negative relationship between bidder abnormal returns and
the relative size of the target to bidder.
H1: There is a statistical negative relationship between bidder abnormal returns and
the relative size of the target to bidder.
Combined firms shareholder wealth
H 0 : The  level  of  the abnormal  returns  for  combined  firms  is  not  statistically
positively association with the relative size of the target to bidder.
H1: The level of the abnormal returns for combined firms is statistically positively
association with the relative size of the target to bidder.
4.3.2.4 Firm specific characteristics
A  number  of  empirical studies,  as  discussed  in  chapter  2,  have  showed  that  the
cumulative abnormal returns of the firms can be influenced by firm specific characteristics
such as company performance, growth potential, capital ratio and firm size. To reduce the
omitted  variable bias,  this  thesis  also  controls  for  these  aspects  in  the  cross-sectional
regression analyses. This can provide additional insights to explore the determinants that
can affect the announcement returns of the firms. Thus, hypotheses related to these aspects
are discussed in the following section.
4.3.2.4.1 Performance
Targets with better performance are more attractive to bidders. Akhigbe and Madura
(2004) and Beitel et al. (2004) argue that bidders may have good management if they have
better performance and higher profitability. Beitel et al. (2004) also indicate that bidders
may be good at managing target’s assets if they have better management skills. In the study
of bank mergers, Ismail and Davidson (2007) find that target cumulative abnormal returns
are positively related to target profitability. Akhigbe et al. (2004) also find that target115
announcement  returns  are  positively  related  to  return  on  assets  (ROA).  It  can  thus  be
expected that target abnormal returns are statistically positively related to target’s prior
performance. However, Beitel et al. (2004) report that target cumulative abnormal returns
are negatively related to target’s performance.
With regard to bidder shareholder wealth, Hagendorff et al. (2008) find that bids
made by profitable banks are associated with higher bidder cumulative abnormal returns. It
can  therefore  be  predicted  that  higher  abnormal  returns  to  bidders  are  associated  with
bidder’s prior performance.
While prior performance can be expected to have a positive impact on target and
bidder abnormal returns, it can thus be predicted that the abnormal returns of combined
firms are statistically positively related to bidder’s prior performance.
To measure the performance, this thesis follows Akhigbe et al.’s (2004) study and
uses return on assets (ROA) in the cross-sectional regression analyses. Return on assets
(ROA) is calculated as net income to total assets at the year end prior to the acquisition.
Hypothesis 14: Performance
Target shareholder wealth
H 0:  Target  cumulative  abnormal  returns  are  not statistically positively  associated
with target’s prior performance (ROA)
H1: Target cumulative abnormal returns are statistically positively associated with
target’s prior performance (ROA).
Bidder shareholder wealth
H 0: Higher  abnormal  returns  to  bidders  are  not  associated  with  bidder’s  prior
performance (ROA).
H 1 : Higher  abnormal  returns  to  bidders  are  associated  with  bidder’s  prior
performance (ROA).116
Combined firms shareholder wealth
H 0: The abnormal returns of combined firms are not statistically positively related to
bidder’s prior performance (ROA).
H1: The abnormal returns of combined firms are statistically positively related to
bidder’s prior performance (ROA).
4.3.2.4.2 Capital ratio
Akhigbe et al. (2004) and Valkanov and Kleimeier (2007) argue that higher level of
the capital ratio can serve as a cushion against unexpected losses for the bank. Akhigbe and
Madura (2004) similarly argue that bidding banks with a higher level of capital ratio are
more  capable  of  supporting  the  integration  of  new  services.  Empirically, Cornett  and
Tehranian (1992) find that there is a positive relationship between the capital ratio and
target  cumulative  abnormal  returns.  Akhigbe et  al.  (2004)  also  find  that  target
announcement  returns  are  positively  associated  with  the  capital  ratio. It  can  thus  be
expected that target abnormal returns are statistically positively related to the capital ratio.
However, Grullon et  al.  (1997)  and Ismail  and  Davidson  (2007)  report  that  target
cumulative abnormal returns are negatively associated with the capital ratio.
Turning to bidder shareholder wealth, Baradwaj et al. (1991) and Grullon et al. (1997)
find that bidder cumulative abnormal returns are positively related to the capital ratio. It
can be expected that higher abnormal returns of bidders are related to higher capital ratio.
However, Cornett et al. (2003) find that bidder cumulative abnormal returns are negatively
associated with the primary capital ratio.
As the abnormal returns of targets and bidders are expected to be positively related to
the capital ratio, it can therefore be expected that combined firms obtain higher cumulative
abnormal returns in relation to higher capital ratio of bidders.
Following Akhigbe et al. (2004) to measure the capital ratio, this thesis uses the ratio
of total capital to total assets at the year end prior to the transactions in the regression117
analysis.
Hypothesis 15: Capital ratio
Target shareholder wealth
H 0: Target abnormal returns are not statistically positively related to the capital ratio
of targets.
H1: Target abnormal returns are statistically positively related to the capital ratio of
targets.
Bidder shareholder wealth
H 0: Higher abnormal returns of bidders are not related to higher capital ratio of
bidders.
H1: Higher abnormal returns of bidders are related to higher capital ratio of bidders.
Combined firms shareholder wealth
H 0: Combined firms do not obtain higher cumulative abnormal returns in relation to
higher capital ratio of bidders.
H1: Combined firms obtain higher cumulative abnormal returns in relation to higher
capital ratio of bidders.
4.3.2.4.3 Growth potential
Campa  and  Hernando  (2004)  argue  that  positive  returns  can  be  generated  when
engaging in “value” investments. “Value” investments occur when bidders buy apparently
cheap firms (firms with low market to book ratios). However, Akhigbe et al. (2004) argue
that banks with high growth potential may be more attractive targets to bidders. If targets
with higher growth potential are more attractive, they may demand higher premium. In the
study of bank mergers, Akhigbe et al. (2004) find that target announcement returns are118
positively related to the market to book ratio. In the study of M&As for industrial firms,
Goergen and Renneboog (2004) also report that target cumulative abnormal returns are
positively related to target market to book ratio. It can therefore be expected that higher
abnormal returns of targets are related to higher market to book ratio.
Turning to bidder shareholder wealth, Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) find that
bidder cumulative abnormal returns are positively correlated to bidder’s market to book
value. Lang et  al.  (1991)  and  Servaes  (1991)  similarly  find  that bidder  returns  are
positively associated with bidder’s market to book value. It can thus be predicted that the
level of bidder abnormal returns is positively associated with market to book ratio.
As  the  market  to  book  ratio  can  be  expected  to  have  a  positive  impact  on  the
abnormal  returns  of  targets  and  bidders,  it  can  thus  be  expected that  the  level  of  the
abnormal returns for combined firms is statistically positively associated with the market to
book ratio of bidders.
To measure the growth potential, the current study follows Beitel et al.’s (2004) study
and uses the market to book ratio at the year end prior to the transactions as the growth
potential in the cross-sectional regression analyses.
Hypothesis 16: Growth potential
Target shareholder wealth
H 0: Target abnormal returns are not statistically positively related to the market to
book ratio of targets.
H1: Target abnormal returns are statistically positively related to the market to book
ratio of targets.
Bidder shareholder wealth
H 0: The level of bidder abnormal returns is not statistically positively associated with
the market to book ratio of bidders.119
H1: The level of bidder abnormal returns is statistically positively associated with the
market to book ratio of bidders.
Combined firms shareholder wealth
H 0 : The  level  of  the  abnormal  returns  for  combined  firms  is  not  statistically
positively associated with the market to book ratio of bidders.
H1: The level of the abnormal returns for combined firms is statistically positively
associated with the market to book ratio of bidders.
4.3.2.4.4 Size
Moeller et al. (2004) argue that managers in larger firms may be overconfident to
manage new firms as a result of managerial hubris. Masulis et al. (2007) also argue that a
larger firm size serves as a rather effective takeover defence in that bidders need to pay
more  to  acquire  a  larger  target.  Thus,  targets  with  large  firm  size  may  obtain  higher
premium. In addition, large targets may cause bidders to spend more time integrating firm
resources. In the study of bank mergers, Valkanov and Kleimeier (2007) find that target
cumulative  abnormal  returns  are  negatively  related  to  the  size  of  the  target.  It  can  be
expected that the level of target abnormal returns is statistically negatively associated with
target size.
With regard to bidder shareholder wealth, prior studies report that bidder cumulative
abnormal returns are negatively associated with the size of the bidder (Subrahmanyam et al.
(1997);  Kiymaz  (2004);  Fields et  al.  (2007);  Valkanov  and  Kleimeier  (2007)).  It  can
therefore be expected that the level of bidder abnormal returns is statistically negatively
related to bidder size.
As firm size can be expected to have a negative impact on the level of target and
bidder abnormal returns, it can thus be predicted that the abnormal returns of combined
firms are statistically negatively related to the size of bidders.120
To measure the size of the firm, this thesis follows Valkanov and Kleimeier’s (2007)
study and applies the natural log of total assets of the firm at the year end prior to the
transactions in the regression analysis.
Hypothesis 17: Size
Target shareholder wealth
H 0: The level of target abnormal returns is not statistically negatively associated with
target size.
H1: The level of target abnormal returns is statistically negatively associated with
target size.
Bidder shareholder wealth
H 0: The level of bidder abnormal returns is not statistically negatively related to
bidder size.
H1: The level of bidder abnormal returns is statistically negatively related to bidder
size.
Combined firms shareholder wealth
H 0: The abnormal returns of combined firms are not statistically negatively related to
the size of bidders.
H1: The abnormal returns of combined firms are statistically negatively related to the
size of bidders.
4.3.2.5 Country level specific characteristics
The main focus in the regression analyses is to determine as to whether investor
protection and bank regulation are important determinants influencing shareholder wealth
in bank mergers. While focusing on the country level corporate governance mechanisms in121
terms of the legal and regulatory system in a country, it can be argued that country level
specific characteristics can also influence the announcement returns of the firms. Thus, this
thesis  also  controls  for  various  country  level  specific  characteristics  in  terms  of  the
competitiveness of the banking market and the size of the banking market in the regression
analyses. These variables are discussed below.
4.3.2.5.1 The competitiveness of the banking market
The degree of competition in the financial sector is an important factor to influence
the efficiency of the production of financial services, the quality of financial products and
the degree of innovation in the sector (Claessens and Laeven (2003)). Demirguc-Kunt et al.
(2003) argue that the competitive nature of the banking market is reflected by the net
interest margin. If the banking market is more competitive, banking firms may cut down
bank’s niche in lending in order to compete with other financial firms.
However, no prior empirical studies look at the influence of the competitiveness of
the banking market on shareholder wealth in bank mergers. Waheed and Mathur (1995)
indicate that bidders obtain higher wealth gains when expanding into developing countries.
The lack of competition in the market allows bidders to take opportunities to generate
revenues through their expertise (Kiymaz (2004)). If so, it can therefore be expected that
bidders can obtain higher cumulative abnormal returns if bidders are in a country with a
less competitive banking market.
When bidders acquire targets in a country with a less competitive banking market,
bidders may enlarge their market shares and increase their competitive advantages through
mergers and acquisitions. Bidders may have more ability to generate higher profitability.
Thus, bidders may want to pay more to targets located in a country with a less competitive
banking market. If so, it can therefore be expected that targets in a country with a less
competitive banking market obtain higher cumulative abnormal returns. While both targets
and bidders in a country with a less competitive banking market obtain higher cumulative122
abnormal  returns,  it  can  then  be  expected  that  combined  firms  also  obtain  higher
cumulative abnormal returns in relation to bidders in a country with a less competitive
banking market.
To measure the competitiveness of the banking market, this thesis uses a proxy of net
interest margin from Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2003) collected from the World Bank.
Hypothesis 18: The competitiveness of the banking market
Target shareholder wealth
H 0: Targets in a country with a less competitive banking market do not obtain higher
cumulative abnormal returns.
H1:  Targets  in  a  country  with  a  less  competitive  banking  market  obtain  higher
cumulative abnormal returns.
Bidder shareholder wealth
H 0: Bidders do not obtain higher cumulative abnormal returns when bidders are in a
country with a less competitive banking market.
H1: Bidders obtain higher cumulative abnormal returns when bidders are in a country
with a less competitive banking market.
Combined firms shareholder wealth
H 0: Combined firms do not obtain higher cumulative abnormal returns in relation to
bidders in a country with a less competitive banking market.
H1: Combined firms obtain higher cumulative abnormal returns in relation to bidders
in a country with a less competitive banking market.
4.3.2.5.2 The size of the banking market
Well-functioning  financial  institutions  prompt  economic  growth  (Levine  (1997);123
Beck et al. (2003)). The increase of the economic growth creates an opportunity to enlarge
the financial market. Waheed and Mathur (1995) and Kiymaz (2004) similarly argue that
the level of economic development in the home country is an important factor to impact
the  wealth  effects  from  mergers. Kiymaz  (2004)  argues  that  a  firm  has  an  economic
incentive to expand internationally, such as to seek new opportunity, if the home market is
maturing.  Thus,  the  size  of  the  banking  market  can  be  a  component  to  create  the
opportunity to the firms through mergers and acquisitions.
Waheed and Mathur (1995) report that negative abnormal returns are generated when
U.S.  banks  expand into  developed  countries.  When  expanding  into  risky  developing
countries, U.S. banks obtain positive abnormal returns. Kiymaz (2004) finds that  U.S.
bidders obtain greater wealth gains when acquisitions take place in developing countries.
It can be argued that the size of the banking market in the developing countries is in
general smaller than that of the developed countries. While bidders are in a country with
small size of the banking market engaged in mergers and acquisitions, bidders may not
have opportunities to create higher synergy  effects after the transactions. This may be
because  a  small  size  of the  banking  market  cannot  offer  a  sufficient  market  shares  to
bidders after the transactions. It can therefore be expected that the level of bidder abnormal
returns is lower in relation to a small size of the banking market in a bidder country. As
bidders may not obtain higher synergy effects in small developing countries, bidders may
not want to pay more to targets. Thus, it can be predicted that targets earn lower abnormal
returns when the size of the banking market is small. When target and bidder abnormal
returns are lower in a small size of the banking market, it can thus be predicted that lower
abnormal returns of combined firms are statistically related to a small size of the banking
market.
As no prior empirical studies look at the size of the banking market to explain the
variations in abnormal returns, this thesis incorporates this aspect in the cross-sectional
regression analysis. To measure the size of the banking market, this thesis uses a proxy of124
deposit money bank assets to GDP from the World Bank. As large size of the banking
markets can be expected to have higher deposit money bank assets, this measurement also
standardises GDP in order to control for the size effect of the market.
Hypothesis 19: The size of the banking market
Target shareholder wealth
H 0: Targets do not earn lower abnormal returns when the size of the banking market
is small.
H1: Targets earn lower abnormal returns when the size of the banking market is
small.
Bidder shareholder wealth
H 0: The level of bidder abnormal returns is not lower in relation to a small size of the
banking market.
H1: The level of bidder abnormal returns is lower in relation to a small size of the
banking market.
Combined firms shareholder wealth
H 0: Lower abnormal returns of combined firms are not statistically related to a small
size of the banking market in a bidder country.
H1: Lower abnormal returns of combined firms are statistically related to a small size
of the banking market in a bidder country.
4.4 Conclusion
The objective of this thesis is to explore the impact of investor protection and bank
regulation on the shareholder wealth around bank merger and acquisition announcements
from 1995 to 2005. This chapter aims to address the research questions and to develop125
hypotheses  for  the  empirical  test  in  this  thesis.  As  prior  empirical  evidence  for  bank
mergers and acquisitions is limit in international studies and the results are inconclusive,
this thesis thus further explores the impact of shareholder wealth around bank merger and
acquisition announcements for targets, bidders and combined firms.
Furthermore, prior empirical studies as discussed in chapter 3 pay little attention to
examine the effectiveness of the country level corporate governance mechanisms in terms
of the legal and regulation system on the shareholder wealth in bank mergers. Thus, little is
known  as  to  whether  investor  protection  and  bank  regulation  can  be  important
determinants to influence shareholder wealth in bank mergers. As a consequent, this thesis
further addresses the second research question as to whether investor protection and bank
regulation can be important determinants to influence shareholder wealth in bank mergers.
In  order  to  explain  the  impact  of  investor protection and  bank  regulation  on  the
shareholder wealth in bank mergers accurately, this thesis also controls for the deal and
firm  specific  characteristics  and  the  country  level  specific  characteristics  in  the
cross-sectional regression analysis. The variables related to these characteristics include the
method of payment, cross-border or domestic deals, the relative size of the target to bidder,
firm performance, the capital ratio, the growth potential, firm size, the competitiveness of
the banking market and the size of the banking market.
To carry out the empirical test in this thesis, this chapter discusses the hypotheses
related to the abnormal returns of the firms and the variables in the regression analysis. The
construction of the variables is also specified in this chapter. It can be expected that the
discussion of hypotheses enables this thesis to  clearly  establish the proposition and to
conduct the empirical test in chapter 6, 7 and 8. Thus, the next chapter will discuss the
sample selection and methodology in this thesis.126
Chapter 5 Sample Selection and Methodology
5.1 Introduction
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the impact of investor protection and bank
regulation on the shareholder wealth around bank merger and acquisition announcements
from 1995 to 2005. This chapter discusses the sample selection and methodology used in
this thesis.
The  sample  selection  consists  of  several  criteria  that  assist  the  current  study  to
construct the final sample. The event study methodology is used to measure the impact of
shareholder  wealth  around  bank  merger  and  acquisition  announcements.  Finally,
cross-sectional regression analyses are also employed to investigate as to whether investor
protection and bank regulation are important determinants of shareholder wealth around
bank merger and acquisition announcements.
This chapter is organised as follows. The sample selection is presented in section 5.2.
Sections 5.3 and 5.4 provide the distribution of the sample and the descriptive statistics of
the financial data, respectively. The event study methodology is discussed in section 5.5.
Section 5.5 also discusses the model specification and the test of the significance level. The
cross-sectional regression analysis is discussed in section 5.6. Conclusion is provided in
section 5.7.
5.2 Sample selection and Data sources
This  section describes  the  sample  selection  and  data  sources  in  this  thesis.  As
discussed in chapter 2, there is limited evidence from international studies of bank mergers.
Thus, this thesis contains an international study of bank mergers and their effects on the
shareholder wealth. From this perspective, the current study aims to collect a sufficient
international sample of bank mergers to measure the impact of shareholder wealth on bank
mergers from a number of countries.127
To obtain a sufficient international sample of bank mergers, the sample is collected
from  the Securities  Data  Company  (SDC)  Thomson  One  Banker  Database.  The  SDC
database covers the transactions of mergers and acquisitions internationally. This database
also contains a wide range of the deal information, including the name and nationality of
the  target  and  bidder,  the  type  of  deal,  the  method  of  payment,  the  deal  value,  the
announcement date, etc. Hence, this database has been applied in the existing literature and
demonstrated its importance in the study of mergers and acquisitions. This thesis relies on
the SDC database to collect the sample of bank mergers.
To construct the effective and representative sample of bank mergers, several criteria
are imposed in the current study. As can be seen from prior empirical studies discussed in
chapter 2, the sample of bank mergers is relatively small before the year of 1995. Due to
data availability, the investigation period does not cover the period prior to the year of
1995.
Furthermore, the analysis of shareholder wealth from bank mergers may be affected
by  a  shorter  investigation  period  in  that  the  market  may  exhibit  higher volatility  in  a
shorter period relative to a longer period. If the market generates higher volatility in a
shorter period, it may not be able to draw a fair and strong conclusion to address the impact
of shareholder wealth in bank mergers.
In addition, as this thesis focuses on international studies of bank mergers, the sample
size may be small if using a short sample period in that bank mergers may not take place in
a particular year or a shorter period. Thus, this thesis uses a longer period of time to carry
out this research. The investigation period is determined to cover 11 years from 1995 to
2005.  This  long  investigation  period  allows me  to  obtain  sufficient  samples  of  bank
mergers and to also capture a bank merger wave during this period.
Bidders and targets are restricted to be banks and financial firms, respectively. As
bank  mergers  can  take  place  in  the  form  of  different  types  of  deals  due  to  risk
diversification, this criterion allows this thesis to further examine shareholder wealth of128
consolidation across different financial product markets in terms of bank to bank (focusing)
deals and bank to another financial firm (diversifying) deals. When the bidding firm is
limited to be the bank, I obtain 16,310 transactions from the SDC database. These bidding
banks share the 2-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code 60XX.
46
While the bidding firm is limited to be a bank, the target firm is restricted to be a
financial  firm,  imposing  this  criterion  yields  14,114  out  of  16,310  transactions.  These
target financial firms share a 1-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code 6XXX.
47
Another restriction is that either the target or bidder is required to be listed on the
stock market. The share price is the element to analyse the wealth effect of bank mergers.
As some target firms in general may be small and may not be listed on the stock exchange,
their share price may be unavailable. Similarly, some acquisitions may be undertaken by
non-listed bidders. On the other hand, if both the target and bidder are restricted to be listed
firms, this restriction would further reduce the sample size. Requiring only that either the
target or bidder be listed on the stock exchange in this thesis, I obtain a relatively large
sample of targets and bidders to carry out this research. However, it should be noted that
this  requirement will yield  an  unmatched  sample of  targets  and  bidders.  Adding  this
restriction, I obtain 10,098 out of 14,114 transactions from the SDC database.
An additional requirement is that the transactions are eventually complete. Houston
and Ryngaert (1994) argue that the market may not be able to determine which mergers
will  ultimately  be  completed. This  thesis  only  includes  complete  transactions.  When
further analysing the impact of investor protection and bank regulation on the shareholder
wealth, the results can be expected to reinforce the importance of the legal system in bank
mergers. Restricting  the  transactions  to  be  complete,  there  are  6,144  out  of  10,098
transactions remaining.
46 Taking  into  account  the  international  sample  of  bank  mergers,  a  broad  classification  shared  with  the
2-digit SIC code 60XX is categorised as the banks in this thesis. This classification can be expected to reduce
the errors to classify the bidding firms as the banks from the international sample of bank mergers.
47 According to the definition of the SIC code, the financial firm is defined as the firm with a 1-digit SIC
code 6XXX. If the target and bidder share the same 2-SIC code, the deals are categorised as bank to bank
(focusing) deals. Otherwise, the deals are regarded as a bank to another financial firm (diversifying) deal.129
Furthermore, the sample of bank mergers only includes exchange offer
48, merger
49
and acquisition of majority interest
50, but excludes, for example, acquisition of minority
interest. These transactions allow the current study to focus on the change of corporate
control  after  the  transactions.  Under  this  requirement,  2,796  out  of  6,144  transactions
remain in the sample.
The value of the transaction would be an important determinant to investigate the
impact of shareholder wealth in that larger deals of bank mergers may draw much attention
to the market. Several studies confine their analysis to the deals that are larger than 100
million U.S. dollars (e.g., Houston and Ryngaert (1994); Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000);
Beitel et al. (2004); Moeller (2005)). However, restricting the deals that are larger than 100
million U.S. dollars may eliminate smaller transactions. This may reduce the validity to
analyse shareholder wealth of bank mergers.
On the other hand, including relative small deals may contain too much noise to
analyse shareholder wealth. To reduce this potential disadvantage, this thesis follows the
study of Amihud et al. (1990) where they exclude the deals below 10 million U.S. dollars
in their sample. Imposing this criterion, there are 2,073 transactions remaining. As firm
size can be a factor to influence the deal value and the analysis of shareholder wealth, firm
size is controlled for in the cross-sectional regression analysis to specify the size effects.
Next, the sample is also restricted to where the bidder obtains over 50% of target
shares after the transaction, thus resulting in a change of corporate control. This criterion
reduces the sample from 2,073 to 2,052 transactions.
However, these 2,052 transactions may still contain deals where the bidder owned
over 50% of the target shares prior to the transaction. In this case, the bidder would already
48  “Exchange offer: deals in which a company offers to exchange new securities for its equity securities
outstanding or its securities convertible into equity.” (Sources: SDC Thomson One Banker Database)
49  “Acquisition of majority interest: the acquiror must have held less than 50% and be seeking to acquire
50% or more, but less than100% of the target company’s stock.” (Sources: SDC Thomson One Banker
Database)
50  “Merger: a combination of business takes place or 100% of the stock of a public or private company is
required.” (Sources: SDC Thomson One Banker Database)130
have control powers prior to the acquisition. Thus, this may reduce the validity to analyse
the effectiveness of investor protection and bank regulation on the shareholder wealth in
bank mergers. Hence, I further remove 5 transactions in which the bidder controlled over
50% of target shares prior to the transaction. Thus, there are 2,047 transactions remaining.
Moreover,  this  thesis  further  takes  into  account  whether  the  transactions  are
categorised  as  hostile  or  friendly  deals. Hadlock et  al.  (1999)  argue  that  “hostile
acquisition attempts in banking are rare.” (p. 230). Similarly, Becher (2000) also argues
that “due to regulatory constraints, hostile takeovers are a rarity in the banking industry”.
(p. 194).
Baradwaj et al. (1990) find that nonhostile targets earn significantly lower abnormal
returns than targets in hostile bank mergers, although the negative abnormal returns for
hostile bidders are insignificantly different than for bidders involved in nonhostile bank
mergers. This suggests that it is important to control for whether the deals is hostile or
friendly transactions when examining shareholder wealth of bank mergers. Thus, three
hostile transactions are deleted from the sample. Only three hostile transactions in bank
mergers also lend support to the argument of Hadlock et al. (1999) and Becher (2000) that
hostile takeovers are rare in the banking industry.
51  As a result, the sample in this thesis
only contains friendly deals. There are 2,044 transactions remaining.
Companies with more than one takeover bid during the estimation period need to be
taken into account in that repeated bidding activity for a firm may affect the share price
during the estimation period. Thus, the analysis of shareholder wealth may not accurately
reflect the impact of bank mergers due to biased model parameters applied. Lensink and
Maslennikova (2008) argue that repeated bidder activity introduces noise to affect the true
effect over a short period of time.
52  If bidders have repeated bidding activity during the
51 Given the small number of hostile bids, it is more appropriate to delete these from the sample rather than
controlling for bid hostility in the cross-sectional analysis.
52 Lensink and Maslennikova (2008) argue that “If one assumes that the usually constant variance of stock
returns should change in response to such a shock only, the effect of earlier shocks will dampen any other
effects.” (p. 190).131
estimation period, their  share price may  appear to have higher fluctuation. The model
parameters may be affected by other bids and the model parameters cannot accurately
measure the normal relationship between share and market returns. This causes a bias to
the measure of the effects on shareholder wealth for the subsequent bid.
However,  Lensink  and  Maslennikova  (2008)  also  argue  that “Firms  that  have
mastered the science of successful growth through acquisitions are the ones likely to do it
very  often.”  (p.  190).  This suggests  that  bidders  may  engage  in  several  different
transactions if they have past good acquisition experience. This may introduce a bias to the
analysis if frequent bidders are excluded from the sample. In addition, excluding frequent
bidders can also further reduce the sample size.
As  will  be discussed  in  the  section  of  the  event  study  methodology  later,  the
estimation period in this thesis covers 256 trading days. If bidders have frequent bidding
activities during the estimation period in this thesis, a longer estimation period can also be
expected to reduce any bias introduced into the estimate of the model parameters. This is
due to the fact that a longer estimation period can smooth the variation of the share price
and obtain less biased model parameters. As a result, this thesis does not eliminate the
bidders with multiple bidding activities from the sample.
The current study further controls for whether the firm announces other corporate
events  in  terms  of  the  confounding  effects around  bank  merger  and  acquisition
announcements.
53  When the firm announces other corporate events accompanied with the
announcement  of  bank  mergers,  it  may  not  be  clear  to  distinguish  the  impact  of
shareholder  wealth.  Thus,  this  thesis  separates  the  sample  in  terms  of  the  clean  and
non-clean sample in the later analysis to account for the influence of the confounding
effects.
54  This can also assist the current study to illustrate the confounding effects on the
53 Other  corporate  events  may  include  the  announcement  of  earnings,  dividends,  corporate  investment
projects or the release of the interim report, annual reports, etc.
54 The clean sample means that no other corporate events are announced during the 3-day (-1,+1) event
window, where day 0 is the announcement day. Instead, if any corporate event is announced during the 3-day
(-1,+1) event window, the sample is classified as the non-clean sample.132
impact  of  shareholder  wealth.  Consequently,  this  thesis  utilises  a  3-day  (-1,+1)  event
window to control for the confounding events, where day 0 is the announcement date as
will be presented in the following chapters.
To construct the final sample in this thesis, transactions are further removed from this
analysis if the Datastream database does not incorporate the share price of the firm. In
addition, another problem is encountered where a market index is not available to measure
the market returns for a country. As the Datastream Total Market Return Index (TRI) is
applied in this thesis as the benchmark of the market, acquisitions are removed from the
sample  where  the  Datastream  TRI  is  not  available  for  the  market.  Furthermore,  the
financial data for each firm is also collected from Datastream database, where the financial
data is gathered at the year end prior merger and acquisition announcements.
Table 5.1 Summary the sample selection criteria
Database Include All Mergers & Acquisitions Transactions
Date Announced Between 01/01/1995 to 12/31/2005 n/a
Bidding firm Include Banks 16,310
Target firm Include Financials 14,114
Target or Bidder Public
Status
Include Public 10,098
Dear Status Include Completed 6,144
Form of the deal Include
Exchange Offer, Merger,
Acquisition of Majority
Interest
2,796
Deal Value ($ Mil) At least 10 million U.S. dollars 2,073
Percent of Shares Owned
after Transaction (%)
At least 50 % 2,052
Percent of Shares Owned
before Transaction (%)
Exclude
At least 50 % prior to
announcement date
2,047
Targets 508
Bidders 1,424 Final sample
Combined firms 388
Data source: SDC Thomson One Banker Database133
As mentioned above, the sample of bank mergers is collected from the SDC database.
The SDC database provides useful information, especially the announcement date. If the
announcement date can be exactly identified, the analysis of shareholder wealth in bank
mergers can be more accurate. Ismail and Davidson (2005) check the announcement date
from the Financial Times and Reuters database in order to verify the announcement date
reported  in  the  SDC  database. They  document  that  “we  are  confident  that  the
announcement date reported by SDC Platinum is the exact date  when the information
about the deal was first announced to the public.” (p. 16). Thus, this thesis relies on the
announcement date reported in the SDC database to measure the impact of shareholder
wealth on bank mergers.
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In  addition  to  the  SDC  and  Datastream  database,  two  alternative  databases  are
selected  in  order  to  control  for  the  confounding  events  during  a  3-day  (-1,+1)  event
window. These two databases are Perfect Information (PI) and SEC filings. The Perfect
Information (PI) database covers companies globally and the SEC filings cover firms in the
U.S. market. If the sample firms cannot be identified from the Perfect Information (PI) or
the SEC filings, the Financial Times database is used as an alternative source to verify any
confounding event over a 3-day (-1,+1) event window as will be presented in the empirical
section in chapter 6, 7 and 8.
Table 5.1 shows the summary of the sample criteria, as discussed above. The final
sample consists of 508 targets and 1,424 bidders. To construct the sample for combined
firms, both the target and bidder are required to have share price information available.
Thus, this thesis only obtains 388 combined firms in the final sample.
5.3 Sample distribution
In section 5.2, the sample criteria and data sources have been discussed. Eventually,
55 According  to  the  empirical  results  in  this  thesis,  significant  abnormal  returns  are  detected  on  the
announcement date, day 0. The results lend support to the argument that the SDC database offers the exact
announcement date.134
the final sample contains 508 targets, 1,424 bidders and 388 combined firms. This section
presents the sample distribution of targets and bidders by country and by year. This enables
the current study to better appreciate the intensity of merger activities in each country. In
addition, the sample distribution also allows this thesis to perceive the waves of bank
merger activities during 11 years investigation period.
Table 5.2 displays the sample distribution of targets. As table 5.2 shows, it can be
observed that a high number of targets involved in bank mergers centre on the developed
countries. Within the developed countries, targets are largely dominated by the U.S. sample.
This indicates that the banking takeover market is more active in the U.S. market.
On the other hand, there are only few targets in the developing countries as showed in table
5.2. Within the entire sample of targets, U.S. targets account for some 70% of target firms.
The  sample  of  targets  in  the  developed  and  developing  countries  is  460  and  48,
respectively. These targets cover 36 countries.
Taking into account target distribution by year, the figure shows that there is a wave
of bank mergers after the year of 1997. The bank merger wave may reflect that banking
firms may respond the consequence caused by the financial crisis in 1997, such as the
decrease of the profitability. In addition, the figure can also reveal the transactions taken
place in a country during a particular year.
Furthermore, table 5.3 exhibits the sample distribution of bidding firms. Similar to
the discussion for targets above, bidding firms also largely concentrate on the developed
countries. Within the developed countries, bidding firms are mainly dominated by the U.S.
sample. This also denotes that banking takeover market is more active in the U.S. market.
In contrast, there are relatively few samples of bidding firms in the developing countries.
The figure shows 1,351 and 73 bidding firms in the developed and developing countries,
respectively. Overall, U.S. bidders account for about 75% of the bidding firms. Bidding
firms cover 39 countries for the full sample. Considering the distribution of bidding firms
by year, the trend of bank mergers is consistent with the distribution of target firms.135
Table 5.2 The distribution of target nation
Target nation 1995-2005
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Total
Australia 1 1 1 3
Belgium 1 1
Canada 1 2 1 4
Denmark 2 2 4
Finland 1 1 2
France 1 4 2 2 1 1 11
Germany 1 1 1 3 6
Greece 3 1 1 1 1 7
Ireland-Rep 1 1 1 3
Italy 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 3 1 17
Japan 1 5 6 3 2 3 1 21
Netherlands 1 1
Norway 1 1 1 1 4
Portugal 2 2 4
Spain 1 1 1 2 5
Sweden 1 1 2
United Kingdom 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 10
United States 14 4 28 35 31 47 39 25 51 52 29 355
Total 19 9 36 39 54 68 50 34 56 59 36 460
Argentina 1 1
Brazil 1 1 1 3
Chile 1 2 1 4
Colombia 1 1
Hong Kong 1 2 1 4
India 1 1 2
Indonesia 1 1
Malaysia 1 1
Mexico 1 1 1 3
Philippines 1 1 1 3
Poland 1 1
Reunion 1 1
Singapore 2 2 1 5
South Africa 1 2 3
South Korea 1 1 1 3
Taiwan 2 2 1 5
Thailand 1 2 1 2 6
Venezuela 1 1
Total 2 1 3 7 5 3 9 8 2 4 4 48
Total 21 10 39 46 59 71 59 42 58 63 40 508136
Table 5.3 The distribution of bidder nation
Bidder nation 1995-2005
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Total
Australia 2 3 2 3 1 11
Austria 1 1 2 1 1 6
Belgium 2 2 4 3 1 12
Canada 2 3 3 2 4 1 1 2 1 19
Denmark 1 1 2 1 1 6
Finland 1 1 2
France 1 2 2 2 6 6 1 4 2 26
Germany 3 1 1 2 3 2 1 2 15
Greece 2 3 1 3 1 2 2 14
Ireland-Rep 1 1 1 1 4
Italy 5 2 4 7 6 10 5 10 3 3 7 62
Japan 1 3 8 2 2 1 1 5 23
Luxembourg 1 1 1 3
Netherlands 3 2 2 7
Norway 2 1 1 1 1 6
Portugal 2 3 5
Spain 2 1 5 8 4 1 2 2 2 1 28
Sweden 1 2 3 1 1 1 1 10
Switzerland 1 1
United Kingdom 3 2 3 3 3 2 1 2 1 20
United States 99 107 153 148 108 87 72 47 86 91 73 1071
Total 117 125 176 172 147 134 102 72 100 107 99 1351
Argentina 1 1 2
Brazil 1 1
Chile 1 1
Colombia 1 1 2
Hong Kong 1 1 2 1 1 6
India 1 1 1 3
Indonesia 1 1
Malaysia 1 2 3 1 7
Mexico 1 2 2 1 1 7
Peru 1 1
Philippines 1 3 2 1 1 8
Poland 1 1 2
Singapore 1 1 2 4
South Africa 2 1 3
South Korea 1 2 1 4
Taiwan 1 1 2 2 1 2 4 13
Thailand 2 1 3 1 7
Venezuela 1 1
Total 2 2 3 9 7 10 9 7 5 11 8 73
Total 119 127 179 181 154 144 111 79 105 118 107 1424137
Table 5.4 The distribution of combined firm nation 1995-2005
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As can be seen in table 5.3, there is a bank merger wave after the year of 1997. The
figure indicates that the sample of bidding firms reaches the highest levels, at 179 and 181,
in 1997 and 1998,respectively. A possible explanation is that bidding firms may want to
take advantage of this opportunity to acquire other target firms during this period if bidding
firms do not suffer from a significant impact of the financial crisis. Consequently, bidding
firms may be able to enlarge their market shares and expand their services through mergers
and acquisitions.
Furthermore, table 5.4 shows the distribution of combined firm nation. As can be
seen  in  table  5.4,  the  majority  of  the  transactions  are  domestic  deals,  where  358
transactions are domestic deals and 30 transactions are classified as cross-border deals.
Within  domestic  bank  mergers,  U.S.  domestic  deals  account  for  276  transactions,
indicating that U.S. samples similarly form a large number of combined firms. With a
relative small number of cross-border deals, there are 388 combined firms in the final
sample to be analysed in the empirical chapter 8.
5.4 Descriptive statistics of the data and financial characteristics
The analysis of the shareholder wealth in bank mergers is based on 508 targets, 1,424
bidders  and  388  combined  firms  in  this  thesis.  This  section  summarises  descriptive
statistics of the financial characteristics for targets and bidders.
56  The descriptive statistics
of the data and financial characteristics can uncover the level of investor protection and
bank regulation in the analysis and also reveal the financial situation of targets and bidders,
respectively.  In  addition,  I  also  compare  the  descriptive  statistics  of  the  financial
characteristics for targets to those for bidders.
56 The financial characteristics for each firm are collected from the year end prior to the transactions as has
indicated in chapter 4. Total assets are measured by the scale of million U.S. dollars.139
Table 5.5 The scale of investor protection and bank regulation for each country
Investor
protection by La
Porta et al. (1998)
Bank regulation by Barth et al. (2003)
Antidire
ctor
Law Activitie
s
Supervisor
y
Correctiv
e
Independenc
e
Australia 4 10 9 10 0 3
Austria 2 10 5 13 5 2
Belgium 0 10 7 10 0 2
Canada 5 10 5 10 0 2
Denmark 2 10 7 9 2 0
Finland 3 10 6 6 1 2
France 3 8.98 4 7 0 1
Germany 1 9.23 5 9 0 1
Greece 2 6.18 8 12 0 2
Ireland-Rep 4 7.8 5 11 0 3
Italy 1 8.33 8 7 0 0
Japan 4 8.98 8 12 6 1
Luxembour
g
N/A N/A 3 13 0 2
Netherlands 2 10 5 5 0 2
Norway 4 10 5 9 1 2
Portugal 3 8.68 7 14 0 3
Spain 4 7.8 5 9 3 1
Sweden 3 10 7 8 0 2
Switzerland 2 10 5 14 0 3
United
Kingdom
5 8.57 4 11 0 1
United
States
5 10 8 13 5 2
Argentina 4 5.35 8 8 0 1
Brazil 3 6.32 7 13 0 1
Chile 5 7.02 9 11 3 0
Colombia 3 2.08 10 13 4 0
Hong Kong 5 8.22 4 11 0 1
India 5 4.17 9 10 0 2
Indonesia 2 3.98 9 10 0 2
Malaysia 4 6.78 8 11 0 2140
Mexico 1 5.35 7 N/A 6 0
Peru 3 2.5 5 12 4 2
Philippines 3 2.73 5 11 6 1
Poland N/A N/A 6 8 3 0
Singapore 4 8.57 6 13 0 1
South
Africa
5 4.42 6 6 0 2
South
Korea
2 5.35 9 12 5 1
Taiwan 3 8.52 10 14 6 1
Thailand 2 6.25 9 10 0 0
Venezuela 1 6.37 6 11 3 1
Average 3.08 7.53 6.68 10.43 1.66 1.39
Table 5.5 presents the scale of investor protection and bank regulation for each nation
collected from La Porta et al. (1998) and Barth et al. (2003), respectively. The variables of
investor protection include the antidirector rights index and the rule of law. As table 5.5
shows, the scale of the antidirector rights index ranges from 0 to 5. In addition, the level of
the rule of law ranges from 2.08 to 10. Higher score of the antidirector rights index and the
rule  of  law  indicates  stronger  investor  protection  in  a  country.  The  average  of  the
antidirector rights index and the rule of law is 3.08 and 7.53, respectively. Furthermore,
table 5.5 also reveals that the law and regulation system in U.S. is generally stronger than
that in EU and the market from outside the U.S. and EU. This can also illustrate that a
more  competitive  U.S.  market  exists  a  strong  law  and  legal  system  in  protecting
shareholders. A possible reason is that a strong law and regulation system in U.S. market
can attract investors to invest in this market.
Turning  to  the  data  of  bank  regulation,  the  variables  include  overall  activities
restrictiveness,  official  supervisory  power,  prompt  corrective  power  and  overall
independence  of  supervisory  authority.  The  level  of  the  variable  of  overall  activities
restrictiveness ranges from 3 to 10, with the average score at 6.68. The scale of the variable141
for official supervisory power ranges from 5 to 14, where the average score is 10.43.
Similarly, the level of the variable of prompt corrective power ranges from 0 to 6,
where the  average score is 1.66. The scale of the variable of overall independence of
supervisory authority ranges from 0 to 3, with the average score at 1.39. It is obvious that
the average score of the variable for prompt corrective power and overall independence of
supervisory  authority is lower than that of overall activities restrictiveness and official
supervisory  power.  It  should  be  noted  that  a  lower  average  score  derives  from  the
construction of the components for each variable.
Furthermore,  this  section  also  presents  the  descriptive  statistics  of  the  financial
characteristics for targets and bidders. As table 5.6 shows, mean value of ROA for targets
is  3.48  and  mean  value  of  ROA  for  bidders  is  1.50.  The  figure  suggests  that  the
performance of targets is on average better than that of bidders prior to the transactions.
Better  performance  of  targets  implies  that  targets  may  be  more  attractive  to  bidders.
However, it should be noted that the standard deviation of ROA for targets is much higher
than that for bidders. A much higher mean ROA for targets may be attributable to the
occasion of a relatively large mean value of target ROA. Thus, it should be necessary to
exercise care to claim that targets on average perform better than that of bidders.
Table 5.6 also shows that mean value of the capital ratio for targets is higher than that
for bidders, at 22.19 and 15.67, respectively. The figure indicates that targets hold higher
capital ratios to support their operations, which might imply that targets use their capital
inefficiently. On the contrary, bidders hold lower capital ratio relative to targets, indicating
that bidders use more external funding to support their operation. However, it should be
acknowledged that the standard deviation of the capital ratio for targets is much higher
than that of bidders. Thus, it may need to exercise care to compare the capital ratio for
targets and bidders.142
Table 5.6 Descriptive statistics of the financial characteristics
Targets Bidders
Financial
characteristics
Mean SD Minimum Maximum Mean SD Minimum Maximum
ROA (%) 3.48 4.70 -2.73 28.56 1.50 0.78 -7.21 5.08
Capital ratio
(%)
22.19 17.70 0.82 1.05 15.67 8.78 0.00 1.00
Market to book
ratio (%)
1.82 1.99 -1.18 27.43 2.14 1.09 0.00 12.47
In(Total assets) 15.13 2.90 10.76 25.11 16.18 2.46 11.14 25.39
With regard to the market to book ratio in terms of the growth potential, mean value
for targets and bidders is 1.82 and 2.14, respectively. This suggests that bidders appear to
have higher growth potential relative to targets. Higher growth potential to bidders also
indicates  that  mergers  and  acquisitions  can  be  a  way  to  support  bidder’s  growth
opportunities. On the other hand, as the market to book ratio for bidders is higher than that
for targets, this may also indicate that bidders  may be overvalued and targets may be
undervalued.
While looking at the figures of ROA and the market to book ratio simultaneously, it
is  interesting  to  find  that  bidders  on  average  have  higher  growth  potential  but  lower
performance. The findings may imply that bidders may engage in mergers and acquisitions
to support their high growth potential and improve their low performance.
Taking into account the firm size measured as the natural log of total assets, the mean
value for targets and bidders is 15.13 and 16.18, respectively. The figure suggests that
targets on average are smaller than bidders. However, the difference of firm size between
targets and bidders does not show any significant difference.
5.5 Methodology
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the impact of investor protection and bank
regulation on the shareholder wealth for targets, bidders and combined firms around bank143
merger  and  acquisition  announcements  during  the  1995-2005  period.  To  measure  the
impact  on  shareholder  wealth,  event study  methodology  is  applied  to  compute  the
abnormal returns. Furthermore, cross-sectional regression analysis is carried out to explore
as to whether investor protection and bank regulation can be important determinants to
explain the cross-sectional variation in the announcement returns.
As discussed in chapter 2, prior empirical studies have demonstrated that the deal and
firm specific characteristics have its importance to explain the cumulative abnormal returns.
This thesis also controls for deal characteristics and firm specific characteristics in the
cross-sectional regression analysis. In addition, the regression analysis also controls for the
country level specific characteristics as better legal and regulatory systems may be a result
of advanced development of the economy and financial markets. It may be expected that
country level characteristics may affect the legal and regulation system in a country. Thus,
while  controlling  for  these  characteristics,  the  empirical results  in  this  thesis  can  be
expected  to  explain the  impact  of investor  protection  and  bank  regulation  on  the
shareholder wealth in bank mergers more precisely. As a result, the following sections
discuss the methodology applied in this thesis.
5.5.1 Event study methodology
The event study methodology is broadly applied to accounting and finance research.
Fama et al. (1969) develop the event study methodology to examine the financial market
efficiency and the speed with which the market adjusts to new information. The authors
suggest that the firm should have a nonzero stock price reaction on the event date if an
event has an information effects. Mackinlay (1997) similarly argues that an event study
measures the impact of a specific event on the value of the firm by using financial market
data.
Specifically,  the  event  study  is  explained  as  an  empirical  investigation  of  the
relationship between share prices and firm-specific or economic events (Strong (1992)).144
For example, firm-specific events can be the announcements of mergers and acquisitions,
issues  of  new  debt  or  equity  and  the  announcement  of  earnings  (Mackinlay  (1997)).
However, this thesis focuses on the event of merger and acquisition announcements.
The rationale behind event study methodology is that the effects of an event are
reflected in security prices immediately (Brown and Warner (1980); Mackinlay (1997)). If
the share price adjusts to the release of the new information efficiently, nonzero abnormal
security returns should not persist after a particular type of event. On the other hand, the
impact  of  the  event  can  be perceived  if  nonzero  abnormal  returns and  the  cumulative
abnormal returns exist after the release of the information for the event.
The  degree  of the abnormal  returns  and  cumulative abnormal  returns  is  also  a
measure of the impact on the shareholder wealth associated with a particular event, such as
mergers and acquisitions. The positive (zero) abnormal return indicates that shareholders
appreciate (are neutral to) the benefit to their own wealth when the event occurs. On the
contrary,  the  shareholders  experience  losses  in  their  own  wealth  if  negative  abnormal
return is generated.
To  reveal  the  effects  on  shareholder  wealth,  the abnormal  return  for  targets  and
bidders are computed by subtracting the expected return from the actual return for each
share. The expected return is estimated from the estimation period using various event
study models as will be discussed in sections 5.5.4 and 5.5.5. Thus, the following formula
is used to generate the abnormal return for targets and bidders while the calculation of the
joint returns for combined firms will be discussed in section 5.5.8.
Abnormal return = Actual return – Expected return
In  order  to  calculate  the  return,  the  price  of  each  share  is  collected from  the
Datastream  total  return  index  (RI). Rad  and  Beek  (1999)  argue  that applying  the
Datastream total return index (RI) has its advantage in the calculation of the return for each145
share. Firstly, the composition of RI is constructed by selecting the same component for
each country. In turn the estimated coefficients will not be affected by the differences of
the index composition.
Secondly, the Datastream total return index (RI) has adjusted prices for dividends
(Antoniou et al. (2007)). RI incorporates an annualised dividend yield to adjust the index
as a dividend payment that could exert an influence to measure the abnormal return. In
light of the effect of dividend payments, using RI is believed to ensure that no significant
bias will be introduced to the analysis in this thesis.
In  addition,  Datastream  total  market  index  for  each  country  is  employed  as  the
market index to calculate the market return. The logarithmic process is used to calculate
the return of the share and the market. Strong (1992) argues that logarithmic returns are
more  likely  to  be  normally  distributed, thus  allowing  the  use  of  standard  statistical
techniques. Thus, the return generation of each share and the market with respect to the
logarithmic process will be discussed in section 5.5.3.2.
When the return of each share and the market is obtained, the expected return can be
measured. The expected return is defined as the normal return without conditioning on the
event taking place. Hence, each share can be measured the expected return if no event is
expected  to  be  occurred  (Mackinlay  (1997)).  When  the  event,  such  as  mergers  and
acquisitions, occurs,  the  market  should  respond  to  the  release  of  new  information
efficiently. As a result, the difference between the actual return and the expected return can
be measured, known as the abnormal return. By identifying the abnormal return, the impact
on shareholder  wealth  around  bank  merger  and  acquisition  announcements can  be
quantified.
Specifically, the expected return can be estimated by using a number of applicable
models based on event study methodology. While each model has its own assumption and
its own merit with the degree of sophistication and complexity to calculate the expected
return, the choice of the model should be carefully considered. Hence, I briefly discuss146
event  study  models  applied  in  this thesis  here,  but  the  formula  of  the  models  will  be
specified in section 5.5.5.
Mackinlay  (1997)  argues  that  there  are  two  common  choices  for  modelling  the
expected return. These two models are the market model and the mean adjusted returns
model. However, Brown and Warner (1985) use three event study methods in terms of the
market model, the market adjusted returns model and the mean adjusted returns model in
their  study to  compute  the  expected  return.  Dyckman et  al.  (1984)  undertake  similar
situation analysis to evaluate the merit of the market model, the mean adjusted return
model and the market adjusted return model. The authors state that these three models have
similar  abilities  in  detecting  abnormal  returns.  Thus,  the  use  of different  event  study
models appears to have no significant influence on the analysis of shareholder wealth.
However,  it  should  be  noted  that  each  model  has  its  assumption  to  measure  the
expected returns of the share. The market model assumes that there is a linear relationship
between  the  security  return  and  the  market  return. The  market  adjusted  returns  model
assumes that the expected return of the share is equal to the return of the market. The mean
adjusted returns model assumes that the mean return of a given security is constant through
time. Due to different assumptions, it may not be expected that the analysis based on
different models can obtain similar results. As a consequence, using different event study
models to measure the abnormal returns is useful to offer additional insights and provide a
robustness check.
Besides, alternative approaches can be applied to generate the expected return, for
example the CAPM model and the Fama-French three-factor model. These two models
involve additional risk factors, such as the risk free rate, the size and the market to book
ratio. However, Brown and Warner (1980) document that “…. In fact, we have presented
evidence that more complicated methodologies can actually make the researcher worse off,
both compared to the market model and to even simpler methods, like the mean adjusted
return model, which make no explicit risk adjustment.” (p. 249).147
In addition, data availability is another reason to limit the use of applicable event
study models in this thesis. As mentioned in the sample selection, the sample is composed
of 508 target firms and 1,424 bidding firms, covering 36 and 39 countries, respectively. As
a consequence, there is a potential limitation to apply some event study methods in this
thesis, for instance the CAPM model or the Fama-French three-factor model. This derives
from the fact that the factors related to these two models are not easily available.
In  addition, Brown  and  Warner  (1980) also argue  that  under  a  wide  variety  of
conditions, a simple methodology based on the market model performs well. As Strong
(1992) and Bessler and Murtagh (2002) report that the most popular model is the market
model to employ in the event studies as a benchmark to estimate the expected return, this
thesis  employs  the  market  model  as  a  core  model  to  investigate  the  impact  on  the
shareholder wealth around bank merger and acquisition announcements.
Mackinlay (1997) argues that the benefit to use the market model will depend upon
the coefficient of determination,
2 R , from the market model regression.
57  If the
2 R   is
high, the greater variation of the abnormal return will derive from a higher volatility of the
slope coefficient,  . In light of this argument, this thesis also employs alternative event
study methods in terms of the market adjusted returns model and the mean adjusted returns
model to measure the abnormal returns as a robustness check.
The advantage to use the market adjusted returns model is that it does not require
computing  the  expected  return.  The  market  adjusted  returns  model  assumes that the
expected return is equal to the market return. In addition, the merit of the use of the mean
adjusted returns model is that it generally requires less data availability. The expected
return based on the mean adjusted return model can be obtained by estimating its historical
price of the share. Due to a less data limitation, this allows the mean adjusted returns
model to be performed conveniently. Thus, this thesis also applies these two models to
examine the sensitivity of the results.
57 The coefficient of determination,
2 R , measures the strength of the linear relationship.148
With respect to the event study method, prior empirical studies, however, suggest that
the coefficients of the market model can be biased when applying short term intervals, for
instance using daily data (e.g., Scholes and Williams (1977); Dimson (1979); Fowler and
Rorke  (1983);  Cohen et  al.  (1983)).  This  raises  a  question  that  the  market  model
parameters may be biased due to the presence of the problem of nonsynchronous trading.
Eckbo (1983) argues that when returns are not measured over a fixed time interval,
which is identical for all securities, the OLS estimates may be biased and inconsistent due
to the presence of nonsynchronous trading. To adjust the market model parameters for the
problem of nonsynchronous trading, this thesis employs three methods in terms of Scholes
and Williams’ (1977) method, Dimson’s (1979) method and Fowler and Rorke’s (1983)
method to yield unbiased beta estimates as will be discussed in section 5.5.7.
5.5.2 The choice of market index
This thesis investigates the impact of investor protection and bank regulation on the
shareholder wealth effects around bank merger and acquisition announcements from 1995
to 2005 based on 36 and 39 countries for target firms and bidding firms, respectively. As
argued by Brown and Warner (1980), considerable problems may occur when improper use
of the index is employed and has not been recognised in event studies. Consequently, the
null hypothesis may be frequently rejected at some degree of significance level.
However, due to the limitation of data accessibility, the benchmark is collected from
the  Datastream  database  as  the  market  performance  for  the  respective  country.
Cybo-Ottone  and  Murgia  (2000)  use  the  Datastream  general  market  index  and  the
Datastream  bank  sector  index  as  a  benchmark  for  the  market  index.  Valkanov  and
Kleimeier  (2007)  argue  that  using  Datastream’s  own  index  provides  the  advantage  in
which the index is constructed in the same way for each country. The difference of the
composition  will  not  influence  the  estimated  coefficients  for  the  index.  In  addition,
Valkanov and Kleimeier also argue that the use of the bank sector index provides better149
estimates for the abnormal return compared with the total market index. Hence, the use of
the bank sector index can reduce the industry-specific developments, which impact one
sector more than the market as a whole.
On the contrary, the use of the bank sector index may have a potential disadvantage.
When  the  banking  sector  reacts  to  an  unexpected  economic  shock, for  example  the
financial crisis in 1997, the bank sector index may overreact to the impact of the shock
compared with the overall market performance. In turn the volatility of the bank sector
index may cause an overestimate (under-estimate) of the coefficients, which drive down
(push up) the abnormal return from the market performance.
In addition, the bank sector index may overreact to favourable news such as the
release of the Federal Reserve’s rate compared with the market as a whole. The generation
of the abnormal return from the bank sector index may not be detected precisely taking
into account the potential disadvantage. Another limitation is that a bank sector index is not
available for all markets while international samples of bank mergers are involved into this
thesis. The sample size would be reduced as a result of the lack of the bank sector index in
particular. Thus, bank sector indices are not applied in this thesis.
Considering  the  discussion  above,  this  thesis  applies  the  Datastream  total  market
index as the proxy for the market index of each country. The advantage of the Datastream
total  market  index  is  that  this  index  has  taken  into  account  the  size  of  the  market
capitalisation, and the changes to reflect current market conditions. (Source: Datastream
database). Thus, it is believed that Datastream total return index as a market index gives a
fair indication to measure the market performance.
5.5.3 The choice of data and the process of return generation
This  section  aims  to  discuss the  choice  of  the  data  and  the  process  of  return
generation for this thesis. This enables an understanding of the merit and weakness of these
elements that can affect the analysis of the abnormal returns.150
5.5.3.1 The choice of data
The determination of the data is a critical ingredient for conducting this research. As
empirical  studies  suggested  (Scholes  and  Williams  (1977);  Brown  and  Warner  (1980,
1985)), the format of the data type to measure the return of the firm could be gathered at
any interval, but studies normally use monthly, weekly or daily data. For example, monthly
data is used in a number of empirical studies (Dodd and Ruback (1977); Kummer and
Hoffmeister (1978); Brown and Warner (1980); Malatesta (1983); Schipper and Thompson
(1983)). Weekly data has also been employed in the empirical studies (Neely (1987); Trifts
and Scanlon (1987)).
However, daily data is applied in a large number of empirical studies to investigate
the shareholder wealth when applying the event study methodology (e.g., Asquith (1983);
Asquith et  al.  (1983);  Eckbo  (1983);  Brown  and  Warner  (1985); Zhang  (1998);
Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000); Akhigbe at al. (2004); Gleason et al. (2006)). Brown and
Warner (1985) argue that daily data is generally available in the database. If the event day
is known, using daily data is more precise and efficient to detect the abnormal performance
compared with monthly data and weekly data.
However, using daily data has potential limitations compared with using monthly or
weekly data. These problems include the issue of non-normality of returns and excess
returns  and  the  bias  in  estimating  market  model  parameters.  For  example,  Brown  and
Warner  (1985)  argue  that  the  daily  stock  return  shows  significant  departures  from
normality  for  an  individual  security  compared to  monthly  data.  This  may  reduce  the
explanatory power when testing the significance level. On the other hand, Scholes and
Williams  (1977)  argue  that  using  daily  data  to  estimate  the  model  parameters  may
encounter the problem of non-synchronous trading, where the model parameters may result
in a bias of the results.
Empirical  studies  argue  that  using  daily  data  results  in a potential  problem  in
estimating the market model parameters when non-synchronous trading exists (Scholes and151
Williams (1977); Dimson (1979); Fowler and Rorke (1983); Cohen et al (1983); Cohen et
al. (1986)). When securities suffer from relatively infrequent trading, the market model
parameters, , generate a downward bias. In contrast,    estimates exhibit an upward bias
if securities are traded relatively frequently.
However,  Brown  and  Warner  (1985)  argue  that  a  bias  in  the  estimate  of    is
compensated  by  a  bias  in    in  that  OLS  residuals  for  a  security  sum  to  zero  in  the
estimation period. The higher (lower)    estimates are, the lower (higher)    estimates
are. The discussion of the market model parameters in this thesis will be presented in the
empirical section (chapter 6 and 7).
In order to cope with the issue of non-synchronous trading, this thesis utilises three
procedures to adjust for the market model parameters in terms of Scholes and Williams’
(1977),  Dimson’s  (1979)  and  Fowler  and  Rorke’s  (1983)  methods,  respectively.  The
specification of these three approaches will be discussed in section 5.5.7. In spite of the
problem that can be caused by nonsynchronous trading, Brown and Warner (1985) state
that “the results from simulations with daily data generally reinforce the conclusions of our
previous work with monthly data”. (p. 25). A similar view is addressed in the study of
Dyckman et al. (1984), where their study documents that using daily data results in more
powerful test statistics compared with using monthly data.
As a result, using daily data generally presents few difficulties in the content of event
study methodology (Brown and Warner (1985)). The merit of using daily data could also
assist this thesis to capture the impact on the shareholder wealth precisely and efficiently
when  the  announcement  date  is  identified. Thus,  this  thesis  applies  the  daily  data  to
measure the abnormal return.
5.5.3.2 The purpose of return generation
While  the  return  of  the  firm  and  market  is  the  key  component  to  measure  the
abnormal return, this section focuses on discussing the return-generation process for each152
stock and each market. In general, there are two ways to calculate the returns of the share
and the market in terms of the discrete (arithmetic) process and the logarithmic process
(Strong (1992)). These two processes are calculated as follows
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Where it R is the return of stock ion day t,
it P is the share price of stock ion day t,
1  t P is the share price of stock ion day 1  t ,
However, Strong (1992) argues that “There are both theoretical and empirical reasons
for preferring logarithmic returns. Theoretically, logarithmic returns are analytically more
tractable when linking together sub-period returns to form returns over longer intervals
(simply add up the sub-period returns). Empirically, logarithmic returns are more likely to
be  normally  distributed  and  so  conform  to  the  assumptions  of  standard  statistical
techniques.” (p. 535).
Following Strong’s (1992) argument, this thesis employs the logarithmic process to
generate the return for each stock and the market, respectively. The return of stock i  and
the return of the market index in each country are calculated as follows
59:
The return of stock i:
58 The  share  price in  these  two formulas  is  assumed to  have  been  adjusted  for  any capitalisations  and
incorporates dividend payments.
59 As discussed previously, the share price of each stock and the market index for each country is collected
from the Datastream database using the Total Return Index (RI). RI has been adjusted for dividend payments.
As  a  result,  the  calculation  of  the  share  return  and  the  market  return  does  not  need  to  make  separated
adjustments for dividend payments.153
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Where it R is the return of stock i  on day t,
it RI is the return index of stock i as the share price on
day t,
1  it RI is the return index of stock i as the share price on
day 1  t , and
log denotes the natural logarithm, using the logarithm
to the base e.
e   is  a  certain  constant  approximately  equal  to
2.718.
The return of the market portfolio for each country is estimated as follows:
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Where mt R is the return of the market performance (RI) on day t,
mt RI is the Datastream total market index for each country
on day t,
1  mt RI is the Datastream total market index for each country
on day 1  t , and
log denotes the natural logarithm, where is the logarithm to
the base e.
In turn, this thesis discusses the event study method in the following sections related
to the  selection  of  the  event  window,  the  estimation  of  the  model  parameters,  model154
specifications and statistical test for the null hypothesis, respectively.
5.5.4 The selection of the event window and the estimation of model parameters
To conduct the event study, Mackinlay (1997) argues that the first step is to select the
event window and to identify the period for the model parameter estimation. The selection
of the event window allows this thesis to examine the abnormal return for each stock
during  the  test  period. Besides,  the  market  model  parameters  are  estimated  from  the
estimation period prior to the test period to calculate the expected return for each stock.
The following sections discuss these two perspectives.
5.5.4.1 The selection of the event window
To examine the impact on shareholder wealth around bank merger and acquisition
announcements, the determination of the event window in this thesis is important. The
event window allows this study to capture the abnormal performance of a stock during a
certain period of time. Empirically, researchers choose different event periods, and either
shorter or longer event windows, to address the impact on the shareholder wealth around
the  event.  Goergen  and  Renneboog  (2004)  argue  that  “the  measurement  error  may  be
substantial  when  using  narrow  event  windows  especially  if  there  was  a  leakage  of
information before the first mention in the financial press.” (p. 16).
Houston  and  Ryngaert  (1994)  argue  that  “the  primary  drawback  with  the  shorter
window was that it appeared to miss some run-up in the target’s abnormal return”. (p.
1161). As the information leakage has been documented in the prior empirical studies, this
indicates that the choice of the event window should cover the pre-announcement period
prior to bank merger and acquisition announcements.
However, Caves (1989) argues that it is complicated to capture longer-run returns
following the transaction. On the other hand, Cheng and Chan (1995) argue that target
firms are often delisted in a short period after the initial announcement. This implies that155
the choice of the post-announcement period should not cover a fairly long window. If the
post-event window covers a fairly long period, this may significantly reduce the sample
size for target firms as a result of the limited stock price availability. The loss of target
firms may result in reducing the validity to test the significance level.
Thus, this thesis follows the study of Peterson and Peterson (1991) and Kiymaz and
Mukherjee  (2001) using  a  longer  61-day (-30,+30) event  window, where  day  0  is  the
announcement  date.  Using a  longer 61-day  (-30,+30)  event  window  offers  valuable
benefits to this thesis. First, this event window allows this thesis to capture the information
leakage prior to bid announcement date and the information lag after the announcement
date. Secondly, the sample size of target firms does not significantly reduce in that the
share  price  of target  firms can  be  obtained  within  a  short  period  of  time  after  the
transaction.
Within a 61-day (-30,+30) event window, this thesis utilises various event windows
to  measure  the  impact  of  the  shareholder  wealth  around  bank  merger  and  acquisition
announcements. Various event windows allow this study to capture the wealth effects of
bank mergers during a certain period of time. However, it should be noted that this thesis
mainly focuses on a narrow 3-day (-1,+1) event window. It is believed that the significant
impact of shareholder wealth can be captured surrounding a 3-day (-1,+1) event window if
the  market  efficiently  reflects  the  information  of  bank  merger  and  acquisition
announcements.
On  the  other  hand,  pre-event  windows  are  provided  in  order  to  capture  the
information leakage of bid announcements, for example a 30-day (-30,-1) event window.
Similarly, post-event windows are reported in order to capture the drift of the abnormal
return during the post-announcement period, which can also detect the information lag,
such as a 30-day (+1,+30) event window.156
5.5.4.2 The estimation of model parameters
Based  on  the  semi-strong  market  efficiency  hypothesis,  the  share  price  should
respond  to  the  newly  released  information  quickly  (Brown  and  Warner  (1980);  Fama
(1991); Mackinlay (1997)). An estimation period to estimate the model parameters applied
in the market model is normally selected prior to the event window so that the model
parameters  cannot  be  affected  by  the  event  period.  To  estimate  the  model  parameters,
Aktas et al. (2007) argue that “it is most often defined as a period preceding the event,
which is sufficiently long to enable the parameters of the chosen return-generating process
to be properly estimated.” (p. 130).
As  discussed  in chapter  2, prior  empirical  studies  apply a  variety  of  estimation
periods to estimate the model parameters. Ashorter estimation period may not truly capture
the relationship between the share return and the market return resulting in a bias of the
model parameters. If there is any unexpected shock for the stock during a short estimation
period, this can significantly affect the estimation of the model parameters. For example,
the financial firms could be more sensitive to respond the change of the interest rate. Thus,
using a longer estimation period can be expected to obtain a true relationship between the
share return and the market return.
However, Bartholdy et  al.  (2007)  argue  that  “the  standard  estimation  period  is
between 200 and 250 observations.” (p. 228). Taking into account the nature of this thesis
60,
the estimation period in the current study is determined by using 256 days from day -286 to
day -31  prior  to  the  event  window,  where  day  0  is  the  announcement  date.  As  the
estimation period from day -286 to day -31 ends up the day prior to the event period, the
model parameters will not be correlated with the return from the event period. Accordingly,
the model parameters can be obtained by regressing the market return on the stock return
60 As specified in the sample selection, the final sample in this thesis spans over 36 and 39 countries for
target and bidding firms, respectively. There is a potential difficulty to adjust for the trading day in order to
set out the estimation period for each market. Accordingly, the estimation period of the current study is set to
256 days as a proxy for one year to estimate the model parameters. The estimation period of 256 days is
constructed by subtracting the weekend from a year, where 256 days are equal to 360 days minus 104 days.157
during  the  estimation  period  of  256  days  from  day -286  to  day -31  prior  to  the
announcement date, day 0.
5.5.5 The benchmark in the event study
The event study methodology is applied to calculate the abnormal return and the
cumulative abnormal return in order to specify the effects of bank mergers. As discussed
previously, the expected return is calculated by using daily data from three benchmarks in
terms  of  the  market  model,  the  market  adjusted  returns  model  and  the  mean  adjusted
returns model, respectively. Accordingly, model specifications of event study methods are
discussed in the following sections.
5.5.5.1 The market model
The market model is a statistical model, where the return of any given security is
related to the return of the market portfolio. Strong (1992) argues that “the market model
makes no explicit assumption about how equilibrium security prices are established.” (p.
537). Hart and Apilado (2002) point out that “the standard market model assumes linearity,
homoscedasticity, and independence in stock returns.” (p. 314). In addition, Eckbo (1983)
similarly argues that “the regression coefficients of the market model reflect systematic
co-movements of the share return with the return on the market portfolio, while the serially
uncorrelated, zero mean error term picks up the impact of non-market factors (such as
firm- or industry-specific) information events and random price fluctuations.” (p. 251).
Linn and McConnell (1983) also argue that “according to this model each security’s
period t  return is expressed as a linear function of the contemporaneous return on the
market portfolio plus a stochastic error term which reflects security specific effects.” (p.
375). Due to the simplistic assumption, the market model is the most popular event study
model to be applied in the empirical studies (Strong (1992).158
Thus, the market model is shown as follows:
it R   = i    + mt iR    + it 
Where it R is the return of stock i  on day t,
i  , i  are the market model parameters for stock i
61,
mt R is the return of the market index on day t
62,
it  is  the  disturbance  term  with  zero  mean  and
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As the expected return is obtained by using the market model, the abnormal return can be
calculated as follows:
it AR   = it R - ( i    + mt iR  )
Where it AR is the abnormal return for stock i  on day t,
However, using the market model with daily data to estimate the expected return
incurs  a  criticism  in  that  the  model  parameters may  be  biased  due  to  the  problem  of
nonsynchronous trading. When computing the abnormal return for each share, the results
may not reflect the true value of the impact on the shareholder wealth as a result of the
problem of nonsynchronous trading. As a consequence, this thesis also applies different
methods to take into account the problem of nonsynchronous trading as will be discussed
in section 5.5.7.
61 The market model parameters, i    and i  , are estimated by using daily data from day -286 to day -31,
where day 0 is the announcement date.
62 The market index employs the Datastream total market index collected from Datastream database.159
Furthermore, a number of prior empirical studies provide evidence that the market
model  is  misspecified  (MacDonald  and  Lee  (1988);  Coutts et  al.  (1995);  Mills et  al.
(1996)). Coutts et al. (1995) argue that the market model is misspecified if the assumption
that the error term is identically and independently distributed with constant variance is
violated. The authors report that there is evidence of heteroscedasticity, non-normality,
serial correlation and non-linearity for the error term in their data set. When the market
model is misspecified, it can be incorrect to compute the abnormal return. Thus, the results
cannot truly reflect the market reaction to the events.
In  spite  of the  critics, the  market  model  has  been  applied  in  a  number  of  prior
empirical studies (e.g., Cornett and De (1991); Hudgins and Seifert (1996); Black et al.
(2005); Gleason et  al.  (2005)). This  may  indicate  that  the  market  model  has  its  own
strength to be recognised in the empirical research. Thus, this thesis employs the market
model as a core model to estimate the expected return.
To examine the sensitivity of the results calculated from the market model, this thesis
also utilises alternative event study methods in terms of the market adjusted returns model
and the mean adjusted returns model to estimate the expected return. These two models
can not only provide additional insights on the impact on shareholder wealth but also assist
to check the robustness of the results. Thus, the model specifications of these two models
are discussed in the following sections.
5.5.5.2 The market adjusted returns model
An alternative event study model to estimate the expected returns in this thesis is the
market adjusted returns model. Brown and Warner (1980) argue that the market adjusted
returns model “takes into account marketwide movements which occurred at the same time
that the sample firms experienced events.” (p. 213). Strong (1992) similarly argues that the
market adjusted returns model assumes that ex ante expected returns are the same for all
securities within the same market. Accordingly, the expected return of the stock is equal to160
the expected market return in any period. Thus,
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is the expected return for the market on day t,
t K denotes a constant on day t,
Accordingly, the return for stock i  on day t  is given by:
it R   = mt R   + it 
Where it R is the return for stock i  on day t,
mt R is the return of the market on day t,
it  is the disturbance term for stock i  on day t  with
a mean to be zero
The market adjusted returns model can be regarded as restricting the market model i    to
be zero and i    to be one (Maynes and Rumsey (1993); Mackinlay (1997)). The abnormal
return measures  the  difference  between  the  return  of  each  share  and  the  return  of  the
market index. Thus, the formula is presented as follows:
it AR   = it R - mt R
Where it AR is the abnormal return for stock i  on day t,
However, a potential problem may occur when applying the market adjusted returns
model. The magnitude of the abnormal return may vary depending on the choice of the161
market index. The constitution of the market index may result in a marginal difference in
computing the abnormal return. In addition, the assumption of the market adjusted returns
model may be unrealistic in that the risk of each share could vary across securities. Thus,
this may be a limitation of estimating the expected return for each share applying the
market adjusted returns model.
However, there are a number of advantages to applying the market adjusted returns
model in this thesis. The market adjusted returns model simply assumes that the expected
return  is  equal  to  the  return  of  the  market  index. Thus,  it  is  relatively  convenient  to
calculate the abnormal return. An alternative strength is that the less restriction of data
availability does not result in reducing the sample size, as would have been the case with
e.g., the CAPM model and the Fama-French three-factor model.
Furthermore, using the market adjusted returns model eliminates biases of market
model parameters when using daily data. The biased model parameters can derive from the
presence of the problem of thin trading estimated from daily data. Without computing the
model parameters, the use of the market adjusted returns model can exclude the potential
bias from the market model.
As  the  market  adjusted  returns  model has  been  employed in  a  number  of  prior
empirical studies (Dennis and McConnell (1986); Rosenstein and Wyatt (1997); Brook et
al. (2000) and Conn et al. (2005)), this also suggests that the market adjusted returns model
has its own merit to be recognised in the prior empirical research. Thus, this thesis also
applies the market adjusted returns model to measure the abnormal returns as a robustness
check.
5.5.5.3 The mean adjusted returns model
The mean adjusted returns model assumes that the ex ante expected return is equal to
a constant i K   for a given security i  that can differ across securities. Thus,162
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( it R E is the expected return for stock i  on day t,
i K denotes a constant for stock i,
Strong (1992) argues that the ex post expected return for stock i  on day t  is given by
i K   if risk premiums, interest rates and the risk of the security are constant over time with
the  absence  of  any  new  information  disclosure.  Accordingly,  the  abnormal  return  is
computed as the difference between the actual return on stock i  and the expected return,
i K . Thus,
it AR   = it R - i K
Where it AR is the abnormal return for stock i  on day t,
it R is the return for stock i  on day t
Based on the mean adjusted returns model, the expected return ( i K ) is calculated by
averaging the return of the share during the estimation period.
63  Thus, the expected return
of each share calculated from the mean adjusted returns model is computed as follows:
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However,  researchers  also  criticise  the  use  of  the  mean  adjusted  returns  model.
Dyckman et al. (1984) argue that the mean adjusted returns model “is labelled the naive
model insofar as market-wide factors and risk are not accounted from explicitly.” (p. 4).
63 As discussed before, the estimation period starts from day -286 to day -31.163
This implies that the assumption of the mean adjusted returns model may not be realistic.
Although the assumption of the mean adjusted returns model can be unrealistic, the
mean adjusted returns model has been employed in a number of prior empirical studies
(e.g., Brown and Warner (1980, 1985); Lahey and Conn (1990)). Brown and Warner (1980)
document that the mean adjusted returns model is simple to estimate and has the same
power  to  detect  abnormal  performance  compared  with  the  market  model.  In  addition,
Lahey and Conn (1990) also document that it is important to contrast various models in
order to make comparisons with previous market model based merger studies. This may
imply that the mean adjusted returns model has its own merit to be taken into account in
the prior empirical studies.
Alternatively, there are several advantages to apply the mean adjusted returns model
in this thesis. First, the calculation of the expected return from the mean adjusted returns
model does not rely on the market index. Accordingly, there is less restriction of data
requirement to employ the mean adjusted returns model when computing the abnormal
return. Secondly, unlike the market model, the use of the mean adjusted returns model does
not require to compute the model parameters, which may suffer from the problem of thin
trading.
Furthermore, with the sample size being large in this thesis, the computation of the
abnormal returns based on the mean adjusted returns model only depends on historical
share price data of each security. There is no extra information to be required and the
expected  return  can  be  relatively conveniently  estimated  for each  stock. Due  to  these
advantages, this thesis also applies the mean adjusted returns model as the third model to
check the robustness of the results in association with the market model and the market
adjusted returns model.
5.5.5.4 Summary of the benchmark of event study methodology
As discussed above, three event study models are applied in this thesis in terms of the164
market model, the market adjusted returns model and the mean adjusted returns model to
investigate  the  impact of  shareholder  wealth around  bank  merger  and  acquisition
announcements. As event study methodology is widely used to measure the effect of the
event,  a  number  of  applicable  event  study  methods may also be  used to  measure  the
expected returns in this thesis. For example, the capital asset pricing (CAPM) model and
the  Fama-French  three-factor  model could  potentially also have been employed  in  the
study of the shareholder wealth effects related to merger and acquisition announcements.
One of the components for the CAPM model relates to determine the risk free rate
when calculating the expected return of each stock. Empirically, the rate of Treasury Bills
is  normally  used  to  be  the  return  on  a  risk  free  security  (Strong  (1992);  Eckbo  and
Thorburn (2000)). However, the risk free rate in terms of the Treasury Bills cannot be
collected for all countries from the Datastream database as the sample of bank mergers
covers a large number of countries in this thesis.
On the other hand, the risk free rate may be substituted by using the short term
interest rate. As the current study focuses on the banking industry, the short term interest
rate may have potential influences in the banking industry. However, alternative short term
interest rate cannot be collected for all countries. Thus, the sample size may be reduced as
a result of the data availability of the risk free rate when applying the CAPM model. As a
result, the CAPM model is not suitable to be applied in the current study.
With  regard  to  the  Fama-French  three-factor  model,  the  variables  related  to  this
model  include  an  overall  market  risk  factor  and  risk  factors  related  to  size  and
book-to-market-equity.  Risk  factors  related  to  size  and  book-to-market-equity  include
SMB (small minus big) and HML (high minus low), respectively (Fama and French (1993,
1996)). However, it may be difficult to define each factor for the three-factor model when
the sample involves a number of countries. In addition, the data availability is also an issue
to limit the choice of the Fama-French three-factor model. As a consequence, due to these
limitations, the three-factor model may be inappropriate to be applied in this thesis.165
With regard to the use of the event study model, Brown and Warner (1980) argue that
“more  complicated  methodologies  can  actually  make  the  researcher  worse  off,  both
compared to the market model and to even simpler methods, like Mean Adjusted Returns,
which make no explicit risk adjustment.” (p. 249). Thus, the use of the simplistic event
study model can be viewed as a better way to measure the impact of shareholder wealth in
bank mergers.
Overall, as discussed above, this thesis applies three different event study models to
measure  the  impact  on  shareholder  wealth  around  bank  merger  and  acquisition
announcements.  These  models  include the  market  model,  the  market  adjusted  returns
model and the mean adjusted returns model. The use of these different models also allows
this thesis to overcome the sensitivity of the results due to different assumptions of each
model. As a result, it can be expected that this thesis can generate powerful conclusions to
address the impact of shareholder wealth in bank mergers.
5.5.6 The calculation of the cumulative abnormal return
As discussed in section 5.5.5, the abnormal return is calculated to reveal the impact
on the shareholder wealth around bank merger and acquisition announcements. However,
Mackinlay (1997) argues that “the abnormal return observations must be aggregated in
order  to  draw  overall  inferences  for  the  event  of  interest.”  (p.  21). To  draw  overall
inferences for the impact of shareholder wealth, it is common to accumulate the abnormal
return over the selected event window. This assists this thesis to capture the changes of
shareholder wealth during a certain period of time. Thus, the cumulative abnormal return is
computed as follows:
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) 2 , 1 ( t t CAR is the cumulative abnormal return in the ) , ( 2 1 t t event window
during the test period
t AR is the mean abnormal return on day t
In order to capture the impact of shareholder wealth during a certain period, this
thesis uses various event windows to calculate the cumulative abnormal returns of the
firms, including the pre-announcement and post-announcement event window. Thus, the
following chapters will present the cumulative abnormal returns of the firms based on
different event windows.
5.5.7 The adjustment of nonsynchronous trading
As discussed in section 5.5.3.1, three measurement intervals in terms of monthly,
weekly and daily data can be used to conduct event study methodology. While this thesis
uses daily data to measure the return of the stock, the calculation of the abnormal return
based on the market model may not precisely detect the abnormal performance. This may
derive from the fact that the returns computed from the market model may deviate from the
true value.
Prior empirical studies suggest that the model parameters may be biased as a result of
the problem of nonsynchronous trading when daily data is used (Scholes and Williams
(1977); Dimson (1979); Cohen et al. (1983); Fowler and Rorke (1983); Strong (1992);
Clare et al. (2002); Brooks et al. (2005)). Maynes and Rumsey (1993) argue that “the bias
arises because the recorded closing prices of stock returns and the market index correspond
to  transactions  which  occurred  earlier  in  the  day.”  (p.  147).  In  order  to  overcome  the
problem  of  nonsynchronous  trading,  this thesis  applies  three thin  trading  adjustment
approaches in  terms  of Scholes  and  Williams  (1977)  method, Dimson  aggregated
coefficients (1979) method and Fowler and Rorke (1983) method to estimate unbiased167
estimates for the market model. These approaches are discussed in the following sections.
5.5.7.1 Scholes and Williams (1977) method
Scholes and Williams (1977) argue that a potentially serious econometric problem is
incorporated into the market model when daily data is employed. As ordinary least square
(OLS)  regression  method  is  used  to  estimate  the  model  parameters,  the  econometric
problem of errors in variables can be introduced into the market model. This could be due
to the problem of nonsynchronous trading in that share prices are reported only at distinct,
random intervals for most securities. Thus, it is not possible to yield completely accurate
calculation of returns over any fixed sequence of periods.
In  order  to  avoid  the  problem  caused  by  nonsynchronous  trading,  Scholes  and
Williams (1977) develop a method and demonstrate that their method can obtain consistent
estimators of the model coefficients. Scholes and Williams’ method simply assumes that
the  share  does  not  trade  for  any  day  and  for  the  following  day.  Thus,  the  consistent
estimators of alpha and beta can be calculated as follows:
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method to  adjust  for  the  problem  of
non-synchronous trading,
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are estimators of the slope coefficients in a simple
regression by a lag, synchronous and a lead of the
market return on the return of stock i,168
m  ˆ is an estimate of the first order serial correlation
coefficient for the market return,
it r is the return of stock i  on day t,
mt r is the return of the market on day t,
T denotes the number of days in the estimation period
As noted above, unbiased beta estimates are computed by regressing the return on the
security against a lagged, synchronous and a leading return on the market. After summing
up the beta estimates, the figure is divided by one plus twice the estimated autocorrelation
coefficient for the market index in order to obtain unbiased beta estimates. When unbiased
beta estimates are determined, alpha estimates are calculated from day -285 to day -32
during the estimation period, giving 254 observations. The loss of two observations during
the  estimation  period  derives  from  a  lagged  and  a  leading  market  returns.  As  a
consequence, the unbiased estimates of alpha and beta can be applied to the market model
to measure the abnormal performance for each stock.
As Scholes and Williams’ method is applied in a number of empirical studies (Dodd
and Warner (1983); Baradwaj et al. (1991); Hudgins and Seifert (1996); Gleason et al.
(2005)), this may suggest that this method has its own strength to be recognised in the prior
empirical studies. Specifically, Scholes and Williams’ method provides an advantage to this
study. As the sample size being large and the estimation period covering 256 days, it is not
possible to examine the problem of nonsynchronous trading for the stock price data of each
share  literally.  Thus, this thesis  utilises  this  method  to deal  with  the  problem  of
nonsynchronous trading.
Thus, unbiased estimates of the coefficients from Scholes and Williams’ method are
calculated as follows:
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However, Scholes and Williams’ method similarly faces some critics. Fowler et al.
(1989) argue that Scholes and Williams’ method has a shortcoming in that the variance of
the estimator produced by Scholes and Williams’ method is large. This would cause the
beta  estimates to  be  imprecise. In  addition,  Brooks et  al.  (2005) also argue  that  it  is
inappropriate to apply Scholes and Williams’ method in extreme cases of thin trading for
beta estimation. Scholes and Williams’ method may not be sufficient to generate unbiased
estimates of the model parameters if the shares are subject to extreme nonsynchronous
trading  or  no  trading.  As  a  result,  unbiased  beta  estimates  adjusted  for  Scholes  and
Williams’ method do not cope well in such circumstances.
Taking into account this drawback, this thesis also applies an alternative method in
terms of Dimson’s (1979) method to deal with the problem of non-synchronous trading.
The results from Dimson’s (1979) method can also be used as the robustness check.
5.5.7.2 Dimson aggregated coefficients (1979) method
As discussed above, Scholes and Williams (1977) demonstrate that their procedure
can obtain unbiased estimates by using one lagged and leading structure of the market
returns. However, Dimson (1979) argues that Scholes and Williams’ method cannot obtain
unbiased beta estimates if the share is traded in only every fourth periods. Thus, Dimson
(1979) develops a method to overcome this drawback. As demonstrated by Dimson (1979),
a consistent estimate of beta is obtained by aggregating the slope coefficients from the
multiple  of  security  returns  against  lagged,  matching  and  leading  market  returns.  The
number of leads and lags of market returns should increase if the share is more thinly170
traded. As a result, a consistent estimate of beta based on Dimson’s method is constructed
as follows:
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Where 

is the unbiased beta estimate based on Dimson aggregated
coefficients method. The unbiased beta estimate is the sum
of the coefficients in a multiple regression of the return for
stock i  on day t  against the return of the market from day
n t    to day n t  , where day 0 is the match of the stock
return  and  the  market  return. n   denotes  that the  share
trades in every n  period.

k  is  the  estimate  of  the  slope  coefficients  in  a  multiple
regression
Empirically, a number of prior studies has been applied Dimson’s method to adjust
for the risk measurement in order to deal with the problem of nonsynchronous trading
(Brown and Warner (1985); Goergen and Renneboog (2004); Semih et al. (2006)). As in
the study of McInish and Wood (1986), the authors conclude that the Dimson’s method is
the best technique to reduce the amount of bias in beta estimation. This suggests a merit to
employ Dimson’s method in the current study.
Following Brown and Warner (1985), this thesis utilises Dimson’s method by using
three lagged and three leading structure. Using Dimson’s method with three lagged and
three leading structure can be expected to yield more accurate beta estimates when the
share trades more than every three consecutive time.
In addition, the results based on Dimson’s method can provide an additional insight171
into whether the results are different from those of Scholes and Williams’ method. This can
also assist this thesis to perceive whether the problem of nonsynchronous trading is a case,
which impacts the analysis in this thesis. Thus, the formula of Dimson’s method in this
thesis is presented as follows:
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When using Dimson’s method to compute the alpha estimate, there are six missing
observations during the estimation period. The missing observations are due to three leads
and lags market returns in the estimation period. Thus, the alpha estimate is calculated
from day –283 to day -34 during the estimation period, giving 250 observations.
However, Dimson’s method cannot avoid incurring criticism by scholars. Fowler and
Rorke (1983) argue that Dimson’s method is incorrect and cannot generate consistent beta
estimates in accordance with Scholes and William’s method. Fowler and Rorke (1983)
further present a procedure to correct Dimson’s estimator. In order to reinforce the results
from Dimson’s method in association with Scholes and William’s method, this thesis also
employs Fowler and Rorke’s (1983) approach as a third method to deal with the problem
of nonsynchronous trading.
5.5.7.3 Fowler and Rorke (1983) method
Scholes and Williams (1977) and Dimson (1979) have introduced methods to obtain
unbiased estimates of the model parameters due to the presence of the problem of thin172
trading.  As  Scholes  and  Williams  have  demonstrated  that  their  procedure  can  yield
unbiased estimates of the model parameters, Fowler and Rorke (1983) argue that Dimson’s
method  cannot  generate  unbiased  beta  estimates  in  line  with  Scholes  and  Williams’
method.
As a result, Fowler and Rorke (1983) present a corrected version for the Dimson’s
approach in accordance with Scholes and Williams’ method. As demonstrated by Fowler
and Rorke (1983), a consistent beta estimate based on the Dimson’s method should be
weighted by functions of the observable serial correlation coefficients for the index. Thus,
a corrected version of Dimson’s method provided by Fowler and Rorke (1983) is shown as
follows:
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Where
i 
 is the unbiased beta estimate,
2 1 0 1 2 , , , ,
   
i i i i i      indicate the parameter estimates obtained from
the  simple  regression  of a security  return
against lag 2, lag 1, synchronous, lead 1 and
lead 2 of the market return, respectively
2 1,  are the first and second order serial correlation
coefficients of the market return, respectively.
According to  Fowler  and Rorke’s procedure, this approach  assumes that the first
order serial correlation coefficients and the second order serial correlation coefficients are
not  zero  and  all  other  serial  correlation  coefficients  are  zero.  Thus,  a  consistent  beta
estimate can be obtained when a weighted sum of the slope coefficients is calculated.173
When employing Fowler and Rorke’s procedure to calculate the alpha estimate, there
are four missing observations during the estimation period. The missing observations in the
estimation period are because of two lags and two leads market returns. As a result, the
alpha estimate is calculated from day -284 to day -33 during the estimation period, in
which 252 observations are remaining. Thus, Fowler and Rorke’s method applied in this
study is shown as follows:
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5.5.7.4 Summary of the adjustment for nonsynchronous trading
A number of prior empirical studies document that the market model parameters may
be biased when using daily data. This may result from the problem of nonsynchronous
trading (Scholes and Williams (1977); Dimson (1979); Fowler and Rorke (1983); Cohen et
al.  (1986);  Clare et  al.  (2002);  Brooks et  al.  (2005)).  To  deal  with  this  problem,  two
approaches are widely used in terms of Scholes and Williams’ (1977) and Dimson’s (1979)
method (Peterson (1989); Bartholdy and Riding (1994); Clare et al. (2002); Brooks et al.
(2005)). This may indicate that these two approaches have their own strengths to deal with
the problem of thin trading.
However, the Scholes  and  Williams  and the Dimson  methods  have  their  own
limitation. For example, Brooks et al. (2005) argue that the Scholes and Williams and the174
Dimson method do not cope well in cases of extreme thin trading. On the other hand,
Fowler and Rorke (1983) argue that Dimson’s method cannot generate a consistent beta
estimate in accordance with Scholes and Williams’ method as Scholes and Williams have
demonstrated that their method can yield an unbiased beta estimate.
Thus,  Fowler  and  Rorke  (1983)  demonstrate  that  a  weighted  sum  of  the  slope
coefficients is required to obtain a consistent beta estimate instead of an unweighted sum
of the slope coefficients from Dimson’s (1979) approach. To provide additional insights to
check the robustness of the results, this thesis also employs Fowler and Rorke’s (1983)
method as an alternative technique to deal with the problem of nonsynchronous trading
However, there  are alternative  approaches that  can  be  applied to  deal  with  the
problem  of  nonsynchronous  trading  (Cohen et  al.  (1983)).  For  example,  Dimson  and
March  (1983)  argue  that  the  trade-to-trade  method  can  overcome  the  problem  of
nonsynchronous  trading  when  the  timing  of  trades  is  known.  Bartholdy et  al.  (2007)
similarly argue that “the trade to trade method uses all available information about total
stock and market returns over time and no bias is introduced by attempting to estimate
unobserved daily stock returns.” (p. 229). With regard to the trade to trade method, this
model encounters a problem of data availability. This method cannot be used when the
times of recording share prices within a time interval are unknown (Dimson (1979)). As a
result, this method is not appropriate to be applied in this thesis in that the transaction
information  is  not  perfectly  available.  While  zero  returns  may  be  used  to  proxy  for
non-trading, it is possible for trades to have taken place even if the share prices do not
change.
In addition, Cohen et al. (1983) provide a price-adjustment delay structure to show
how to estimate unbiased betas. Cohen et al. (1983) demonstrate that bias in beta changes
when the length of the measurement interval is varied. As the interval length is increased,
the estimates of true beta can be obtained when the bias approaches zero. However, this
method is inappropriate to be employed in this thesis in that it costs time to obtain the175
unbiased beta estimate. In addition, this method also requires a benchmark to the beta
estimate, where the benchmark requires the beta estimate generated from that without thin
trading problem. As the sample size is large, there is a potential difficulty in obtaining
trading information for each share. So, this method is not suitable to be applied in this
thesis. Thus, this thesis only relies on three approaches in terms of Scholes and Williams’,
Dimson’s and Fowler and Rorke’s method to deal with the problem of nonsynchronous
trading.
5.5.8 The calculation of joint abnormal returns
As mentioned above, the abnormal return for targets and bidders is calculated by
subtracting  the  expected  return  from  the  actual return  of  the  share.  However,  the
calculation of the joint return for the combined firm is distinct from the calculation of the
abnormal return for the target and bidder. It is essential to consider the difference of the
size between the targets and the bidders. A large percentage gain to the target could be
more than offset by a small percentage loss to the bidder if the bidder is substantially larger
(Bruner (2002)).
Empirically, researchers compute the joint return for the combined firm by weighting
the market value of target and bidder abnormal return (e.g., Houston and Ryngaert (1994);
Toyne and  Tripp (1998); Becher  (2000); Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000); Becher and
Campbell (2005)). Houston and Ryngaert (1994) argue that the measure of the joint return
by weighting the market value of the target and bidder abnormal return gives the true
percentage change in the value of the combined pre-merger firm.
Following Houston and Ryngaert (1994), the joint return for the combined firm is
calculated by weighting the market value for the target and bidder abnormal return on day
-31 before the announcement date, day 0. As the event window stems from day -30 to day
+30 in this thesis, the use of the market value for the targets and bidders on day -31 does
not generate a correlation with the abnormal return of the firm. Thus, the calculation of the176
joint return is calculated as follows:
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Where JOINT
t AR is  the  joint abnormal return for  the  combined
firms on day t,
TARGET MV is  the  market  value  of  the  target  firm  31  days
before the announcement date, day 0,
BIDDER MV is the market value of the bidder firm 31 days
before the announcement date, day 0,
it T AR , is the target abnormal return for the ith target on
day t,
it B AR , is the bidder abnormal return for the ith bidder
on day t,
5.5.9 Statistical test procedure
A number of different models are applied in this thesis to measure the level of the
abnormal return. In order to test the null hypothesis, H 0: the mean abnormal return is zero,
this thesis applies several  test  statistics  to  examine  the  significance  level  of  the  mean
abnormal return. This thesis initially uses the parametric statistic to test the results for each
event study method. The parametric statistic is based on the assumption that the abnormal
returns  are  normally  distributed,  as  will  be  discussed  in  sections  5.5.9.1,  5.5.9.2  and
5.5.9.3.
However, the assumption of normal distribution in terms of the parametric statistic
may be violated. The nonparametric statistic does not require that the sample satisfies the
assumption  of  the  parametric  statistic  (Bartholdy et  al.  (2007)). Thus,  this thesis  also177
employs nonparametric statistics as will be discussed in sections 5.5.9.4 and 5.5.9.5 to
examine  the  significance  level for the  null  hypothesis,  H 0:  the  proportion  of  positive
abnormal returns is equal to that of negative abnormal returns. Thus, the following sections
present the detailed specifications of test procedure for the parametric and nonparametric
statistic.
5.5.9.1 Cross-sectional statistic t 
The first parametric statistic is the cross-sectional statistic t    that is applied to test
the null hypothesis in this thesis. Strong (1992) argues that “the most naive test procedure
would  be  to  calculate  the  average  abnormal  return  and  its  standard  error  across  event
securities to give a t-statistic as follows:” (p. 544, 545).
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Where t u is the mean abnormal return across securities on day t,
) ( t u SE is the  standard  deviation  of  the  mean  abnormal  return
across securities on day t,
it u ˆ is the abnormal return for stock i  on day t,
N is the number of securities,
i is an individual security
t denotes the time period
^ indicates the estimated value
- denotes the mean value178
The cross-sectional statistic t    assumes that the mean abnormal return is normally
distributed and independent. Implicitly, the cross-sectional statistic t  assumes that the
mean  abnormal  return  is  identical  across  securities.  In  addition, the cross-sectional
statistic t    assumes that variances of abnormal returns are equal across securities and
there is no cross-correlation in abnormal returns.
Dodd (1980) employs the cross-sectional statistic t    to test the null hypothesis that
the mean abnormal return is zero. With a large sample size in this thesis, the cross-sectional
statistic t  can be assumed to satisfy the assumption that the mean abnormal return is
normally distributed. Thus, the cross-sectional statistic t  is applied in this thesis to test
the significance level. As a result, the cross-sectional statistic t    is calculated as follows:
H 0: the mean abnormal return across securities is zero ( t u = 0)
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Where t u is the mean abnormal return across securities on day
t,
) ( t u S is the standard deviation of the mean abnormal return
across securities on day t,
it u ˆ is the abnormal return for stocki  on dayt,
n is the number of securities
64,
As the sample size is larger than 30, the cross-sectional statistic t    is distributed student
64  508 targets, 1424 bidders and 388 combined firms are included in the sample. The share price is available
for at least 30 days during the estimation period.179
statistic t  , with N-1 degree of freedom.
5.5.9.2 Time-series statistic t 
The cross-sectional statistic t    assumes that the mean abnormal return is normally
distributed  and  cross-sectionally  independent.  However,  Strong  (1992)  argues  that the
cross-sectional statistic t    leads to inefficient estimates of the significance of the mean
abnormal  return  if the abnormal  return  exhibits  cross-sectional  dependence. The
cross-sectional dependence may result from the clustering in the event date of the sample.
Thus, the calculation of standard errors assuming cross-sectional independence leads to
biases in the estimated standard errors. Accordingly, the statistical test for the significance
level is misspecified.
Considering  that  the  assumption  of  cross-sectional  independent  may  be  violated,
Brown  and  Warner  (1985)  use the time-series statistic t  to  take  into  account
cross-sectional dependence in the abnormal return of the stock. Baradwaj et al. (1990) also
argue that the time-series statistic t    assumes that the variance of the abnormal return is
constant over time for each company. When using the time-series statistic t    to test the
significance level of the mean abnormal return, cross-sectional dependence is taken into
consideration in the test statistic.
As the investigation period in this thesis covers from 1995 to 2005, it can be expected
that the mean abnormal return should not cluster in any event date. However, to consider
cross-sectional  dependence  on  the  influence  of  the  significance  statistic,  the  mean
abnormal  return  is  also  examined  by  using the time-series statistic t  . Thus,  the
procedure of the time-series statistic t  is shown as follows:
H 0: the mean abnormal return for any event day t  is zero ( t u = 0)180
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Where t u is the mean abnormal return across securities on dayt,
it u ˆ is the mean abnormal return for stock i  on day t,
) ( ˆ
t u S is the standard deviation of the mean abnormal return on
day t ,  estimated  from  the  time-series  during  the
estimation period,
u is the average of the mean abnormal return during the
estimation period,
n is the number of securities,
-286, -31 denote that the estimation period starts from day -286 to
day -31, where day 0 is the announcement date. There
are 256 days during the estimation period.
However, Brown and Warner (1985) also argue that cross-sectional procedures in
terms of time-series procedures have limitations when testing the null hypothesis that the
mean abnormal return is equal to zero. “For example, if the variance shift differs across
sample securities, the test statistic is likely to be misspecified because the assumption of
identically distributed excess returns is violated. In addition, if there is no variance increase,181
the cross-sectional procedure will not be very powerful because they ignore estimation
period  data.”  (p.24).  Taking  into  consideration  this  limitation,  this  thesis  also  applies
another parametric statistic in terms of the Patell Standardised Residual (PSR) test to test
the mean abnormal return.
5.5.9.3 Patell Standardised Residual (PSR) test
Strong (1992) argues that equally weighting abnormal returns lead to insufficient
estimates  of  the  mean  abnormal  returns  if  abnormal  returns  exhibit  heteroscedasticity.
When the sample increases, the variances of the mean abnormal returns increase in the
estimation period. Then, tests for the statistically significance level will be misspecified in
that the calculation of standard errors from the estimation period could be biased.
Patell (1976) provides a refined test procedure, which is referred to as the Patell
Standardised Residual (PSR) test. Czyrnik and Klein (2004) argue that the traditional Patell
(1976) test statistics focuses on a possible event-induced increase in variance. Besides,
Strong (1992) argues that abnormal returns are prediction errors rather than true residuals
when the parameters of the market model are estimated from observations outside the test
period.
Strong (1992) also argues that “The PSR test explicitly recognises the possibility of
different residual variances across securities, and weights the abnormal returns accordingly.
But, as Patell notes, the PSR test continues to assume cross-sectional independence of
abnormal returns and no change in residual variances between the EP [estimation period]
and the TP [test period].” (p. 546).
To  take  into  account  the  variances  of the  mean  abnormal  returns  during  the
estimation period that may affect the test of the significance level, this thesis also employs
the PSR test to examine the mean abnormal return. Thus, the procedure related to PSR test
is presented as follows:182
The definition of the notion for the PSR test is provided as follows:
Estimation
period
= the  period covers  which  the  market  model
parameters  are  estimated. The  estimation  period
ranges from day -286 to day -31.
Test period = the  period covers which  abnormal  returns  are
estimated. The test period covers from day -30 to
day +30.
(1) Estimate the variance of the residuals (estimated abnormal returns) ( it u ˆ ) during the
estimation period.
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Where T = the number of observations in the estimation period
The residuals (estimated abnormal returns ( it u ˆ )) are estimated during the test period from
day -30 to day +30, which is calculated by using the market model.
(2) Compute it C , which reflects the adjustment for the increase in variance for prediction
outside the estimation period. it C   is calculated for each day during the test period.
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Where
m R   = average return of market index in the estimation period
mr R   =   the return of market index on day r   during the estimation
period
The notation of
2 ) ( m mt R R    denotes the square for the deviation of the market return on
day t  during the test period from the mean market return during the estimation period. In
addition, the notation of
2 ) ( m mr R R    indicates the square for the deviation of the market
return on day r   during the estimation period from the mean market return during the
estimation period. The formula (2) for the PSR procedure takes into account the adjustment
for the increase in variance for prediction outside the estimation period. The variance may
increase as a result of the increase of the estimation period. Thus, the test statistic is not
biased when the variance of the residuals are taken into consideration during the estimation
period.
(3) Compute the Patell Standardised Residuals ( it V ) for each daily abnormal return. The
test statistic is distributed as a Student t  statistic with 2  T   degree of freedom.
it V   =
it i
it
C s
u ˆ
~ t( 2  T )                                                  (3)
(4) Compute the Patell Standardised Residuals ( iL W ) for the cumulative abnormal returns.
The test statistic is distributed as a Student t  statistic with 2  T   degree of freedom.184
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Where L  =    the number of day, which abnormal return is cumulated in the
test period.
L  ranges from 1 to 61 days during the test period, depending on the
event window.
As showed in the formula (3) and (4), the difference between it V   and iL W   is that
the test statistics of the residuals are calculated for a single day and the event window
during the test period, respectively. Thus, the abnormal return and the cumulative abnormal
return can be performed to test the significance level.
(5) Compute the test statistic ( vt Z ) for the standardised abnormal returns across securities
on day t. For large N , vt Z   is distributed approximately unit normal.
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(6) Compute the test statistic ( WL Z ) for the standardised cumulative abnormal return for the
event window. For large N , the test statistic is distributed approximately unit normal.
WL Z   =
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In  sum, three  parametric  statistics  are  applied in  this  thesis to  test  the  level  of
significance,  including the cross-sectional statistic t  ,  time-series statistic t    and
Patell Standardised Residual (PSR) test, respectively. These three test procedures are based
on the assumption that the sample is normally distributed.
However, if  the  sample  violates  the  assumption  that  the  sample  is  normally
distributed,  parametric  statistics  cannot  generate powerful  conclusions  in  testing  the
significance level. Brown and Warner (1980) argue that “If such an assumption is not met,
then the sampling distribution of test statistics assumed for the hypothesis tests could differ
from the actual distribution, and false inferences could result. If the distribution of the test
statistic is misspecified, then the null hypothesis, when true, could be rejected with some
frequency other than that given by the significance level of the test.” (p. 217).
Thus, nonparametric statistics can be employed to test the null hypothesis for the
level of significance in that the nonparametric statistic does not require that the sample is
normally distributed. Hence, the nonparametric statistic yields a powerful conclusion and
statistic test when the assumption of the parametric statistic is violated (Bartholdy et al.
(2007)).  Following  Brown  and  Warner  (1980),  this  thesis further employs  two
nonparametric  statistics,  the  sign  test  and  the  Wilcoxon  signed  rank  test,  to  test  the
significance level for the null hypothesis, H 0: the proportion of positive abnormal return is
equal to that of negative abnormal return. These two nonparametric statistics are discussed
below.
5.5.9.4 Sign test
A common nonparametric statistic related to market based research is the sign test.
Corrado and Zivney (1992) argue that the sign test statistic does not require a symmetrical
distribution of the mean abnormal return. Zivney and Thompson (1989) suggest that a
properly specified sign test may provide a more powerful test for abnormal security price
performance than the test t    in event studies.186
Brown and Warner (1980) argue that “In the sign test for a given sample, the null
hypothesis is that the proportion of sample securities having positive measures of abnormal
performance (e.g., positive residuals) is equal to 0.5; the alternative hypothesis (for any
particular level of abnormal return performance) is that the proportion of sample securities
having positive performance measures is greater than 0.5.” (p. 218). Thus, the sign test
provides additional insights to test the significance level. Following Brown and Warner
(1980), the sign test is performed as follows:
H 0: The proportion of sample securities having positive abnormal return is equal to 0.5
( p = 0.5)
Z   =
N
N P
/ ) 5 . 0 ( 5 . 0 (
2
1 5 . 0  
Where P   is the proportion of the abnormal return on day t  with positive
sign
N   denotes the number of securities
For the sign test, the Z test statistic should be distributed unit normal in large samples,
following the standard normal distribution.
5.5.9.5 Wilcoxon signed rank test
The Wilcoxon signed rank test has been performed in prior empirical studies (Brown
and Warner (1980); Bradley (1988); Becher (2000); Mulherin and Boone (2000); Becher
and  Campbell  (2005);  Ismail  and  Davidson  (2005)).  Becher  (2000)  argues  that  the
Wilcoxon signed rank test relaxes the assumption of normality, but assumes a symmetric
distribution. Brown and Warner (1980) also argue that “In the Wilcoxon test, both the sign
and the magnitude of the abnormal performance are taken into account in computing the187
test statistic.” (p. 218).
To perform the Wilcoxon signed rank test, the null hypothesis is specified that the
number  of  positive  mean  abnormal  return  is  equal  to  the  number  of  negative  mean
abnormal  return.  For  relatively  large  sample  size, the statistic Z    is  approximately
normally  distributed.  Accordingly,  the  Wilcoxon  signed  rank  test can  be  conducted  as
follows:
H 0: The populations of positive mean abnormal return and negative mean abnormal return
are identical ( T u = 0).
Z   =
T
T u T


T    =
6
) 1 2 )( 1 (   n n n
Where T denotes the sum of the signed rank values.
T  is the standard deviation
n indicates  the  number  of  positive  and  negative  mean
abnormal return in the sample
Similar to the sign test, the Z test statistics is approximately normal for large samples,
following the standard normal distribution.
In sum, the assumption of normal distribution for the parametric statistic may be
violated. When the abnormal return is not normally distributed, the nonparametric statistic
could generate more powerful conclusions in testing the significance level relative to the
parametric statistic. Thus, this thesis also applies the nonparametric statistic in terms of the188
sign  test  and  the Wilcoxon  signed  rank  test  to  test  the  level  of  significance.  While
employing the parametric and nonparametric statistic to examine the level of significance
for the abnormal return, the results are not influenced by any particular statistic test. Then,
the results can be robust to conclude the announcement returns based on the statistical test
for the significance level.
5.6 Cross-sectional regression analysis
As  discussed  above,  the  event  study  method  is  utilised  to  analyse  the  impact  of
shareholder wealth effects around bank merger and acquisition announcements. In addition,
this  thesis  further  explores  whether  investor  protection  and  bank  regulation  can  be
important determinants to explain shareholder wealth in bank mergers. Thus, this thesis
provides cross-sectional ordinary least square (OLS) regression analyses to explore the
relationship between the abnormal return and investor protection and bank regulation.
However,  as  discussed  in  chapter  2,  deal  characteristics  and  firm  specific
characteristics have been demonstrated to have an influence on the abnormal return. This
thesis  also  controls  for  deal  characteristics  and  firm  specific  characteristics  in  the
cross-sectional regression analyses in order to accurately explain the impact of investor
protection and bank regulation on the shareholder wealth in bank mergers. The variables
include  cross-border  dummy,  cash  dummy,  the  relative  size  of  the  target  to  bidder,
performance (ROA), the growth potential (market to book ratio), the capital ratio and firm
size. Furthermore, due to the focus on country level corporate governance mechanisms in
terms of investor protection and bank regulation in a country to explain shareholder wealth,
I  also  control  for  the  country  level  specific  characteristics,  the  competitiveness  of  the
banking market and the size of the banking market, in the regression analyses. It can be
expected that the cross-sectional regression analyses can explain the relationship between
the  abnormal  return  and  investor  protection  and  bank  regulation  more  precisely  when
controlling for these characteristics.189
However, one concern to perform the cross-sectional regression analysis is whether
the explanatory variables are highly  correlated,  especially for the variables of investor
protection and bank regulation in a country. If the explanatory variables in the multiple
regression analysis are highly correlated, problems of multicollinearity may occur. Thus,
the  coefficients  generated  from  the  regression  analysis  can  be  biased.  To  reduce  this
problem, the key explanatory variables related to investor protection and bank regulation
are analysed separately  in the cross-sectional regression analysis using different model
specification.  As  will  be  indicated  in  the empirical  section  (chapters  6,  7  and  8),
multicollinearity is not a problem in the cross-sectional regression analysis.
To distinguish the wealth effects of bank mergers for the firm, the cross-sectional
regression  analyses  are  separated  in  terms  of  targets,  bidders  and  combined  firms,
respectively.  The  separation  of  the  regression  analysis  enables  this  thesis  to  explain
shareholder wealth effects of the firm clearly. Thus, the analysis of the cross-sectional
regression analysis is presented in the empirical section (chapter 6, 7 and 8).
5.7 Conclusion
The  aim  of  this  thesis  is  to  explore  the  impact  of  investor  protection  and  bank
regulation on the shareholder wealth around bank merger and acquisition announcements
during the 1995-2005 period. This chapter focuses on discussing the sample selection and
methodology in this thesis.
As discussed in the section on sample selection, a number of sample criteria have
been imposed in order to construct the final sample for this analysis. Eventually, the final
sample consists of 508 targets, 1424 bidders and 388 combined firms. The sample contains
36 and 39 countries for targets and bidders, respectively.
To  address  the  impact  on  the  shareholder  wealth  in  bank  mergers,  event  study
methodology is applied in this thesis with three event study models in terms of the market
model, the mean adjusted returns model and the market adjusted returns model to calculate190
the abnormal return. As each model has its own strengths and weaknesses, the results
generated from different models could provide a robustness check and show additional
insights to this analysis.
As mentioned previously, the market model parameters may be biased as a result of
the problem of nonsynchronous trading. To take into account the problem of thin trading,
this thesis employs three methods to estimate unbiased beta estimates, including Scholes
and Williams’ (1977) method, Dimson’s (1979) method and Fowler and Rorke’s (1983)
method. When applying these three methods to cope with the problem of nonsynchronous
trading, unbiased model parameters for the market model can be obtained. Using three
different thin trading adjustment approaches, this can also reinforce the discussion of the
results for this analysis and identify whether the problem of thin trading is an issue in this
study.
In addition, this thesis applies the parametric statistic and nonparametric statistic to
test the level of significance. The parametric statistic assumes that the abnormal return is
normally distributed. As the assumption may be violated, the nonparametric statistic can be
used to test the significance level. The nonparametric statistics can also lend support to the
test of the significance level from the parametric statistics. This thesis can draw a strong
statistical  conclusion  to  interpret  the  results  in  this  analysis.  As  a  result,  several  test
statistics are employed in the current study to test the significance level, including the
cross-sectional statistic t  ,  time-series statistic t  ,  PSR  test,  sign  test and Wilcoxon
signed rank test.
Furthermore,  this  thesis  performs  cross-sectional  regression analyses  to  explore
whether investor protection and bank regulation can be important determinants to explain
shareholder wealth in bank mergers. In the regression analysis, this thesis also controls for
deal  characteristics, firm  specific  characteristics and  the  country  level  specific
characteristics in  cross-sectional  regression analyses.  It can  be  expected  that  the
interpretation of the results with respect to the relationship between the abnormal returns191
and investor protection and bank regulation could be more precise. Thus, the analysis of
the abnormal returns and OLS regression analysis is presented in the next three chapters.192
Chapter 6 The Empirical Results for Target Firms
6.1 Introduction
The  aim  of  this  thesis  is  to  explore  the  impact  of  investor  protection  and  bank
regulation on the shareholder wealth around bank merger and acquisition announcements
from 1995 to 2005. As has been discussed in chapter 2, the existing empirical studies have
reported positive announcement returns to targets in bank mergers. However, these prior
empirical studies report a wide variation of abnormal returns to targets, depending on the
market,  the  investigation  period  and  the  event  window.  This  thesis  uses  a  large
international sample of bank mergers to carry out this research. The empirical findings in
this  thesis  can  also  make  a comparison  to  prior  empirical  studies.  Thus,  this  chapter
presents the empirical findings in the current study based on 508 target firms.
As discussed in chapter 5 on the methodology, the measure of the level of abnormal
returns may be influenced by the model parameters, the problem of thin trading and the
confounding  events.
65  This  chapter  discusses  these  issues  on  the  influence  of  target
announcement returns first, following by presenting the empirical findings for target firms.
As target announcement returns may differ with respect to the market and activity focusing
or diversifying acquisitions, target announcement returns are further analysed taking into
account these aspects.
Furthermore, the cross-sectional regression analysis is undertaken in an attempt to
explain the variation of target announcement  returns. However, the regression analysis
focuses  on  determining  as  to  whether  investor  protection  and  bank  regulation  can  be
important determinants to explain target cumulative abnormal returns in bank mergers.
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 discusses the model parameters.
Section 6.3 presents target announcement returns taking into account the problem of thin
trading. Section 6.4 discusses the issue of the confounding events. Target abnormal returns
65 To take into account the confounding effects, the sample of targets is classified as the clean and nonclean
sample.  If  no  other corporate  events  are  announced  over  a  3-day  (-1,+1)  event  window,  the  sample  is
categorised as the clean sample; otherwise it is grouped as the nonclean sample.193
and cumulative abnormal returns are discussed in section 6.5. Section 6.6 and 6.7 present
the empirical findings with respect to the market and whether the acquisitions are activity
diversifying or focusing deals. The cross-sectional regression analyses are presented in
section 6.8. Section 6.9 also provides the cross-sectional regression analyses with respect
to the influence of the difference of investor protection and bank regulation between the
bidder and target countries on the target announcements returns. Conclusion is provided in
section 6.10.
6.2 The model parameters
As has discussed in chapter 5, the level of model parameters can be expected to
influence the calculation of target abnormal returns. Thus, this section presents descriptive
statistics of the market model parameters for target firms.
Table 6.1 The model parameters
Mean Maximum Minimum SD Negative Positive Sample
Alpha 0.0003 0.0147 -0.0099 0.0014 0.36 0.64 508
Beta 0.4891 2.5524 -2.0036 0.4898 0.11 0.89 508
As table 6.1 shows, the mean value of beta for targets is 0.4891. This figure is much
lower than 1 when comparing to the market adjusted returns (Mkt-Adj) model, assuming
that  beta  is  1  and  alpha  is  0. A  possible  reason  is  that the  model  parameters  may  be
influenced  by  the  problem  of  thin  trading. Thus,  the  problem  of  thin  trading  will  be
discussed in section 6.3.
When looking at the maximum beta value, a significant positive value of 2.5524
could result in lower abnormal returns to targets. Targets with positive beta value indicate
that target’s prior performance is consistent with market performance. On the contrary, a
significant negative value at -2.0036 for the minimum of beta value indicates that target’s
prior performance has a reverse association with the market performance, suggesting that194
targets with negative betas appear to have poor prior performance relative to the market.
Table 6.1 also shows that the percentage of positive beta amounts to 89% relative to
11%  of  negative  beta. The  large  proportion  of  positive  beta  suggests  that  target  prior
performance is generally consistent with the market performance although beta is more or
less volatile. Furthermore, table 6.1 shows that the mean value of alpha is 0.0003, which is
marginally higher than 0. This suggests that the level of target abnormal returns is mainly
affected by the magnitude of the beta. The percentage of positive and negative value of
alpha is 64% and 36%, respectively.
6.3 The problem of thin trading
As the market model (MM) parameters may be biased due to the presence of the
problem of thin trading, this thesis applies Scholes and Williams’ (SW), Dimson’s (DM)
and Fowler and Rorke’s (FR) approaches to adjust the model parameters. These models
have discussed in section 5.5.7. This section discusses the model parameters after taking
into account the problem of thin trading. Target abnormal returns adjusted for the thin
trading  adjustment  approaches  are  also  presented  in  this  section  in  order  to  identify
whether different thin trading adjustment approaches can result in differences of target
announcement returns.
Table 6.2 presents the model parameters with respect to the thin trading adjustment
approaches. As table 6.2 shows, the mean value of beta for the thin trading adjustment
approaches  is  higher  than  that  of  the  MM  model.  This  suggests  that  the  lead  and  lag
structure  of  thin  trading  adjustment  approaches  does  generate  different  levels  of  beta,
implying that the analysis of target abnormal returns can be influenced by the problem of
thin trading.
Among the thin trading adjustment approaches, the DM approach obtains the highest
mean value of beta at 0.6044, following by the FR and SW approach at 0.5917 and 0.5569,
respectively.  These  beta  coefficients  are  still  low  and  below  1.  However,  it  should  be195
acknowledged that thin trading adjusted betas maybe not all that different from those from
the MM model.
Table 6.2 The market model parameters adjusted for thin trading
Beta Alpha
MM SW DM FR MM SW DM FR
Mean 0.4891 0.5569 0.6044 0.5917 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002 0.0065
Maximum 2.5524 3.0363 3.4416 3.0271 0.0147 0.0031 0.0035 2.1403
Minimum -0.0036 -1.3367 -3.4878 -2.3807 -0.0099 -0.0077 -0.0080 -0.2215
SD 0.4898 0.5371 0.6050 0.6058 0.0014 0.0012 0.0013 0.1103
Negative 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.14 0.36 0.38 0.38 0.39
Positive 0.89 0.89 0.87 0.86 0.64 0.62 0.62 0.61
Sample 508 508 508 508 508 508 508 508
When looking at the maximum and minimum of beta value, the results show that the
DM approach obtains the highest value at 3.4416 and the lowest value at -3.4878. The
spread  of  beta  estimates indicates  that  target  abnormal returns  adjusted  for  the  DM
approach can significantly vary. However, the percentage of positive (negative) beta does
not  show  any  difference  between  the  thin  trading  adjustment  approaches  and  the  MM
model, at around 89% (11%).
Furthermore, table 6.2 also shows that the mean alpha value for the FR approach is,
at 0.0065, higher than that for the SW and DM approach as well as the MM model. This
may  be  attributable  to  the  difference  of  thin  trading  adjustment  approaches  as  the  FR
approach also takes into the first and second order serial correlation coefficients in their
model. As can be seen from table 6.2, the standard deviation of alpha value from the FR
approach  is  significantly  higher  than  that  from  the  SW  and  DM  approach.  The  figure
suggests a wide variation of alpha value from the FR approach. However, the mean value
of alpha for the SW and DM approach does not show any significant difference compared
to the MM model.196
When looking at the maximum and minimum of mean value of alpha, the results
show  that  the  FR  approach  similarly  obtains  the  highest  and  lowest  value  of  alpha  at
2.1403 and -0.2215, respectively. A positive (negative) value of alpha also indicates that
targets obtain lower (higher) abnormal returns. The percentage of positive (negative) value
of alpha for the thin trading adjustment approaches is in general consistent with that of the
MM model, at around 62% (38%). Overall, it can be found that thin trading adjustment
approaches seem to produce better coefficients than the MM model. This also allows the
current study to test the sensitivity of the results using different thin trading adjustment
approaches.
To better uncover the impact of thin trading adjustment approaches on the influence
of target announcement returns, figure 6.1 shows the drift of target cumulative abnormal
returns during the event period. As can be seen in figure 6.1, the graph shows that the
movement  of  target  cumulative  abnormal  returns  calculated  from  the  thin  trading
adjustment approaches is in general the same and also consistent with that from the MM
model.
66  There may still be thin trading problem, but the various models trying to control
for thin trading have overall limited impact on the mean abnormal returns.
Figure 6.1 Target cumulative abnormal returns from the thin trading adjustment approaches
66 Target abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns measured from the MM model will be presented
in section 6.5.197
In addition, as can be seen from figure 6.1, the impact of the level of target abnormal
returns mainly centres on the announcement date, day 0. Thus, I further present target
abnormal returns on day 0 for the thin trading adjustment approaches in order to provide a
direct evidence to identify whether the issue of thin trading is really a problem to influence
target cumulative abnormal returns in this thesis. As table 6.3 shows, targets in general earn
around  8.74%  abnormal  returns  on  day  0  with  respect  to  the  thin  trading  adjustment
approaches, all statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The results indicate that the use of
different  thin  trading  adjustment  approaches  does  not  show  any  difference  to  target
abnormal returns.
Furthermore, as will be discussed in section 6.5, targets earn 8.73% abnormal returns
on day 0 for the MM model. The results similarly do not show any difference between the
thin trading adjustment approaches and the MM model, confirming that the analysis of
target announcement returns does not suffer from the problem of thin trading. As thin
trading does not appear to be a major issue, the analysis of target abnormal returns will
then focus on the MM model.
Table  6.3  Target  abnormal  returns  on  the announcement  date  from  the  thin  trading
adjustment approaches
Mean p-value 1 Sign test
Wilcoxon
test
Scholes-Williams method 0.0873 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Dimson method 0.0874 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Fowler and Rorke method 0.0874 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
MM model 0.0873 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Day 0: abnormal returns
p-value 1: t test with assuming cross-sectional independence
Wilcoxon test: Wilcoxon signed rank test198
6.4 Confounding events
As confounding events
67  can be expected to have an influence on target cumulative
abnormal  returns,  this  section  further  discusses  target  cumulative  abnormal  returns  by
controlling for the confounding events. The discussion of the confounding events is based
on a 3-day (-1,+1) event window. The confounding events are identified from the database
of PI, SEC Filings and Financial Times as has discussed in chapter 5. Target announcement
returns are analysed in terms of the clean sample and nonclean sample in order to reveal
whether the confounding events are issues to be concerned in this analysis.
68
As table 6.4 shows, targets earn 8.98% and 4.73% abnormal returns on day 0 for the
clean and nonclean sample, respectively, both statistically significant at the 0.01 and 0.1
level. A significant difference of target abnormal returns between the clean and nonclean
sample would suggest that the analysis of target announcement returns can be affected by
the  confounding  events.  However,  the difference  is  not  statistically  significant, as  the
p-value  is  0.122.  It  is not  possible  to  draw  a  statistical  conclusion,  claiming  that  the
confounding events are important to be considered in the analysis of target announcement
returns. However, care should be exercised to claim this in that quite large difference of
target abnormal returns between the clean and nonclean sample is found, indicating that
target abnormal returns are at least qualitatively different.
While comparing to the results for the clean sample and the full sample
69, targets earn
8.98% and 8.73% abnormal returns on day 0, respectively. The difference between the
clean sample and the full sample is not statistically significant, p-value is 0.779. Due to a
small difference of the sample, the comparison of target abnormal returns between the
clean sample and the full sample could not generate any statistical significant results.
67 Confounding events mean that target firms announce other corporate events on day -1, 0, +1, for example,
earning or dividend announcements, the release of the annual report, etc.
68 Clean sample means that targets do not announce other confounding events during a 3-day (-1,+1) event
window. If targets announce other confounding events over a 3-day (-1,+1) event window, the sample is
classified as the nonclean sample.
69 As will be discussed in section 6.5, targets with the full sample earn 8.73% abnormal returns on day 0 and
13.25% cumulative abnormal returns over a 3-day (-1,+1) event window calculated from the market (MM)
model.199
Table 6.4 The influence of the confounding events on target cumulative abnormal returns
MM model
N Mean p-value 1 SD Minimum Maximum
Day 0 clean sample 478 8.98% 0.0000 0.1404 -0.3933 1.0661
(-1,+1) clean sample 478 13.33% 0.0000 0.1628 -0.6198 1.2209
Day 0 nonclean sample 30 4.73% 0.0800 0.1425 -0.2797 0.5773
(-1,+1) nonclean sample 30 11.99% 0.0010 0.1773 -0.308 0.5688
p-value 1: t test with assuming cross-sectional independence
Looking  at  a  3-day  (-1,+1)  event  window,  targets  obtain  13.33%  and  11.99%
cumulative  abnormal  returns  for  the  clean  and  nonclean  sample,  respectively,  both
statistically significant at the 0.01 level. However, the difference between the clean sample
and nonclean sample is not statistically significant, p-value is 0.689. This indicates that
there is no significant difference of target cumulative abnormal returns over a 3-day (-1,+1)
event window between the clean sample and nonclean sample.
While comparing to the results for the clean sample and the full sample, targets earn
13.33%  and  13.25%  cumulative  abnormal  returns  over  a  3-day  (-1,+1)  event  window,
respectively,  both  statistically  significant  at  the  0.01  level.  However,  the  difference
between the clean sample and the full sample is not statistically significant, p-value is
0.939. As a result, I cannot conclude that there is any difference between the clean sample
and the full sample, suggesting that the analysis of target cumulative abnormal returns is
not statistically and significantly influenced by the confounding events. However, it should
be acknowledged that the comparison between the clean sample and the full sample may
not be meaningful due to a small difference of the sample.
While  the  results  based  on  the  announcement  date  cannot  draw  a  statistical
conclusion and no significant difference between the clean sample and the full sample can
be found, these findings suggest that the issue of the confounding effects is not a problem
to be concerned with. So, the analysis of target abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal200
returns is based on the full 508 sample in the following section.
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Overall,  table  6.4  shows  that  the  clean  and  nonclean  sample  is  478  and  30,
respectively. The figure also supports the argument that mergers and acquisitions are major
corporate  events.  The announcement  of  other  corporate  events  may  tend  to  avoid  the
announcement of mergers and acquisitions in order to reduce the impact of share price.
6.5 Target abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns
As  has  been  discussed  in  chapter  2,  prior  empirical  studies  report  positive
announcement returns to targets. While using a large international sample of bank mergers,
this section presents the empirical findings to targets. To understand target shareholder
wealth of bank mergers, I analyse target daily abnormal returns over a 61-day period first,
from day -30 to day +30, to ascertain whether there are significant abnormal returns either
prior  to  or  after  the  day  of  the  bid  announcement.  Then,  I  further  examine  target
cumulative abnormal returns over a certain event window in order to capture the change of
target announcement returns within a certain period.
Table  6.5  shows  target  daily  abnormal  returns  calculated  from the  market  (MM)
model and the market adjusted returns (Mkt-Adj) model, respectively.
71  As can be seen in
table 6.5, target daily abnormal returns vary depending on the event day. However, the
majority  of  target  daily  abnormal  returns  during  the  event  period  are  positive  with  a
significant impact of target abnormal returns on day 0. In addition, the parametric and
nonparametric statistics as discussed in section 5.5.9 are employed to test the significant
level. The results of the significant level are generally the same around the announcement
date although the significant level can vary depending on the event day.
70 Due to similar results, target cumulative abnormal returns for the market adjusted returns (Mkt-Adj) model
and the mean adjusted returns (Mean-Adj) model are not repeatedly discussed.
71 The results from the mean adjusted returns (Mean-Adj) model are the same as those from the market (MM)
model and the market adjusted returns (Mkt-Adj) model. The results are not repeatedly discussed.201
Table 6.5 Target daily abnormal returns
Market
model
Market adjusted
return model
day Mean p-value1 p-value2 p-value3 Sign Wilcoxon Mean p-value1 p-value2 Sign Wilcoxon
-30 0.0019 0.2425 0.2425 0.2846 0.1205 0.5030 0.0020 0.2279 0.0768 0.0370 0.7010
-29 0.0017 0.0900 0.0900 0.1910 0.5641 0.6500 0.0015 0.1391 0.1665 1.0000 0.4830
-28 0.0004 0.3666 0.3666 0.3899 0.0237 0.5070 0.0008 0.3154 0.3180 0.3075 0.9050
-27 0.0024 0.0211 0.0211 0.1328 0.6897 0.1310 0.0032 0.0028 0.0065 0.0370 0.0030
-26 -0.0016 0.2225 0.2225 0.1326 0.0000 0.0020 -0.0018 0.1978 0.1105 0.0001 0.0060
-25 -0.0002 0.3906 0.3906 0.3887 0.0114 0.3940 -0.0001 0.3964 0.3968 0.4507 0.8390
-24 0.0005 0.3488 0.3488 0.3292 0.0564 0.9100 0.0002 0.3949 0.3949 0.1007 0.7090
-23 0.0025 0.0171 0.0171 0.0324 1.0000 0.0940 0.0025 0.0217 0.0316 0.1205 0.0310
-22 0.0009 0.2672 0.2672 0.1926 0.1432 0.6740 0.0009 0.2839 0.2916 0.2309 0.8620
-21 -0.0010 0.2068 0.2068 0.2049 0.0006 0.0490 -0.0011 0.2160 0.2567 0.0114 0.1840
-20 0.0005 0.3475 0.3475 0.0019 0.5057 0.3890 0.0006 0.3420 0.3509 0.3992 0.4750
-19 0.0009 0.2968 0.2968 0.2594 0.9646 0.5330 0.0016 0.1707 0.1522 0.3515 0.0570
-18 0.0012 0.1848 0.1848 0.2651 0.5641 0.7210 0.0011 0.2010 0.2368 0.1982 0.8040
-17 0.0002 0.3950 0.3950 0.0000 0.0836 0.2780 0.0008 0.3523 0.3106 0.5057 0.9900
-16 0.0006 0.3200 0.3200 0.0000 0.5641 0.9680 0.0014 0.1320 0.1754 0.9646 0.2750
-15 0.0020 0.0993 0.0993 0.0482 0.7561 0.3680 0.0018 0.1369 0.1100 0.6570 0.5180
-14 0.0009 0.3272 0.3272 0.0568 0.7561 0.7310 0.0014 0.2393 0.1829 0.7224 0.2250
-13 0.0005 0.3484 0.3484 0.3484 0.0459 0.3960 0.0009 0.2711 0.2840 0.2309 0.8790
-12 0.0025 0.0353 0.0353 0.0050 0.3515 0.3330 0.0020 0.0957 0.0794 0.1432 0.5580
-11 0.0008 0.2916 0.2916 0.3959 0.4507 0.9680 0.0004 0.3761 0.3779 0.1553 0.8310
-10 0.0018 0.1090 0.1090 0.1390 0.4507 0.5780 0.0016 0.1458 0.1394 0.3992 0.5530
-9 0.0004 0.3828 0.3828 0.3657 0.5641 0.8310 0.0003 0.3878 0.3843 0.3515 0.3820
-8 0.0025 0.0459 0.0459 0.0517 0.9646 0.2370 0.0023 0.0659 0.0504 0.8941 0.2020
-7 0.0031 0.0072 0.0072 0.0039 1.0000 0.0710 0.0033 0.0057 0.0054 0.8941 0.0430
-6 0.0042 0.0024 0.0024 0.0000 0.8244 0.0410 0.0053 0.0002 0.0000 0.0297 0.0010
-5 0.0011 0.2121 0.2121 0.2778 0.0370 0.8790 0.0009 0.2734 0.2876 0.3075 0.9000
-4 0.0033 0.0201 0.0201 0.0024 0.8244 0.1050 0.0035 0.0149 0.0029 0.2673 0.0220
-3 0.0038 0.0230 0.0230 0.0001 0.5057 0.1060 0.0043 0.0108 0.0003 0.7561 0.0220
-2 0.0070 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.1432 0.0000 0.0073 0.0001 0.0000 0.0045 0.0000
-1 0.0137 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0141 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
0 0.0873 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0875 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
1 0.0315 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1982 0.0000 0.0316 0.0000 0.0000 0.1432 0.0000202
2 0.0015 0.1405 0.1405 0.3076 0.1690 0.8860 0.0015 0.1375 0.1534 0.8941 0.2830
3 -0.0003 0.3787 0.3787 0.3796 0.3075 0.9560 -0.0002 0.3908 0.3937 0.2865 0.7600
4 -0.0019 0.0299 0.0299 0.0000 0.0297 0.0720 -0.0021 0.0230 0.0745 0.0039 0.0210
5 -0.0002 0.3787 0.3787 0.0000 0.5057 0.9490 -0.0002 0.3884 0.3937 0.1690 0.9890
6 0.0003 0.3716 0.3716 0.3973 0.0068 0.2160 0.0002 0.3855 0.3920 0.3992 0.9030
7 0.0014 0.0890 0.0890 0.2058 0.0114 0.6780 0.0011 0.1601 0.2371 0.1205 0.6520
8 -0.0014 0.0540 0.0540 0.0301 0.0068 0.0440 -0.0010 0.1634 0.2627 0.0068 0.2380
9 0.0008 0.1989 0.1989 0.2161 0.8941 0.2010 0.0010 0.1676 0.2748 0.3075 0.0330
10 -0.0001 0.3958 0.3958 0.0000 0.0564 0.0140 0.0000 0.3987 0.3987 0.1007 0.0990
11 0.0012 0.1248 0.1248 0.0000 0.8244 0.4380 0.0012 0.1421 0.2249 0.6255 0.4920
12 -0.0005 0.2869 0.2869 0.1976 0.1982 0.1520 -0.0006 0.2815 0.3438 0.0689 0.1160
13 -0.0006 0.2914 0.2914 0.2867 0.0459 0.4330 -0.0003 0.3653 0.3830 0.2309 0.9410
14 0.0001 0.3952 0.3952 0.0328 0.6897 0.9120 -0.0000 0.3982 0.3986 0.8941 0.8210
15 -0.0005 0.3042 0.3042 0.3969 0.0370 0.2800 0.0002 0.3818 0.3902 0.6897 0.5680
16 0.0016 0.0173 0.0173 0.3375 0.6897 0.1900 0.0018 0.0114 0.1120 0.1982 0.0580
17 -0.0004 0.3281 0.3281 0.2089 0.0000 0.0140 -0.0003 0.3670 0.3858 0.0089 0.3010
18 -0.0002 0.3804 0.3804 0.3860 0.1690 0.6230 0.0006 0.2750 0.3424 0.9646 0.1580
19 0.0007 0.2530 0.2530 0.0700 0.5057 0.4650 0.0013 0.0984 0.2083 0.6897 0.0500
20 -0.0009 0.1585 0.1585 0.2966 0.0002 0.0060 -0.0007 0.2783 0.3349 0.0129 0.1100
21 0.0004 0.3429 0.3429 0.3965 0.1205 0.9680 0.0012 0.0971 0.2207 0.8941 0.0300
22 -0.0001 0.3950 0.3950 0.0020 0.3075 0.9470 0.0006 0.3002 0.3402 0.7561 0.4540
23 0.0000 0.3986 0.3986 0.3897 0.1205 0.5760 0.0001 0.3960 0.3966 0.1007 0.7240
24 0.0003 0.3722 0.3722 0.3927 0.1690 0.8320 0.0001 0.3967 0.3977 0.2309 0.9880
25 0.0014 0.1003 0.1003 0.2681 0.6897 0.7830 0.0012 0.1611 0.2299 0.4507 0.7920
26 -0.0010 0.1176 0.1176 0.1818 0.0012 0.0070 -0.0009 0.1903 0.2986 0.1690 0.2720
27 0.0003 0.3742 0.3742 0.3977 0.0564 0.5690 0.0001 0.3943 0.3962 0.0370 0.8910
28 0.0011 0.1531 0.1531 0.2819 0.2309 0.5840 0.0009 0.2211 0.2858 0.8941 0.6330
29 -0.0010 0.1432 0.1432 0.0000 0.0016 0.0110 -0.0009 0.2039 0.2885 0.0016 0.0510
30 -0.0009 0.1827 0.1827 0.2365 0.0689 0.3350 -0.0006 0.2931 0.3478 0.7561 0.9160
p-value 1: t test with assuming cross-sectional independence
p-value 2: t test with assuming cross-sectional dependence
p-value 3: PSR test
Sign: Sign test
Wilcoxon: Wilcoxon signed rank test203
The results show that targets earn 8.73% and 8.75% abnormal returns on day 0 from
the MM and Mkt-Adj model, respectively, both statistically significant at the 0.01 level.
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Applying other testing procedures, the results are all the same, statistically significant at
the  0.01  level.  This  also  allows  the  current  study  to  confirm  that  there  is  a  statistical
significant  impact  of  target  abnormal  returns  on  the  announcement  date.  A  significant
impact of target abnormal returns on day 0 lends support to the market efficient hypothesis,
implying  that  the  market  responds  the  information  efficiently.  However,  it  should  be
necessary  to  exercise  care  to  claim  this  as  there  is  also  a  significant  impact  of  target
announcement returns on day -1 and +1.
In addition, significant positive abnormal returns with statistically significant at the
0.01 level also allow this analysis to reject the null hypothesis, concluding that there are
positive abnormal returns to targets around bank merger and acquisition announcements.
Positive abnormal returns to targets also indicate that bank mergers create value to target
shareholders.
When  looking  at  the  pre-announcement  period,  targets,  for  example,  earn  0.33%
abnormal returns on day -4, raising to 1.37% abnormal returns on day -1, all statistically
significant at the 0.01 level. An increase of target abnormal returns suggests the existence
of the information leakage during the pre-announcement period.
Taking into account the post-announcement period, the results show that targets, for
example, earn 3.15% abnormal returns on day +1, statistically significant at the 0.01 level.
Positive  abnormal  returns  for  targets  on  day  +1  may  attribute  to  the  presence  of
information lag. A possible explanation is that the market may additionally evaluate the
transactions that may trigger the market to further respond the information of bank mergers
and acquisitions.
Furthermore, this thesis also presents a figure to illustrate the movement of target
72 The discussion of the significance level is based on p-value 1, assuming cross-sectional independence.204
announcement returns during the event period. As figure 6.2 shows, there is an upward
trend prior to the announcement date. The figure shows approximately 5% cumulative
abnormal  returns  over  30  days  leading  up  to  the  bid  announcement  date.  This  clearly
indicates the existence of the information leakage before the transactions.
Figure 6.2 The movement of target cumulative abnormal returns during the test period
With a significant impact of the abnormal returns on day 0 and +1, target cumulative
abnormal returns are fairly stable during the post-event period. The results suggest that the
impact of target announcement returns mainly derive from the announcement date and the
pre-announcement  period.  The  figure  shows  that  the  level  of  total  target  cumulative
abnormal returns is approximately 18% over the 61-day period.
To better perceive the change of target abnormal returns within a certain period, this
thesis also reports target cumulative abnormal returns over different event windows. As
table 6.6 shows, targets earn cumulative abnormal returns of 14.67% over a 6-day (-4,+1)
event window, statistically significant at the 0.01 level.
While looking at a 3-day (-1,+1) event window, the results show that targets obtain
13.25%  cumulative abnormal  returns.  Extending  to  a  longer  61-day  (-30,+30)  event205
window, targets earn 17.81% cumulative abnormal returns, statistically significant at the
0.01 level. Hence, it is apparent that the impact of target shareholder wealth mainly centres
on 3-day (-1,+1) event window.
Table 6.6 Target cumulative abnormal returns over various event windows
Market model Market adjusted return model
Mean p-value1 p-value3
Sign
test
Wilcoxon
test
Mean p-value1
Sign
test
Wilcoxon
test
(-4,1) 0.1467 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1484 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(-1,1) 0.1325 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1332 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(-30,30) 0.1781 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1878 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0) 0.0873 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0875 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(-1,0) 0.1010 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1016 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(-30,-1) 0.0586 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0631 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0,1) 0.1188 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1191 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(1,30) 0.0322 0.0000 0.0000 0.0030 0.0000 0.0372 0.0000 0.0030 0.0000
p-value 1: t-test with assuming cross-sectional independence
p-value 3: PSR test
Wilcoxon test: Wilcoxon signed rank test
As has mentioned previously, cross-sectional analysis is undertaken to explain the
variation of target announcement returns. While target announcement returns center on a
3-day (-1,+1) event window, this thesis applies 3-day (-1,+1) target cumulative abnormal
returns  as the  dependent  variable in  the  regression  analysis.  The  regression  analysis
focuses  on  the  country  level  corporate  governance  mechanisms  in  terms  of  investor
protection and bank regulation to explain target announcement returns, as will be discussed
in section 6.8.
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Overall, the results show that targets earn positive announcement returns around bank
merger and acquisition announcements, indicating that bank mergers create value to target
73 The results do not show any significant difference when computing from the Mkt-Adj model. Similarly,
the results from the Mean-Adj model are in general consistent with the MM and Mkt-Adj model. Thus, the
results are not repeatedly discussed.206
firms. Similarly, positive announcement returns to targets are also consistent with prior
empirical studies, as has been discussed in chapter 2. On the other hand, while the results
of  target  announcement  returns  from  the  MM,  Mkt-Adj  and  Mean-Adj  model  are  in
general the same, the discussion of target announcement returns related to the market and
activity diversifying or focusing deals is based on the MM model.
6.6 Country differences in target cumulative abnormal returns
Prior empirical studies have been reviewed in chapter 2. The prior empirical evidence
has reported a variation of target cumulative abnormal returns depending on the market. It
can be useful to further examine target announcement returns with respect to the market.
The  analysis  of  target  announcement  returns  related  to the  market  can  also  make  a
comparison to prior empirical evidence.
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While the U.S. banking takeover market can be regarded as the most competitive
banking takeover market relative to the EU market and the markets from the rest of the
world
75, it can be hypothesised that U.S. targets obtain higher announcement returns than
EU targets and targets from other markets as discussed in section 4.3.1.1. This section
discusses  target  announcement  returns  with  respect  to  the  U.S.,  EU  market  and  other
markets.
Figure 6.3 shows the development of target cumulative abnormal returns from day
-30 to day +30 in terms of the U.S., EU market and other markets, respectively.
76  As
figure 6.3 shows, U.S.  targets earn higher cumulative abnormal returns relative to EU
targets and targets from other markets. The results implicate that U.S. banking takeover
market is more competitive than the EU market and other markets. However, targets from
other  markets  obtain  the  lowest  cumulative  abnormal  returns  around  bank  merger  and
74 Other markets mean the markets from outside the U.S. and EU market.
75 Conn and Connell (1990) and Aybar and Ficici (2009) argue that U.S. targets can obtain high bid premia
due to highly competitive nature of the U.S. takeover market.
76 Figure 6.3 shows target cumulative abnormal returns measured from the MM model.207
acquisition announcements, implying that banking takeover markets from other markets
are less competitive relative to the U.S. and EU market.
77
Figure 6.3 Target cumulative abnormal returns for the market
As discussed in section 6.5, the information leakage can be spotted in the analysis of
target announcement returns during the pre-announcement period. Given the presence of
the information leakage, figure 6.3 similarly shows that the information leakage is more
significant in the U.S. and EU market compared to other markets. A possible explanation
may be that the information flow could be relatively faster in the U.S. and EU market
relative  to  other  markets.  However,  the  information  leakage  does  not  show  a  large
difference between U.S. targets and EU targets as figure 6.3 shows.
In  addition,  figure  6.3  also  indicates  that  there  is  a  significant  impact  of target
abnormal returns on day 0 in the U.S. and EU market compared to that from other markets.
This suggests that the U.S. and EU market can also be more efficient to respond the newly
released information quickly as the abnormal returns on day 0 in the U.S. and EU market
are rather significant.
77 As discussed in chapter 4, other markets in the current study also include some highly developed markets,
such as Canada or Japan, etc. It should be acknowledged that it is necessary to exercise care to interpret the
results.208
Furthermore, this thesis presents target cumulative abnormal returns from different
event windows in order to better understand the impact of target shareholder wealth over a
certain period. As table 6.7 shows, targets in the U.S. market earn 11.01% abnormal returns
on day 0, compared to 6.22% and 0.57% for those in the EU market and other markets,
respectively. However, the results are statistically significant at the 0.01 level for the U.S.
and EU market only. The difference between the markets is all statistically significant,
p-value is 0.005 (U.S.-EU), 0.000 (U.S.-Others) and 0.002 (EU-Others).
These findings suggest that U.S. targets obtain the highest bid premium and are also
consistent with the argument by Conn and Connell (1990) and Aybar and Ficici (2009),
where U.S. targets earn high bid premia due to the highly competitive nature of the U.S.
banking takeover market.
Looking at a 3-day (-1,+1) event window, targets obtain 16.47%, 8.88% and 2.57%
cumulative abnormal returns in the U.S., EU market and other markets, respectively. The
results  are  statistically  significant  at  the  0.01  level  for  the  U.S.  and  EU  market  only.
Significant positive cumulative abnormal returns for targets are consistent with the study of
U.S. bank mergers (e.g., Siems (1996); Toyne and Tripp (1998); Akhigbe et al. (2004)) and
EU bank mergers (e.g., Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000); Beitel et al. (2004)). Similarly,
positive announcement returns to targets from other markets are also consistent with prior
empirical evidence from international studies, e.g., Biswas et al. (1997), DeLong (2003),
Scholtens and de Wit (2004) and Valkanov and Kleimeier (2007).
In comparison of prior empirical studies, my results, showing 16.47% cumulative
abnormal returns to targets over a 3-day (-1,+1) event window in the U.S. market, are
consistent with those of U.S. studies, e.g., 14.39% of Houston and Ryngaert (1994), 5.06%
of Zhang (1995), 13.04% of Siems (1996), 10.97% of Toyne and Tripp (1998), 16.70% of
Becher  and  Campbell  (2005).  The  results  also  indicate  that  targets  earn  significant
announcement returns regardless of the investigation period although a variation of target209
announcement returns is reported.
In addition, my results, showing 8.88% cumulative abnormal returns to targets in the EU
market, are also consistent with those of EU studies, e.g., 4.65% of Rad and Beek (1999),
12.93% of Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000), 12.39% of Beitel et al. (2004), 3.24% of
Campa and Hemando (2006), 3.31% of Ismail and Davidson (2007). Although my results
are  consistent  with  prior  empirical  studies,  it  can  be  found  a  wide  variation  of  target
announcement returns in EU bank mergers. A possible explanation is that the analysis of
target announcement returns in EU bank mergers could be more sensitive to the sample
construction and the investigation period.
While looking at other markets, my results show 2.57% cumulative abnormal returns
to targets. The results are consistent with those in international studies, e.g., 6.23% of
Biswas et al. (1997), 2.98% of Fields et al. (2007), 19.06% of Valkanov and Kleimeier
(2007). However, it should be necessary to exercise care to make such a comparison in that
these prior empirical studies in international studies also include the sample of U.S. and
EU bank mergers in their study.
Overall, the results show that targets in the U.S. market earn higher announcement
returns  than  those  in  EU  market  and  those  from  other  markets.  These  findings  are
consistent with the hypothesis set out in section 4.3.1.1, predicting that U.S. targets earn
higher announcement returns than EU targets and targets from outside the U.S. and EU
market. The results also indicate that U.S. banking takeover market is more competitive as
bidders need to pay more to U.S. targets. Table 6.6 shows that the samples of bank mergers
are 355, 78 and 75 from the U.S., EU market and other markets, respectively. The figure
also denotes that bank mergers mainly take place in the U.S. market, further indicating that
U.S. banking takeover market is more active.
78
78 The discussion of the results above focuses on the MM model. The discussion of statistically significant
level is based on p-value 1, assuming t-test with cross-sectional independent. As the results from the Mkt-Adj
model and the Mean-Adj model are in general the same, these findings are not repeatedly discussed.210
Table 6.7 Target cumulative abnormal returns for the market
Market model
U.S. EU Others
Mean p-value 1 Sign test Wilcoxon test Mean p-value 1 Sign test Wilcoxon test Mean p-value 1 Sign test Wilcoxon test
(-4,1) 0.1519 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1281 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1414 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
( -1 , 1 ) 0.1647 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0888 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0257 0.1150 0.0027 0.0080
( -30 , 30 ) 0.2148 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1478 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 0.0362 0.2890 0.2482 0.0560
( 0 ) 0.1101 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0622 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 0.0057 0.5210 0.6442 0.3140
( -1 , 0 ) 0.1262 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0708 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0134 0.2000 0.1659 0.0800
( -30 , -1 ) 0.0653 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0589 0.0030 0.4280 0.0170 0.0269 0.2930 0.0012 0.0050
( 0 , 1 ) 0.1183 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1148 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1252 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
( 1 , 30 ) 0.0305 0.0000 0.0010 0.0000 0.0182 0.2030 0.4280 0.9290 0.0546 0.0020 0.1659 0.0240
N 355 78 75
p-value 1: t test with assuming cross-sectional independence
Wilcoxon test: Wilcoxon signed rank test211
6.7 The analysis of diversifying or focusing deals
Banks can achieve risk diversification through diversifying acquisitions. However,
when banks engage in mergers with focusing deals, managers may be relatively easy to
manage similar bank risks after the transactions. Thus, it can be expected that there are
differences  in  target  announcement  returns  between  activity  diversifying  and focusing
deals as discussed in section 4.3.1.1.
79  This section discusses target cumulative abnormal
returns in terms of diversifying or focusing deals. The discussion of target cumulative
abnormal returns related to activity focusing and diversifying deals is based on a sample of
508 targets, where 424 targets are focusing deals and 84 targets are diversifying deals.
Figure  6.4  The  development  of  target  cumulative abnormal  returns  for  activity
focusing/diversifying deals
The development of target  cumulative abnormal returns for activity focusing and
diversifying deals from day -30 to day +30 is presented in Figure 6.4. The figure shows
79 Diversifying  or  focusing  deals  mean  that  the  type  of  deals  is  in  the  form  of  bank  to other  financial
institution (cross-product) deals and bank to bank deals, respectively. If the two merging companies have the
same 2-digit SIC code, the deals are categorised as focusing (bank-to-bank) deals. Otherwise, the deals are
classified as diversifying (cross-product) deals if banks with 2-digit SIC code are different. With regard to
diversifying  deals,  it  should  be  acknowledged  that  the  definition  of  diversification  transactions  may  not
provide a clear picture of the impact of bank diversification. This may derive from the fact that banks within
the same 2-digit SIC code may also contain different types of banks, such as retail banks, wholesale banks,
etc. The analysis of the abnormal returns may vary depending on different types of the banks. This can also
suggest future research to further look into the impact of shareholder wealth in bank mergers within different
types of banks.212
that  there  is  an  upward  trend  for  target  cumulative abnormal  returns  prior  to  the
announcement  date  and  this  upward  trend  is  more significant  to  target  cumulative
abnormal returns in focusing deals relative to those in diversifying deals. This indicates
that the information leakage for targets is more apparent in focusing deals. However, it
remains  unknown  as  to  why  the information  leakage  is  more  significant  to targets  in
focusing deals.
Table 6.8 presents the results of target announcement returns over different event
windows. As table 6.8 shows, targets in focusing deals earn 9.06% abnormal returns on day
0 higher than 7.08% abnormal returns for those in diversifying deals, both statistically
significant at the 0.01 level. The results lend support to the hypothesis that targets earn
higher  cumulative abnormal  returns  in  focusing  deals  than  in  diversifying  deals.  This
suggests that the management of bidders wants to pay more in bank to bank deals in that
managers do not need to manage more types of risks after the transactions. However, the
difference  of  target  abnormal  returns  between  focusing  and  diversifying  deals  is  not
statistically significant, p-value is 0.335.
Table 6.8 Target cumulative abnormal returns for activity focusing/diversifying deals
Focusing Diversifying
Mean
p-value
1
Sign
test
Wilcoxon
test
Mean
p-value
1
Sign
test
Wilcoxon
test
(-4,1) 0.1490 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1352 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(-1,1) 0.1366 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1126 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(-30,30) 0.1810 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1641 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0) 0.0906 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0708 0.0000 0.0005 0.0000
(-1,0) 0.1017 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0978 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(-30,-1) 0.0586 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0590 0.0180 0.0024 0.0000
(0,1) 0.1185 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1204 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(1,30) 0.0284 0.0000 0.0087 0.0000 0.0513 0.0010 0.1931 0.0220
N 424 84213
p-value 1: t test assuming cross-sectional independence
Wilcoxon test: Wilcoxon signed rank test
Looking at  a 3-day (-1,+1) event window, targets in focusing deals  earn 13.66%
cumulative abnormal  returns  relative  to  11.26%  for  those  in  diversifying  deals,  both
statistically  significant  at the  0.01  level. Targets  earn  statistically  significant  higher
announcement returns in focusing deals than those in diversifying deals. The results are
consistent  with  the  studies  of  DeLong  (2001)  and Ismail  and  Davidson  (2005),  but
contradict Cybo-Ottone and Murgia’s (2000) findings.
In addition, targets in focusing deals in general earn higher cumulative abnormal
returns also over other event windows than those in diversifying deals, excluding a 2-day
(0,+1) and 30-day (+1,+30) event window. When looking at a 2-day (0,+1) and 30-day
(+1,+30)  event  window,  targets  in  diversifying  deals  earn  higher  cumulative  abnormal
returns than those in focusing deals. The results may suggest that the market attempts to
revise its expectation after the transactions. The results imply that diversifying acquisitions
are more favourable due to risk diversification effects after the transactions.
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This  section  discusses  target  cumulative  abnormal  returns  taking  into  accounting
activity  focusing  and  diversifying  deals.  The  results  overall  show  that  targets  earn
significant positive cumulative abnormal returns in both activity focusing and diversifying
deals.  These  findings  also  reveal  that  targets  in  focusing  deals  in  general  earn  higher
announcement returns than those in diversifying deals. The results indicate that the market
responds  focusing  deals  favourably,  denoting  that  managers  may  be  relatively  easy  to
manage similar bank risks after the transactions.
Overall,  as  discussed  above,  this  thesis  presents  the  empirical  findings  of  target
80  The  discussion  of  statistical  significance  levels  is  based  on  p-value  1,  which  is a t-test  assuming
cross-sectional independent. Due to similar results of target cumulative abnormal returns from the Mean-Adj
and Mkt-Adj model, those findings are not repeatedly discussed.214
announcement  returns  in  the  previous  sections,  taking  into  account  the  issues  of  thin
trading,  the  confounding  events,  the  analysis  of  the  market  and  activity  focusing  or
diversifying deals, respectively. The results show that targets earn positive announcement
returns  around  bank  merger  and  acquisition  announcements,  which  are  consistent  with
prior empirical studies as discussed in chapter 2.
Furthermore, in order to explain the variation of target cumulative abnormal returns,
this thesis carries out a cross-sectional regression analysis. The regression analysis is to
explore as to whether the country level  corporate  governance mechanisms in terms of
investor protection and bank regulation can be important determinants to explain target
announcement returns. Thus, the following section provides the cross-sectional regression
analysis in this thesis.
6.8 Cross-sectional regression analysis
This thesis aims to explore the impact of investor protection and bank regulation on
the shareholder wealth around bank merger and acquisition announcements from 1995 to
2005. As has been discussed in chapter 3, prior empirical studies pay less attention to
explore the impact of the country  level corporate  governance mechanisms in terms of
investor protection and bank regulation on target announcement returns in bank mergers.
This section further provides the cross-sectional regression analysis to determine as to
whether investor protection and bank regulation in a country can be important determinants
to  influence  target  cumulative abnormal  returns  around  bank  merger  and  acquisition
announcements.
While focusing on the country level corporate governance mechanisms in terms of
investor protection and bank regulation in a country, target announcement returns may be
affected by the country level specific characteristics. In addition, as has been discussed in
chapter  2,  the  deal  and  firm  specific  characteristics  can  have  an  influence  on  target215
shareholder wealth of bank mergers. Thus, this thesis also controls for the country level
specific characteristics and the deal and firm specific characteristics in the cross-sectional
regression  analyses  in  order  to  explore  the  relationship  between  target  cumulative
abnormal returns and investor protection and bank regulation in a country accurately.
Controlling for these characteristics also allows the current study to further explore
the factors that can affect target announcement returns in bank mergers. The variables
related  to  the  country  level  specific  characteristics  contain  the  competitiveness  of  the
banking market and the size of the banking market. The variables related to the deal and
firm  characteristics  include  cross-border  dummy,  cash  dummy,  the  relative  size  of  the
target to bidder, firm performance, the growth potential, the capital ratio and firm size. The
hypotheses related to these variables have been discussed in chapter 4.
However,  it  should  be  acknowledged  that  other  variables  may  also  affect  target
announcement returns. Without controlling for other variables in the regression analysis,
this may be a limitation in the analysis. In addition, the regression analysis does not control
for  whether  the  deals  are  diversifying  or  focusing  transactions  although the  previous
section  has  shown  the  difference  in  target  announcement  returns.  This  allows  the
regression analysis to further control for other factors. Controlling for other factors allows
the current study to look at different facets in explaining target announcement returns.
To undertake the regression analysis in this thesis, the variables related to investor
protection and bank regulation in a country may be highly correlated. This may be due to
the fact that highly developed markets may be expected to have better investor protection
and  bank  regulation.  Thus,  this  thesis  employs  different  model  specifications  in  the
cross-sectional regression analyses. This can reduce a high level of the correlation among
the variables in terms of investor protection and bank regulation in a country that may
affect the regression analysis.
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81 The correlation matrix is provided in appendix A table 6.1.216
Furthermore, to entirely focus on bank merger and acquisition announcements, this
thesis only includes the clean sample in the regression analyses to explore the relationship
between  target  announcement  returns  and  investor  protection  and  bank  regulation  in  a
country.
82  This thesis also deletes 1% of the observations from the top and bottom of target
3-day (-1,+1) cumulative abnormal returns in order to control for outliers in the regression
analyses.
83  The existence of outliers may reduce the validity of the regression analysis as
the coefficients cannot actually reflect the relationship between the cumulative abnormal
returns  and  investor  protection  and  bank  regulation  in  a  country.  Thus,  the  regression
analysis deletes the observations on the top and bottom 1% of the distribution of target
3-day (-1,+1) cumulative abnormal returns.
However, it may be argued that a relative small number of the observations being
deleted may not actually affect the regression analysis. In order to have a robustness check
and  distinguish  whether  outliers  are  an  issue  to  be  considered  in  this  analysis,  the
regression analysis with the full 508 sample is also provided in the appendix B. As can be
seen  from  the  discussion  of  target  cumulative  abnormal  returns  in  section  6.5,  target
cumulative abnormal returns mainly centre on a 3-day (-1,+1) event window. Hence, the
dependent variable in the regression analyses only relies on a 3-day (-1,+1) event window
for target cumulative abnormal returns.
Table 6.9 shows the results based on the market (MM) model. In model specification
(1) of table 6.9, the results show that target cumulative abnormal returns have a positive
relationship with investor protection measured as the antidirector rights index in a target
country. The coefficient is 0.018, statistically significant at the 0.05 level.
84  The results
82 The clean sample indicates that the sample does not announce other corporate events over a 3-day (-1,+1)
event window.
83 All  model  specifications  in  target  regression  analyses  are  met  these  two  requirements,  including  the
sample without any confounding events and deleting 1% observations from the top and bottom of target
3-day (-1,+1) cumulative abnormal returns.
84 This thesis also applies Djankov et al.’s (2006) revised antidirector rights index to the regression analysis
as a robustness check. The results show that the coefficient is 0.009 between target cumulative abnormal
returns and the revised antidirector rights index. A positive relationship is consistent with the results in table
6.9, where investor protection is measured from La Porta et al.’s (1998) index. However, the results are not217
suggest that an increase in the level of investor protection in a target country of one point
can be  expected  to result  in  an  increase in target  cumulative abnormal  returns of  1.8
percentage points. As the results are statistically significant, I can therefore reject the null
hypothesis and conclude that higher target cumulative abnormal returns are associated with
stronger investor protection measured as the antidirector rights index in a target country.
Table 6.9 The cross-sectional regression analysis for targets
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 0.273 *** 0.046 0.317 *** 0.266 *** 0.365 *** 0.389 ***
Antidirector rights
index
0.018 **
Rule of law 0.025 ***
Overall Activities
Restrictiveness
0.010 *
Official Supervisory
Power
0.009 **
Prompt Corrective
Power
0.007 **
Independence of
Supervisory
Authority - Overall
0.003
Cross-border 0.028 0.036 0.041 * 0.046 * 0.040 * 0.026
Cash 0.007 0.009 0.001 0.006 0.003 -0.003
Relative size 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ROA 0.127 0.120 0.134 0.164 0.153 0.154
MKTV -0.001 -0.002 * -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
Capital to assets 0.009 0.017 -0.010 0.005 0.003 -0.006
ln (total assets) -0.014 *** -0.011 *** -0.015 *** -0.014 *** -0.015 *** -0.016 ***
Deposit Money Bank
Assets / GDP
-0.009 -0.009 -0.018 -0.019 -0.020 -0.019
Net Interest Margin -0.331 0.247 -0.455 -0.605 -0.658 -0.326
Observations 376 376 376 376 376 376
statistically significant, p-value is 0.5. The adjusted R square is 8.67% and F-value is 4.56 with p-value is
0.000.218
Adjusted R Square 9.89% 12.49% 8.99% 9.44% 9.29% 8.59%
F-value 5.11 6.35 4.71 4.91 4.84 4.52
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Table 6.9 presents the results of targets to explore the impact of investor protection and bank regulation on
the shareholder wealth in bank mergers using OLS regression analysis. The dependent variable is target
3-day (-1,+1) cumulative abnormal returns measured from the market model. Investor protection is measured
as the antidirector rights index and the rule of law in a target country from La Porta et al. (1998). Bank
regulation  is  measured  as  overall  activities  restrictiveness,  official  supervisory  power,  prompt  corrective
power and independence of supervisory authority-overall in a bidder country from Barth et al. (2003). The
regression model also includes a number of control variables. Cross-border is a dummy variable, where the
value of 1 indicates the target and bidder in different countries. Cash is a dummy variable, where the value of
1 indicates cash payment. The relative size is measured as the relative size of the target to bidder. ROA is
measured as net income to total assets. The market to book ratio is measured as the market value to book
value. The capital ratio is measured as total capital to total assets. Size is calculated as ln(total assets). The
variables  of  the  firm  specific  characteristics  are  gathered  from  the  year  end  prior  to  bank  merger  and
acquisition announcements. The financial data is collected from Datastream database. The competitiveness of
the banking market is proxied as net interest margin in a bidder country. The size of the banking market is
measured as deposit money bank assets to GDP in a bidder country. The country level specific characteristics
are collected from the World Bank.
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. * Significant at the 0.1 level.
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With regard to control variables in model specification (1), the results only show that
target cumulative abnormal returns are negatively and significantly correlated to target size.
The coefficient is -0.014, statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The results indicate that
targets gain more when target size is small. The null hypothesis can thus be rejected. A
negative  impact  between target  cumulative abnormal  returns  and  target  firm  size  is
consistent with the study of Valkanov and Kleimeier (2007).
In  model specification  (1),  the  adjusted  R  square  is  9.89%  and  F-value  is  5.11,219
statistically significant at the 0.01 level. When performing additional statistical tests of
Ramsey test, the results show that there is no omitted variable. Variance inflation factor
(VIF) also indicates that multicollinearilty is not a major issue to be taken into account in
the regression analysis as the figure is lower than 3.
In model specification (2), the results show that the coefficient is 0.025 between
target cumulative abnormal returns and investor protection measured as the rule of law in a
target country. The results are statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The results are
consistent  with  the  findings  in  model  specification  (1), suggesting that  higher  target
cumulative  abnormal  returns  are  associated  with  better  investor protection  in  a  target
country.
The  results  suggest  that  strong  investor  protection  in  a  country  can  mitigate  the
conflicts between managers and shareholders. This also illustrates that strong enforcement
mechanisms  can  limit  managerial  discretion  at  the  expense  of  shareholders  through
mergers and acquisitions. When managers make decisions of mergers and acquisitions,
their decisions tend to aim at shareholders’ interests. A positive relationship between target
cumulative abnormal returns and investor protection in a target country also lend support
to Anderson (2009) et al.’s arguments, where they argue that stronger investor protection in
a target country offers higher bargaining power to targets. Thus, bidders need to pay more
to targets. The findings are also consistent with prior empirical studies from the industrial
firms, e.g., Bris and Cabolis (2004), Martynova and Renneboog (2008), and Anderson et al.
(2009).  Comparing  the  results  of  the  measurement  of  investor  protection between  the
antidirector rights index and the rule of law, it can be found that the rule of law appears to
have stronger influence on target announcement returns in that the coefficient of the rule of
law is at 0.025 higher than that of the antidirector rights index at 0.018. However, it should
be necessary to exercise care to make such a comparison in that the significant level for
these variables is different.220
Similar to model specification (1), the results also indicate that there is a negative and
significant  association between  target  cumulative abnormal  returns  and  target  size,  the
coefficient is -0.011. The results suggest that higher target cumulative abnormal returns are
associated with smaller target size. In addition, the results also show that the coefficient is
-0.002  between  target cumulative  abnormal  returns  and  the  market  to  book  ratio,
statistically significant at the 0.1 level. The results indicate that higher target cumulative
abnormal returns are related to lower growth potential for targets. A possible explanation is
that  target  shareholders  expect  to obtain  higher  future  gains  if  they  have  poor  growth
potential prior to the transactions. In model specification (2), the adjusted R square is
12.49% and F-value is 6.35, statistically significant at the 0.01 level.
Turning to the analysis of bank regulation, the results in model specification (3) show
that there is a positive relationship between target cumulative abnormal returns and bank
regulation measured as overall activities restrictiveness in a bidder country, the coefficient
is 0.010. The results are statistically significant at the 0.1 level.
The  results  also  find that  target cumulative  abnormal  returns  are  positively  and
significantly  correlated  to  bank  regulation  measured  as  official  supervisory  power  and
prompt corrective power in model specification (4) and (5), respectively, the coefficient is
0.009 and 0.007. The results are both statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Thus, the
null  hypothesis  can  be  rejected  and  conclude  that  higher  target  cumulative  abnormal
returns are related to stronger bank regulation measured as official supervisory power and
prompt corrective power in a bidder country. These findings denote that targets gain more
when bank regulation in a bidder country is strong.
The results show a positive relationship between target cumulative abnormal returns
and bank  regulation in  a bidder  country, suggesting that bidder managers evaluate the
transactions more carefully in the presence of stronger bank regulation in a bidder country.
The transactions of mergers and acquisitions can then be expected to enhance synergy221
effects after the transactions. Thus, targets can gain higher announcement returns in bank
mergers and acquisitions.
Although the results similarly show a positive relationship between target cumulative
abnormal returns and bank regulation in a bidder country measured as independence of
overall supervisory authority in model specification (6), the coefficient is 0.003, the results
are not statistically significant.
With  regard  to  control  variables,  the  results show  that  higher  target  cumulative
abnormal returns are associated with cross-border deals in model specification (3), (4) and
(5); the coefficients are 0.041, 0.046 and 0.040, respectively. The results are statistically
significant at the 0.1 level. The findings indicate that targets gain more when the bidder is a
foreign company.
In addition, the results in model specification (3)-(6) also find that there is a negative
relationship between target cumulative abnormal returns and target size. The coefficients
are similar at around -0.015. The results are all significant at the 0.01 level. These findings
indicate that higher target cumulative abnormal returns are associated with smaller target
size. The adjusted R square in model specification (3)-(6) is at around 9% and F-value is at
around 4.84 with all statistically significant at the 0.01 level.
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Similar to the model specification (1), additional statistical tests of Ramsey test in
model specification (2)-(6) indicate that there is no omitted variable and multicollinearity
is not a major issue in the regression analysis as the figure of Variance Inflation Factor
(VIF) is lower than 3.
As  mentioned  earlier,  the  regression  analysis  is  also  analysed  with  the  full  508
sample in order to investigate whether the outliers are an issue to be taken into account in
85 Appendix  A  table  6.2  and  6.3  show  the  results  of  the  regression  analyses,  where  target  cumulative
abnormal  returns  calculated  from  the  market  adjusted  (Mkt-Adj)  returns  model  and  the  mean  adjusted
(Mean-Adj) returns model, respectively. The results show that the sign of the coefficient for explanatory
variables is in general consistent with table 6.9. Thus, the results are not repeatedly discussed in this thesis.222
this study. As shows in appendix B table 6.1, the results show that the coefficients of the
variables  for  investor  protection  and  bank  regulation  are  sensitive.  The  level  of  the
coefficients varies although the coefficients do not show a significant difference. However,
the significance level for the variables of bank regulation shows a significant difference.
The variables of bank regulation in appendix B table 6.1 are not statistically significant,
suggesting  that  the presence  of  outliers  in  the  regression  analysis  can  reduce  the
creditability in testing significant level. This can illustrate that a small number of outliers
can be an issue to affect the regression analysis in the current study.
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While this section presents the empirical findings to show the relationship between
target announcement returns and investor protection and bank regulation in a country, the
difference of investor protection and bank regulation may also have an influence on target
announcement  returns.  To  provide  additional  insights  to  reveal  the  impact  of  investor
protection  and  bank  regulation  on  target  announcement  returns,  the  following  section
further controls for this issue in the regression analysis.
6.9 Cross-sectional regression analysis for the difference of investor protection and
bank regulation
Section  6.8  has  discussed  the  relationship  between  target  cumulative  abnormal
returns and investor protection and bank regulation in a country. Rossi and Volpin (2004)
argue  that  bidders  tend  to  come  from  a  country  with  better  investor  protection.  The
difference  of investor  protection  and  bank  regulation  can  also  be  expected  to  have  an
influence on target announcement returns. The regression analysis further controls for the
variable of the difference of investor protection and bank regulation in a bidder and target
country  to  shed  lights  on  the  impact  of  target  cumulative  abnormal  returns  in  bank
86 Appendix B table 6.2 and 6.3 also show the results of the regression analyses with respect to the full 508
sample, where targets cumulative abnormal returns are calculated from the market adjusted (Mkt-Adj) returns
model and the mean adjusted (Mean-Adj) returns model, respectively.223
mergers.
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Similar to the discussion in section 6.8, the regression analysis also deletes the top
and bottom 1% of target 3-day (-1,+1) cumulative abnormal returns in order to control for
the outliers that may affect the regression analysis. However, removing a small number of
observations in the regression analysis may not necessarily change the results significantly.
Thus, this thesis also presents the results run by the full 508 sample in appendix to have a
robustness check and identify whether the outliers cannot an issue to be taken into account.
As table 6.10 shows, the results in model specification (1) find that there is a positive
relationship between target cumulative abnormal returns and investor protection measured
as the antidirector rights index in a target country. The coefficient is 0.015, statistically
significant at the 0.1 level. The results indicate that higher target cumulative abnormal
returns are related to stronger investor protection in a target country.  The level of the
antidirector  rights  index  in  a  target  country  is  still  significantly  positive,  even  when
additionally controlling for the difference of the antidirector rights index in a bidder and
target country.
In addition, the results show that the coefficient for the difference in the antidirector
rights  index  in  a  bidder  and  target  country  is -0.015,  suggesting  that  higher  target
cumulative abnormal returns are associated with smaller difference in antidirector rights.
However, the results are not statistically significant.
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With regard to the control variables, the results only show that target cumulative
abnormal returns are negatively and significantly related to target size. The coefficient is
87 As Rossi and Volpin (2004) argue that bidders tend to come from a country with better investor protection,
the variable of the difference of investor protection and bank regulation in a bidder and target country is
constructed by the level of investor protection and bank regulation in a bidder country minus the level of
investor protection and bank regulation in a target country.
88 Applying Djankov et al.’s (2006) revised antidirector rights index in the regression analyses, the results
show that the coefficient is -0.011 between target cumulative abnormal returns and the difference of the
revised antidirector rights index in a bidder and target country. However, the results are not statistically
significant, as the p-value is 0.6. The results also show that there is a positive relationship between target
cumulative abnormal returns and the revised antidirector rights index, the coefficient is 0.008. However, the
results are not statistically significant, where the p-value is 0.5. The adjusted R square is 8.30% and F-value
(p-value) is 4.07 (0.000).224
-0.014, statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The results suggest that targets obtain
higher gains when the size of targets is small. The results are also consistent with those in
section  6.8.  This  also  suggests  that  target  size  is  an  important  factor  to  affect  target
announcement  returns.  The  adjusted  R  square  is  9.77%  and  F-value  (p-value)  is  4.66
(0.000) in model specification (1).
In model specification (2), investor protection in a target country is measured by the
rule of law in a target country. The results show that target cumulative abnormal returns
have  a  positive  relationship  with  the  rule  of  law,  the  coefficient  is  0.022,  statistically
significant  at  the  0.01  level.  The  results  indicate  that  targets  earn  higher  cumulative
abnormal returns when the rule of law in a target country is strong, which is consistent
with the discussion in section 6.8.
Interestingly,  the  results  show  that  the  coefficient  between target  cumulative
abnormal returns and the difference of the rule of law in a bidder and target country is
-0.023,  suggesting  that  higher  target  cumulative abnormal  returns  are  associated  with
smaller  difference  of  the  rule  of  law  in  a  bidder  and  target  country.  The  results  are
statistically significant at the 0.1 level.
The results implicate that targets earn higher announcement returns when bidders
come from a  country  with weaker investor protection relative to the target country.  A
possible  interpretation  may  be  that  targets  require  high  bid  premium  in  order  to
compensate their additional risk to be expropriated by managers due to lower investor
protection in a bidder country.
With regard to control  variables in model specification (2), the results show that
target  cumulative  abnormal  returns  are  positively  related  to  cross-border  deals.  The
coefficient is 0.044, statistically significant at the 0.1 level. The results suggest that targets
gain more when targets engage in cross-border deals. The results also show that target
cumulative abnormal returns have a negative relationship to the market to book ratio and225
target size. The coefficients for the market to book ratio and target size are -0.002 and
-0.010, statistically significant at the 0.1 and 0.01 level, respectively. The results indicate
that higher target cumulative abnormal returns are correlated with lower target growth
potential and smaller target size. The adjusted R square is 12.47% and F-value (p-value) is
5.82 (0.000) in model specification (2).
Turning to the analysis of bank regulation, table 6.10 shows that target cumulative
abnormal returns are positively related to bank regulation in a bidder country measured as
overall activities restrictiveness, official supervisory power, and prompt corrective power.
The  coefficients  are  0.010,  0.007  and  0.007  in  model  specification  (3),  (4)  and  (5),
respectively, all statistically significant. These findings indicate that targets earn higher
announcement returns when bank regulation in a bidder country is strong. The results are
consistent with those in section 6.8, denoting that these variables are still significantly
positive  even  when  additionally  controlling  for  the difference  of  bank  regulation  in  a
bidder and target country. Although the results in model specification (6) also show a
positive relationship between target cumulative abnormal returns and bank regulation in a
bidder country measured as independence of overall supervisory authory, the results are
not statistically significant.
In  addition,  the  results  show  that there  is  a  negative  relationship  between  target
cumulative abnormal returns and the difference of bank regulation in a bidder and target
country, where bank regulation is measured as overall activities restrictiveness, official
supervisory power, and prompt corrective power. The coefficients are -0.060, -0.022 and
-0.067, respectively. These findings indicate that targets earn higher announcement returns
when the difference of bank regulation in a bidder and target country is small. However,
the results are statistically significant at the 0.1 level for the difference of prompt corrective
power  in  a  bidder  and  target  country  only.  Although  target  announcement  returns  are
positively related to the difference of bank regulation in a bidder and target country, bank226
regulation measured as independence of overall supervisory authority, is not statistically
significant.
With regard to the control variables, the results show that target cumulative abnormal
returns are negatively related to target size in model specification (3)-(6). The coefficient is
around -0.015, statistically significant at the 0.01 level. This denotes that higher target
cumulative abnormal returns are associated to smaller target size.
In addition, the results in model specification (4) and (5) also show that targets earn higher
announcement  returns  when  targets  have  better  performance  prior  to  the  transactions,
where  performance  is  measure  as  ROA.  The  coefficients  are  0.181  and  0.180,  both
statistically  significant  at  the  0.1  level.  In  addition,  the  results  also  show  that  target
cumulative  abnormal  returns are  negatively  associated  with  the  capital  ratio  in  model
specification (6). The coefficient is -0.017, statistically significant at the 0.1 level. The
results indicate that higher target cumulative abnormal returns are related to lower target
capital ratio. Overall, the adjusted R square in model specification (3)-(6) is around 9.30%
and F-value is around 4.40 with statistically significant at the 0.01 level.
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In addition to discussing above, the results run by the full 508 sample are presented
in appendix B table 6.4.
90  Table 6.4 shows that the results are sensitive for the variables of
the difference of bank regulation in a bidder and target country. This suggests that outliers
do  actually  generate  an  influence  to  the  analysis  of  the  relationship  between  target
announcement returns and the difference of investor protection and bank regulation in a
bidder and target country. However, to reduce the outliers that may decrease the validity of
this  analysis,  the  regression  analysis  is  based  on  deleting  the  top  and  bottom  1%
observations for target 3-day (-1,+1) cumulative abnormal returns.
89 The analysis for the difference of investor protection and bank regulation between the bidder and target
countries on target shareholder wealth are presented in appendix A table 6.4 and 6.5 with respect to the
market adjusted returns model and the mean adjusted returns model, respectively.
90 The results analysed with the full sample are also reported in appendix B table 6.5 and 6.6, where target
cumulative abnormal returns are measured from the market adjusted returns model and the mean adjusted
returns model, respectively.227
Table 6.10 The cross-sectional regression analysis for targets controlling for the difference
of investor protection and bank regulation in a bidder and target country based on the
market (MM) model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 0.282 *** 0.072 0.309 *** 0.286 *** 0.358 *** 0.388 ***
Antidirector  rights  in
dex
0.015 *
Difference  (Antidirec
tor  rights  index)
-0.015
rule of law 0.022 ***
Difference (Rule of
law)
-0.023 *
Overall Activities
Restrictiveness
0.010 *
Difference (Overall
Activities
Restrictiveness)
-0.060
Official Supervisory
Power
0.007 *
Difference (Official
Supervisory Power)
-0.022
Prompt Corrective
Power
0.007 **
Difference (Prompt
Corrective Power)
-0.067 *
Independence of
Supervisory Authority
- Overall
0.001
Difference
(Independence of
Supervisory Authority
- Overall)
0.064
Cross-border 0.014 0.044 * 0.035 0.032 0.020 0.004
Cash 0.006 0.010 0.001 0.003 0.005 -0.002
Relative size 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ROA 0.108 0.096 0.149 0.181 * 0.180 * 0.185
MKTV -0.001 -0.002 * -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
Capital to assets -0.006 0.004 -0.015 -0.006 -0.003 -0.017 *
ln (total assets) -0.014 *** -0.010 *** -0.015 *** -0.015 *** -0.015 *** -0.016 ***228
Deposit Money Bank
Assets / GDP
-0.011 -0.012 -0.013 -0.014 -0.015 -0.014
Net Interest Margin 0.154 0.363 -0.325 -0.385 -0.507 -0.176
Observations 373 373 372 372 372 372
Adjusted R Square 9.77% 12.47% 9.20% 9.38% 9.35% 8.63%
F-value 4.66 5.82 4.42 4.49 4.48 4.19
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Table  6.10  presents  the  results  to  explore  the  impact  of  the  difference  of  investor  protection  and  bank
regulation  on  target  shareholder  wealth  in  bank  mergers  using  OLS  regression  analysis.  The  dependent
variable  is  target  3-day  (-1,+1)  cumulative abnormal  returns  measured  from  the  market  model.  Investor
protection is measured as the antidirector rights index and the rule of law in a target country from La Porta et
al. (1998). The difference of investor protection is measured as the difference of investor protection in a
bidder  and  target  country.  Bank  regulation  is  measured  as  overall  activities  restrictiveness,  official
supervisory power, prompt corrective power and independence of supervisory authority-overall in a bidder
country from Barth et al. (2003). The difference of bank regulation is measured as the difference of bank
regulation in a bidder and target country. The regression model also includes a number of control variables.
Cross-border is a dummy variable, where the value of 1 indicates the target and bidder in different countries.
Cash is a dummy variable, where the value of 1 indicates cash payment. The relative size is measured as the
relative size of the target to bidder. ROA is measured as net income to total assets. The market to book ratio is
measured as the market value to book value. The capital ratio is measured as total capital to total assets. Size
is calculated as ln(total assets). The variables of the firm specific characteristics are gathered from the year
end prior to bank merger and acquisition announcements. The financial data is collected from Datastream
database. The  competitiveness  of  the  banking  market  is  proxied  as  net  interest  margin.  The size  of  the
banking market is measured as deposit money bank assets to GDP. The country level specific characteristics
are collected from the World Bank.
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. * Significant at the 0.1 level.
CAR
et T arg
) 1 , 1 (     = 0  + 1  (Target’s investor protection) + 2  (The difference of
target’s investor protection) + 3  (Bidder’s bank regulation) + 4  (The difference of bidder’s
bank regulation) + 5  (Cross-border dummy) + 6  (Cash dummy) + 7  (The relative size
of the target to bidder) + 8  (ROA) + 9  (The market to book ratio) + 10  (The capital
ratio) + 11  (Size) + 12  (The competitiveness of the banking market) + 13  (The size of
the banking market) + i 229
6.10 Conclusion
This chapter consists of a number of discussions with regard to the empirical results
for target firms. As discussed in the previous sections, the analysis of target announcement
returns does not suffer the problem of thin trading or confounding events. With the analysis
of 508 targets, I find that targets earn 13.25% cumulative abnormal returns over a 3-day
(-1,+1)  event  window,  statistically  significant  at  the  0.01  level.  Significant  positive
cumulative abnormal returns lend support to prior empirical studies as has discussed in
chapter 2.
Splitting  the  sample  based  on  the  market,  I  further  find  that  U.S.  targets  obtain
16.47% cumulative abnormal returns over a 3-day (-1,+1)  event window, compared to
8.88%  and  2.57%  cumulative  abnormal  returns  for  EU  targets  and  targets  from  other
markets, respectively. Positive announcement returns to targets are consistent with prior
empirical evidence in U.S. studies (e.g., Siems (1996); Toyne and Tripp (1998); Akhigbe et
al. (2004)), EU studies (e.g., Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000); Beitel et al. (2004)) and
international studies (Biswas et al. (1997); DeLong (2003); Scholtens and de Wit (2004);
Valkanov and Kleimeier (2007)). Using a large international sample of bank mergers, I do
find that there are differences in target announcement returns depending on the market. The
findings  are  consistent  with prior  empirical  studies,  where  these  studies  report  higher
announcement returns to U.S. targets. The results also suggest that U.S. banking takeover
market is more competitive resulted in higher announcement returns to U.S. targets.
Additional  analysis  shows  that  targets  in  focusing  deals  earn  13.66%  cumulative
abnormal  returns  over  a  3-day  (-1,+1)  event  window  relative  to  11.26%  for  those  in
diversifying deals. The results are consistent with DeLong (2001) and Ismail and Davidson
(2005), where the authors report higher announcement returns to targets in focusing deals.
In the cross-sectional regression analysis, I find that investor protection and bank
regulation have a positive impact to target shareholder wealth. When shareholders have230
more rights against managers in mergers and acquisitions, shareholders have more ability
to protect their wealth. Thus, targets gain more when targets are in a country with strong
antidirector rights. In addition, when the target country has stronger enforcement of law,
target managers can be expected to better look after the interests of shareholders. This also
illustrates  that  stronger  rule  of  law  can  reduce  the  problem  of  shareholders  being
expropriated  by  targets  managers.  The  results  also  support  Anderson et  al.’s  (2009)
argument, claiming that targets have more bargaining power if targets are in a country with
strong  investor  protection.  Thus,  bidders  need  to  pay  more  to  targets.  This  can  be  an
important contribution as shareholders can be better protect not only for industrial firms
but also for banking firms.
Furthermore, when analysing bank regulation, targets gain more when the bidder’s
bank regulation is more restrictive to bank activity. A possible explanation is that bidder
managers can be expected to more carefully evaluate the transactions when bank regulation
in a bidder country is more restrictive to bank activity. In addition, when bank regulators in
a bidder country have more ability to take action to correct problems, it can be expected to
reduce  any  negative  impact  on  bank  mergers  and  acquisitions.  This  can  reduce  the
expropriation and create higher gains to targets. This can be expected to create higher
synergy effects to targets. Thus, targets can be expected to obtain higher announcement
returns in bank mergers. Similarly, when bank regulation in a bidding country has more
ability to enforce actions, such as intervention, this can also be expected to reduce any
problem in bank mergers. This can therefore increase target gains after the transactions. As
a consequent, bank regulation in a bidder country can be expected to offer alternative
mechanisms to protect minority shareholders of targets.
The regression analysis also reveals that bidders may have problem to integrate large
firm resources after the transactions when targets size is large. The synergy effects can thus
be  lower.  The  results  find  that  targets  gain  more  when  target  size  is  small.  When231
additionally controlling for the difference of investor protection and bank regulation in the
regression analysis, the results show that targets earn higher announcement returns when
the difference of the rule of law between the bidder and target countries is small.
In  addition,  the  findings  also  show  that  higher  target  announcement  returns  are
associated  with  smaller  difference  of  bank  regulation  between  the  bidder  and  target
countries,  where  bank  regulation  is  measured  as  prompt  corrective  power. When  bank
regulation in a target country has more power to correct the problem promptly relative to in
a bidder country, targets can be expected to obtain higher announcement returns.
Interestingly,  the  results  related  to the  variables  of  investor  protection  and  bank
regulation  still  remain  significant  when  additionally  controlling  for  the  difference  of
investor protection and bank regulation. This also suggests that investor protection and
bank regulation can be important determinants to explain target announcement returns in
bank mergers.
Finally,  the  analysis  in  this  chapter  shows  some interesting  findings.  The  results
reveal that the legal and regulation system in a country in terms of investor protection and
bank regulation can generate an influence to target shareholder wealth in bank mergers and
acquisitions. My findings provide the empirical findings showing that investor protection is
important to shareholders not only to industrial firms but also to banking firms. In addition,
the results also find that bank regulation can also offer a function to protect shareholders
and have an influence to target announcement returns in bank mergers and acquisitions.232
Chapter 7 The Empirical Results for bidding Firms
7.1 Introduction
The existing empirical literatures have reported mixed results for bidding firms, as
has been discussed in chapter 2. While the empirical findings in chapter 6 have reported
positive  announcement  returns  to target  firms,  it  is  not  clear  as  to  whether  positive
announcement returns to targets can be attributable to wealth transfer from bidding firms.
Thus, this chapter presents the empirical findings for bidding firms in this thesis.
Similar to the discussion of target cumulative abnormal returns in chapter 6, this
chapter commences from discussing the model parameters,  followed by  discussing the
problem  of  thin  trading  and  the  confounding  events,  respectively.  Then, the  empirical
findings  for  bidder  shareholder  wealth  are  presented.  Additional  analyses  for  bidder
cumulative abnormal returns are also presented in this chapter with respect to the market
and activity diversifying or focusing deals.
Furthermore, the cross-sectional regression analyses for bidders are provided in order
to determine as to whether investor protection and bank regulation in a country can be
important  determinants  to  explain  bidder  cumulative  abnormal  returns.  To  explore  the
relationship between bidder cumulative abnormal returns and investor protection and bank
regulation accurately, the regression analyses also control for the country level specific
characteristics  and  the  deal  and  firm  specific  characteristics.  Controlling  for  these
characteristics  also  provides  additional  insights  to  explore  the  factors  that  may  affect
bidder announcement returns around bank merger and acquisition announcements.
This chapter is organised as follows. The discussion of the market model parameters
is provided in section 7.2. Section 7.3 and 7.4 discuss the problem of thin trading and the
confounding events. Section 7.5 presents the empirical results for bidder abnormal returns
and cumulative abnormal returns. Bidder cumulative abnormal returns with respect to the
market and activity diversifying or focusing deals are presented in section 7.6 and 7.7,233
respectively. The cross-sectional regression analyses are provided in section 7.8. Section
7.9 also provides the cross-sectional regression analyses with respect to the difference of
investor  protection  and  bank  regulation  in  a  bidder  and  target  country.  Conclusion  is
provided in section 7.10.
7.2 The model parameters
The  level  of  the  market  model  parameters  can  be  expected  to  affect  bidder
cumulative abnormal returns in that the model parameters are important components to
measure the expected returns. Bidder abnormal returns are measured by subtracting the
expected returns from the actual returns as has been discussed in chapter 5. Thus, this
section discusses the model parameters for bidding firms.
Table 7.1 The market model parameters
Mean Maximum Minimum SD Negative Positive
Sample
size
Alpha 0.0004 0.0050 -0.0033 0.0010 0.33 0.67 1424
Beta 0.6770 2.2149 -1.9249 0.4626 0.05 0.95 1424
Table 7.1 presents descriptive statistics for the market (MM) model parameters of
bidding  firms.  As  table  7.1  shows,  the  mean  beta  value  is  0.6770.  While  the  market
adjusted returns (Mkt-Adj) model assumes that alpha is 0 and beta is 1, the mean value of
beta from the MM model is lower than 1. Lower mean value of beta may suggest that the
analysis of bidder abnormal returns may encounter the problem of thin trading. Therefore,
a discussion of the problem of thin trading is provided in section 7.3.
91
As has been discussed in section 6.2, the mean value of beta for targets is 0.4891. It is
91 While the assumption of the MM model and the Mkt-Adj model is different, as discussed in section 5.5.5,
this thesis also applies the Mkt-Adj model to calculate bidder abnormal returns. Furthermore, this thesis also
uses the mean adjusted returns (Mean-Adj) model to measure bidder abnormal returns as a robustness check.234
apparent that the mean value of beta for bidders is at 0.6770 higher than that for targets.
This suggests that bidder’s prior performance highly correlates to the market performance
relative to that for target’s. For example, bidders in general perform well when the market
has a better performance.
Table 7.1 also shows that the maximum (minimum) value of beta is 2.2149 (-1.9249).
Based on the assumption that market returns are normally positive, the positive (negative)
value of beta indicates that bidders appear to generate lower (higher) abnormal returns.
The percentage of positive (negative) value of beta accounts for 95% (5%). The significant
higher  percentage  of  the  positive  value  of  beta  also  suggests  that  bidder’s  prior
performance is significantly consistent with the market performance although beta is more
or less volatile.
In addition, the mean value of alpha is 0.0004. Although the level of beta can be
compensated by the level of alpha, the mean value of alpha is rather low. This suggests that
bidder  abnormal  returns  are  mainly  affected  by  the  magnitude  of  beta.  Overall,  the
percentage of positive (negative) value of alpha amounts to 67% (33%).
7.3 The problem of thin trading
As discussed above, the model parameters may be biased due to the presence of the
problem of thin trading. If the model parameters are influenced by the problem of thin
trading, this thesis cannot accurately detect the announcement returns to bidding firms.
Thus,  this  section  discusses  the  model  parameters  measured  from  the  thin  trading
adjustment approaches in terms of Scholes-Williams’ (SW), Dimson’s (DM) and Fowler
and Rorke’s (FR) approach.
As table 7.2 shows, the mean of beta value is 0.7105, 0.7558 and 0.7493 for the SW,
DM and FR approach, respectively. Comparing to the mean value of beta from the MM
model, the use of thin trading adjustment approaches yields slightly higher mean value of
beta, suggesting that beta value for bidding firms is sensitive to the thin trading adjustment235
approaches. However, the level of mean value of beta varies, depending on the thin trading
adjustment approaches applied. This also indicates the lead and lag structure can produce
different levels of beta value.
Table 7.2 The market model parameters adjusted for thin trading
Beta Alpha
MM SW DM FR MM SW DM FR
Mean 0.6770 0.7105 0.7558 0.7493 0.0004 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003
Maximum 2.2149 2.4722 2.6924 4.1787 0.0050 0.0055 0.0057 0.0057
Minimum -1.9249 -0.9846 -1.2072 -0.8423 -0.0033 -0.0036 -0.0050 -0.0038
SD 0.4626 0.4650 0.5096 0.5505 0.0010 0.0009 0.0010 0.0010
Negative 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.33 0.34 0.36 0.35
Positive 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.95 0.67 0.66 0.64 0.65
Sample size 1424 1424 1424 1424 1424 1424 1424 1424
Taking into account the maximum beta value, the FR approach produces the highest
value relative to the SW and DM approach. However, the DM approach generates the
lowest value of the minimum of beta. In addition, the spread of beta estimates from the FR
approach  appears  to  be  significant,  suggesting  that  bidder  abnormal  returns  can
significantly vary. Overall, the percentage of the positive (negative) value of beta is around
95%  (5%).  Higher  positive  percentage  of  beta  value  suggests  that  bidders  tend  to  be
consistent with market performance. The figure also indicates that thin trading approaches
generally produce better beta estimates than the MM model.
With regard to alpha value, the results are in general the same for the SW, DM and
FR approach at around 0.0004. The figure is similarly consistent with the mean value of
alpha from the MM model. As the mean alpha value does not show differences between
thin trading adjustment approaches and the MM model, this suggests that the analysis of236
bidder cumulative abnormal returns adjusted for the thin trading approaches are mainly
driven by the parameter of beta. Table 7.2 also shows that the percentage of the positive
(negative) value of alpha is generally the same at around 65% (35%) for the thin trading
adjustment approaches. The results are also in general consistent with that from the MM
model. Thus, the figure indicates that alpha value does not alter significantly when using
different thin trading adjustment approaches.
Figure  7.1  Bidder  cumulative abnormal  returns  from  the  thin  trading  adjustment
approaches
In order to identify whether the problem of thin trading is an issue to be considerably
taken into account in the analysis of bidder announcement returns, figure 7.1 shows the
graph to exhibit the drift of bidder cumulative abnormal returns during the event period. As
figure  7.1  shows,  the  movement  of  bidder  cumulative  abnormal  returns  is  generally
consistent of which the thin trading adjustment approaches are being used although a slight
difference of bidder cumulative abnormal returns is observed. Similarly, the development
of bidder cumulative abnormal returns based on different thin trading adjustment approach
is generally consistent with that from the MM model. In addition, a significant impact of
bidder abnormal returns can be spotted on day 0. To make a clear comparison between
each thin trading approach, this thesis also presents the results of bidder abnormal returns
on day 0 in table 7.3.237
Table  7.3  Bidder  abnormal  returns  on  the  announcement  date  from  the  thin  trading
adjustment approaches
Mean p-value 1 Sign test Wilcoxon test
Scholes-Williams method -0.0045 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Dimson method -0.0046 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Fowler and Rorke method -0.0047 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
MM model -0.0046 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Day 0: abnormal returns
p-value 1: t test with assuming cross-sectional independence
Wilcoxon test: Wilcoxon signed rank test
As table 7.3 shows, bidder abnormal returns are -0.45%, -0.46% and -0.47% on day 0
for the SW, DM and FR approach, respectively, all statistically significant at the 0.01 level.
These findings suggest that the use of different thin trading adjustment approaches does
not make any significant difference on bidder abnormal returns. While bidders with the full
sample experience -0.46% abnormal returns on day 0 for the MM model
92, the results
calculated  from  the  thin  trading  adjustment  approaches  do  not  show  any  significant
difference relative to those from the MM model. Thus, thin trading cannot be a significant
issue to be taken into account when analysing bidder abnormal returns in this thesis. The
analysis of bidder abnormal returns is then on the basis of the MM model.
7.4 Confounding events
Similar  to  the  discussion  of  target  announcement  returns  in  chapter  6,  the
confounding events
93  may be expected to have an influence on the announcement returns
of bidding firms. I control for confounding events during a 3-day (-1,+1) event window in
92 The full sample means that the sample of bidders is based on 1,424 bidding firms. The discussion of
bidder cumulative abnormal returns with the full sample will be presented in section 7.5.
93 As has been discussed in chapter 5, the confounding events are identified from the database of Perfect
Information,  SEC Filings  and  Financial  Times,  where  the  sample  does  not  release  the information  of
corporate events over a 3-day (-1,+1) event window. The announcement of other corporate events means the
release of the information, such as earning and dividend announcement, the annual report and other corporate
events, etc.238
terms of the clean or nonclean sample in order to check whether the confounding events
would be an issue to influence bidder cumulative abnormal returns.
94  Thus, this section
discusses  bidder  cumulative abnormal  returns  taking  into  account  the  effects  of  the
confounding events.
As table 7.4 shows, bidders in the clean sample obtain -0.53% abnormal returns on
day 0 relative to -0.06% for those in the nonclean sample. The results are statistically
significant at the 0.01 level for the clean sample only. The difference between the clean and
nonclean sample is statistically significant, p-value is 0.026. This indicates that there is a
statistical significant difference of bidder  announcement returns between the clean and
nonclean sample. However, the difference between the clean sample and the full sample is
not statistically significant, p-value is 0.620.
95
Table 7.4 The influence of the confounding events on bidder cumulative abnormal returns
MM model
N Mean p-value 1 SD Minimum Maximum
Day 0 clean sample 1208 -0.53% 0.0000 0.0331 -0.2727 0.4687
(-1,+1) clean sample 1208 -0.76% 0.0000 0.0510 -0.3839 0.7057
Day 0 nonclean sample 216 -0.06% 0.7520 0.0284 -0.1097 0.1540
(-1,+1) nonclean sample 216 0.07% 0.8300 0.0497 -0.1297 0.3213
p-value 1: t test with assuming cross-sectional independence
In  addition,  table  7.4  also  shows  that  bidders in  the  clean  sample  yield -0.76%
cumulative abnormal returns over a 3-day (-1,+1) event window relative to 0.07% for those
with the nonclean sample. The results are statistically significant at the 0.01 level for the
94 The clean sample means that no other corporate events are announced for a 3-day (-1,+1) event window. If
there are any corporate events announced over a 3-day (-1,+1) event window, the sample is classified as the
nonclean sample.
95 As will be discussed in section 7.5, bidders with the full 1,424 sample experience -0.46% abnormal returns
on day 0 and -0.63% cumulative abnormal returns over a 3-day (-1,+1) event window.239
clean sample  only.  The difference  between  the  clean  sample  and  nonclean  sample  is
statistically significant, p-value is 0.015. The results also suggest that the analysis of bidder
cumulative abnormal returns can suffer from the confounding events.
However,  the  difference  between  the  clean  sample  and  the  full  sample  is  not
statistically significant, p-value is 0.726. Thus, I cannot conclude that there is statistically
significant difference between the clean sample and the full sample. So, the analysis of
bidder announcement returns is based on the full 1,424 sample in the following section. On
the other hand, the results are sensitive as the difference between the clean sample and
nonclean  sample  is  statistically  significant.  To  make  a  clear  comparison  with  prior
empirical studies, this thesis uses the clean 1,208 sample to measure bidder announcement
returns in terms of the market and activity diversifying or focusing deals in section 7.6 and
7.7, respectively.
7.5 Bidder abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns
In  chapter  6,  the  empirical  results  show  that  targets  earn  positive  announcement
returns  around  bank  merger  and  acquisition  announcements.  However,  prior  empirical
studies report contradictory findings regarding bidder announcement returns. It is uncertain
as  to  whether  positive  announcement  returns  to  targets  can  be  attributable  to  wealth
transfer  from  bidders.  Thus,  the  empirical  evidence  for  bidder  abnormal  returns  and
cumulative abnormal returns is presented in this section.
As can be seen in table 7.5, bidder abnormal returns vary during the event period.
Bidders, for example, obtain 0.12% and 0.13% abnormal returns on day -2 from the MM
and  Mkt-Adj  model,  respectively,  both  statistically  significant  at  the  0.05  level.
Furthermore, the results show that bidders experience -0.46% and -0.44% abnormal returns
on day 0 from the MM model and the Mkt-Adj model
96, respectively, both statistically
96 The results in appendix A table 7.1 also show that bidders experience -0.46% abnormal returns on day 0
from the mean adjusted (Mean-Adj) returns model, statistically significant at the 0.01 level.240
significant at the 0.01 level.
97 However, the majority of bidder daily abnormal returns are
negative during the event period. As can be seen in table 7.5, bidder daily abnormal returns
are also tested by using the nonparametric statistics in terms of sign test and wilcoxon
signed  rank  test. While  the  significance  level  for  bidder  daily abnormal  returns  varies
during the test period, bidder abnormal returns on day 0 are all statistically significant
regardless of the parametric or nonparametric test of statistical significance used. This
clearly indicates that there is a significant negative impact of bidder shareholder wealth on
the announcement date.
Table 7.5 Bidder daily abnormal returns
MM model Mkt-Adj model
day Mean p-value
1
p-value
2
p-value
3
Sign
test
Wilcoxon
test
Mean p-value
1
p-value
2
Sign
test
Wilcoxon
test
-30 -0.0007 0.1435 0.1441 0.1245 0.0011 0.0180 -0.0005 0.2137 0.3716 0.0183 0.0910
-29 0.0003 0.3457 0.3429 0.3030 0.0413 0.5150 0.0005 0.2248 0.3715 0.2773 0.8010
-28 0.0001 0.3957 0.3961 0.3902 0.0033 0.1670 0.0002 0.3483 0.3932 0.0018 0.4120
-27 -0.0006 0.1818 0.1708 0.2458 0.0013 0.1150 -0.0003 0.3114 0.3866 0.2890 0.5120
-26 0.0007 0.1409 0.1409 0.2774 0.0531 0.7240 0.0007 0.1601 0.3580 0.1179 0.8660
-25 -0.0003 0.3306 0.3263 0.3292 0.0211 0.3790 0.0000 0.3988 0.3989 0.5077 0.8150
-24 0.0006 0.1786 0.1811 0.3235 0.3014 0.5030 0.0009 0.0567 0.3175 0.9366 0.0880
-23 0.0003 0.3106 0.3054 0.2150 0.3014 0.9990 0.0005 0.2481 0.3767 0.2545 0.5150
-22 -0.0001 0.3868 0.3853 0.3227 0.0054 0.1010 0.0001 0.3962 0.3985 0.0159 0.3480
-21 -0.0009 0.0677 0.0606 0.1206 0.0039 0.0070 -0.0006 0.1863 0.3634 0.0074 0.0560
-20 -0.0005 0.2155 0.1936 0.1921 0.0102 0.0380 -0.0003 0.3318 0.3892 0.0137 0.2430
-19 0.0006 0.1641 0.1498 0.2140 0.0850 0.6300 0.0010 0.0570 0.3098 0.6910 0.1470
97 The discussion of the significance level is based on p-value 1, where p-value 1 assumes cross-sectional
independence. However, the significance level for bidder abnormal returns on day 0 is generally the same
regardless of the use of different statistical tests.241
-18 -0.0005 0.2335 0.2253 0.0888 0.0000 0.0070 -0.0003 0.3128 0.3873 0.0001 0.0350
-17 0.0001 0.3928 0.3918 0.3049 0.4114 0.9170 0.0005 0.2646 0.3774 0.8115 0.5050
-16 -0.0001 0.3806 0.3801 0.3661 0.3268 0.4390 0.0003 0.3456 0.3922 0.1941 0.8620
-15 -0.0003 0.3507 0.3394 0.3902 0.0009 0.0660 -0.0001 0.3955 0.3984 0.0002 0.1920
-14 0.0005 0.2191 0.2087 0.1195 0.3537 0.5990 0.0006 0.1827 0.3617 0.4907 0.4280
-13 0.0006 0.1965 0.1732 0.3352 0.4422 0.8710 0.0006 0.1831 0.3598 0.1765 0.8300
-12 -0.0009 0.0653 0.0568 0.0631 0.0039 0.0180 -0.0007 0.1370 0.3500 0.0118 0.1060
-11 0.0009 0.0738 0.0680 0.1592 0.5779 0.2560 0.0011 0.0274 0.2943 1.0000 0.0380
-10 -0.0008 0.1130 0.0737 0.2639 0.0469 0.3640 -0.0002 0.3749 0.3952 0.9789 0.5390
-9 0.0001 0.3968 0.3964 0.3521 0.0027 0.2210 0.0000 0.3989 0.3989 0.0675 0.4140
-8 -0.0002 0.3696 0.3656 0.3672 0.2331 0.6350 0.0003 0.3288 0.3890 0.5077 0.3070
-7 -0.0002 0.3880 0.3740 0.3571 0.0137 0.4720 0.0001 0.3922 0.3970 0.1941 0.7290
-6 -0.0005 0.2465 0.2095 0.1738 0.0039 0.0880 -0.0004 0.3085 0.3842 0.0278 0.1590
-5 -0.0002 0.3551 0.3484 0.3188 0.1060 0.4310 0.0001 0.3939 0.3982 0.5077 0.7860
-4 -0.0000 0.3973 0.3970 0.3183 0.0137 0.1390 0.0001 0.3856 0.3969 0.0278 0.3320
-3 -0.0002 0.3527 0.3475 0.3852 0.0243 0.3320 0.0004 0.2668 0.3790 0.4743 0.6000
-2 0.0012 0.0198 0.0146 0.0274 0.5779 0.1850 0.0013 0.0127 0.2554 0.3818 0.1040
-1 -0.0000 0.3979 0.3974 0.2991 0.0531 0.1690 0.0003 0.3472 0.3891 0.0278 0.7240
0 -0.0046 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0044 0.0000 0.0026 0.0000 0.0000
1 -0.0017 0.0180 0.0004 0.0000 0.0002 0.0010 -0.0014 0.0494 0.2351 0.0009 0.0070
2 -0.0002 0.3688 0.3513 0.2530 0.0002 0.0250 0.0000 0.3983 0.3988 0.0033 0.2080
3 -0.0011 0.0323 0.0233 0.0322 0.0074 0.0830 -0.0011 0.0409 0.2981 0.0003 0.0530
4 0.0000 0.3982 0.3981 0.3239 0.1179 0.3040 -0.0000 0.3978 0.3987 0.0599 0.3600
5 -0.0002 0.3619 0.3589 0.3416 0.1179 0.4430 -0.0002 0.3674 0.3948 0.0531 0.6050
6 -0.0002 0.3543 0.3564 0.3981 0.0758 0.2820 0.0001 0.3832 0.3971 0.2129 0.9340
7 0.0001 0.3818 0.3804 0.3944 0.1309 0.8840 0.0005 0.2169 0.3696 0.3537 0.5230242
8 -0.0002 0.3805 0.3777 0.3947 0.1450 0.5180 0.0002 0.3641 0.3940 0.1450 0.7140
9 -0.0003 0.3308 0.3262 0.2579 0.0074 0.0750 0.0003 0.3405 0.3912 0.1309 0.6670
10 -0.0010 0.0471 0.0387 0.0512 0.0054 0.0120 -0.0006 0.1856 0.3636 0.0159 0.1910
11 0.0005 0.2193 0.2028 0.1825 0.0469 0.6710 0.0006 0.1943 0.3646 0.0147 0.5360
12 0.0008 0.0995 0.0948 0.2671 0.1765 0.9670 0.0009 0.0651 0.3212 0.4743 0.3550
13 -0.0003 0.3170 0.3121 0.3900 0.0046 0.0410 -0.0000 0.3989 0.3989 0.0102 0.3730
14 -0.0006 0.1982 0.1905 0.1125 0.0159 0.0650 -0.0001 0.3904 0.3978 0.1179 0.5080
15 -0.0001 0.3928 0.3908 0.2344 0.9366 0.6300 0.0004 0.3234 0.3864 0.6146 0.2880
16 -0.0006 0.1595 0.1469 0.0921 0.0004 0.0010 -0.0002 0.3640 0.3942 0.0243 0.0560
17 -0.0003 0.3243 0.3218 0.3276 0.0033 0.1120 -0.0004 0.2781 0.3826 0.0159 0.1120
18 0.0012 0.0169 0.0131 0.0078 0.6146 0.0750 0.0016 0.0025 0.2070 0.2545 0.0080
19 -0.0007 0.1212 0.1210 0.0381 0.0039 0.0130 -0.0006 0.1776 0.3619 0.0211 0.0260
20 -0.0001 0.3898 0.3897 0.3832 0.1179 0.3170 0.0002 0.3607 0.3942 0.0675 0.8380
21 -0.0002 0.3641 0.3521 0.2104 0.1602 0.5090 0.0001 0.3900 0.3975 0.1941 0.6930
22 -0.0004 0.2847 0.2824 0.2294 0.0046 0.0970 0.0000 0.3989 0.3989 0.0318 0.5560
23 -0.0001 0.3907 0.3908 0.3851 0.0183 0.3170 0.0001 0.3868 0.3975 0.0211 0.5260
24 -0.0002 0.3700 0.3700 0.3812 0.0469 0.2300 0.0001 0.3966 0.3986 0.0675 0.7030
25 -0.0001 0.3847 0.3850 0.3389 0.0137 0.1170 0.0002 0.3586 0.3940 0.3818 0.7620
26 -0.0009 0.1025 0.0657 0.0979 0.0054 0.0310 -0.0003 0.3319 0.3886 0.3014 0.4810
27 0.0007 0.1154 0.1087 0.3050 0.1060 0.8080 0.0009 0.0831 0.3293 0.3268 0.4040
28 -0.0012 0.0147 0.0124 0.0203 0.0001 0.0100 -0.0009 0.0803 0.3298 0.0074 0.1560
29 -0.0014 0.0040 0.0051 0.0071 0.0003 0.0010 -0.0010 0.0450 0.3147 0.0013 0.0140
30 -0.0002 0.3516 0.3537 0.3371 0.1450 0.3220 0.0001 0.3898 0.3979 0.1602 0.9250
p-value 1: t test with assuming cross-sectional independence
p-value 2: t test with assuming cross-sectional dependence
p-value 3: PSR test
Wilcoxon test: Wilcoxon signed rank test243
In addition to bidder daily abnormal returns, this chapter also shows the figure to
capture the movement of bidder cumulative abnormal returns during the event period. As
shows in figure 7.2, the movement of bidder cumulative abnormal returns is similar when
using the MM model and the Mean-Adj model. The results show that there is a downward
trend for bidder cumulative abnormal returns during the post-event period. This suggests
that the analysis of bidder announcement returns during the post-announcement period
contains the information lag.
Figure 7.2 The movement of bidder cumulative abnormal returns during the test period
However, as can be seen in figure 7.2, the movement of bidder cumulative abnormal
returns calculated from the Mkt-Adj model is clearly distinct from that of the MM model
and the Mean-Adj model. This may attribute to the assumption of the model specification,
where the Mkt-Adj model assumes alpha equal to 0 and beta equal to 1. As bidders tend to
outperform the market prior to the transactions, bidders can be expected to obtain higher
abnormal returns during the pre-announcement period. On the other hand, if bidders tend
to outperform the market prior to the transactions, it can be expected that bidders may also
outperform the market after the transactions. Thus, bidders can also obtain higher abnormal
returns  after  the transactions  when  using  the  Mkt-Adj  model.  As  a  consequent,  it  is244
apparent that there are differences of bidder abnormal returns between the Mkt-Adj model
and the MM and Mean-Adj model.
To detect the change of bidder cumulative abnormal returns in a certain period, this
chapter also presents bidder cumulative abnormal returns over different event windows. As
table 7.6 shows, bidders experience -0.63% and -0.56% cumulative abnormal returns over
a 3-day (-1,+1) event window measured from the MM model and the Mkt-Adj model,
respectively, both statistically significant at the 0.01 level.
98  In addition, the results are
also statistically significant at the 0.01 level, testing from the nonparametric statistics in
terms of sign test and wilcoxon singed rank test. The results enable the current study to
reject the null hypothesis, concluding that there are negative cumulative abnormal returns
to bidders around bank merger and acquisition announcements. However, the difference
between the MM and Mkt-Adj model is not statistically significant, p-value is 0.705.
Negative  cumulative abnormal  returns  to  bidders  suggest  that  bidders experience
losses in their wealth in bank mergers. This also lends support to either the hubris or
agency hypothesis, where the hypotheses expect that bidders may overpay to targets. In
addition, negative announcement returns to bidders are also consistent with prior empirical
studies, e.g., Neely (1987), Houston and Ryngaert (1994), Siems (1996), Cornett et al.
(2003), DeLong (2003), Beitel et al. (2004), Campa and Hernando (2006), Hagendorff et
al. (2008).
While looking at a 61-day (-30,+30) event window, the results show that bidders
from  the  MM  model  obtain -1.48%  cumulative  abnormal  returns  relative  to  0.13%
cumulative abnormal  returns  from  the  Mkt-Adj  model.  The  results  are  statistically
significant at the 0.01 level for the MM model only. The difference between the MM
model and the Mkt-Adj model is statistically significant, and the p-value is 0.001.
As bidders tend to outperform the market prior the acquisition resulting on average in
98 The results calculated from the Mean-Adj model are in general consistent with those from the MM model.
Thus,  the  results  are  not  repeatedly  discussed  in  this  section.  However,  the  results  are  provided  in  the
appendix A table 7.2.245
positive alpha coefficients, it is not surprising that bidders still obtain positive cumulative
abnormal returns in terms of the Mkt-Adj model when measuring from a longer 61-day
(-30,+30) event window. This also indicates that bidder cumulative abnormal returns are
sensitive to the use of the model specification.
Table 7.6 Bidder cumulative abnormal returns over various event windows
MM model Mkt-Adj model
Mean
p-value
1
p-value
3
Sign
test
Wilcoxon
test
Mean p-value1
Sign
test
Wilcoxon
test
(-4,1) -0.0054 0.0006 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0037 0.0219 0.0000 0.0000
(-1,1) -0.0063 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0056 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000
(-30,30) -0.0148 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0013 0.3696 0.0950 0.7520
(0) -0.0046 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0044 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(-1,0) -0.0046 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0041 0.0004 0.0002 0.0000
(-30,-1) -0.0014 0.3291 0.2754 0.3537 0.2990 0.0062 0.0071 0.0278 0.0150
(0,1) -0.0063 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0059 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(1,30) -0.0088 0.0008 0.0000 0.0074 0.0000 -0.0005 0.3917 0.2773 0.5440
p-value 1: t test with assuming cross-sectional independence
p-value 3: PSR test
Wilcoxon test: Wilcoxon signed rank test
In  addition  to  examining  bidder  shareholder  wealth,  this  thesis  further  provides
regression analysis to explore the determinants that can explain the announcement returns
of  bidding  firms.  As has  been  mentioned previously,  this  thesis  focuses  on  exploring
whether  the  country  level  corporate  governance  mechanisms  in  terms  of  investor
protection and bank regulation are important determinants to explain bidder announcement
returns.  To  explore  investor  protection  and  bank  regulation  on  the  impact  of  bidder
cumulative abnormal  returns  accurately,  the  regression  analysis  also  controls  for  the246
country level specific characteristics.
While  the deal  and  firm  specific  characteristics  have  shown  its  importance  to
influence the announcement returns of the firms as discussed in chapter 2, the regression
analysis also controls for these characteristics in order to provide additional insights to
explore the factors that can also affect bidder announcement returns. Thus, the regression
analysis for bidders will be presented in section 7.8.
Overall,  the  results  show  that  bidders  experience  negative  announcement  returns
around bank merger and acquisition announcements, also implying wealth transfer from
bidders to targets. The analysis of bidder cumulative abnormal returns is based on the full
1,424 sample of bidding firms.
7.6 Country differences in bidder cumulative abnormal returns
Prior empirical studies discussed in chapter 2 have reported that bidder cumulative
abnormal returns vary depending on the market. While the majority of prior empirical
studies focus on a signal market, it is interesting to see whether bidder announcement
returns are different in various regions as this thesis contains a large international sample
of bank mergers.
As has been discussed in section 6.6, Conn and Connell (1990) and Aybar and Ficici
(2009) argue that U.S. targets earn higher bid premia due to the highly competitive U.S.
takeover market. Thus, bidders need to pay more to targets in the U.S. market. So, U.S.
bidders may obtain lower announcement returns than EU bidders and bidders from outside
the U.S. and EU market. It can be expected that a difference of bidder announcement
returns between the markets can be found. Accordingly, this thesis further splits the sample
based on the markets to analyse bidder announcement returns.
99  The analysis of bidder
announcement returns is based on the clean 1,208 sample as this allows the current study to
99 The  sample  is  further  divided  into  the  U.S.  and  EU  market  and  other  markets  to  examine  bidder
announcement returns. The discussion of bidder announcement returns is based on the MM model. The
results measured from the Mkt-Adj and Mean-Adj model are provided in the appendix A table 7.3 and 7.4,
respectively.247
make a clear comparison between the markets. Thus, the analysis of bidder cumulative
abnormal returns for the U.S., EU market and other markets is based on the sample of 943,
164 and 101, respectively.
Figure 7.3 Bidder cumulative abnormal returns for the market
Bidder  cumulative abnormal  returns  in  terms  of  the  U.S.,  EU  market  and  other
markets are presented in order to capture the development of bidder cumulative abnormal
returns during the event period, as is given in figure 7.3. The figure shows that bidders
from other non-U.S. and European markets in general perform well relative to bidders
from the U.S. and EU markets, particularly centring on the announcement date and the
post-announcement period. This can be an indication that the banking takeover market
from other markets is less competitive compared to the U.S. and EU market. Thus, bidders
from other markets do not need to pay so much to targets.
However, it should be acknowledged that it is necessary to exercise care to claim this
argument. This is because other markets also contain some competitive banking takeover
market, such as Japan, Canada, etc. As a consequent, the results for bidders from other
non-U.S. and European markets cannot strongly draw a conclusion that bidders from these248
markets do obtain lower announcement returns due to less competitive banking takeover
markets.
On the other hand, when taking into account the analysis of target announcement
returns from other non-U.S. and European countries discussed in section 6.6, the results
can lend support to the argument that banking takeover markets outside the U.S. and EU
market are generally less competitive. This can attribute to lower announcement returns to
targets from other markets and higher announcement returns to bidders from other markets.
Furthermore, this thesis presents bidder cumulative abnormal returns over various
event windows in order to capture bidder cumulative abnormal returns in a certain period.
As table 7.7 shows, bidders obtain -0.64%, -0.20% and -0.01% abnormal returns on day 0
for  the  U.S.,  EU  market  and  other  markets,  respectively.  The  results  are  statistically
significant at the 0.01 level for the U.S. market only. These results suggest that bidders
marginally lose their wealth on the announcement date.
While looking at a 3-day (-1,+1) event window, the results show that bidders in the U.S.
market obtain -0.91% cumulative abnormal returns, statistically significant at the 0.01 level.
Similarly, the results are also statistically significant at the 0.01 level when performing the
nonparametric statistics  in  terms  of  sign  test  and  wilcoxon  signed  rank  test.  Negative
cumulative abnormal returns to U.S. bidders are consistent with prior empirical evidence in
U.S. studies, e.g., -1.96% of Siems (1996), -2.24% of Toyne and Tripp (1998) and -0.74%
of Cornett et al. (2003).
With regard to bidder cumulative abnormal returns in the EU market, the results
show that EU bidders experience -0.10% cumulative abnormal returns over a 3-day (-1,+1)
event  window.  However,  the  results  are  not  statistically  significant.  This  finding  is
consistent with prior empirical evidence in EU studies, e.g., -0.01% of Beitel et al. (2004),
-0.33% of Rad and Beek (1999), -0.87% of Campa and Hernando (2006), but contradicts to
the studies of EU bank mergers, e.g., 0.99% of Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000), 0.03% of
Ismail and Davidson (2005), 0.03% of Ekkayokkaya et al. (2007) and 0.39% of Lensink249
Table 7.7 Bidder cumulative abnormal returns for the market
MM model
U.S. EU Other
Mean p-value 1 Sign test Wilcoxon test Mean p-value 1 Sign test Wilcoxon test Mean p-value 1 Sign test Wilcoxon test
(-4,1) -0.0082 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0012 0.7850 0.6962 0.2690 -0.0006 0.5210 1.0000 0.8730
(-1,1) -0.0091 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0010 0.7980 0.9378 0.7620 -0.0039 0.5270 0.3197 0.2490
(-30,30) -0.0145 0.0010 0.0003 0.0000 -0.0255 0.0140 0.1844 0.0340 0.0097 0.7710 0.5505 0.7350
(0) -0.0064 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0020 0.4310 0.3100 0.8120 -0.0001 0.3650 0.6906 0.7040
(-1,0) -0.0072 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.9960 0.3100 0.3960 0.0005 0.2040 0.8423 0.9590
(-30,-1) -0.0009 0.7320 0.7945 0.8430 -0.0028 0.6720 0.1379 0.1580 0.0141 0.4650 0.3197 0.3310
(0,1) -0.0083 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0030 0.3930 0.8148 0.8440 -0.0045 0.8130 0.2325 0.2040
(1,30) -0.0072 0.0180 0.0904 0.0020 -0.0207 0.0050 0.0509 0.0120 -0.0043 0.6440 1.0000 0.6890
N 943 164 101
p-value 1: t test with assuming cross-sectional independence
Wilcoxon test: Wilcoxon signed rank test250
and Maslennikova (2008).
While looking at other markets, bidders obtain -0.39% cumulative abnormal returns
over a 3-day (-1,+1) event window, not statistically significant. Similarly, the results are
not statistically significant when performing nonparametric statistics in terms of sign test
and wilcoxon signed rank test. Taking into account the difference of bidder cumulative
abnormal returns for a 3-day (-1,+1) event window between the markets, the results are
only statistically significant between the U.S. and EU market, p-value is 0.067. The results
indicate that bidders do obtain a different level of the announcement returns between the
U.S. and EU market. Overall, the results show that U.S. bidders experience more losses
than EU bidders and bidders from outside the U.S. and EU market. This lends support to
the hypothesis discussed in section 4.3.1.2, expecting that there are differences of bidder
announcement  returns  between  the  markets,  although  the  results  are  not  statistically
significant.
When extending to a longer 61-day (-30,+30) event window, it can be found that
bidders  in  the  EU  market  encountered  significant  mean  abnormal  losses  of -2.55%
although  bidders  in  U.S.  market  obtain -1.45%  cumulative  abnormal  returns,  both
statistically significant at the 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively. The results indicate that EU
bidders experience more losses when analysing a longer event window relative to U.S.
bidders. The results contradict to those from the shorter 3-day (-1,+1) event window. On
the contrary, bidders from other markets obtain marginally positive announcement returns
when looking at a longer 61-day (-30,+30) event window. The results suggest that bidders
from other markets gain more, partially attributing to a less competitive banking takeover
markets.
7.7 The analysis of diversifying or focusing deals
As  mentioned  in  section  6.7,  banks  can  diversify  risks  through  diversification
acquisitions. Instead, managers may find it relatively easy to manage similar risks when251
engaging in focusing deals. It can therefore be expected that there are differences in bidder
cumulative abnormal returns in activity focusing and diversifying deals. Thus, this section
discusses  bidder  cumulative  abnormal  returns  with  respect  to  activity  diversifying  and
focusing deals measured from the MM model and based on the clean 1,208 sample. The
analysis  of  bidder  cumulative abnormal  returns  for  focusing  and  diversifying deals  is
further based on the sample of 1,032 and 176, respectively.
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The development of bidder cumulative abnormal returns during the event period with
respect to activity diversifying and focusing deals is presented in figure 7.4. As figure 7.4
shows, bidders in diversifying deals in general perform well during the test period relative
to those in focusing deals although the reverse situation is found around two weeks prior to
the announcement date. As can be seen in figure 7.4, bidders in diversifying deals clearly
obtain higher announcement returns than those in focusing deals, starting from one week
prior to the announcement date. Although the results still show significant difference of
bidder  announcement  returns  between  diversifying  and  focusing  deals  during  the
post-event period, the difference becomes small approaching the end of the test period.
Thus,  the  findings  clearly  indicate  that  banks  in  diversifying  deals  create  higher
announcement returns to bidders, suggesting that banks can be expected to achieve risk
diversification through diversification acquisitions.
Surprisingly,  figure  7.4  also  shows  interesting  findings.  As  can  be  seen,  the
movement  of  bidder  cumulative abnormal  returns  in  focusing  deals  during  the
post-announcement period is rather stable with a significant impact of the announcement
returns to bidders on the announcement date. A possible explanation is that the market may
not exist too much information regarding focusing deals. Thus, the movement of bidder
100 It should be acknowledged that the definition of diversification transactions may not provide a clear
picture to analyse the abnormal returns of bank diversification acquisitions. This may derive from the fact
that banks within the same 2-digit SIC code may also contain different types of banks, such as retail banks,
wholesale banks, etc. The analysis of the abnormal returns may vary depending on different types of the
banks. This can also suggest future research to further look into the impact of shareholder wealth in bank
mergers within different types of banks.252
cumulative abnormal returns is stable during the post-announcement period.
Figure  7.4  The  development  of  bidder  cumulative abnormal  returns  for  activity
focusing/diversifying deals
However,  the  variation  of  bidder  cumulative  abnormal  returns  appears  to  be
significant in diversifying deals. The presence of a wide variation of bidder cumulative
abnormal returns in diversifying deals may suggest that the market may have more rumour
regarding to diversifying deals. However, it remains unknown as to why bidder cumulative
abnormal returns in diversifying deals appear to vary during the test period.
As the variation of bidder announcement returns in diversifying deals is wide relative
to that in focusing deals, another interesting implication in figure 7.4 is that the presence of
either  information  leakage  or  information  lag  is  mainly  driven  by  the  transactions  in
diversification deals. This also implies the importance to control for activity diversifying or
focusing deals in the analysis of bidder announcement returns in bank mergers. However,
this thesis does not intend to control for activity  focusing or diversifying deals in the
regression analysis to explore the impact of investor protection and bank regulation on
bidder  announcement  returns.  Due  to  several  variables  being  controlling  for  in  the
regression analysis, I do not control for whether the deals are focusing or diversifying253
acquisitions. Instead, bidder regression analysis allows the current study to look at different
facets to affect bidder announcement returns.
In addition, this thesis also presents bidder cumulative abnormal returns over various
event windows in order to capture the impact of bidder announcement returns in a certain
period. As table 7.8 shows, bidders in focusing deals on average obtain -0.62% abnormal
returns  on  day  0  relative  to  0.03%  for  those  in  diversifying  deals.  The  results  are
statistically  significant  at  the  0.01  level  for  focusing  deals  only.  While performing
nonparametric statistics in terms of sign test and wilcoxon singed rank test, the results are
statistically significant  the  0.01  level  for  focusing  deals  only.  The difference  between
focusing and diversifying deals is statistically significant, p-value is 0.005. Thus, these
findings  suggest  that  bidders  in  diversifying  deals  can  be  expected  to  achieve  risk
diversification benefits, resulting in higher bidder announcement returns.
Table 7.8 Bidder cumulative abnormal returns for activity focusing/diversifying deals
Focusing Diversifying
Mean
p-value
1
Sign
test
Wilcoxon
test
Mean
p-value
1
Sign
test
Wilcoxon
test
(-4,1) -0.0078 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0026 0.5320 1.0000 0.4420
(-1,1) -0.0089 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 0.8770 0.9399 0.9240
(-30,30) -0.0146 0.0010 0.0009 0.0000 -0.0105 0.3250 0.3271 0.2410
(0) -0.0062 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.8840 0.9399 0.6680
(-1,0) -0.0068 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0018 0.5110 1.0000 0.5450
(-30,-1) -0.0014 0.6010 0.2759 0.4000 0.0086 0.2120 0.2000 0.3010
(0,1) -0.0084 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0010 0.7210 0.7063 0.8830
(1,30) -0.0070 0.0180 0.1272 0.0050 -0.0194 0.0140 0.0288 0.0040
N 1032 176
p-value 1: t test with assuming cross-sectional independence254
Wilcoxon test: Wilcoxon signed ranked test
Looking at a 3-day (-1,+1) event window, the results show that bidders in focusing
deals on average obtain -0.89% cumulative abnormal returns relative to 0.05% for those in
diversifying deals. The results are also statistically significant at the 0.01 level for focusing
deals  only.  The difference  between  focusing  and  diversifying  deals  is  statistically
significant, p-value is 0.011. This allows the current study to reject the null hypothesis as
discussed in section 4.3.1.2 and conclude that there are differences of bidder cumulative
abnormal  returns  between  activity  focusing  and  diversifying  deals.  This  finding  is
consistent with Ekkayokkaya et al. (2007) and Hagendorff et al. (2008) in the study of EU
bank  mergers,  where  these  two  studies  have  reported  higher  announcement  returns  to
bidders in diversifying deals.
Interestingly, table 7.8 shows that bidders obtain higher cumulative abnormal returns
in diversifying deals than those in focusing deals in all event windows, except a 30-day
(+1,+30) event window. However, the results show that bidders in focusing deals obtain
higher  announcement  returns  over  a  30-day  (+1,+30)  event  window  than  those  in
diversifying  deals  although  both  diversifying  and  focusing  deals  generate  negative
announcement  returns  to  bidders.  The  figure  shows  that  bidder  cumulative  abnormal
returns  are -0.70%  and -1.94%  for  focusing  and  diversifying  deals,  respectively,  both
statistically significant at the 0.05 level. However, the difference between focusing and
diversifying deals is not statistically significant, p-value is 0.141.
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While  bidders  in  diversifying  deals  obtain  higher  announcement  returns  within
various event windows in table 7.8, bidders, on the contrary, yield higher announcement
returns in focusing deals during the post-announcement 30-day (+1,+30) event window.
This indicates that the market has a reverse expectation after the transactions regarding to
diversifying acquisitions. A possible reason is that the market may realise that it may be
101 Bidder cumulative abnormal returns measured from the Mkt-Adj and Mean-Adj model are presented in
the appendix A table 7.5 and 7.6, respectively.255
relatively  difficult  to  manage  different  risks  for  various  financial  products  after  the
transactions  when  acquiring  other  financial  firms.  Thus,  bidders  in  diversifying
acquisitions experience significantly negative announcement returns after the transactions.
Another possible explanation is that the market may react the advantages of the risk
diversification effects significantly to bidders in diversifying deals prior to the transactions.
The market may therefore show a reverse reaction after the transactions in order to revise
its pervious expectation for diversifying deals. As a result, bidders experience more losses
in diversifying acquisitions than in focusing deals during the post-announcement 30-day
(+1,+30) period.
Overall, as discussed above, this chapter discusses the empirical findings of bidder
announcement  returns,  taking  into  account  the  issues  of  thin  trading,  the  confounding
events, the market and activity diversifying or focusing deals, respectively. The results
show that bidders in general obtain negative announcement returns around bank merger
and acquisition announcements.
In  order  to  explain  bidder  announcement  returns,  this  thesis  also  carries  out
cross-sectional  regression  analysis  to  explore  the  factors  that  can  affect  bidder
announcement returns. As has been discussed in chapter 1, the main focus in the regression
analysis is to determine as to whether the country level corporate governance mechanisms
in  terms  of  investor  protection  and  bank  regulation  can  be  important  determinants  to
explain  bidder  announcement  returns.  Thus,  the  following  section  provides  the
cross-sectional regression analysis for bidders.
7.8 Cross-sectional regression analysis
The  empirical  findings  related  to  bidder  cumulative  abnormal  returns  have  been
discussed  in  the  previous  sections.  To  explain  bidder  shareholder  wealth,  this  thesis256
provides cross-sectional regression analysis to determine as to whether investor protection
and  bank  regulation  in  a  country  can  be  important  determinants  to  influence  bidder
cumulative abnormal returns. The regression analysis also controls for the country level
specific characteristics to explain bidder announcement returns.
In addition, as has been suggested by prior empirical studies discussed in chapter 2,
bidder cumulative abnormal returns can be influenced by factors, such as the deal and firm
specific characteristics. Thus, the cross-sectional regression analysis also controls for the
country level specific characteristics and the deal and firm specific characteristics in order
to  explore  the  relationship  between  bidder  cumulative abnormal  returns  and  investor
protection and bank regulation in a country accurately. With regard to control variables, the
country level specific characteristics include the variable of the competitiveness of the
banking market and the size of the banking market. The control variables related to the
deal  and  firm  specific  characteristics  include  a  cross-border  dummy,  cash  dummy,  the
relative size of the target to bidder, firm performance, the growth potential, the capital ratio
and firm size.
Similar to the discussion of target regression analyses in section 6.8, the sample only
includes the clean sample in bidder regression analyses.
102  Bidder regression analyses also
control for outliers by deleting 1% observations from the top and bottom of bidder 3-day
(-1,+1)  cumulative  abnormal  returns.  However,  due  to  a  relative  small  number  of
observations being deleted from the sample, the results may not change significantly. In
order  to  identify  whether  the  existence  of  outliers  is  an  issue  to  affect  the  regression
analysis, this thesis also uses the full 1,424 sample of bank mergers in the analysis. The
results are presented in appendix B.
Furthermore, this thesis uses different model specifications in order to avoid a high
level of the correlation among the variables of investor protection and bank regulation in a
102 The clean sample indicates that the sample firms do not announce other corporate events over a 3-day
(-1,+1) event window.257
country  that  may  affect  the  analysis.
103  The  dependent  variable  in  bidder  regression
analyses  only  relies  on  bidder  cumulative abnormal  returns  for  a  3-day  (-1,+1)  event
window  in  that  bidder  3-day  (-1,+1)  announcement  returns  can  capture  the immediate
reaction of bank merger and acquisition announcements efficiently.
Table 7.9 shows the results of bidder regression analysis based on the market (MM)
model.  The  results  in  model  specification  (1)  show  that  bidder  cumulative abnormal
returns  are  positively  related  to  investor  protection  measured  as  the  antidirector  rights
index  in  a  bidder  country,  the  coefficient  is  0.001.
104  However, the  results  are  not
statistically significant.
In addition, the results show that bidder cumulative abnormal returns are negatively
and significantly related to investor protection measured as the rule of law in a bidder
country in model specification (2). The coefficient is -0.002, statistically significant at the
0.1  level.  The  results  indicate  that  higher  bidder  cumulative abnormal  returns  are
associated with weaker investor protection in a bidder country. The results denote that
bidders  reduce -0.002  cumulative abnormal  returns  when  the  rule  of  law  in  a  bidder
country increases 1 point.
Although the statistical significant finding allows the current study to reject the null
hypothesis,  it  should  be  acknowledged  that  the  sign  of the  coefficient  contradicts  the
expectation  as  has  been  discussed  in  chapter  4.  A  possible  explanation  for  a  negative
relationship  between  bidder  announcement  returns  and investor  protection  in  a  bidder
country can be that strong investor protection in a bidder country can actually impede
managers’ ability to pursue risky investment projects through mergers and acquisitions.
This  would  reduce  the  potential  future  gains  to  shareholders.  Thus,  stronger  investor
protection in a bidder country can result in lower bidder cumulative abnormal returns in
103 The correlation matrix is provided in appendix A table 7.7.
104 This thesis also applies Djankov et al.’s (2006) revised antidirector rights index to explore the impact of
investor protection on the bidder cumulative abnormal returns in bank mergers. The results show that the
coefficient is 0.001 between bidder cumulative abnormal returns and the revised antidirector rights index.
However, the results are not statistically significant.258
bank mergers.
With regard to the control variables, several explanatory variables are found to be
highly statistically significant. As can be seen in model specification (1) and (2) of table
7.9, the results show that higher bidder cumulative abnormal returns are associated with
cash payment, the coefficient is 0.011.
In addition, the results also show that bidder cumulative abnormal returns have a
positive relationship with the market to book ratio and capital ratio, the coefficients are
0.002 and 0.032, respectively, both statistically significant. The results indicate that higher
bidder  cumulative  abnormal  returns  are  related  to  higher  growth  potential  and  higher
capital ratio.
While the variables of cash payment, the market to book ratio and the capital ratio
have a positive relationship with bidder cumulative abnormal returns, it can be seen that
the capital ratio generates the highest coefficient at 0.032. This denotes that the capital
ratio is an important determinant to explain bidder announcement returns. However, it
should be necessary to exercise care to make such a comparison in that the significant level
of the coefficient among these three variables is different. A positive coefficient of the
capital ratio also suggests that higher capital ratio of banks can serve  as a cushion to
protect unexpected losses through bank mergers and acquisitions.
In contrast, the results show that bidder cumulative abnormal returns are negatively
and  significantly  correlated  to  the  relative  size  of  the  target  to  bidder,  indicating  that
bidders  obtain  higher  announcement  returns  when  targets  are  relatively  smaller  than
bidders. Similarly, the results also show that bidder size has a negative impact to bidder
cumulative abnormal  returns.  Bidder  cumulative  abnormal  returns  are  negatively  and
significantly  related  to  ROA,  the  coefficient  is -0.312,  suggesting  that  bidders  obtain
higher announcement returns when bidder’s prior performance is poor. Furthermore, the
results also find that bidder cumulative abnormal returns are negatively and significantly
associated with net interest margin, suggesting that bidders in a more competitive banking259
market obtain lower announcement returns.
Overall, the results show that the adjusted R square in model specification (1) and (2)
is 7.44% and 7.64%, respectively. F-value in model specification (1) and (2) is 9.66 and
9.91, respectively, both statistically significant at the 0.01 level.
Turning  to  the  analysis  of  bank  regulation  on  the  impact  of  bidder  cumulative
abnormal returns in model specification (3)-(6), the results are mixed. The results in model
specification (3) of table 7.9 show that bidder cumulative abnormal returns are negatively
and  significantly  associated  with  bank  regulation  measured  as  overall  activity
restrictiveness in a bidder country, the coefficient is -0.003. The results suggest that higher
bidder cumulative abnormal returns are associated with less restriction of banking activity
in a bidder country.
However, when bank regulation is measured as independence of overall supervisory
authority  in  a  bidder  country,  the  results  in  model  specification  (6)  show  that  bidder
cumulative  abnormal  returns  are  positively  and significantly  associated  with  bank
regulation,  the  coefficient  is  0.006.  The  results  suggest  that  higher  bidder  cumulative
abnormal  returns  are  related  to  stronger  bank  regulation  measured  as  independence  of
supervisory  authority-overall  in  a  bidder  country.  However,  when  bank  regulation  is
measured as official supervisory power and prompt correct power in model specification (4)
and  (5)  respectively,  the  results  do  not  show  any  statistical  relationship  with  bidder
announcement returns.
With  regard  to  control  variables  in  model  specification  (3)-(6),  the  results  are  in
general consistent with those in model specification (1) and (2). The results show that
higher bidder cumulative abnormal returns are related to cash payment, higher market to
book ratio and higher capital ratio. On the contrary, the results find that higher bidder
cumulative abnormal returns are associated with smaller relative size of the target to bidder,
smaller bidder size, lower ROA and lower net interest margin. However, the results in
model  specification  (3)  also  show  that  higher  bidder  cumulative abnormal  returns  are260
related to cross-border deals.
Overall, the adjusted R square in model specification (3)-(6) is around 8%. F-value in
model specification (3)-(6) is around 10, with statistically significant at the 0.01 level.
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Additional statistical tests of Ramsey test show that there are no omitted variables in all
model specifications. Multicollinearity is similarly not a problem as the figure of Variance
Inflation Factor (VIF) is lower than 3.
From the empirical findings reported above, my findings show that bidder cumulative
abnormal returns are negatively related to investor protection measured as the rule of law
and bank regulation measured as overall activities restrictiveness, respectively. The results
suggest  that  the  presence  of  strong  legal  and  regulation  system  cannot  mitigate  the
conflicts between managers and shareholders resulted in lower announcement returns to
bidders. As discussed previously, the existence of strong legal and regulation system may
limit  managerial  ability  to  pursue  risky investment  projects  through  mergers  and
acquisitions in return of higher returns to shareholders. Thus, a strong legal and regulation
system can exaggerate the conflicts between managers and shareholders to bidding firms.
However, when bank regulation measured as overall independence of supervisory
authority applies in the regression analysis, the results show a positive relationship with
bidder cumulative abnormal returns. The findings imply that managers can carry out their
duty  to  benefit  their  firms  and  shareholders  when supervisory  authority  is  more
independence  without  outside  influence  through  political  consideration.  Thus,  a  more
independent  supervisory  authority can  reduce  the  conflicts  between  managers  and
shareholders. This can then benefit shareholders of bidders showing higher announcement
returns.
In addition to the analysis above, this thesis also analyses the regression analysis
based on the full 1,424 sample of bank mergers. As appendix B table 7.1 shows, the
105 Appendix A table 7.8 and 7.9 show the results based on bidder 3-day (-1,+1) cumulative abnormal returns
measured from the market adjusted (Mkt-Adj) returns model and the mean adjusted (Mean-Adj) returns
model, respectively.261
coefficients of the variables for investor protection and bank regulation vary, showing a
degree  of  the different  level  in  determining  the  coefficients  and  significance  level.
However,  it  is  obvious  that  the  explanatory  power,  adjusted  R  square,  in  the  model
specifications in appendix B table 7.1 is lower. This suggests that the presence of outliers
in  the  regression  analysis  can  actually  reduce  the  explanatory  power  in  the  regression
analysis. Thus, this thesis relies on the results, where the regression analysis removes the
top and bottom 1% sample of bidder 3-day (-1,+1) cumulative abnormal returns.
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Table 7.9 The cross-sectional regression analysis for bidders
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 0.039 ** 0.072 *** 0.072 *** 0.052 *** 0.047 *** 0.023
Antidirector rights  in
dex
0.001
Rule of law -0.002 *
Overall Activities
Restrictiveness
-0.003 **
Official Supervisory
Power
-0.000
Prompt Corrective
Power
0.000
Independence of
Supervisory Authority
- Overall
0.006 **
Cross-border -0.004 -0.004 -0.008 * -0.005 -0.004 -0.003
Cash 0.011 *** 0.009 *** 0.010 *** 0.010 *** 0.011 *** 0.012 ***
Relative size -0.159 *** -0.163 *** -0.161 *** -0.160 *** -0.159 *** -0.158 ***
ROA -0.312 * -0.202 -0.271 * -0.266 * -0.275 * -0.386 **
MKTV 0.002 *** 0.002 ** 0.002 *** 0.002 ** 0.002 ** 0.002 ***
Capital to assets 0.032 ** 0.030 ** 0.029 * 0.028 * 0.030 * 0.035 **
ln (total assets) -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.002 ***
Deposit Money Bank
Assets / GDP
0.005 0.004 0.002 0.004 * 0.005 0.007
Net Interest Margin -0.392 * -0.475 ** -0.431 ** -0.416 * -0.423 * -0.299
106 Appendix B table 7.2 and 7.3 presents the results with the full 1,424 sample of bank mergers based on
bidder 3-day (-1,+1) cumulative abnormal returns  measured from the  market adjusted (Mkt-Adj) returns
model and the mean adjusted (Mean-Adj) returns model, respectively.262
Observations 1078 1078 1080 1078 1080 1080
Adjusted R Square 7.44% 7.64% 7.90% 7.58% 7.57% 8.01%
F-value 9.66 9.91 10.25 9.83 9.84 10.40
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Table 7.9 presents the results of bidder regression analysis. The dependent variable is bidder 3-day (-1,+1)
cumulative abnormal returns based on the market model. Investor protection is measured as the antidirector
rights index and the rule of law in a bidder country from La Porta et al. (1998). Bank regulation is measured
as overall activities restrictiveness, official supervisory power, prompt corrective power and independence of
supervisory authority-overall in a bidder country from Barth et al. (2003). The regression model also includes
a number of control variables. Cross-border is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the target and
bidder locate in different countries. Cash is a dummy variable, where the value of 1 indicates cash payment.
The relative size is measured as the relative size of the target to bidder proxied as deal value to bidder assets.
ROA is measured as net income to total assets. The market to book ratio is measured as the market value to
book value. The capital ratio is measured as total capital to total assets. Size is calculated as ln(total assets).
The variables of the firm specific characteristics are gathered from the year end prior to bank merger and
acquisition announcements. The financial data is collected from Datastream database. The competitiveness of
the banking market is proxied as net interest margin. The size of the banking market is measured as deposit
money bank assets to GDP. The country level specific characteristics are collected from the World Bank.
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. * Significant at the 0.1 level.
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) 1 , 1 (     = 0  + 1  (Bidder’s investor  protection)  + 2  (Bidder’s bank  regulation)
+ 3  (Cross-border  dummy)  + 4  (Cash  dummy)  + 5  (The  relative  size  of  the  target  to  bidder)  +
6  (ROA)  + 7  (The  market  to  book  ratio)  + 8  (The  capital  ratio)  + 9  (Size)  + 10  (The
competitiveness of the banking market) + 11  (The size of the banking market) + i 
7.9 Cross-sectional regression analysis for the difference in investor protection and
bank regulation
As has been discussed in section 7.8, the results have shown that bidder cumulative
abnormal returns have a relationship with investor protection and bank regulation in a
country. As Rossi and Volpin (2004) argue that bidders tend to come from a country with
better investor protection, I can therefore expect that the difference of investor protection263
and bank regulation in a bidder and target country may also have an influence on bidder
announcement returns. Thus, this section further controls for the difference of investor
protection and bank regulation in a bidder and target country in the regression analysis.
107
Similar to the discussion in section 7.8, the regression analysis is based on the clean
sample. Although the regression analysis deletes the top and bottom 1% distribution of
bidder 3-day (-1,+1) cumulative abnormal returns to control for the outliers, the regression
analysis is also analysed on the basis of the full 1,424 sample to identify whether outliers
are an issue to be taken into account in this study. Thus, appendix B table 7.1/7.2/7.3
presents the results based on the full 1,424 sample of bank mergers.
With regard to the aspects of investor protection in table 7.10, the results in model
specification (1) and (2) do not find a statistical significant relationship between bidder
announcement  returns  and  the difference  of  investor  protection  in  a  bidder  and  target
country. However, the results find that higher bidder announcement returns are associated
with weaker investor protection measured as the rule of law in a bidder country in model
specification  (2),  the  coefficient  is -0.003.  Although  the  regression  analysis  in  model
specification (2) also controls for the difference of investor protection in a bidder and
target country, the rule of law is still statistically significant. This suggests that investor
protection  measured  as  the  rule  of  law  in  a  bidder  to  target  country  is  an  important
component to explain bidder announcement returns.
When  investor  protection  is  measured  as  the  antidirector  rights  index  in  model
specification (1), the results are not statistically significant. Similarly, when analysing the
difference of the antidirector rights index in a bidder and target country, the results do not
show any statistical significance.
108  Thus, I cannot draw a conclusion that there is any
107 Similar to the discussion of target regression analysis in section 6.9, the variable related to the difference
of investor protection and bank regulation  in a bidder and target country is constructed by the level of
investor protection and bank regulation in a bidder country minus the level of investor protection and bank
regulation in a target country.
108 Applying Djankov et al.’s (2006) revised antidirector rights index in the regression analysis, the results
show that the coefficient for the difference of the revised antidirector rights index is -0.008. The results
suggest  that  higher  bidder  announcement  returns  are  associated  with  smaller  difference  of  the  revised
antidirector rights index. The results are statistically significant at the 0.01 level.264
statistically significant relationship between bidder cumulative abnormal returns and the
difference of the antidirector rights index in a bidder and target country.
With regard to the control variables in model specification (1) and (2), the results
show that higher bidder cumulative abnormal returns are related to cash payment, higher
market to book ratio and higher capital ratio, with coefficients of 0.011, 0.003 and 0.040,
respectively. The results are all statistically significant. On the contrary, the results find that
higher bidder cumulative abnormal returns are associated with smaller relative size of the
target  to  bidder  and  smaller  bidder  size.  The  coefficients  are -0.155  and -0.003,
respectively. In addition, the results also show that bidder cumulative abnormal returns are
negatively and significantly related to net interest margin, suggesting that higher bidder
announcement returns are associated with less competitive banking market in a bidder
country.  The  coefficients  in  model  specification  (1)  and  (2)  are -0.403  and -0.549,
respectively.
While additionally controlling for the difference of investor protection in a bidder
and  target  country  in  the  regression  analysis,  these  control  variables  above  are  still
statistically significant. These findings are also consistent with those in section 7.8. Thus,
the  results also  demonstrate  the  importance  of  these  variables  in  explaining  bidder
announcement returns. Overall, the adjusted R square in model specification (1) and (2) is
7.58% and 8.16% and F-value is 8.84 and 9.49, both statistically significant at the 0.01
level, respectively.
Turning to the analysis of bank regulation, the results only show that bidder cumulative
abnormal returns are positively and significantly related to bank regulation measured as
independence of overall supervisory authority in a bidder country in mode specification (6).
The results suggest that higher bidder cumulative abnormal returns are associated with
stronger bank regulation measured as independence of overall supervisory authority in a
bidder country, which is also consistent with those reported in table 7.9 in the previous
section.  This  illustrates  that  the  shareholders  of  bidders  can  obtain  higher  gains  when265
supervisory authority is more independent to carry out their duty. Thus, bank mergers can
result in higher announcement returns to bidders.
When analysing the difference of bank regulation in a bidder and target country, the
results only show that bidder cumulative abnormal returns are positively and significantly
associated with the difference of prompt corrective power in a bidder and target country in
model  specification  (5).  The  results  indicate  that  higher  bidder  cumulative  abnormal
returns are related to a larger difference in the prompt corrective power in a bidder and
target country. When bidders in a country with higher prompt corrective power engage in
bank mergers, their bank regulation can carefully monitor the transactions. Overall, the
adjusted R square in model specification (3)-(6) is around 8%. F-value is around 9 with
statistically significant at the 0.01 level.
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As can be seen in appendix B table 7.4, the coefficients of the variables for investor
protection and bank regulation show a degree of the difference in comparison with those in
table 7.10 below. However, the explanatory power for the model specifications in appendix
B table 7.4 is lower. This suggests that the existence of outliers in the regression analysis
can  actually  reduce  the  explanatory  power  in  model  specifications.  As  a  result,  the
regression analysis in the current study relies on the sample that deletes the top and bottom
1% distribution of bidder 3-day (-1,+1) cumulative abnormal returns.
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Table 7.10 The cross-sectional regression analysis for bidders controlling for the difference
of investor protection and bank regulation in a bidder and target country based on the
market (MM) model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 0.041 ** 0.084 *** 0.064 *** 0.057 *** 0.051 *** 0.027
Antidirector rights 0.001
109 The analysis for the difference of investor protection and bank regulation in a bidder and target country
with respect to the market adjusted (Mkt-Adj) returns model and the mean adjusted (Mean-Adj) returns
model are presented in appendix A table 7.9 and 7.10, respectively.
110 The results based on the full 1,424 sample of bank mergers from the market adjusted returns model and
the mean adjusted returns model are provided in appendix B table 7.5 and 7.6, respectively.266
index
Difference
(Antidirector rights
index)
-0.000
rule of law -0.003 **
Difference (Rule of
law)
0.003
Overall Activities
Restrictiveness
-0.002
Difference (Overall
Activities
Restrictiveness)
-0.001
Official Supervisory
Power
-0.001
Difference (Official
Supervisory Power)
-0.000
Prompt Corrective
Power
-0.001
Difference (Prompt
Corrective Power)
0.003 *
Independence of
Supervisory
Authority - Overall
0.005 *
Difference
(Independence of
Supervisory
Authority - Overall)
0.001
Cross-border -0.004 -0.007 -0.008 -0.005 -0.002 -0.004
Cash 0.011 *** 0.009 *** 0.011 *** 0.011 *** 0.010 *** 0.012 ***
Relative size -0.155 *** -0.161 *** -0.156 *** -0.156 *** -0.156 *** -0.154 ***
ROA -0.259 -0.141 -0.233 -0.209 -0.184 -0.327 *
MKTV 0.003 ** 0.002 ** 0.003 ** 0.003 *** 0.002 ** 0.003 ***
Capital to assets 0.040 *** 0.038 *** 0.038 *** 0.038 ** 0.038 ** 0.042 ***
ln (total assets) -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.002 ***
Deposit Money
Bank Assets / GDP
0.006 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.006 0.008
Net Interest Margin -0.403 ** -0.549 *** -0.444 ** -0.413 ** -0.446 ** -0.336
Observations 1052 1051 1054 1047 1054 1054267
Adjusted R Square 7.58% 8.16% 8.03% 7.83% 8.04% 8.05%
F-value 8.84 9.49 9.36 9.08 9.36 9.38
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Table  7.10  presents  the  results  to  explore  the  impact  of  the  difference  of  investor  protection  and  bank
regulation in a bidder and target country on bidder shareholder wealth. The dependent variable is bidder
3-day (-1,+1) cumulative abnormal returns based on the market model. Investor protection is measured as the
antidirector rights index and the rule of law in a bidder country from La Porta et al. (1998). The difference of
investor protection is measured as the difference of investor protection in a bidder and target country. Bank
regulation  is  measured  as  overall  activities  restrictiveness,  official  supervisory  power,  prompt  corrective
power and independence of supervisory authority-overall in a bidder country from Barth et al. (2003). The
difference of bank regulation is measured as the difference of bank regulation in a bidder and target country.
The regression analysis also includes a number of control variables. Cross-border is a dummy variable that
takes the value of 1 if the target and bidder locate in different countries. Cash is a dummy variable, where the
value of 1 indicates cash payment. The relative size is measured as the relative size of the target and bidder
proxied as deal value to bidder assets. ROA is measured as net income to total assets. The market to book
ratio is measured as the market value to book value. The capital ratio is measured as total capital to total
assets. Size is calculated as ln(total assets). The variables of the firm specific characteristics are gathered
from the year end prior to the transactions. The financial data is collected from Datastream database. The
competitiveness of the banking market is proxied as net interest margin. The size of the banking market is
measured as deposit money bank assets to GDP. The country level specific characteristics are collected from
the World Bank.
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. * Significant at the 0.1 level.
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) 1 , 1 (     = 0  + 1  (Bidder’s investor protection) + 2  (The difference of investor protection in
a bidder and target country) + 3  (Bidder’s bank regulation) + 4  (The difference of bank regulation in a
bidder and target country) + 5  (Cross-border dummy) + 6  (Cash dummy) + 7  (The relative size of the
target to bidder) + 8  (ROA) + 9  (The market to book ratio) + 10  (The capital ratio) + 11  (Size) +
12  (The competitiveness of the banking market) + 13  (The size of the banking market) + i 
7.10 Conclusion
This chapter consists of several discussions for bidder announcement returns in order
to identify whether positive cumulative abnormal returns to targets can be attributable to
wealth transfer from bidders to targets. In the previous sections, the analysis of bidder
announcement returns does not suffer from the problem of thin trading. While taking into268
account the confounding events, the results do show a difference between the clean sample
and  nonclean  sample.  Based  on  the  full  1,424  sample  of  bank  mergers,  the  empirical
findings show that bidders experience -0.63% cumulative abnormal returns over a 3-day
(-1,+1) event window. While targets earn positive cumulative abnormal returns, bidders
obtain negative cumulative abnormal returns. This can be an indication of wealth transfer
from bidders to targets. Negative announcement returns to bidders are consistent with prior
empirical studies, e.g., Neely (1987), Houston and Ryngaert (1994), Siems (1996), Cornett
et  al.  (2003),  DeLong  (2003),  Beitel et  al.  (2004),  Campa  and  Hernando  (2006),
Hagendorff et al. (2008).
To make a clear comparison with prior empirical studies, the analysis of the market
and  diversifying/focusing  deals  is  based  on  the  clean  1,208  sample  of  bank  mergers.
Splitting the sample based on the market, U.S. bidders obtain -0.91% cumulative abnormal
returns  over  a  3-day  (-1,+1)  event  window,  compared  to  0.97%  for  bidders  from  the
markets outside the U.S. and EU market and -2.55% for EU bidders. The results indicate
that there are differences in bidder cumulative abnormal returns in the U.S., EU market and
the markets from outside the U.S. and EU market. This also suggests that the level of the
competitive  banking  takeover  market  can  cause  different  levels  of  bidder  cumulative
abnormal returns.
Additional analysis shows that bidders in diversifying deals obtain higher cumulative
abnormal returns at 0.05% over a 3-day (-1,+1) event window relative to -0.89% for those
in focusing deals. These findings suggest that bidders in diversifying acquisitions obtain
higher gains in that diversifying acquisitions allow bidding banks to diversify their risks
and  create  higher  synergies  after  the  transactions.  These  findings  are  consistent  with
Ekkayokkaya et al. (2007) and Hagendorff et al. (2008) in the study of EU bank mergers,
where  these  two  studies  have  reported  higher  announcement  returns  to  bidders  in
diversifying deals.
Theoretically,  stronger  investor  protection  can  be expected  to  better  protect269
shareholders.  This  can  reduce  the  expropriation  by  managers  through  mergers  and
acquisitions. In other words, stronger investor protection can be expected to reduce the
effects  of  the  conflicts  of  interests  between  managers  and  shareholders.  This  can  be
expected to increase the gains to bidders. However, in the regression analysis, the results
reveal that bidders gain more when bidders are in a country with weak investor protection.
A possible explanation is that strong investor protection in a bidder country can actually
reduce the incentives or ability to bidder managers to pursue risky investment projects
through mergers and acquisitions in return of higher future gains to bidders. Thus, when
legal enforcement in a bidder country is strong, bidders obtain lower gains as reflected in
lower announcement returns to bidders.
Turning to the analysis of bank regulation, the results show that bidders gain more
when bank regulation measured as overall activities restrictiveness, is low. When bank
regulation in a bidder country has less restriction on bank activity, mergers and acquisitions
allow bidder managers to create higher synergies to shareholders. Thus, bidders obtain
higher announcement returns.
On  the  other  hand,  the findings  show  that  bidders  obtain  higher  gains  when
supervisory authority in a bidder country is more independent. When supervisory authority
can independently evaluate the transactions of mergers and acquisitions and reduce the
outside influence from the political consideration, they can create higher value to bidding
firms. This suggests that bidder managers can be expected to better aim at the interests of
shareholders in mergers and acquisitions. So, bidders obtain higher gains.
Furthermore, the regression analysis also finds that bidder gains more when bidders
use cash payment in mergers and acquisitions. When bidders have higher growth potential,
they can create higher synergies to the firms after the transactions. Thus, bidders gain more
when they have higher growth potential. When bidders have higher capital ratio, this can
serve as higher cushion to bidders against unexpected losses after the transactions. Thus,
the results show that bidders gain more when bidders have higher capital ratio.270
On the contrary, the results also reveal that bidders obtain higher gains when the
relative size of the target to bidder is small and bidder size is small. In addition, bidders
obtain  higher  gains  if  their  prior  performance  is  poor.  This suggests  that  mergers  and
acquisitions  allow  bidders  to  improve  their  performance  after  the transactions.  When
bidders are in a country with less competitive banking market, bidders can be expected to
obtain higher gains after the transactions.
Controlling for additional factors in the regression analysis, the results only find that
higher bidder announcement returns are related to the difference of bank regulation in a
bidder and target country measured as the difference of prompt corrective power. However,
the results  related  to  investor  protection  and  bank  regulation  in  a  bidder  country  still
remain significant when additionally controlling for the differences of investor protection
and bank regulation in a bidder and target country. This also demonstrates the importance
of investor protection  and  bank  regulation  in  a  bidder  country  in  explaining  bidder
announcement returns.
Finally, this chapter presents the empirical findings for bidding firms. The results
reveal that the legal and regulation system in a country in terms of investor protection and
bank regulation can have an impact on bidder announcement returns in bank mergers and
acquisitions. However, the influence  can be positive or negative depending on various
variables, suggesting that the country level corporate governance mechanisms in terms of
investor  protection  and  bank  regulation  have  positive  and  negative  impact  to  bidder
shareholder  wealth  in  bank  mergers  and  acquisitions.  My  findings  contribute  our
knowledge to illustrate how managerial decisions in bank mergers and acquisitions can be
influenced  by  the  country  level  corporate  governance  mechanisms.  This  can  then  be
expected to affect shareholder wealth of the firms.271
Chapter 8 The Empirical Results for Combined Firms
8.1 Introduction
The empirical results for targets and bidders in the current study have been discussed
in chapters 6 and 7, respectively. The results show that targets earn significant positive
announcement returns and bidders experience marginally negative announcement returns
around bank merger and acquisition announcements in this thesis. While prior empirical
studies discussed in chapter 2 have reported marginally positive announcement returns to
combined  firms,  this  may  be  attributable  to  the  fact  that  insignificant  negative
announcement returns to bidders can be compensated by significant positive announcement
returns to targets.
However,  prior  empirical  studies  in  general  contain  smaller  samples.  This  thesis
consists of a large international sample of bank mergers to compute the abnormal returns
of combined firms. Thus, this chapter presents the empirical findings for combined firms in
this thesis.
Prior empirical studies discussed in chapter 2 apply a weighted average approach to
measure combined firms announcement returns. Following prior empirical studies, such as
Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000), this thesis also employs the weighted average approach
to  measure  combined  firms  announcement  returns.  The  weighted  average  approach  is
calculated below.
JOINT
t AR   =
BIDDER TARGET
it B BIDDER it T TARGET
MV MV
AR MV AR MV

 , , * *
As has been discussed in chapter 5, TARGET MV   and BIDDER MV   indicate market value
of the target and bidder on day -31, respectively. When market value of the target and
bidder calculates from day -31, this can reduce the influence to calculate the abnormal
returns of combined firms during the test period from day -30 to day +30.
Similar to the discussion in chapter 6 and 7, this chapter also takes into account the272
influence  of  the  confounding  events  on  combined  firms  abnormal  returns.  Then,  the
empirical findings for combined firms are presented. An additional analysis for combined
firms  announcement  returns  with  respect  to  activity  focusing  and  diversifying  deals  is
presented. Furthermore, the cross-sectional regression analysis is carried out in order to
explore as to whether the country level corporate  governance mechanisms in terms of
investor  protection  and  bank  regulation  can  be  important  determinants  to  explain  the
cumulative  abnormal  returns  of  combined  firms  in  bank  mergers.  To  explore  the
relationship between combined firms announcement returns and investor protection and
bank  regulation  accurately,  the  regression  analysis  also  controls  for  the  country  level
specific  characteristics  and  the deal  and  firm  specific  characteristics.  This  provides
additional insights to explore the factors that can affect combined firms announcement
returns.
This  chapter  is  organised  as  follows.  Section  8.2  discusses  combined  firms
announcement returns taken into account the confounding events. The empirical results of
combined  firms  cumulative  abnormal  returns  are  presented  in  section  8.3.  Section  8.4
presents combined firms announcement returns with respect to activity diversifying and
focusing deals. The cross-sectional regression analyses are provided in section 8.5. Section
8.6 provides the conclusion.
8.2 The confounding events
As has been discussed in chapter 5, the calculation of combined firms announcement
returns requires the data for a pair of the target and bidder. While this thesis yields an
unmatched  sample  of  targets  and  bidders,  the  computation  of  combined  firms
announcement returns is based on a sample of 388 bank mergers due to data availability.
In chapters 6 and 7, this thesis has already discussed the influence of the confounding
events on target and bidder announcement returns, respectively. It is also important to take273
into account the influence of the confounding events on the analysis of combined firms
announcement returns when analysing a pair of target and bidder announcement returns to
combined firms. As a result, this section discusses combined firms announcement returns
considering the influence of the confounding events.
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Table 8.1 Combined firms abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns controlling
for the confounding events
MM model
N Mean p-value 1 SD Minimum Maximum
Day 0 clean sample 314 0.16% 0.4500 0.0361 -0.1830 0.2208
(-1,+1) clean sample 314 0.32% 0.2590 0.0505 -0.2749 0.2198
Day 0 nonclean sample 74 0.14% 0.6990 0.0317 -0.0877 0.1159
(-1,+1) nonclean sample 74 0.67% 0.4000 0.0674 -0.1041 0.3347
p-value 1: t test with assuming cross-sectional independence
As table 8.1 shows, combined firms with the clean sample on average earn 0.16%
abnormal returns on day 0 relative to 0.14% for those in the nonclean sample. The results
are both statistically insignificant. The difference between the clean and nonclean sample is
not statistically significant, p-value is 0.979. When comparing the clean sample to the full
sample
112, the results show that the difference is not statistically significant either, p-value
is 0.924. While the results are both statistically insignificant, I cannot conclude that the
confounding  events  can  generate  an  influence  on  the  analysis  of  combined  firms
announcement returns.
Looking at a 3-day (-1,+1) event window, the results show that combined firms in the
clean sample earn 0.32% cumulative abnormal returns relative to 0.67% for those in the
nonclean sample, neither statistically significant. The difference between the clean and
111 The sample is classified as the clean and nonclean sample depending on whether either the target or
bidder announces other corporate events over a 3-day (-1,+1) event window.
112 As will be discussed in section 8.3, the results show that combined firms earn 0.15% abnormal returns on
day 0 and 0.39% cumulative abnormal returns for a 3-day (-1,+1) event window.274
nonclean sample is not statistically significant, p-value is 0.683. In addition, the difference
between the clean sample and the full sample is not statistically significant, p-value is
0.794. This also suggests that the results are not affected by the confounding effects. As a
result, the analysis of combined firms announcement returns is based on the full sample of
388 bank mergers.
8.3 Combined firms abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns
While targets earn positive announcement returns and bidders experience negative
announcement returns as discussed in chapter 6 and 7, this section presents the empirical
findings for combined firms. This allows the current study to reveal whether bank mergers
create an overall value to combined firms.
Table 8.2  shows  combined  firms  daily  abnormal  returns  during  the  test  period
measured from the MM and Mkt-Adj model. As can be seen in table 8.2, combined firms
daily abnormal returns vary depending on the event day. The results show that combined
firms obtain 0.15% and 0.19% abnormal returns on day 0 measured from the MM and
Mkt-Adj  model,  respectively,  neither  statistically  significant.
113 Due  to  statistical
insignificant results, I cannot reject the null hypothesis that combined firms obtain positive
announcement returns.
Although I do find slight positive abnormal returns to combined firms, showing that
bank mergers do create value to combined firms, the results are statistically insignificant.
This illustrates that bank mergers create small amount of wealth to combined firms, which
is  consistent  with  synergy  hypothesis.  However,  it  is  observed  that  gains  to  targets
generally exceed overall wealth creation, resulting in losses to bidders.
Table 8.2 Combined firms daily abnormal returns
113 Combined firms daily abnormal returns measured from the Mean-Adj model are provided in appendix A
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MM model Mkt-Adj model
Mean p-value 1 Sign test Wilcoxon test Mean p-value 1 Sign test Wilcoxon test
-30 0.0002 0.3854 0.3323 0.4620 0.0006 0.3058 0.0364 0.3180
-29 0.0006 0.2997 0.3323 0.8970 0.0011 0.1787 0.5746 0.3880
-28 -0.0002 0.3856 0.7986 0.6390 -0.0001 0.3966 0.5746 0.9790
-27 -0.0007 0.2820 0.6460 0.6020 -0.0001 0.3953 0.1137 0.1170
-26 -0.0009 0.2268 0.1137 0.1230 -0.0008 0.2571 0.8783 0.9470
-25 0.0001 0.3923 0.4440 0.6190 0.0003 0.3738 0.1389 0.6080
-24 -0.0013 0.1108 0.0364 0.0350 -0.0012 0.1436 0.1683 0.2220
-23 0.0010 0.1565 0.5071 0.2410 0.0012 0.1167 0.4440 0.7730
-22 0.0004 0.3410 0.5746 0.8020 0.0005 0.3149 0.2839 0.8280
-21 -0.0011 0.1250 0.1683 0.1380 -0.0010 0.1842 0.1137 0.1880
-20 -0.0011 0.1595 0.4440 0.1160 -0.0010 0.2043 0.9593 0.5970
-19 0.0002 0.3819 0.7986 0.8100 0.0008 0.2178 0.1389 0.4750
-18 0.0001 0.3972 0.4440 0.5590 -0.0001 0.3964 0.4440 0.9210
-17 -0.0013 0.0795 0.0590 0.0550 -0.0008 0.2132 0.0590 0.1040
-16 0.0003 0.3750 0.2020 0.6420 0.0008 0.2129 0.4440 0.6430
-15 0.0007 0.2567 0.3857 0.9420 0.0009 0.1888 1.0000 0.8370
-14 0.0007 0.2684 0.7209 0.3700 0.0014 0.0729 0.3323 0.8880
-13 0.0003 0.3586 0.4440 0.8450 0.0007 0.2464 0.4440 0.9200
-12 0.0005 0.3425 0.5746 0.6930 0.0006 0.3346 0.7986 0.9910
-11 0.0003 0.3693 0.7986 0.4750 0.0000 0.3986 0.7209 0.7650
-10 -0.0005 0.3275 0.9593 0.9250 0.0001 0.3964 0.5071 0.8590
-9 -0.0005 0.3225 0.0741 0.3620 -0.0008 0.2675 0.2839 0.3570
-8 0.0019 0.0226 0.2201 0.0260 0.0022 0.0137 0.2201 0.0340
-7 -0.0003 0.3675 0.3068 0.7490 0.0001 0.3976 0.9186 0.8410
-6 0.0000 0.3986 1.0000 0.9530 0.0011 0.2092 0.2201 0.8800
-5 0.0013 0.0727 0.1525 0.0530 0.0014 0.0839 1.0000 0.3790
-4 0.0012 0.1619 0.9186 0.2980 0.0015 0.1303 1.0000 0.4600
-3 -0.0009 0.2180 0.0278 0.0690 0.0000 0.3980 0.0049 0.0360
-2 0.0020 0.0349 0.9592 0.1490 0.0021 0.0283 0.7981 0.4130
-1 0.0008 0.2721 0.4428 0.4180 0.0012 0.1912 0.5060 0.7720
0 0.0015 0.2778 0.3844 0.8300 0.0019 0.2260 0.0278 0.6430
1 0.0016 0.2274 0.0466 0.3760 0.0018 0.1901 0.0590 0.5530
2 -0.0001 0.3964 0.0364 0.2560 0.0000 0.3987 0.1389 0.4230276
3 -0.0009 0.2060 0.4440 0.3480 -0.0008 0.2572 0.0364 0.0440
4 -0.0011 0.1758 0.1683 0.3010 -0.0009 0.2355 0.0165 0.1540
5 0.0011 0.1364 0.3857 0.7630 0.0009 0.2078 1.0000 0.6180
6 -0.0003 0.3597 0.1683 0.3230 -0.0002 0.3906 0.0590 0.5570
7 -0.0001 0.3919 0.2020 0.3300 0.0000 0.3987 0.5071 0.5180
8 -0.0002 0.3774 0.5071 0.6620 0.0003 0.3732 0.7209 0.9040
9 0.0004 0.3471 1.0000 0.9500 0.0004 0.3432 0.3323 0.9710
10 -0.0014 0.0392 0.3323 0.0870 -0.0012 0.0823 1.0000 0.5280
11 0.0007 0.2659 0.5746 0.9250 0.0007 0.2507 0.3857 0.1470
12 0.0003 0.3676 0.2405 0.4740 0.0004 0.3493 0.6460 0.5920
13 -0.0008 0.2102 0.1683 0.3040 -0.0004 0.3314 0.5071 0.9160
14 -0.0015 0.0395 0.0093 0.0150 -0.0012 0.0990 0.0050 0.0280
15 -0.0001 0.3943 1.0000 0.9140 0.0007 0.2981 0.1137 0.7160
16 0.0008 0.2032 0.7986 0.5340 0.0013 0.1011 0.6460 0.3910
17 -0.0004 0.3288 0.0590 0.2100 -0.0006 0.2823 0.0466 0.1110
18 0.0012 0.1136 1.0000 0.4040 0.0017 0.0410 0.5746 0.7410
19 -0.0003 0.3731 0.5746 0.7290 0.0002 0.3828 0.0466 0.0800
20 -0.0003 0.3686 0.5071 0.4620 0.0001 0.3920 0.7209 0.8740
21 -0.0001 0.3944 0.1389 0.9540 0.0002 0.3875 0.1683 0.7070
22 -0.0006 0.2810 0.1389 0.4790 0.0002 0.3916 0.3857 0.1840
23 0.0007 0.2624 0.3857 0.7470 0.0008 0.2599 0.2020 0.9420
24 0.0007 0.2647 0.4440 0.9130 0.0007 0.2616 0.0922 0.5510
25 0.0009 0.2299 0.6460 0.7450 0.0010 0.1928 0.3323 0.5560
26 -0.0003 0.3754 0.2020 0.2750 -0.0001 0.3969 0.2839 0.3100
27 0.0003 0.3632 0.3323 1.0000 0.0005 0.3419 0.5071 0.3830
28 -0.0003 0.3730 0.8783 0.5620 -0.0002 0.3807 0.2020 0.2410
29 -0.0021 0.0065 0.0217 0.0040 -0.0016 0.0391 0.0013 0.0060
30 -0.0009 0.1955 0.1137 0.1880 -0.0006 0.2726 0.0922 0.1490
p-value1: t test with assuming cross-sectional independence
Wilcoxon test: Wilcoxon signed rank test
In addition to presenting combined firms daily abnormal returns in table 8.2, this
section also shows the development of combined firms cumulative abnormal returns in
figure 8.1. This can provide a clear picture to understand the change of combined firms277
announcement  returns  during  the  test  period.  As  figure  8.1  shows,  the  movement  of
combined  firms  announcement  returns  measured  from  the  Mkt-Adj  model  is  clearly
distinct  from  that  of  the  MM  and  Mean-Adj  model.  This  may  be  attributable  to  the
different assumption of the model as has been discussed in chapter 6 and 7.
Figure 8.1 The movement of combined firms cumulative abnormal returns
While bidders tend to perform well prior to the transactions as has been mentioned in
chapter 7, bidders may also have better performance after the transactions. Thus, when
computing the announcement returns of combined firms, combined firms announcement
returns measured from the Mkt-Adj model can be expected to generate a difference of the
announcement returns relative to those from the MM and Mean-Adj  model. However,
figure  8.1  shows  that  the  movement  of  combined  firms  cumulative abnormal  returns
measured from the MM and Mean-Adj model is in general consistent although a slight
difference of combined firms cumulative abnormal returns is observed.
To better understand the change of combined firms cumulative abnormal returns in a
certain period, this chapter also presents combined firms cumulative abnormal returns over
various event windows. As shows in table 8.3, combined firms earn 0.15% and 0.19%278
abnormal returns on day 0 measured from the market (MM) model and the market adjusted
(Mkt-Adj)  returns  model,  respectively,  neither  statistically  significant.  The  difference
between the MM and the Mkt-Adj model is not statistically significant, where the p-value
is  0.879.  Similarly,  the  results  are  not  statistically  significant  when  performing
nonparametric  statistics  in  terms  of  sign  test  and  wilcoxon  signed  rank  test.  Slightly
positive abnormal returns to combined firms suggest that bank mergers create marginal
value to combined firms.
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Table 8.3 Combined firms cumulative abnormal returns
Market model Market adjusted return model
Mean p-value
1
Sign test Wilcoxon
test
Mean
p-value
1
Sign test
Wilcoxon
test
(-4,1) 0.0063 0.0310 0.5060 0.2600 0.0087 0.0050 0.6452 0.0470
(-1,1) 0.0039 0.1590 0.1389 0.8700 0.0050 0.0800 0.3323 0.6410
(-30,30) 0.0022 0.7390 0.7986 0.8730 0.0187 0.0060 0.1137 0.0080
(0) 0.0015 0.3960 0.3844 0.8300 0.0019 0.2880 0.5060 0.8150
(-1,0) 0.0024 0.2590 0.2393 0.8550 0.0031 0.1410 0.2826 0.6780
(-30,-1) 0.0039 0.3340 0.3857 0.1580 0.0127 0.0030 0.0217 0.0000
(0,1) 0.0031 0.2130 0.3857 0.7610 0.0038 0.1360 0.3323 0.9760
(1,30) -0.0032 0.4820 0.0590 0.0640 0.0041 0.3770 0.8783 0.8300
p-value 1: t test with assuming cross-sectional independence
Wilcoxon test: Wilcoxon signed rank test
With regard to a 3-day (-1,+1) event window, the results show that combined firms
earn 0.39% and 0.50% cumulative abnormal returns calculated from the MM and Mkt-Adj
model, respectively. The results are statistically significant at the 0.1 level for the Mkt-Adj
model  only.  However,  the difference  between  the  MM  and  Mkt-Adj  model  is  not
statistically  significant,  where  the  p-value  is  0.788.  However,  the  results  are  not
statistically significant when performing nonparametric statistics in terms of sign test and
114 The results from the Mean-Adj model are provided in the appendix A table 8.2.279
wilcoxon signed rank test. Thus, I cannot conclude that there are statistically significant
announcement  returns  to  combined  firms.  As  combined  firms  obtain  slightly  positive
announcement returns, the results are consistent with the study of U.S. bank mergers (e.g.,
Cornett and Tehranian (1992); Zhang (1995); Becher (2000); Becher and Campbell (2005);
DeLong (2003); DeLong and DeYoung (2007)) and the study of EU bank mergers (e.g.,
Beitel et al. (2004); Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000); Ismail and Davidson (2005); Ismail
and Davidson (2007)).
Looking  at  a  longer  61-day  (-30,+30)  event  window,  combined  firms  cumulative
abnormal returns are 0.22% and 1.87% with the MM and Mkt-Adj model, respectively.
The results are statistically significant at the 0.01 level for the Mkt-Adj model only. The
difference  between the  MM  and  Mkt-Adj  model  is  statistically  significant,  where  the
p-value is 0.082. A significant difference of combined firms cumulative abnormal returns
over a 61-day (-30,+30) event window may be attributable to the fact that bidders tend to
perform well relative to the market performance prior to the transactions. When applying
the Mkt-Adj model, bidders obtain higher abnormal returns during the pre-announcement
period. This viewpoint can be supported when looking at the pre-announcement 30-day
(-30,-1) event window in table 8.3. Combined firms cumulative abnormal returns from the
Mkt-Adj model are at 1.27% significantly higher than those from the MM model at 0.39%
over a 30-day (-30,-1) event window.
Similarly,  if  bidders  have  better  performance  relative  to  the  market  performance
before  the  transactions,  they  may  be  expected  to  have  a  better  performance  after  the
transactions. Looking at a 30-day (+1,+30) post-announcement event window, combined
firms obtain higher cumulative abnormal returns at 0.41% from the Mkt-Adj model than
those at -0.32% from the MM model. Although combined firms announcement returns in
table  8.3  vary  depending  on  the  event  window,  the  results  show  that  combined  firms
generally  obtain  slightly  positive  announcement  returns  around  bank  merger  and
acquisition announcements. This finding also suggests that bank mergers overall create280
value to combined firms. But gains to targets on average exceed overall valuation creation
due to negative cumulative abnormal returns to bidders.
Furthermore, in an attempt to explain combined firms announcement returns, this
thesis also undertakes cross-sectional regression analysis as will be discussed in section 8.5.
The  regression  analysis  focuses  on  exploring  whether investor  protection  and  bank
regulation can be important determinants to explain combined firms announcement returns.
Similar to the discussion of target and bidder regression analysis in chapters 6 and 7, the
regression analysis also controls for the country level specific characteristics and the deal
and firm specific characteristics. This can provide additional insights to explore the factors
that can affect combined firms announcement returns.
8.4 The analysis of diversifying or focusing deals
As discussed previously, bank mergers allow banks to achieve risk diversification
when engaging in activity diversification acquisitions. However, bank managers may have
more ability to manage similar bank risks if they engage in focusing deals. While the
results show that targets in focusing deals earn higher announcement returns and bidders in
diversifying  deals  obtain  higher  announcement  returns,  it  is  not  sure  as  to  whether
combined  firms  obtain  higher  announcement  returns  either  in  focusing  deals  or  in
diversifying deals. Thus, this section discusses combined firms announcement returns with
regard to activity diversifying and focusing deals in terms of the market (MM) model.
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The analysis of the abnormal returns to combined firms is based on the sample of 324 and
64 for activity focusing and diversifying deals, respectively.
Similar to the discussion of focusing and diversifying deals for targets and bidders in
chapter 6 and 7, this chapter also presents the movement of combined firms cumulative
abnormal returns for focusing and diversifying deals, as is given in figure 8.2. As can be
115 The results from the Mkt-Adj and Mean-Adj model are presented in the appendix A table 8.3 and 8.4,
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seen  in  figure  8.2, the  variation  of  combined  firms  cumulative abnormal  returns  in
diversifying deals during the test period appears to be significantly different from that in
focusing deals.
Figure 8.2 also shows that combined firms cumulative abnormal returns in focusing
deals  are  lower during  the  pre-announcement  period,  with  a  significant  increase  of
combined  firms  announcement  returns  around  the  announcement  date.  With  regard  to
diversifying deals, the figure shows that combined firms announcement returns vary.
Figure 8.2 The movement of combined firms cumulative abnormal returns for focusing and
diversifying deals
When particularly looking at the post-announcement period, combined firms obtain
lower  announcement  returns  in  diversifying  deals  than  those  in  focusing  deals.  The
difference of combined firms announcement returns between focusing  and diversifying
deals is more significant at the end of the test period. Figure 8.2 also reveals that the
cumulative abnormal returns of combined firms are very volatile during the test period.
However, it remains a puzzle to interpret the volatility of the cumulative abnormal returns
to combined firms during the test period.
In addition to showing the movement of combined firms cumulative abnormal returns282
during  the  test  period,  this  section  also  presents  combined  firms  cumulative abnormal
returns over various event windows in order to capture the change of combined firms
cumulative abnormal returns in a certain period. As table 8.4 shows, combined firms earn
0.20%  and -0.07%  abnormal  returns  on  day  0  for  focusing  and  diversifying  deals,
respectively,  neither  statistically  significant.  The difference  between  focusing  and
diversifying deals is not statistically significant, where the p-value is 0.959. For a 3-day
(-1,+1)  event  window,  combined  firms  in  focusing  deals  obtain  0.42%  cumulative
abnormal  returns  relative  to  0.23%  for  those  in  diversifying  deals,  neither  statistically
significant.  The difference  between  focusing  and  diversifying  deals  is  not  statistically
significant, where the p-value is 0.960.
Table  8.4  combined  firms  cumulative abnormal  returns  for  activity  focusing  and
diversifying deals
Market
model
Focusing Diversifying
Mean p-value
1
Sign
test
Wilcoxon
test
Mean p-value
1
Sign
test
Wilcoxon
test
(-4,1) 0.0069 0.0150 0.4331 0.4260 0.0031 0.7120 1.0000 0.4250
(-1,1) 0.0042 0.1670 0.1181 0.6670 0.0023 0.7300 1.0000 0.5910
(-30,30) 0.0022 0.7420 0.9111 0.9900 0.0021 0.9220 0.8011 0.9260
(0) 0.0020 0.3330 0.3703 0.8130 -0.0007 0.8400 1.0000 0.9810
(-1,0) 0.0028 0.2170 0.2628 0.8670 -0.0001 0.9850 0.8011 0.9920
(-30,-1) 0.0041 0.3300 0.5767 0.1800 0.0029 0.8120 0.4497 0.6890
(0,1) 0.0034 0.2230 0.2195 0.5770 0.0016 0.7670 0.6143 0.6490
(1,30) -0.0038 0.4100 0.0741 0.0850 -0.0001 0.9950 0.6143 0.5180
N 324 64
p-value 1: t test with assuming cross-sectional independence
wilcoxon test: Wilcoxon signed rank test
As  the  results  in  table  8.4  show  that  combined  firms  in  general  obtain  higher283
announcement returns in focusing deals than in diversifying deals, this suggests that the
market is favourable to focusing deals. A possible explanation is that bank managers may
have more experience to manage similar bank risks after the transactions when bidding
banks  acquire  other  banks  in  terms  of focusing  deals.  However,  the  difference  is  not
statistically significant.
However, when looking at the post-announcement 30-day (+1,+30) event window,
the results show that combined firms obtain lower announcement returns in focusing deals
than  those  in  diversifying  deals,  at -0.38%  and -0.01%  cumulative abnormal  returns,
respectively. The results are both statistically insignificant. A possible explanation is that
the market has a reverse expectation after the transactions due to an overreaction of the
benefits of risk diversification effects prior to the transactions. An alternative explanation
is that the market realised risk diversification effects is not significant to combined firms
after the transactions although the  cumulative abnormal returns of  combined firms are
marginally negative.
Overall, the empirical findings for combined firms’ cumulative abnormal returns are
discussed  above.  The  results  show  that  combined  firms  obtain  slightly  positive
announcement  returns,  suggesting  that  bank  mergers  overall  create  value  to  combined
firms.
Further  analysis  shows  that  combined  firms  in  general  obtain  somewhat  higher
announcement  returns  in  focusing  deals  than  those  in  diversifying  deals  although  the
difference is not statistically significant. In addition to the empirical results for combined
firms  shareholder  wealth  presented  above,  this  thesis  also  undertakes  cross-sectional
regression  analysis  to  explore  factors  that  may  affect  combined  firms  announcement
returns.  Thus,  the  following  section  provides  the  cross-sectional  regression  analysis  to
explain combined firms cumulative abnormal returns.284
8.5 Cross-sectional regression analysis
This section discusses the cross-sectional regression analysis in order to explore the
determinants that can affect combined firms cumulative abnormal returns. The aim of the
regression  analysis  is  to  determine  whether  the  country  level  corporate  governance
mechanisms  in  terms  of  investor  protection  and  bank  regulation  can  be  important
determinants  to  explain  combined  firms  cumulative  abnormal  returns.  To  explore  the
relationship between combined firms cumulative abnormal returns and investor protection
and bank regulation precisely, the regression analysis also controls for the country level
specific characteristics and the deal and firm specific characteristics in a bidder country.
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This can also offer additional insights to determine the factors that can affect combined
firms announcement returns.
Similar to the discussion for target and bidder regression analysis, the cross-sectional
regression analysis only includes the clean sample in order to accurately investigate the
relationship between combined firms announcement returns in bank mergers and investor
protection and bank regulation. In addition, different model specifications are applied in
the regression analyses in order to avoid a high correlation among the variables in terms of
investor protection and bank regulation in a country that may affect the analysis.
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The regression analysis also deletes 1% of observations from the top and bottom of
combined firms 3-day (-1,+1) cumulative abnormal returns in order to control for outliers.
However,  removing  a  small  number  of  observations  may  not  generate  a  significant
influence for the results in the regression analysis. Thus, this thesis also employs the full
388 sample of bank mergers in the regression analysis in order to identify whether outliers
are an issue to be considered in the analysis. So, the results based on the full 388 sample
are presented in appendix B table 8.1/8.2/8.3. The dependent variable in the regression
116 As  has  been  discussed  in  chapter  7,  bidder  characteristics  appear  to  have  an  influence  on  bidder
announcement returns. On the contrary, the results show in chapter 6 that target characteristics seems to have
less influence on target announcement returns. In addition, bidders will be the existing companies after the
transactions. Thus, the control variables are selected using bidder’s characteristics.
117 The correlation matrix is provided in appendix A table 8.5285
analysis uses combined firms 3-day (-1,+1) cumulative abnormal returns.
As  table  8.5  shows,  combined  firms  announcement  returns  are positively  and
significantly related to investor protection measured as the combination of the antidirector
rights index in a target and bidder country in model specification (1).
118  The coefficient is
0.004, statistically significant at the 0.05 level. The results indicate that higher combined
firms announcement returns are associated with strong investor protection in a target and
bidder country.
119  This indicates that combined firms increase 0.004 cumulative abnormal
returns when the level of investor protection in a target and bidder country increases 1
point.
With regard to the control variables, the results in model specification (1) show that
combined  firms  announcement  returns  are  negatively  and  significantly associated  with
ROA and the market to book ratio of the bidder. The coefficients are -0.730 and -0.002,
respectively, both statistically significant. The results indicate that higher combined firms
announcement returns are related to poorer bidder’s prior performance and lower growth
potential  of  bidders.  The  results  also  show  that  higher  combined  firms  announcement
returns are correlated to smaller bidder size. In addition, the results also find that combined
firms  announcement  returns  are  high  when  bidders  are  in  a  less  competitive  banking
market.
When investor protection is measured as the combination of the rule of law in a target
and  bidder  country  in  model  specification  (2),  the  results  show  that  combined  firms
announcement  returns  are  positively,  but  insignificantly,  related  to  investor  protection.
Taking into account control variables in model specification (2), the sign of the coefficient
is  in  general  consistent  with  those  in  model  specification  (1),  showing  that  higher
118 The combination of the antidirector rights index in a target and bidder country means that the level of the
antidirector rights index in a target country plus the level of the antidirector rights index in a bidder country.
The same measurement for investor protection is also applied to the rule of law.
119 This  thesis  also  applies  Djankov et  al.’s  (2006)  revised  antidirector  rights  index  to  explore  the
relationship with combined firms cumulative abnormal returns. The results indicate that the coefficient is
0.013 between combined firms cumulative abnormal returns and the combination of the revised antidirector
rights index in a target and bidder country, where p-value is 0.000.286
combined firms announcement returns are associated with lower market to book ratio,
smaller bidder size and lower net interest margin.
Overall, the adjusted R square in model specification (1) and (2) is 8.37% and 6.93%,
respectively. F-value is 3.59 and 3.12 in model specification (1) and (2), both statistically
significant at the 0.01 level.
Turning to the analysis of bank regulation, the results in model specification (3) show
that combined firms announcement returns are negatively, but insignificantly, associated
with bank regulation measured as the combination of overall activities restrictiveness in a
target  and  bidder  country.  The  results  indicate  that  combined  firms  obtain higher
announcement returns when the combination of overall activities restrictiveness in a target
and  bidder  country  is  low.  The  results  in  model  specification  (5)  and  (6)  show  that
combined  firms  announcement  returns  are  positively,  but insignificantly,  related  to  the
combination of prompt corrective power and the combination of independence of overall
supervisory authority in a target and bidder country, respectively. These findings indicate
that combined firms gain more when the level of the combination of bank regulation in a
target and bidder is high.
Taking into account control variables in model specification (3)-(6), the results show
that higher combined firms announcement returns are associated with smaller bidder size
and  bidders  in  a  less  competitive  banking  market.  In  addition,  the  results  in  model
specification (6) show that higher combined firms announcement returns are related to
lower ROA. The results also show that higher combined firms announcement returns are
related to lower market to book ratio in model specification (3) and (4). Overall, the results
in model specification (3)-(6) show that the adjusted R square is around 6.5% and F-value
is around 3 with statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Additional statistical tests of
Ramsey test for all model specifications show that there are no omitted variables. Variance
Inflation Factor (VIF) shows that the figures in all model specifications are lower than 3.287
This suggests that multicollinearity is not a problem for all model specifications.
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As  has  discussed  previously,  the results  show  that  combined  firm  cumulative
abnormal returns are positively related to investor protection measured as the combination
of antidirector rights index in a target and bidder country. The findings suggest that a
strong legal and regulation system in a target and bidder country can alleviate the conflicts
between  managers  and  shareholders  in  mergers  and  acquisitions  resulted  in  higher
announcement returns of combined firms.
While the regression analysis is also presented in appendix B table 8.1 with respect to
the full 388 sample, the results do not show any significant difference regarding to the
variables of investor protection and bank regulation. This suggests that controlling for
outliers appears to have no significant influence on the regression analysis. This can also
be confirmed that the explanatory power, adjusted R square, in appendix B table 8.1 is in
general the same compared to table 8.5 below. However, to obtain precise coefficients to
explore the relationship between combined firm cumulative abnormal returns and investor
protection and bank regulation, this thesis relies on the results based on the sample, where
removes the top and bottom 1% distribution of combined firm 3-day (-1,+1) cumulative
abnormal returns.
121
Table 8.5 The cross-sectional regression analysis for combined firms based on the market
(MM) model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 0.105 *** 0.110 *** 0.180 *** 0.149 *** 0.148 *** 0. 114 **
Antidirector rights  in
dex
0.004 **
Rule of law 0.002
Overall Activities
Restrictiveness
-0.002
120 The regression analysis for combined firms measured from the market adjusted (Mkt-Adj) returns model
and  the  mean  adjusted  (Mean-Adj)  returns  model  is  provided  in  appendix  A  table  8.6  and  table  8.7,
respectively.
121 The results based on the full 388 sample of bank mergers from the market adjusted returns model and the
mean adjusted returns model are presented in appendix B table 8.2 and 8.3, respectively.288
Official Supervisory
Power
0.000
Prompt Corrective
Power
0.001
Independence of
Supervisory Authority
- Overall
0.004
Cross-border -0.006 -0.003 -0.012 -0.006 -0.004 -0.005
Cash -0.006 -0.009 -0.012 -0.010 -0.009 -0.009
Relative size 0.034 0.045 0.037 0.040 0.040 0.039
ROA -0.730 * -0.587 -0.473 -0.453 -0.522 -0.639 *
MKTV -0.002 ** -0.003 ** -0.003 * -0.004 * -0.003 -0.003
Capital to assets -0.004 -0.022 -0.027 -0.022 -0.019 -0.018
ln (total assets) -0.004 *** -0.005 *** -0.005 *** -0.005 *** -0.005 *** -0.004 ***
Deposit Money Bank
Assets / GDP
-0.004 -0.006 -0.010 -0.008 -0.009 -0.013
Net Interest Margin -1.264 ** -0.982 * -0.897 ** -0.943 ** -1.104 * -1.444 **
Observations 285 285 285 285 285 285
Adjusted R Square 8.37% 6.93% 6.87% 6.46% 6.55% 6.88%
F-value 3.59 3.12 3.10 2.96 2.99 3.10
(p-value) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Table 8.5 presents the results to explore the impact of investor protection and bank regulation on combined
firms cumulative abnormal returns. The dependent variable is combined firms’ 3-day (-1,+1) cumulative
abnormal returns based on the market model. Investor protection is measured as the combination of the
antidirector rights index and the combination of the rule of law in a target and bidder country from La Porta
et al. (1998). Bank regulation is measured as the combination of the variables, including overall activities
restrictiveness,  official  supervisory  power,  prompt  corrective  power  and independence  of  supervisory
authority-overall in a target and bidder country from Barth et al. (2003). The regression model also includes a
number of control variables. Cross-border is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the target and
bidder locate in different countries. Cash is a dummy variable, where the value of 1 indicates to use the cash
payment. The relative size is measured as the relative size of the target to bidder. ROA is measured as net
income to total assets. The market to book ratio is measured as the market value to book value. The capital
ratio is measured as total capital to total assets. Size is calculated as ln(total assets). The variables of the firm
specific  characteristics  are  gathered  from  the  bidding  firms  at  the  year  end  prior  to  bank  merger  and
acquisition announcements. The financial data is collected from Datastream database. The competitiveness of
the banking market is proxied as net interest margin. The size of the banking market is measured as deposit
money bank assets to GDP. The country level specific characteristics are aimed at the bidder’s perspective289
collected from the World Banks.
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. * Significant at the 0.1 level.
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    = 0  + 1  (The combination of investor protection in a target and bidder country) +
2  (the  combination  of bank  regulation  in  a  target  and  bidder  country)  + 3  (Cross-border  dummy)  +
4  (Cash dummy) + 5  (The relative size of the target to bidder ) + 6  (ROA) + 7  (The market to book
ratio) + 8  (The capital ratio) + 9  (Size) + 10  (The competitiveness of the banking market) + 11  (The
size of the banking market) + i 
8.6 Conclusion
This chapter contains the discussion of shareholder wealth of combined firms in the
current study. As the calculation of combined firms announcement returns requires the data
for a pair of the target and bidder, the discussion of combined firms shareholder wealth is
based on 388 bank mergers. Consistent with prior studies, this thesis employs the weighted
average approach to measure the wealth effects of combined firms.
Similar  to  the  discussion  in  chapter  6  and  7,  the  calculation  of  the  cumulative
abnormal returns for combined firms takes into account the confounding events. As has
been discussed in section 8.2, the confounding events are not an issue to be taken into
account  in  the  analysis  of  combined  firms  announcement  returns  due  to  statistically
insignificant results. Thus, the analysis of combined firms announcement returns is based
on a full sample of 388 bank mergers. However, it should be noted that this thesis uses the
clean  sample  of  combined  firms  in  the  regression  analysis  in  order  to  explore  the
association between combined firms announcement returns and investor protection and
bank regulation accurately.
The results in table 8.3 show that combined firms earn cumulative abnormal returns
of 0.39% over a 3-day (-1,+1) event window measured from the MM model. As combined
firms obtain slightly positive announcement returns, the results indicate that bank mergers
overall  create  value  to  combined  firms.  Slightly  positive  announcement  returns  to
combined firms are also consistent with the study of U.S. bank mergers (e.g., Cornett and290
Tehranian (1992); Zhang (1995); Becher (2000); Becher and Campbell (2005); DeLong
(2003); DeLong and DeYoung (2007)) and the study of EU bank mergers (e.g., Beitel et al.
(2004); Cybo-Ottone  and  Murgia  (2000); Ismail  and  Davidson  (2005);  Ismail  and
Davidson (2007)).
An  additional  analysis  also  finds  that  combined  firms  obtain  0.42%  and  0.23%
cumulative abnormal returns over a 3-day (-1,+1) event window for activity focusing and
diversifying  deals,  respectively.  The  results  denote  that  combined  firms  earn  higher
announcement returns in focusing deals than those in diversifying deals. The results may
suggest that bank managers may have more experience to manage similar bank risks after
the transactions as a result of higher announcement returns to combined firms in focusing
deals.
In the regression analysis, the results show that higher combined firms announcement
returns are associated with stronger investor protection measured as the combination of the
antidirector rights index in a target and bidder country. This illustrates that strong investor
protection  can  be  expected  to  better  protect  shareholders  of  combined  firms.  Thus,
combined  firms  can  obtain  higher  gains  in  mergers  and  acquisitions.  However,  when
analysing bank regulation, the results do not show any statistical significant relationship
with combined firms’ announcement returns. With regard to control variables, the results
find that higher combined firms announcement returns are related to smaller bidder size
and bidders in a country with less competitive banking market.
Overall, the results suggest that investor protection and bank regulation in a country
seem  to  have  less  influence  on  combined  firms  announcement  returns  although  the
antidirector  rights  index  still  has  a  significant  and  positive  impact  to  combined  firms
announcement returns. The findings may also suggest that it is important to enhance the
legal and regulation system in a target and bidder country in protecting shareholders of
combined firms. This can then be expected to increase gains to combined firms.291
Chapter 9 Summary and Conclusion
9.1 Introduction
The  aim  of  this  thesis  is  to  explore  the  impact  of  investor protection  and  bank
regulation on the shareholder wealth around bank merger and acquisition announcements
from 1995 to 2005. First, this thesis analyses the impact of shareholder wealth around bank
merger  and  acquisition announcements  during  the  period  of  1995-2005.  Secondly,  this
thesis  further  explores  as  to  whether  investor  protection  and  bank  regulation  can  be
important determinants to explain shareholder wealth of the firms in bank mergers.
Using  event  study  methodology  with  different  model  applications  and  also
undertaking the cross-sectional regression analysis, this thesis has reported the empirical
findings in this thesis discussed in chapters 6, 7 and 8. This chapter further discusses the
empirical findings and also presents the conclusions of the thesis. Furthermore, this chapter
also discusses the limitations and suggestions in this thesis. This can allow the current
study to improve and undertake the future research.
9.2 Discussion of the empirical findings
The empirical results have been presented in chapters 6, 7 and 8 for targets, bidders
and  combined  firms,  respectively.  This  section  provides discussion  of  the  empirical
findings in the current study.
9.2.1 The empirical results for targets
This section discusses the empirical findings for target firms in this thesis. Based on
the full 508 sample of bank mergers, the empirical findings in this thesis are reported as
follows.
The results show that targets earn 8.73%, 8.75% and 8.71% abnormal returns on the
announcement date measured from the market (MM) model, the market adjusted (Mkt-Adj)292
returns model and the mean adjusted (Mean-Adj) returns model, respectively. The results
are all statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The null hypothesis that targets do not earn
positive abnormal returns can thus be rejected, concluding that targets obtain significant
positive abnormal returns around bank merger and acquisition announcements.
While applying different event windows, such as a 3-day (-1,+1) event window, the
results show that targets earn 13.25%, 13.32% and 13.25% cumulative abnormal returns
computed from the MM, Mkt-Adj and Mean-Adj model, respectively. The results are all
statistically  significant  at  the  0.01  level.  As  I  find  significant  positive  announcement
returns to targets, the results are consistent with prior empirical studies discussed in chapter
2. Significant positive announcement returns to targets also indicate that bank mergers
create value to target firms.
Splitting the sample into the subsample based on the market, the results find that U.S.
targets  earn  11.01%  cumulative abnormal  returns  over  a  3-day  (-1,+1)  event  window,
compared to 6.22% for EU targets and 0.57% to targets from the market outside the U.S.
and EU market. However, the results are statistically significant at the 0.01 level for the
U.S. and EU market only.
When  performing  additional  tests,  the  results  show  that  the  difference  of  target
announcement returns between the markets is all statistically significant. Hence, the null
hypothesis that there is no difference of target announcement returns between the markets
can therefore be rejected, concluding that U.S. targets earn higher announcement returns
than EU targets and targets from other markets. The results thus confirm that the U.S.
banking takeover market is more competitive, where bidders need to pay more to U.S.
targets.
An additional analysis shows that targets in focusing deals obtain 9.06% abnormal
returns on day 0 relative to 7.08% for those in diversifying deals. The results are both
statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The results indicate that targets in focusing deals
earn  higher  announcement  returns  than  those  in diversifying  deals.  This  suggests  that293
managers  in  focusing  deals  do  not  need  to  manage  more  types  of  risks  after  the
transactions.  Thus,  bidders  may  want  to  pay  more  to  targets  in  order  to  complete  the
transactions.  However,  it  should  be  noted  that  the  difference  of  target  announcement
returns  between  focusing  deals  and  diversifying  deals  is not  statistically  significant.
Overall, the results indicate that targets  gain significant positive announcement returns
around bank merger and acquisition announcements, suggesting that bank mergers create
value to targets.
In addition to investigating the impact of shareholder wealth for targets, this thesis
further  provides  the  cross-sectional  regression  analysis  in  an  attempt  to  explain  target
announcement returns. The regression analysis also controls for the country level specific
characteristics, the deal  and firm specific  characteristics although the  main focus is to
determine  as  to  whether  investor  protection  and  bank  regulation  can  be  important
determinants to explain the cumulative abnormal returns of the firms in bank mergers.
The results find that targets gain more when investor protection measured as the
antidirector rights index and the rule of law in a target country is strong. These findings
illustrate  that  targets  have  more  bargaining  power  to  negotiate  the  transactions.  Thus,
bidders need to pay more to targets. Consequently, when targets in a country with strong
investor protection engage in bank mergers and acquisitions, it can be expected that the
wealth of the shareholders can be better protected. In other words, managers may have less
ability to expropriate minority shareholders. Target managers incline to make the decisions
of mergers and acquisitions on the interests of shareholders. Target shareholders can thus
earn higher announcement returns when mergers and acquisitions take place in a target
country with strong investor protection.
In addition, the results also show that higher target cumulative abnormal returns are
correlated to stronger bank regulation measured as overall activities restrictiveness, official
supervisory power and prompt corrective power in a bidder country. The results suggest
that bank regulation in a bidder country can generate an influence to target announcement294
returns.
When bank regulation in a bidder country is strong, managerial decisions can be
closely monitored. Thus, managers of bidding banks can be expected to carefully evaluate
the transactions. So, the synergy effects could be significant after the transactions. As a
consequent, targets obtain higher benefits when bank regulation in a bidder country is
strong.  With  regard  to  control  variables,  the  results  show  that  targets  earn  higher
announcement returns when target size is small.
Furthermore, this thesis further controls for the difference of investor protection and
bank  regulation  between  the  bidder  and  target  country  in  the  regression  analysis.  The
results find that targets gain more when bidders come from a country with weaker investor
protection relative to the target country, where investor protection is measured as the rule
of law. The findings may suggest that target shareholders may require additional premium
to compensate their risk to be expropriated if bidders come from a country with weaker
investor protection. Similarly, the results also find that targets obtain higher gains when
bank regulation in a bidder country is weaker than that in a target country, where bank
regulation is measured as the difference of prompt corrective power.
Interestingly, when additionally controlling for the difference of investor protection
and bank regulation between the bidder and target country, the results are consistent with
my prior empirical findings, showing that targets gain more when investor protection in a
target country measured as the antidirector rights index and the rule of law is strong and
bank regulation in a bidder country measured as overall activities restrictiveness, official
supervisory power and prompt corrective power is strong. These findings too demonstrate
that investor protection in a target country and bank regulation in a bidder country can be
important determinants to influence target announcement returns around bank merger and
acquisition announcements.
Similar to the discussion above, the results show that targets gain more in relation to
smaller target size when additionally controlling for the difference of investor protection295
and bank regulation between the target and bidder country in the regression analysis. The
results  also  confirm  that  target  size  is  an  important  component  to  explain  target
announcement returns.
Overall,  the  empirical findings  in  this  section  demonstrate  that  the  country  level
corporate governance mechanisms in terms of investor protection and bank regulation can
be  important  determinants  to  influence  target  announcement  returns.  Theoretically,  the
presence of corporate governance mechanisms can be expected to protect shareholders.
Thus, managerial decisions can be closely monitored. Their decisions incline to aim at the
interests of shareholders.
My findings apparently show that investor protection in a target country and bank
regulation in a bidder country play an important role to influence target announcement
returns in bank mergers and acquisitions. This implicates that managers may need to take
into account the influence of the country level corporate governance mechanisms on the
decisions of mergers and acquisitions. Thus, target gains can reflect the expectation of the
strength of the country level corporate governance mechanisms.
9.2.2 The empirical results for bidders
This thesis also examines bidder shareholder wealth of bank mergers in order to
investigate as to whether target gains are transferred by losses from bidders. The results
show that bidders obtain cumulative abnormal returns of -0.63%, -0.56%, -0.63% over a
3-day  (-1,+1)  event  window  measured  from  the  MM,  Mkt-Adj  and  Mean-Adj  model,
respectively. The results are statistically significant at the 0.01 level. While targets earn
positive announcement returns, bidders experience negative announcement returns. This
can  be  an  indication  of  wealth  transfer  from  bidders  to  targets.  In  addition,  negative
announcement  returns  to  bidders  are  also  consistent  with  prior  empirical  studies,  e.g.,
Neely (1987), Houston and Ryngaert (1994), Siems (1996), Cornett et al. (2003), DeLong
(2003), Beitel et al. (2004), Campa and Hernando (2006), Hagendorff et al. (2008).296
An additional analysis based on the market shows that U.S. bidders obtain -0.91%
cumulative abnormal returns over a 3-day (-1,+1) event window compared to -0.10% of
EU  bidders  and -0.39%  of  bidders  from  non-U.S.  and  EU  countries.  The  results  are
statistically significant for U.S. bidders only. The results are also statistically significant for
the difference of bidder announcement returns between the U.S. and EU market. As U.S.
bidders experience more losses relative to EU bidders and bidders from other markets, the
results  may  be  attributable  to  the  fact  that  U.S.  banking  takeover  market  is  more
competitive.  So,  bidders  need  to  pay  more  to  targets.  On  the  other  hand,  negative
announcement returns to bidders are also consistent with prior empirical studies, such as
Siems (1996), Toyne and Tripp (1998), Cornett et al. (2003), Beitel et al. (2004), Rad and
Beek (1999), Campa and Hernando (2006).
Furthermore,  a  further  analysis  shows  that  bidders  obtain -0.89%  cumulative
abnormal returns in focusing deals over a 3-day (-1,+1) event window relative to 0.05% of
bidders in diversifying deals. The results are statistically significant for focusing deals only.
In  addition,  the  difference  between  focusing  and  diversifying  deals  is  statistically
significant. As bidders obtain higher announcement returns in diversifying deals than those
in focusing deals, this implies that bidders can be expected to obtain gains due to higher
risk diversification effects after the transactions. As a consequent, the results find a positive
impact of bidder shareholder wealth to be found when bidders engage in diversifying deals
relative to focusing deals.
In addition to examining bidder shareholder wealth, this thesis further undertakes
regression analysis to explore the factors that can explain bidder announcement returns.
The results show that bidders obtain lower announcement returns when investor protection
measured as the rule of law in a bidder country is strong. A possible explanation is that
stronger investor protection in a bidder country may actually impede managerial ability to
pursue risky investment projects through bank mergers and acquisitions in return of higher
returns  to  the  firms.  This  may  reduce  future  gains  after the  transactions.  Thus,  strong297
investor protection in a bidder country may over protect shareholders resulted in damaging
shareholder wealth.
In  addition,  the  results  also  find  that  bidders  obtain  lower  announcement  returns
when  bank  regulation  measured  as  the  restrictiveness  of  banking  activity  in  a  bidder
country is strong. Similar to the discussion of investor protection in a bidder country, the
presence of stronger bank regulation can actually limit managerial behaviour to look for
risky  investment  projects  through  bank  mergers  and  acquisitions.  Therefore,  bidder
shareholders obtain smaller gains if bank regulation in a bidder country is strong.
On  the  contrary,  when  bank  regulation  measured  as  independence  of  overall
supervisory  authority  in  a  bidder  country  is  strong,  bidders  obtain  higher  gains.  This
illustrates that bidders obtain higher announcement returns when supervisory authority can
be  more  independent  and  reduce  the  external  pressure  to  evaluate  the  transactions
influenced by the political influence, or political consideration and the legal system from
the  banking  industry.  The  results suggest  that  the  supervisory  authority  can  also  be
expected to carefully monitor the transactions if they are more independent. The findings
also  indicate  that  bidder  shareholders  may  also  be  well  protected  if  the  supervisory
authority is more independent.
Interestingly, the results also show that bidders gain more when bidders are located in
a country with a less competitive banking market. If bidders are in a country with less
competitive banking market, bidders may have more opportunity to enlarge their market
power. Thus,  bidders  can  be  expected  to  gain  more  after  the  transactions,  resulting  in
higher announcement returns to bidders.
While  the  regression  analysis  also  controls  for  the deal  and  firm  specific
characteristics, the results show that bidders gain more when the payment is cash, the
growth potential and capital ratio is high. However, the results show that bidders obtain
higher  gains  when  the  relative  size  of  the  target  to  bidder  is  small,  bidder’s  prior
performance is poor and bidder size is small.298
Furthermore,  the  results  find  that  bidders  appear  to  have  higher  gains  when  the
difference of prompt corrective power in a bidder and target country is large. This shows
that bidders can obtain higher gains when bank regulation in a bidder country can have
stronger power to intervene the transactions. The results also illustrate that the shareholders
of bidders can be better protected if bank regulation in a bidder country is strong compared
to that in a target country.
While  additionally  controlling  for  the  difference  of investor  protection  and  bank
regulation in a bidder and target country, the results consistently show that bidders obtain
higher gains when investor protection measured as the rule of law in a bidder country is
weak and bank regulation measured as overall supervisory authority in a bidder country is
strong. These findings also confirm my prior empirical findings that investor protection
and  bank  regulation  in  a  bidder  country  are  important  determinants  to  explain  bidder
announcement returns.
In addition, the results also find that bidders gain more when the payment is cash,
bidder’s growth potential and capital ratio is high. On the contrary, bidders obtain higher
gains when the relative size of the target to bidder is small, bidder size is small and bidders
are in a country with a less competitive banking market.
9.2.3 The empirical results for combined firms
The results discussed above show that targets earn positive announcement returns and
bidders experience negative announcement returns. While pairs of targets and bidders are
required to measure the announcement returns of combined firms, this thesis uses 388
samples of bank mergers to examine joint abnormal returns to combined firms.
The results find that combined firms obtain 0.39%, 0.50% and 0.36% cumulative
abnormal returns over a 3-day (-1,+1) event window measured from the MM, Mkt-Adj and
Mean-Adj model, respectively. The results are statistically significant at the 0.1 level for
the Mkt-Adj model only. Positive announcement returns are consistent with prior empirical299
studies in U.S. studies (e.g., Cornett and Tehranian (1992); Zhang (1995); Becher (2000);
Becher and Campbell (2005); DeLong (2003); DeLong and DeYoung (2007)) and in EU
studies (e.g., Beitel et al. (2004); Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000); Ismail and Davidson
(2005); Ismail and Davidson (2007)). Positive announcement returns to combined firms
also confirm that bank mergers overall create value to combined firms.
An  additional  analysis  shows  that  combined  firms obtain  0.42%  and  0.23%
cumulative  abnormal  returns  over  a  3-day  (-1,+1)  event  window  in  focusing  and
diversifying deals. However, the difference between focusing and diversifying deals is not
statistically  significant.  The findings  suggest  that  the  market  is  more  favourable  of
focusing  deals,  indicating  that  combined  firms  gain  more  when  bidding  banks  acquire
other banks. The results suggest that focusing deals can generate higher synergy effects
after the transactions due to similar types of bank risks being managed.
In addition to examining combined firms shareholder wealth, this thesis carries out
regression  analysis  to  explore  the  factors  that  can  affect  the  announcement  returns  of
combined firms. The results show that there is statistically significant impact of investor
protection on combined firms announcement returns. The results find that combined firms
gain more when investor protection measured as the combination of the antidirector rights
index in a bidder and target country is strong.
When investor protection is measured as the combination of the rule of law in a
bidder and target country, the results show a positive relationship with combined firms
announcement  returns  although  the  results  is  not  statistically  significant.  A  positive
association  between  combined  firms  announcement  returns  and  investor  protection
indicates that stronger investor protection in a bidder and target country can be expected to
better  protect  combined  firms  shareholder  wealth.  This  may  also  suggest  that  stronger
investor  protection  can  reduce the  expropriation  from  managers  at  the  expense  of
combined firm shareholders.
With regard to the analysis of bank regulation, the results find that combined firms300
obtain higher announcement returns when bank regulation measured as the combination of
overall activities restrictiveness in a bidder and target country is weak. In contrast, the
results  show  that  combined  firms  obtain  higher  gains  when bank  regulation  is  strong,
where bank regulation is measured as the combination of prompt corrective power and the
combination of independence of overall supervisory authory in a bidder and target country.
However,  the  results  with  respect  to  the  analysis of  bank  regulation  are  not
statistically significant. As I do not find any statistical significant relationship between
combined firms announcement returns and bank regulation, it is not possible to conclude
that bank regulation is an important determinant on combined firms announcement returns.
While controlling for other factors in the regression analysis, the results show that
combined firms gain more when bidders are in a country with a less competitive banking
market. This illustrates that bidders in a country with a less competitive banking market
allow bank mergers to generate more synergy to combined firms. Thus, combined firms
can obtain higher announcement returns. The results also find that combined firms obtain
higher gains when bidder size is small.
Overall,  this  section  highlights  the  empirical  findings  for  targets,  bidders  and
combined  firms,  respectively.  The  results  show  that  targets  earn  significant  positive
announcement returns and combined firms obtain slightly positive announcement returns.
The results suggest that bank mergers create value to targets and combined firms. However,
the  results  find  that  bidders  experience  negative  announcement  returns,  indicating  that
bank mergers destroy value to bidders.
The results show that investor protection and bank regulation do have an influence on
the cumulative abnormal returns of the firms. However, the results vary, depending on the
variable applied. This illustrates that different variables appear to generate difference levels
of the influence on the announcement returns of the firms. These findings also uncover the
importance to protect the shareholders in bank mergers and acquisitions. Furthermore, the301
regression analysis also reveals factors that can affect the announcement returns of the
firms in bank mergers and acquisitions.
However, it should be acknowledged that this thesis also contains some limitations
that may potentially restrict the validity of the analysis in the current study. Thus, the
following section discusses the limitations of this thesis. In addition, the suggestions of the
future research are also discussed in the following section in order to enhance the academic
research in this field.
9.3 Limitations and suggestions
The  aim  of  this  thesis  is  to  explore  the  impact  of  investor  protection  and  bank
regulation on the shareholder wealth around bank merger and acquisition announcements
from 1995 to 2005. As the empirical findings presented above, the analysis may also suffer
from weaknesses regarding the construction of the sample as well as the choice and the
construction  of  the regression  variables. The  current  study  may  have  room for
improvement in this area. Thus, this thesis also provides suggestions for future research.
This section aims to discuss the limitations of this thesis and suggest areas for future work.
9.3.1 Limitations of this thesis
This  thesis  focuses  on  the  cross-country  analysis  to  determine  as  to  whether  the
country level corporate governance mechanisms in terms of investor protection and bank
regulation can be important determinants to explain the announcement returns of the firms
in bank mergers and acquisitions. As has been discussed in chapter 5, this thesis analyses
shareholder  wealth  of  targets  and  bidders  covering  36  and  39  countries,  respectively.
However, it should be acknowledged that the sample of bank mergers includes a large
proportion of U.S. acquisitions relative to the sample from other countries. However, there
is still a substantial number of non-U.S. observations. Thus, it may be argued that the
relatively small number of transactions from outside the U.S. market may potentially limit302
the validity to interpret the empirical findings with respect to the announcement returns of
the firms as this thesis aims to be an international study. Instead, the sample is dominated
by the U.S., reflecting the dominance of U.S. firms in bank mergers and acquisitions.
However, when the sample of bank mergers largely covers from the U.S. market, this
may also reduce the validity to investigate the  relationship between the announcement
returns  of  the  firms  and investor  protection  and  bank  regulation.  This  may  also  be
attributable to the fact that the results may not generate a strong conclusion due to a small
number of samples from the countries outside the U.S. market.
In addition, the final sample may contain state-owned banks in the analysis. The
presence of state-owned banks may affect the analysis of abnormal returns of the firms in
that the market may be more or less sensitive to the announcements of bank mergers and
acquisitions for state-owned banks. If targets are state-owned banks, it may be arguable
that the government may want to achieve policy aim encouraging state-owned banks to be
private or increasing the efficiency of the state-owned banks. The abnormal returns may be
lower if targets are sold in a cheaper price.
On  the  other  hand,  if  bidders  are  state-owned  banks,  it  may  be  argued  that
state-owned  bidding  banks  may  be  less  efficient  in  their  operation.  When  state-owned
bidding banks intend to acquire targets, the transactions may improve the efficiency of
these bidding banks. Accordingly, the market may respond favourably, showing higher
abnormal returns. However, due to data unavailability, the current study cannot look into
the  impact  of  state-owned  banks  on  the  abnormal  returns.  Thus,  this  can  be  another
potential limitation to be cautious in this thesis.
Alternative limitations may relate to the choice and construction of the variables in
the regression analysis. As this thesis focuses on the country level corporate governance
mechanisms  in  terms  of  investor  protection  and  bank  regulation  to  explain  the
announcement  returns  of  the  firms,  it  can  be  argued  that  the  firm  level  corporate
governance mechanisms, such as the ownership and board structure, may also influence the303
announcement  returns  of  the  firms.  Without  controlling  for  the  firm  level  corporate
governance mechanisms, the regression analysis in the current study may not fully reveal
the association between the announcement returns of the firms and investor protection and
bank  regulation  in  a  country.  However,  due  to the large  international  sample  of  bank
mergers  covering  a  number  of  countries,  it  is  not  possible  to  control  for  firm  level
corporate governance variables in the current study. But the interaction between firm- and
country-level corporate governance may be an important area for future research.
On the other hand, it can be argued that there may also have other factors that may
have an influence to affect the announcement returns of the firms. The regression analysis
in the current study has controlled for a number of variables. Controlling for additional
variables may further reduce the observations to be applied in the regression model. Thus,
the  regression  analysis  may  lose  its  degree  of  freedom  that  may  similarly  reduce  the
validity to interpret the regression results.
Furthermore, some limitations are worth being acknowledged. While focusing on the
cross-country analysis related to the country level corporate governance mechanisms, the
regression model does not include the dummy variable with respect to the country region.
As  has  been  discussed  in  chapter  3,  La  Porta et  al.  (1998)  argue  that  English-origin
countries  have  the  strongest  legal  protections  for  investors.  This  may indicate  the
importance to control for the country origin in the regression analysis. However, including
regional dummy in the regression analysis may possibly exert a high correlation as I use
the country level corporate governance variables. Thus, it may be necessary to exercise
care to interpret the results as this thesis does not control for this aspect.
A limitation encountered is that firm specific characteristics use accounting data to
measure these variables. While carrying out the cross-country analysis, the difference of
the accounting standard or the level of tax rate may also have an influence to accounting
data for the firms in this thesis. This may also affect the regression analysis.
Additionally,  the  investigation  period  in  this  thesis  covers  from  1995  to  2005.  It304
should  be  noted  that  the  regression  analysis  may  be  sensitive  to  include  the  dummy
variable for the year. However, including the dummy for the year may reduce degrees of
freedom in the regression analysis. Thus, I do not control for the dummy for the year. This
can also be a limitation to be addressed in this thesis.
Finally, an important limitation may relate to the construction of the variable for
investor protection and bank regulation in a country. It is obvious that the variables related
to  investor  protection  and  bank  regulation  used  in  this  study  are  not  time-varying.  In
addition, the variables may also be somewhat out of date. The analysis of the regression
model cannot reflect the change of the time period regarding to investor protection and
bank regulation. This thesis does not investigate the interaction of investor protection and
bank regulation as the variables of investor protection and bank regulation involve in the
year  of  1998  and  2003,  respectively.  As  a  consequent,  this  limitation  should  be
acknowledged in this thesis. On the other hand, despite these limitations, my findings are
still  valid  as  the  variables  of  investor  protection  and  bank  regulation  are  still  used  in
several other papers. In spite of the limitations discussed above, several suggestions can
also  be  provided  in  this  thesis  in  order  to  robust  the  current  study  and  enhance  the
academic research in this field.
9.3.2 Suggestions for future research
Given  the  existence  of  some  limitations  discussed  above,  this  thesis  also  offers
several suggestions to improve the current study and to undertake future research. As the
number of bank mergers in the developing countries in the current study is small, it is
worth extending the sample to cover a large scale of developing countries. Including a
wide number of developing and developed countries can also be expected to increase the
explanatory power in the analysis when engaging in the cross-country analysis.
As  has  been  argued  previously,  the  variables  of  investor  protection  and  bank
regulation are constructed from the year of 1998 and 2003, respectively. The difference of305
the period  of  the variables  limits  the  current  study  to  analyse  the  interaction  of  the
variables simultaneously. It may be useful to select the variables in the same period.
In  addition,  while  this  thesis  focuses  on  the  country  level  corporate  governance
mechanisms in terms of investor protection and bank regulation, it may be argued that
other country level corporate governance mechanisms, such as the country level of the
credit rating, may also have an influence to the announcement returns of the firms in bank
mergers  and  acquisitions.  It  is  interesting  to  investigate  whether  other  country  level
corporate governance mechanisms can be applied to explain the announcement returns of
the firms.
Finally, this thesis investigates the short term announcement returns of bank mergers.
The future research may interestingly look at the long term announcement returns of bank
mergers. Similarly, it is interesting for future research to investigate the impact of investor
protection and bank regulation on the long run post-announcement returns or long term
performance in bank mergers and acquisitions. This can accumulate our knowledge to
understand how the effectiveness of the country level corporate governance mechanisms in
terms of investor protection and bank regulation on the impact of shareholder wealth in
bank  mergers  and  acquisitions,  regarding  to  the  long  term  announcement  returns  or
performance.
9.4 Conclusion
This thesis explores the impact of investor protection and bank regulation on the
shareholder wealth in bank mergers and acquisitions from 1995 to 2005. The empirical
findings in this thesis reveal that investor protection and bank regulation have an influence
on the announcement returns of the firms. From the perspective of targets, strong investor
protection  in  a  target  country  allows  targets  to  have  higher  bargaining  power.  Target
managers can have more ability to negotiate the deals and to create value to the firms and
shareholders.  In  other  words,  investor  protection  in  a  target  country  can  protect  target306
shareholders and reduce the expropriation by managers. In addition, strong bank regulation
in a bidder country enables bidders to carefully evaluate the transactions. Targets can then
be expected to obtain higher synergies after the transactions. Thus, targets can earn higher
announcement returns.
With respect to bidders, the existence of investor protection in a bidder country may
theoretically protect shareholders. However, the empirical findings in the current study
reveal that the presence of strong investor protection in a bidder country may actually
impede managerial ability to pursue risky investment projects in return of higher returns.
This can then reduce future gains to bidders. Thus, bidders obtain lower announcement
returns  when  investor  protection  in  a  bidder  country  is  strong.  Similarly,  when  bank
regulation has more restriction on bank activity in mergers and acquisitions, this can limit
managerial  ability  to  pursue  risky  investment  projects. Thus,  bidders  can  obtain  lower
announcement returns.
On the contrary, when supervisory authority can be less influence from the external
pressure, such political consideration, they can carefully evaluate the transactions. This can
then be expected to create higher value to shareholders. Thus, bidders can obtain higher
announcement returns.
Interestingly, my results find that strong investor protection in a target and bidder
country can result in higher announcement returns to combined firms. This illustrates that
investor  protection  can  actually  protect  shareholders  of  combined  firms.  This  also
demonstrates the importance of investor protection on the influence of combined firms’
announcement returns.
Overall, this thesis finds that investor protection and bank regulation in terms of the
country level corporate governance mechanisms have an impact on shareholder wealth of
bank mergers. My findings reveal that the effectiveness of the legal and regulation system
can  better  protect  shareholders.  This  allows  shareholders  to  have  more  rights  against307
managers. Thus, the effectiveness of the legal and regulation system can be expected to
protect shareholder wealth in bank mergers. However, my results also suggest that the
presence of strong legal system can reduce the incentives that managers can pursue risky
investment projects through mergers and acquisitions. This can then damage shareholder
wealth in bank mergers.
As  the  legal  and  regulation  system  is controlled  by  the  government,  this  study
indirectly illustrates that the government can monitor managerial behaviour through the
effectiveness of the legal and regulation system. When managers make the decisions of
mergers and  acquisitions, they  may look  after  the shareholders  aiming the interests of
shareholders. This also suggests the importance of the legal and regulation system on the
influence of shareholder wealth. The level of the legal and regulation system can play a
role to affect the conflicts between managers and shareholders. Thus, the level of the legal
and regulation system can affect shareholder wealth in mergers and acquisitions. As a
result, the government should regulate better law and regulation to protect the shareholders
in mergers and acquisitions.
This thesis offers several contributions to academic research and relevant users. This
thesis provides a more meaningful analysis of the impact of bank mergers on shareholder
wealth, by recognising that returns are likely to be affected by the country level corporate
governance  mechanisms  in  terms  of investor  protection  and  bank  regulation.  This  can
board our knowledge to understand the impact of investor protection and bank regulation
on shareholder wealth in bank mergers. In addition, my empirical findings also allow this
thesis to draw important inferences about the extent to which the importance of the country
level corporate governance mechanisms can have an influence on managerial decisions in
bank mergers and acquisitions. My results also provide a direct comparison in different
markets as bank M&A studies largely focus on the U.S. market. The empirical findings
demonstrate that U.S. banking takeover market is more competitive.
Furthermore,  my  results  also  make  contributions  to investors,  managers  and308
policymakers/regulators. According to my findings, investors can understand how investor
protection and bank regulation can protect their wealth and then they can establish their
investment strategies. When managers make decisions of mergers and acquisitions, they
need  to  take  into  account  the  influence  of  investor  protection  and  bank  regulation  on
shareholder wealth.
With respect to policymakers/regulators, my findings assist them to understand the
importance of investor protection and bank regulation in bank mergers and acquisitions.
The results allow them to develop and improve the legal system to protect shareholder
wealth.  When  the  government  wants  to  improve  its  investment  environment,  the  legal
system can play an important role to increase investor confidence. The effectiveness of the
legal system to protect shareholders also prompts the development of the financial market.309
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Appendix A
Table 6.1 Correlation matrix
(-1,+1) Anti Law Ac Sup Cor Inde CB Payment Rel-size ROA MKTV Cap Size Dep Net
(-1,+1) 1
Anti .260** 1
Law .321** .566** 1
Ac .158** .242** .260** 1
Sup .204** .673** .436** .552** 1
Cor .200** .605** .512** .616** .745** 1
Inde .183** .655** .448** .208** .608** .422** 1
CB -0.022 -0.155** -0.202** -0.374** -0.349** -0.345** -0.120** 1
Payment -0.015 -0.288** -0.194** -0.296** -0.364** -0.319** -0.262* .314** 1
Rel-size -0.089 .129** .011 .118* .125* .097 .115** -0.143** -0.174** 1
ROA .097* .099* .052 -0.02 -0.059 -0.063 -0.021 .071 .088 -0.024 1
MKTV -0.092* -0.212** -0.016 -0.107* -0.130** -0.164** -0.039 -0.057 .001 .032 -0.03 1
Cap -0.022 -0.204** -0.109* -0.167** -0.243** -0.272** -0.154** .077 .194** -0.083 .181** .199** 1
Size -0.303** -.0392** -0.451** -0.148** -0.310** -0.200** -0.406** .142** -0.009 .068 -0.155** .083 -0.066 1
Dep -0.205** -0.343** -0.268** -0.275** -0.290** -0.282** -0.444** .079 .142** -0.124* -0.099* .078 -0.05 .501** 1
Net .01 .033 -0.108* .111* .159** .117* .022 .055 .011 .129* .018 -0.069 -0.058 -0.166** -0.453** 1
Anti: antidirector rights index, Law: rule of law, Ac: overall activities restrictiveness, Sup: official supervisory power, Cor: prompt corrective power, Inde: independence of supervisory
authority-overall    ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level.325
Table 6.2 The cross-sectional regression analysis for targets based on the Mkt-Adj model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 0.273 *** 0.037 0.317 *** 0.266 *** 0.366 *** 0.386 ***
Antidirector rights
index
0.019 **
Rule of law 0.026 ***
Overall Activities
Restrictiveness
0.011 *
Official Supervisory
Power
0.009 **
Prompt Corrective
Power
0.007 **
Independence of
Supervisory
Authority - Overall
0.004
Cross-border 0.026 0.034 * 0.039 * 0.044 * 0.038 * 0.024
Cash 0.005 0.007 -0.002 0.003 0.001 -0.005
Relative size 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ROA 0.108 0.101 0.115 0.145 0.134 0.136
MKTV -0.001 -0.002 * -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
Capital to assets 0.012 0.020 -0.007 0.008 0.006 -0.002
ln (total assets) -0.014 *** -0.011 *** -0.016 *** -0.015 *** -0.015 *** -0.016 ***
Deposit Money Bank
Assets / GDP
-0.006 -0.006 -0.015 -0.016 -0.017 -0.014
Net Interest Margin -0.242 0.354 -0.369 -0.518 -0.579 -0.219
Observations 376 376 376 376 376 376
Adjusted R Square 9.98% 12.77% 9.07% 9.52% 9.39% 8.66%
F-value 5.16 6.49 4.74 4.94 4.89 4.56
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Table 6.2 presents the results of targets to explore the impact of investor protection and bank regulation on
the shareholder wealth in bank mergers using OLS regression analysis. The dependent variable is target
3-day  (-1,+1)  cumulative abnormal  returns  measured  from  the  market  adjusted  returns  model.  Investor
protection is measured as the antidirector rights index and the rule of law in a target country from La Porta et
al.  (1998).  Bank  regulation  is  measured  as  overall  activities  restrictiveness,  official  supervisory  power,
prompt corrective power and independence of supervisory authority-overall in a bidder country from Barth et
al. (2003). The regression model also includes a number of control variables. Cross-border is a dummy
variable, where the value of 1 indicates the target and bidder in different countries. Cash is a dummy variable,
where the value of 1 indicates cash payment. The relative size is measured as the relative size of the target to
bidder. ROA is measured as net income to total assets. The market to book ratio is measured as the market
value to book value. The capital ratio is measured as total capital to total assets. Size is calculated as ln(total
assets). The variables of the firm specific characteristics are gathered from the year end prior to bank merger
and  acquisition  announcements.  The  financial  data  is  collected  from  Datastream  database.  The
competitiveness of the banking market is proxied as net interest margin in a bidder country. The size of the
banking market is measured as deposit money bank assets to GDP in a bidder country. The country level
specific characteristics are collected from the World Bank.
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. * Significant at the 0.1 level.
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) 1 , 1 (     = 0  + 1  (Target’s investor  protection)  + 2  (Bidder’s bank  regulation)
+ 3  (Cross-border  dummy)  + 4  (Cash  dummy)  + 5  (The  relative  size  of  the  target  to  bidder)  +326
6  (ROA)  + 7  (The  market  to  book  ratio)  + 8  (The  capital  ratio)  + 9  (Size)  + 10  (The
competitiveness of the banking market) + 11  (The size of the banking market) + i 
Table 6.3 The cross-sectional regression analysis for targets based on the Mean-Adj model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 0.285 *** 0.060 0.339 *** 0.304 *** 0.386 *** 0.399 ***
Antidirector rights
index
0.019 ***
Rule of law 0.025 ***
Overall Activities
Restrictiveness
0.010 *
Official Supervisory
Power
0.008 *
Prompt Corrective
Power
0.007 *
Independence of
Supervisory
Authority - Overall
0.005
Cross-border 0.034 0.042 * 0.047 * 0.048 * 0.045 * 0.033
Cash -0.001 0.000 -0.008 -0.004 -0.006 -0.011
Relative size 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ROA 0.122 0.116 0.131 0.158 0.149 0.151
MKTV -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
Capital to assets 0.010 0.018 -0.010 0.004 0.003 -0.005
ln (total assets) -0.014 *** -0.011 *** -0.016 *** -0.015 *** -0.016 *** -0.016 ***
Deposit Money Bank
Assets / GDP
-0.010 -0.011 -0.018 -0.020 -0.021 -0.016
Net Interest Margin -0.500 0.075 -0.608 -0.735 -0.795 -0.455
Observations 376 376 376 376 376 376
Adjusted R Square 10.49% 12.98% 9.46% 9.70% 9.69% 9.13%
F-value 5.40 6.60 4.92 5.03 5.02 4.77
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Table 6.3 presents the results of targets to explore the impact of investor protection and bank regulation on
the shareholder wealth in bank mergers using OLS regression analysis. The dependent variable is target
3-day  (-1,+1)  cumulative abnormal  returns  measured  from  the  mean  adjusted  returns  model.  Investor
protection is measured as the antidirector rights index and the rule of law in a target country from La Porta et
al.  (1998).  Bank  regulation  is  measured  as  overall  activities  restrictiveness,  official  supervisory  power,
prompt corrective power and independence of supervisory authority-overall in a bidder country from Barth et
al. (2003). The regression model also includes a number of control variables. Cross-border is a dummy
variable, where the value of 1 indicates the target and bidder in different countries. Cash is a dummy variable,
where the value of 1 indicates to use the cash payment. The relative size is measured as the relative size of
the target to bidder. ROA is measured as net income to total assets. The market to book ratio is measured as
the market value to book value. The capital ratio is measured as total capital to total assets. Size is calculated
as ln(total assets). The variables of the firm specific characteristics are gathered from the year end prior to
bank merger and acquisition announcements. The financial data is collected from Datastream database. The
competitiveness of the banking market is proxied as net interest margin in a bidder country. The size of the
banking market is measured as deposit money bank assets to GDP in a bidder country. The country level327
specific characteristics are collected from the World Bank.
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. * Significant at the 0.1 level.
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) 1 , 1 (     = 0  + 1  (Target’s investor  protection)  + 2  (Bidder’s bank  regulation)
+ 3  (Cross-border dummy) + 4  (Cash dummy) + 5  (The relative size of bidder to target) + 6  (ROA)
+ 7  (The market to book ratio) + 8  (The capital ratio) + 9  (Size) + 10  (The competitiveness of the
banking market) + 11  (The size of the banking market) + i 
Table 6.4 The cross-sectional regression analysis for targets controlling for the difference
of investor protection and bank regulation in a bidder and target country based on the
Mkt-Adj model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 0.284 *** 0.064 0.310 *** 0.287 *** 0.359 *** 0.383 ***
Antidirector  rights  in
dex
0.015 *
Difference(Antidirect
or  rights  index)
-0.016
rule of law 0.022 ***
Difference (Rule of
law)
-0.022 *
Overall Activities
Restrictiveness
0.010 *
Difference (Overall
Activities
Restrictiveness)
-0.060
Official Supervisory
Power
0.007 *
Difference (Official
Supervisory Power)
-0.022
Prompt Corrective
Power
0.008 **
Difference (Prompt
Corrective Power)
-0.069
Independence of
Supervisory Authority
- Overall
0.003
Difference
(Independence of
Supervisory Authority
- Overall)
0.065 *
Cross-border 0.010 0.041 * 0.031 0.029 0.017 0.000
Cash 0.003 0.008 -0.002 0.001 0.003 -0.005
Relative size 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ROA 0.086 0.078 0.132 0.164 * 0.162 * 0.169 *
MKTV -0.001 -0.002 * -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
Capital to assets -0.004 0.008 -0.013 -0.004 -0.001 -0.014
ln (total assets) -0.014 *** -0.010 *** -0.016 *** -0.015 *** -0.016 *** -0.016 ***
Deposit Money Bank
Assets / GDP
-0.008 -0.008 -0.009 -0.010 -0.011 -0.010
Net Interest Margin -0.048 0.472 -0.228 -0.289 -0.416 -0.054328
Observations 373 373 372 372 372 372
Adjusted R Square 9.94% 12.72% 9.31% 9.49% 9.49% 8.75%
F-value 4.73 5.93 4.46 4.54 4.54 4.24
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Table  6.4  presents  the  results  to  explore  the  impact  of  the  difference  of  investor  protection  and  bank
regulation  on  target  shareholder  wealth  in  bank  mergers  using  OLS  regression  analysis.  The  dependent
variable is target 3-day (-1,+1) cumulative abnormal returns  measured from the  market adjusted returns
model. Investor protection is measured as the antidirector rights index and the rule of law in a target country
from La Porta et al. (1998). The difference of investor protection is measured as the difference of investor
protection in a bidder and target country. Bank regulation is measured as overall activities restrictiveness,
official supervisory power, prompt corrective power and independence of supervisory authority-overall in a
bidder country from Barth et al. (2003). The difference of bank regulation is measured as the difference of
bank regulation in a bidder and target country. The regression model also includes a number of control
variables. Cross-border is a dummy variable, where the value of 1 indicates the target and bidder in different
countries. Cash is a dummy  variable,  where the value of 1 indicates cash payment.  The relative size is
measured as the relative size of the target to bidder. ROA is measured as net income to total assets. The
market to book ratio is measured as the market value to book value. The capital ratio is measured as total
capital to total assets. Size is calculated as ln(total assets). The variables of the firm specific characteristics
are gathered from the year end prior to bank merger and acquisition announcements. The financial data is
collected from Datastream database. The competitiveness of the banking market is proxied as net interest
margin. The size of the banking market is measured as deposit money bank assets to GDP. The country level
specific characteristics are collected from the World Bank.
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. * Significant at the 0.1 level.
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) 1 , 1 (     = 0  + 1  (Target’s investor  protection)  + 2  (The difference  of  target’s  investor
protection)  + 3  (Bidder’s bank  regulation)  + 4  (The difference  of  bidder’s  bank  regulation)  +
5  (Cross-border dummy) + 6  (Cash dummy) + 7  (The relative size of the target to bidder) + 8  (ROA)
+ 9  (The market to book ratio) + 10  (The capital ratio) + 11  (Size) + 12  (The competitiveness of the
banking market) + 13  (The size of the banking market) + i 
Table 6.5 The cross-sectional regression analysis for targets controlling for the difference
of investor protection and bank regulation in a bidder and target country based on the
Mean-Adj model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 0.296 *** 0.086 0.331 *** 0.296 *** 0.379 *** 0.403 ***
Antidirector  rights
  index
0.015 *
Difference  (Antidir
ector  rights  index)
-0.018 *
rule of law 0.022 ***
Difference (Rule of
law)
-0.027 **
Overall Activities
Restrictiveness
0.010 *
Difference (Overall
Activities
Restrictiveness)
0.085
Official
Supervisory Power
0.008 *329
Difference (Official
Supervisory Power)
0.056 **
Prompt Corrective
Power
0.007 *
Difference (Prompt
Corrective Power)
-0.088 *
Independence of
Supervisory
Authority - Overall
0.002
Difference
(Independence of
Supervisory
Authority - Overall)
0.085 *
Cross-border 0.018 0.049 * 0.026 0.024 0.024 0.009
Cash -0.002 0.004 -0.006 -0.003 -0.004 -0.010
Relative size 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ROA 0.094 0.084 0.160 0.193 * 0.178 * 0.183 *
MKTV -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
Capital to assets -0.006 0.005 -0.017 -0.007 -0.004 -0.017
ln (total assets) -0.014 *** -0.010 *** -0.017 *** -0.015 *** -0.016 *** -0.017 ***
Deposit Money
Bank Assets / GDP
-0.013 -0.016 -0.012 -0.013 -0.015 -0.013
Net Interest Margin -0.302 0.197 -0.440 -0.520 -0.640 -0.311
Observations 373 373 372 372 372 372
Adjusted R Square 10.55% 13.09% 9.58% 9.79% 9.84% 9.24%
F-value 4.99 6.09 4.58 4.66 4.68 4.43
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Table  6.5  presents  the  results  to  explore  the  impact  of  the  difference  of  investor  protection  and  bank
regulation  on  target  shareholder  wealth  in  bank  mergers  using  OLS  regression  analysis.  The  dependent
variable is target 3-day (-1,+1) cumulative abnormal returns measured from the mean adjusted returns model.
Investor protection is measured as the antidirector rights index and the rule of law in a target country from La
Porta et al. (1998). The difference of investor protection is measured as the difference of investor protection
in  a  bidder  and  target  country.  Bank  regulation  is  measured  as  overall  activities  restrictiveness,  official
supervisory power, prompt corrective power and independence of supervisory authority-overall in a bidder
country from Barth et al. (2003). The difference of bank regulation is measured as the difference of bank
regulation in a bidder and target country. The regression model also includes a number of control variables.
Cross-border is a dummy variable, where the value of 1 indicates the target and bidder in different countries.
Cash is a dummy variable, where the value of 1 indicates cash payment. The relative size is measured as the
relative size of the target to bidder. ROA is measured as net income to total assets. The market to book ratio is
measured as the market value to book value. The capital ratio is measured as total capital to total assets. Size
is calculated as ln(total assets). The variables of the firm specific characteristics are gathered from the year
end prior to bank merger and acquisition announcements. The financial data is collected from Datastream
database. The  competitiveness  of  the  banking  market  is  proxied  as  net  interest  margin.  The size  of  the
banking market is measured as deposit money bank assets to GDP. The country level specific characteristics
are collected from the World Bank.
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. * Significant at the 0.1 level.
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) 1 , 1 (     = 0  + 1  (Target’s investor  protection)  + 2  (The difference  of  target’s  investor
protection)  + 3  (Bidder’s bank  regulation)  + 4  (The difference  of  bidder’s  bank  regulation)  +
5  (Cross-border dummy) + 6  (Cash dummy) + 7  (The relative size of the target to bidder) + 8  (ROA)330
+ 9  (The market to book ratio) + 10  (The capital ratio) + 11  (Size) + 12  (The competitiveness of the
banking market) + 13  (The size of the banking market) + i 
Table 7.1 Bidder daily abnormal returns
Mean-Adj model
day Mean p-value  1 p-value  2 Sign  test Wilcoxon  test
-30 -0.0005 0.2585 0.2669 0.0001 0.0490
-29 -0.0001 0.3962 0.3961 0.0039 0.2020
-28 0.0004 0.2638 0.2799 0.0278 0.9240
-27 -0.0006 0.2117 0.2071 0.0001 0.1030
-26 0.0009 0.0746 0.0824 0.0850 0.4500
-25 -0.0008 0.1372 0.1379 0.0054 0.2020
-24 0.0006 0.1908 0.1983 0.1060 0.4460
-23 0.0000 0.3978 0.3978 0.0087 0.4670
-22 -0.0004 0.3202 0.3182 0.0000 0.0240
-21 -0.0009 0.0924 0.0984 0.0000 0.0090
-20 -0.0003 0.3275 0.3228 0.0531 0.4250
-19 0.0004 0.2993 0.2952 0.0023 0.9110
-18 -0.0004 0.3080 0.3059 0.0001 0.0830
-17 0.0005 0.2766 0.2663 0.4743 0.4240
-16 -0.0004 0.3020 0.2993 0.0039 0.1740
-15 -0.0002 0.3614 0.3565 0.0046 0.1540
-14 0.0010 0.0649 0.0571 0.0413 0.4460
-13 0.0008 0.1440 0.1358 0.0758 0.6990
-12 -0.0009 0.0961 0.0904 0.0001 0.0230
-11 0.0008 0.1050 0.1087 0.0531 0.5430
-10 -0.0010 0.0985 0.0753 0.0039 0.4030
-9 0.0002 0.3843 0.3827 0.0006 0.2870
-8 -0.0001 0.3920 0.3916 0.0599 0.4810
-7 0.0000 0.3986 0.3984 0.0004 0.5820
-6 -0.0005 0.2492 0.2313 0.0211 0.2360
-5 -0.0003 0.3558 0.3547 0.0118 0.4590
-4 -0.0001 0.3902 0.3898 0.0063 0.1460
-3 -0.0008 0.1279 0.1260 0.0002 0.0470
-2 0.0007 0.1660 0.1580 0.1309 0.6230
-1 -0.0003 0.3609 0.3488 0.0001 0.0660
0 -0.0046 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
1 -0.0014 0.0626 0.0116 0.0000 0.0020
2 -0.0005 0.3007 0.2669 0.0000 0.0320
3 -0.0016 0.0063 0.0048 0.0001 0.0120
4 0.0003 0.3293 0.3211 0.0006 0.3080
5 -0.0001 0.3949 0.3947 0.0278 0.8580331
6 -0.0003 0.3318 0.3374 0.0046 0.3380
7 -0.0002 0.3827 0.3820 0.2331 0.9820
8 0.0000 0.3982 0.3982 0.0675 0.7570
9 -0.0001 0.3876 0.3871 0.0004 0.1150
10 -0.0007 0.1729 0.1614 0.0013 0.1030
11 0.0010 0.0617 0.0576 0.2773 0.4400
12 0.0009 0.0854 0.0911 0.9366 0.2680
13 0.0000 0.3988 0.3988 0.0019 0.1880
14 -0.0006 0.2098 0.2152 0.0005 0.0610
15 -0.0003 0.3600 0.3529 0.0102 0.7920
16 -0.0007 0.1818 0.1811 0.0000 0.0010
17 -0.0002 0.3719 0.3726 0.0063 0.1900
18 0.0009 0.0945 0.0909 0.0278 0.8340
19 -0.0007 0.1426 0.1469 0.0001 0.0140
20 0.0000 0.3985 0.3985 0.0074 0.2820
21 0.0000 0.3987 0.3987 0.0278 0.9300
22 -0.0007 0.1388 0.1439 0.0000 0.0330
23 -0.0002 0.3708 0.3745 0.0046 0.3080
24 -0.0003 0.3315 0.3343 0.0006 0.1560
25 -0.0004 0.2741 0.2839 0.0033 0.1260
26 -0.0007 0.1541 0.1500 0.0019 0.0300
27 0.0014 0.0136 0.0132 0.3014 0.1660
28 -0.0012 0.0343 0.0343 0.0000 0.0050
29 -0.0015 0.0044 0.0069 0.0000 0.0000
30 -0.0004 0.3111 0.3165 0.0599 0.6700
p-value 1: t test with assuming cross-sectional independence
p-value 2: t test with assuming cross-sectional dependence
Wilcoxon test: Wilcoxon signed rank test
Table 7.2 Bidder cumulative abnormal returns
Mean-Adj model
Mean p-value1 Sign test Wilcoxon test
(-4,1) -0.0065 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000
(-1,1) -0.0063 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(-30,30) -0.0148 0.0004 0.0011 0.0000
(0) -0.0046 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(-1,0) -0.0049 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(-30,-1) -0.0021 0.2849 0.8115 0.5410
(0,1) -0.0060 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(1,30) -0.0082 0.0057 0.5077 0.0390
p-value 1: t test with assuming cross-sectional independence
Wilcoxon test: Wilcoxon signed rank test332
Table 7.3 Bidder cumulative abnormal returns for the market
Mkt-Adj model
U.S. EU Other
markets
N Mean p-value 1 Sign test Wilcoxo
n test
N Mean p-value 1 Sign test Wilcoxo
n test
N Mean p-value 1 Sign test Wilcoxo
n test
(-4 , 1 ) 943 -0.0064 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 164 0.0019 0.6780 0.3904 0.1500 101 0.0005 0.9370 0.5505 1.0000
( -1 , 1 ) 943 -0.0085 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 164 -0.0006 0.8860 0.9378 0.5290 101 -0.0035 0.4790 0.1114 0.2210
( -30 , 30 ) 943 0.0025 0.5430 0.0787 0.5810 164 -0.0146 0.1550 0.8148 0.4460 101 0.0221 0.1650 0.1114 0.0830
( 0 ) 943 -0.0063 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 164 -0.0022 0.4050 0.6962 0.9910 101 0.0004 0.8830 0.5505 0.5900
( -1 , 0 ) 943 -0.0068 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 164 0.0001 0.9670 0.3100 0.3270 101 0.0009 0.8110 1.0000 0.9220
( -30 , -1 ) 943 0.0068 0.0090 0.0371 0.0160 164 0.0042 0.5100 0.5846 0.9720 101 0.0188 0.1180 0.1636 0.1040
( 0 , 1 ) 943 -0.0080 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 164 -0.0029 0.4210 0.9378 0.9770 101 -0.0040 0.3670 0.2325 0.2440
( 1 , 30 ) 943 0.0021 0.4890 0.2682 0.8890 164 -0.0166 0.0370 0.1379 0.0860 101 0.0029 0.8040 0.6906 0.7350
p-value 1: t test with assuming cross-sectional independence
Wilcoxon test: Wilcoxon signed rank test333
Table 7.4 Bidder cumulative abnormal returns for the market
Mean-Adj model
U.S. EU Other
markets
N Mean p-value 1 Sign test Wilcoxo
n test
N Mean p-value 1 Sign test Wilcoxo
n test
N Mean p-value 1 Sign test Wilcoxo
n test
(-4 , 1 ) 943 -0.0085 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 164 -0.0038 0.4760 0.8148 0.5710 101 -0.0046 0.5730 0.4260 0.3860
( -1 , 1 ) 943 -0.0091 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 164 -0.0016 0.7110 0.1010 0.5790 101 -0.0047 0.3800 0.3197 0.1630
( -30 , 30 ) 943 -0.0159 0.0010 0.0001 0.0000 164 -0.0190 0.1460 0.5846 0.1930 101 -0.0042 0.8490 1.0000 0.9110
( 0 ) 943 -0.0064 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 164 -0.0029 0.2920 0.4822 0.6110 101 -0.0008 0.8130 1.0000 0.7600
( -1 , 0 ) 943 -0.0071 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 164 -0.0009 0.7830 0.4822 0.6150 101 -0.0021 0.6430 0.2325 0.4320
( -30 , -1 ) 943 -0.0005 0.8490 0.6023 0.7360 164 -0.0035 0.6860 0.2415 0.2920 101 -0.0024 0.8620 0.5505 0.5580
( 0 , 1 ) 943 -0.0083 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 164 -0.0036 0.3600 0.1379 0.3650 101 -0.0034 0.4570 0.8423 0.2950
( 1 , 30 ) 943 -0.0089 0.0070 0.4737 0.0290 164 -0.0126 0.1860 0.8148 0.4250 101 -0.0010 0.9450 0.6906 0.7790
p-value 1: t test with assuming cross-sectional independence
Wilcoxon test: Wilcoxon signed rank test
Table 7.5 Bidder cumulative abnormal returns for activity focusing/diversifying deals
Mkt-Adj model
Focusing Diversifyi
ng
Mean p-value 1 Sign test Wilcoxon
test
Mean p-value 1 Sign test Wilcoxon
test
( -4 , 1 ) -0.0064 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0052 0.2270 0.7063 0.2290
( -1 , 1 ) -0.0084 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0011 0.7430 0.8211 0.9090
( -30 , 30 ) 0.0010 0.8030 0.1272 0.5660 0.0067 0.5360 0.5977 0.4140
( 0 ) -0.0061 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 0.8640 1.0000 0.7640
( -1 , 0 ) -0.0064 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0017 0.5450 0.9399 0.7780
( -30 , -1 ) 0.0057 0.0260 0.0499 0.0440 0.0178 0.0170 0.0830 0.0440
( 0 , 1 ) -0.0081 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0003 0.9180 0.7063 0.9350
( 1 , 30 ) 0.0015 0.6140 0.4364 0.9550 -0.0114 0.1400 0.0830 0.1220334
N 1032 176
p-value 1: t test with assuming cross-sectional independence
Wilcoxon test: Wilcoxon signed rank test
Table 7.6 Bidder cumulative abnormal returns for activity focusing/diversifying deals
Mean-Adj model
Focusing Diversifyi
ng
Mean p-value 1 Sign test Wilcoxon
test
Mean p-value 1 Sign test Wilcoxon
test
( -4 , 1 ) -0.0095 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0038 0.4410 0.4070 0.3130
( -1 , 1 ) -0.0093 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0019 0.5890 0.7063 0.6890
( -30 , 30 ) -0.0172 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0041 0.7630 1.0000 0.6700
( 0 ) -0.0065 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.8940 0.8211 0.6030
( -1 , 0 ) -0.0072 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0018 0.5400 1.0000 0.5730
( -30 , -1 ) -0.0028 0.3200 0.7320 0.4050 0.0090 0.3120 0.7063 0.3550
( 0 , 1 ) -0.0086 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 0.8980 1.0000 0.8150
( 1 , 30 ) -0.0080 0.0150 0.6857 0.1010 -0.0134 0.1460 0.5977 0.1530
N 1032 176
p-value 1: t test with assuming cross-sectional independence
Wilcoxon test: Wilcoxon signed rank test335
Table 7.7 Correlation matrix
(-1,+1) Anti Law Ac Sup Cor Inde CB Payment Rel-size ROA MKTV Cap Size Dep Net
(-1,+1) 1
Anti -0.064* 1
Law -0.037 .563** 1
Ac -0.058* .233** .275** 1
Sup -0.031 .762** .463** .495** 1
Cor -0.05 .683** .425** .516** .818** 1
Inde .003 .735** .563** .211** .706** .474** 1
CB .064* -0.394** -0.223** -0.529** -0.472** -0.479** -0.224** 1
Payment .150** -0.419** -0.340** -0.299** -0.403** -0.390** -0.356** .407** 1
Rel-size -0.198** .098** .031 .075* .095** .075* .090** -0.149** -0.141** 1
ROA -0.093** .378** .248** .274** .366** .400** .334** -0.242** -0.194** -0.006 1
MKTV .001 -0.071* -0.159** .040 -0.036 -0.073* .016 .097** .039 -0.012 .072* 1
Cap .006 -0.093** -0.085** -0.051 -0.023 -0.021 -0.045 .090** .050 .093** -0.119** -0.009 1
Size .002 -0.430** -0.354** -0.299** -0.428** -0.363** -0.390** .380** .261** -0.288** -0.176** .127** -0.138** 1
Dep -0.086** .275** .035 .263** .333** .435** .095** -0.282** -0.182** .082** .409** -0.023 .518** -0.436** 1
Net .071* -0.413** -0.276** -0.476** -0.494** -0.508** -0.365** .367** .278** -0.093** -0.432** -0.033 -0.054 0.504** -0.615** 1
Anti: antidirector rights index, Law: rule of law, Ac: overall activities restrictiveness, Sup: official supervisory power, Cor: prompt corrective power, Inde: independence of supervisory
authority-overall.    ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level.336
Table 7.8 The cross-sectional regression analysis for bidders based on the Mkt-Adj model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 0.051 *** 0.048 ** 0.081 *** 0.038 * 0.025 0.046 ***
Antidirector rights  in
dex
-0.000
Rule of law -0.000
Overall Activities
Restrictiveness
-0.006 ***
Official Supervisory
Power
0.002
Prompt Corrective
Power
0.002 *
Independence of
Supervisory Authority
- Overall
0.006
Cross-border -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
Cash 0.009 *** 0.009 *** 0.009 *** 0.010 *** 0.010 *** 0.010 ***
Relative size -0.144 *** -0.144 *** -0.149 *** -0.144 *** -0.142 *** -0.144 ***
ROA -0.194 -0.217 -0.166 -0.229 -0.287 -0.293
MKTV 0.002 ** 0.002 ** 0.002 *** 0.002 ** 0.002 ** 0.003 ***
Capital to assets 0.029 * 0.030 * 0.036 ** 0.029 * 0.031 ** 0.030 **
ln (total assets) -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 ***
Deposit Money Bank
Assets / GDP
-0.419 ** -0.420 ** -0.361 * -0.520 ** -0.513 ** -0.525 ***
Net Interest Margin 0.004 * 0.005 * -0.001 0.004 0.007 ** 0.004
Observations 1030 1030 1033 1028 1033 1033
Adjusted R Square 6.27% 6.26% 7.27% 6.94% 6.87% 6.79%
F-value 7.88 7.87 9.09 8.66 8.61 8.52
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Table 7.8 presents the results of bidder regression analysis. The dependent variable is bidder 3-day (-1,+1)
cumulative abnormal returns based on the market adjusted returns model. Investor protection is measured as
the antidirector rights index  and the rule of law  in a bidder country from  La Porta et al. (1998). Bank
regulation  is  measured  as  overall  activities  restrictiveness,  official  supervisory  power,  prompt  corrective
power and independence of supervisory authority-overall in a bidder country from Barth et al. (2003). The
regression model also includes a number of control variables. Cross-border is a dummy variable that takes
the value of 1 if the target and bidder locate in different countries. Cash is a dummy variable, where the value
of 1 indicates cash payment. The relative size is measured as the relative size of the target to bidder proxied
as deal value to bidder assets. ROA is measured as net income to total assets. The market to book ratio is
measured as the market value to book value. The capital ratio is measured as total capital to total assets. Size
is calculated as ln(total assets). The variables of the firm specific characteristics are gathered from the year
end prior to bank merger and acquisition announcements. The financial data is collected from Datastream
database. The  competitiveness  of  the  banking  market  is  proxied  as  net  interest  margin.  The size  of  the
banking market is measured as deposit money bank assets to GDP. The country level specific characteristics
are collected from the World Bank.
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. * Significant at the 0.1 level.
CAR
Bidder
) 1 , 1 (     = 0  + 1  (Bidder’s investor  protection)  + 2  (Bidder’s bank  regulation)
+ 3  (Cross-border  dummy)  + 4  (Cash  dummy)  + 5  (The  relative  size  of  the  target  to  bidder)  +337
6  (ROA)  + 7  (The  market  to  book  ratio)  + 8  (The  capital  ratio)  + 9  (Size)  + 10  (The
competitiveness of the banking market) + 11  (The size of the banking market) + i 
Table 7.9 The cross-sectional regression analysis for bidders based on the Mean-Adj model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 0.065 *** 0.105 *** 0.076 *** 0.074 *** 0.062 *** 0.039 **
Antidirector rights  in
dex
-0.001
Rule of law -0.003 **
Overall Activities
Restrictiveness
-0.002
Official Supervisory
Power
-0.001
Prompt Corrective
Power
-0.001
Independence of
Supervisory Authority
- Overall
0.005 *
Cross-border -0.006 -0.006 -0.008 * -0.007 * -0.007 -0.005
Cash 0.008 *** 0.007 *** 0.008 *** 0.008 *** 0.008 *** 0.010 ***
Relative size -0.153 *** -0.157 *** -0.153 *** -0.153 *** -0.153 *** -0.152 ***
ROA -0.227 -0.123 -0.249 -0.222 -0.222 -0.351 *
MKTV 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Capital to assets 0.016 0.018 0.018 0.016 0.017 0.023 *
ln (total assets) -0.002 *** -0.003 *** -0.002 *** -0.002 *** -0.002 *** -0.002 ***
Deposit Money Bank
Assets / GDP
-0.004 -0.006 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.001
Net Interest Margin -0.701 *** -0.839 *** -0.682 *** -0.704 *** -0.647 *** -0.574 ***
Observations 1079 1079 1081 1079 1081 1081
Adjusted R Square 5.55% 6.12% 5.65% 5.66% 5.57% 5.83%
F-value 7.34 8.02 7.47 7.47 7.37 7.69
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Table 7.9 presents the results of bidder regression analysis. The dependent variable is bidder 3-day (-1,+1)
cumulative abnormal returns based on the mean adjusted returns model. Investor protection is measured as
the antidirector rights index  and the rule of law  in a bidder country from  La Porta et al. (1998). Bank
regulation  is  measured  as  overall  activities  restrictiveness,  official  supervisory  power,  prompt  corrective
power and independence of supervisory authority-overall in a bidder country from Barth et al. (2003). The
regression model also includes a number of control variables. Cross-border is a dummy variable that takes
the value of 1 if the target and bidder locate in different countries. Cash is a dummy variable, where the value
of 1 indicates cash payment. The relative size is measured as the relative size of the target to bidder proxied
as deal value to bidder assets. ROA is measured as net income to total assets. The market to book ratio is
measured as the market value to book value. The capital ratio is measured as total capital to total assets. Size
is calculated as ln(total assets). The variables of the firm specific characteristics are gathered from the year
end prior to bank merger and acquisition announcements. The financial data is collected from Datastream
database. The  competitiveness  of  the  banking  market  is  proxied  as  net  interest  margin.  The size  of  the
banking market is measured as deposit money bank assets to GDP. The country level specific characteristics
are collected from the World Bank.338
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. * Significant at the 0.1 level.
CAR
Bidder
) 1 , 1 (     = 0  + 1  (Bidder’s investor  protection)  + 2  (Bidder’s bank  regulation)
+ 3  (Cross-border  dummy)  + 4  (Cash  dummy)  + 5  (The  relative  size  of  the  target  to  bidder)  +
6  (ROA)  + 7  (The  market  to  book  ratio)  + 8  (The  capital  ratio)  + 9  (Size)  + 10  (The
competitiveness of the banking market) + 11  (The size of the banking market) + i 
Table 7.10 The cross-sectional regression analysis for bidders controlling for the difference
of investor protection and bank regulation in a bidder and target country based on the
Mkt-Adj model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 0.047 *** 0.094 *** 0.076 *** 0.062 *** 0.052 *** 0.032 *
Antidirector rights
index
-0.000
Difference
(Antidirector rights
index)
-0.000
rule of law -0.003 ***
Difference (Rule of
law)
0.002
Overall Activities
Restrictiveness
-0.003 *
Difference (Overall
Activities
Restrictiveness)
-0.001
Official Supervisory
Power
-0.001
Difference (Official
Supervisory Power)
0.000
Prompt Corrective
Power
-0.001
Difference (Prompt
Corrective Power)
0.002
Independence of
Supervisory
Authority - Overall
0.004
Difference
(Independence of
Supervisory
Authority - Overall)
-0.001
Cross-border -0.005 -0.007 -0.010 * -0.005 -0.004 -0.004
Cash 0.010 *** 0.008 *** 0.010 *** 0.010 *** 0.009 *** 0.011 ***
Relative size -0.138 *** -0.145 *** -0.140 *** -0.140 *** -0.139 *** -0.138 ***
ROA -0.106 -0.016 -0.107 -0.089 -0.069 -0.176
MKTV 0.003 *** 0.003 ** 0.003 *** 0.003 *** 0.003 *** 0.003 ***
Capital to assets 0.042 *** 0.044 *** 0.041 *** 0.041 *** 0.041 *** 0.045 ***
ln (total assets) -0.003 *** -0.004 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 ***
Deposit Money
Bank Assets / GDP
-0.457 ** -0.610 *** -0.505 *** -0.479 *** -0.494 *** -0.427 **
Net Interest Margin 0.010 * 0.007 0.006 0.009 0.009 * 0.011 **
Observations 1052 1051 1054 1047 1054 1054
Adjusted R Square 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
F-value 7.71 8.61 8.45 8.01 8.24 8.16339
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Table  7.10  presents  the  results  to  explore  the  impact  of  the  difference  of  investor  protection  and  bank
regulation in a bidder and target country on bidder shareholder wealth. The dependent variable is bidder
3-day (-1,+1) cumulative abnormal returns based on the market adjusted returns model. Investor protection is
measured as the antidirector rights index and the rule of law in a bidder country from La Porta et al. (1998).
The difference of investor protection is measured as the difference of investor protection in a bidder and
target country. Bank regulation is measured as overall activities restrictiveness, official supervisory power,
prompt corrective power and independence of supervisory authority-overall in a bidder country from Barth et
al. (2003). The difference of bank regulation is measured as the difference of bank regulation in a bidder and
target country. The regression analysis also includes a number of control variables. Cross-border is a dummy
variable that takes the value of 1 if the target and bidder locate in different countries. Cash is a dummy
variable, where the value of 1 indicates cash payment. The relative size is measured as the relative size of the
target and bidder proxied as deal value to bidder assets. ROA is measured as net income to total assets. The
market to book ratio is measured as the market value to book value. The capital ratio is measured as total
capital to total assets. Size is calculated as ln(total assets). The variables of the firm specific characteristics
are gathered from the year end prior to the transactions. The financial data is collected from Datastream
database. The  competitiveness  of  the  banking  market  is  proxied  as  net  interest  margin.  The size  of  the
banking market is measured as deposit money bank assets to GDP. The country level specific characteristics
are collected from the World Bank.
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. * Significant at the 0.1 level.
CAR
Bidder
) 1 , 1 (     = 0  + 1  (Bidder’s investor protection) + 2  (The difference of investor protection in
a bidder and target country) + 3  (Bidder’s bank regulation) + 4  (The difference of bank regulation in a
bidder and target country) + 5  (Cross-border dummy) + 6  (Cash dummy) + 7  (The relative size of the
target to bidder) + 8  (ROA) + 9  (The market to book ratio) + 10  (The capital ratio) + 11  (Size) +
12  (The competitiveness of the banking market) + 13  (The size of the banking market) + i 
Table 7.11 The cross-sectional regression analysis for bidders controlling for the difference
of investor protection and bank regulation in a bidder and target country based on the
Mean-Adj model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 0.057 *** 0.109 *** 0.060 *** 0.062 *** 0.058 *** 0.031 *
Antidirector rights
index
-0.000
Difference
(Antidirector rights
index)
-0.000
rule of law -0.004 ***
Difference (Rule of
law)
0.003
Overall Activities
Restrictiveness
-0.001
Difference (Overall
Activities
Restrictiveness)
-0.002
Official Supervisory
Power
-0.001
Difference (Official
Supervisory Power)
-0.002
Prompt Corrective
Power
-0.001
Difference (Prompt
Corrective Power)
0.003 *
Independence of
Supervisory Authority
- Overall
0.006 **340
Difference
(Independence of
Supervisory Authority
- Overall)
-0.003
Cross-border -0.008 -0.010 * -0.012 ** -0.009 * -0.007 -0.007
Cash 0.009 *** 0.006 ** 0.009 *** 0.009 *** 0.008 *** 0.010 ***
Relative size -0.142 *** -0.147 *** -0.141 *** -0.143 *** -0.143 *** -0.141 ***
ROA -0.162 -0.059 -0.175 -0.177 -0.127 -0.264
MKTV 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Capital to assets 0.027 0.028 * 0.028 * 0.029 * 0.027 * 0.031 **
ln (total assets) -0.002 *** -0.003 *** -0.002 *** -0.002 *** -0.002 *** -0.002 ***
Deposit Money Bank
Assets / GDP
-0.701 *** -0.864 *** -0.681 *** -0.690 *** -0.684 *** -0.603 ***
Net Interest Margin -0.003 -0.006 -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.000
Observations 1053 1052 1055 1048 1055 1055
Adjusted R Square 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06
F-value 6.33 7.39 6.52 6.73 6.62 6.70
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Table  7.11  presents  the  results  to  explore  the  impact  of  the  difference  of  investor  protection  and  bank
regulation in a bidder and target country on bidder shareholder wealth. The dependent variable is bidder
3-day (-1,+1) cumulative abnormal returns based on the mean adjusted returns model. Investor protection is
measured as the antidirector rights index and the rule of law in a bidder country from La Porta et al. (1998).
The difference of investor protection is measured as the difference of investor protection in a bidder and
target country. Bank regulation is measured as overall activities restrictiveness, official supervisory power,
prompt corrective power and independence of supervisory authority-overall in a bidder country from Barth et
al. (2003). The difference of bank regulation is measured as the difference of bank regulation in a bidder and
target country. The regression analysis also includes a number of control variables. Cross-border is a dummy
variable that takes the value of 1 if the target and bidder locate in different countries. Cash is a dummy
variable, where the value of 1 indicates cash payment. The relative size is measured as the relative size of the
target and bidder proxied as deal value to bidder assets. ROA is measured as net income to total assets. The
market to book ratio is measured as the market value to book value. The capital ratio is measured as total
capital to total assets. Size is calculated as ln(total assets). The variables of the firm specific characteristics
are gathered from the year end prior to the transactions. The financial data is collected from Datastream
database. The  competitiveness  of  the  banking  market  is  proxied  as  net  interest  margin.  The size  of  the
banking market is measured as deposit money bank assets to GDP. The country level specific characteristics
are collected from the World Bank.
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. * Significant at the 0.1 level.
CAR
Bidder
) 1 , 1 (     = 0  + 1  (Bidder’s investor protection) + 2  (The difference of investor protection in
a bidder and target country) + 3  (Bidder’s bank regulation) + 4  (The difference of bank regulation in a
bidder and target country) + 5  (Cross-border dummy) + 6  (Cash dummy) + 7  (The relative size of the
target to bidder) + 8  (ROA) + 9  (The market to book ratio) + 10  (The capital ratio) + 11  (Size) +
12  (The competitiveness of the banking market) + 13  (The size of the banking market) + i 
Table 8.1 Combined firms daily abnormal returns
Mean-Adj model
Mean p-value 1 Sign test Wilcoxon test
-30 -0.0003 0.3823 0.4440 0.9270
-29 0.0015 0.1114 1.0000 0.4130
-28 -0.0002 0.3843 0.2839 0.8020341
-27 -0.0013 0.1611 1.0000 0.7800
-26 0.0003 0.3688 0.0364 0.1750
-25 -0.0002 0.3853 0.1137 0.6150
-24 -0.0010 0.1945 0.0466 0.0720
-23 0.0003 0.3727 0.7986 0.1340
-22 0.0004 0.3527 0.7986 0.6330
-21 -0.0012 0.1484 0.2839 0.1740
-20 -0.0012 0.1727 0.0590 0.2180
-19 -0.0004 0.3410 0.7986 0.2260
-18 0.0001 0.3978 0.1137 0.5280
-17 -0.0009 0.2121 0.0741 0.1740
-16 -0.0006 0.3107 0.3857 0.6940
-15 0.0010 0.2076 0.3857 0.7300
-14 0.0005 0.3385 0.4440 0.0760
-13 0.0004 0.3540 0.7986 0.4440
-12 0.0006 0.3349 0.4440 0.9560
-11 0.0001 0.3963 0.4440 0.5340
-10 -0.0005 0.3493 0.9593 0.7790
-9 -0.0010 0.2421 0.3323 0.3100
-8 0.0023 0.0100 0.0410 0.0060
-7 0.0003 0.3755 0.7592 0.8850
-6 0.0003 0.3842 0.7592 0.3300
-5 0.0007 0.2767 0.2610 0.0630
-4 0.0007 0.3086 1.0000 0.1970
-3 -0.0015 0.1119 0.1127 0.4100
-2 0.0012 0.1745 0.8780 0.0930
-1 0.0000 0.3986 1.0000 0.1340
0 0.0013 0.3085 0.5060 0.8150
1 0.0023 0.1445 0.0922 0.4860
2 0.0000 0.3986 0.0466 0.4660
3 -0.0020 0.0316 0.2405 0.4340
4 -0.0009 0.2592 0.0922 0.3100
5 0.0014 0.1369 0.0466 0.8450
6 0.0003 0.3783 0.3857 0.8660
7 -0.0006 0.3131 0.1137 0.5230
8 0.0001 0.3945 0.6460 0.6390
9 0.0008 0.2640 0.3857 0.3590
10 -0.0013 0.1083 0.3857 0.2370
11 0.0015 0.0832 0.8783 0.9650
12 0.0006 0.3217 0.0093 0.4230
13 -0.0003 0.3728 0.1137 0.5970
14 -0.0013 0.1179 0.0922 0.1520342
15 -0.0003 0.3787 0.5746 0.3590
16 0.0011 0.1739 0.2839 0.1790
17 -0.0011 0.1591 0.0466 0.1300
18 0.0012 0.1559 0.7209 0.1170
19 -0.0013 0.1284 0.6460 0.9850
20 0.0000 0.3983 0.3857 0.6810
21 -0.0003 0.3769 0.5746 0.5720
22 -0.0014 0.0995 0.5071 0.9510
23 0.0002 0.3920 0.2839 0.8450
24 0.0001 0.3978 0.9593 0.4860
25 -0.0001 0.3941 0.4440 0.2450
26 -0.0005 0.3462 1.0000 0.6000
27 0.0013 0.1422 0.2020 0.7470
28 -0.0006 0.3086 0.2839 0.4500
29 -0.0018 0.0357 0.0466 0.0380
30 -0.0010 0.1911 0.3857 0.4580
p-value 1: t test with assuming cross-sectional independence
Wilcoxon test: Wilcoxon signed rank test
Table 8.2 Combined firms cumulative abnormal returns
Mean-Adj model
Mean p-value 1 Sign test Wilcoxon test
(-4,1) 0.0042 0.2150 0.2009 0.7460
(-1,1) 0.0036 0.2310 0.2405 0.7590
(-30,30) -0.0023 0.7560 0.5746 0.7980
(0) 0.0013 0.4750 0.0278 0.6430
(-1,0) 0.0013 0.5470 0.2393 0.6310
(-30,-1) 0.0004 0.9360 0.2839 0.3750
(0,1) 0.0036 0.1790 0.5071 0.8840
(1,30) -0.0040 0.4260 0.4440 0.2570
p-value 1: t test with assuming cross-sectional independence
Wilcoxon test: Wilcoxon signed rank test343
Table 8.3 Combined firms cumulative abnormal returns for activity focusing/diversifying
deals
Market-Adj model
Focusing Diversifying
Mean p-value 1 Sign test Wilcoxon
test
Mean p-value 1 Sign test Wilcoxon
test
( -4 , 1 ) 0.0091 0.0060 0.8228 0.1350 0.0069 0.4160 0.6143 0.1880
( -1 , 1 ) 0.0052 0.1010 0.2195 0.9430 0.0039 0.5400 0.8011 0.3470
( -30 ,
30 )
0.0191 0.0060 0.2195 0.0170 0.0166 0.4520 0.3135 0.1900
( 0 ) 0.0024 0.2390 0.5756 0.7900 -0.0006 0.8740 0.8011 0.9540
( -1 , 0 ) 0.0035 0.1430 0.3135 0.7450 0.0015 0.7620 0.8011 0.7400
( -30 ,
-1 )
0.0126 0.0040 0.0256 0.0010 0.0131 0.3390 0.6143 0.2300
( 0 , 1 ) 0.0041 0.1450 0.2643 0.8560 0.0019 0.7240 1.0000 0.6200
( 1 , 30 ) 0.0042 0.3870 1.0000 0.8320 0.0040 0.7870 0.6143 0.9920
N 324 64
p-value 1: t test with assuming cross-sectional independence
Wilcoxon test: Wilcoxon signed rank test
Table 8.4 Combined firms cumulative abnormal returns for activity focusing/diversifying
deals
Mean-Adj model
Focusing Diversifying
Mean p-value 1 Sign test Wilcoxon
test
Mean p-value 1 Sign test Wilcoxon
test
( -4 , 1 ) 0.0047 0.1800 0.0732 0.9270 0.0014 0.8910 0.4497 0.4700
( -1 , 1 ) 0.0034 0.3000 0.0445 0.3330 0.0044 0.5400 0.1306 0.2090
( -30 ,
30 )
-0.0044 0.5320 0.3151 0.5490 0.0085 0.7570 0.4497 0.5540
( 0 ) 0.0018 0.3890 0.0570 0.6060 -0.0010 0.8020 0.3135 0.9750
( -1 , 0 ) 0.0016 0.4960 0.1455 0.4260 -0.0003 0.9610 0.8011 0.6050
( -30 ,
-1 )
0.0012 0.7880 0.4346 0.4810 -0.0039 0.8230 0.4497 0.5630
( 0 , 1 ) 0.0036 0.2290 0.1804 0.5230 0.0037 0.5430 0.2077 0.2870
( 1 , 30 ) -0.0075 0.1370 0.2643 0.1570 0.0135 0.4380 0.6143 0.7500
N 324 64
p-value 1: t test with assuming cross-sectional independence
Wilcoxon test: Wilcoxon signed rank test344
Table 8.5 Correlation matrix
(-1,+1) Anti Law Ac Sup Cor Inde CB Payment Rel-size ROA MKTV Cap Size Dep Net
(-1,+1) 1
Anti .096 1
Law .105 .605** 1
Ac .022 .268** .340** 1
Sup .034 .734** .575** .587** 1
Cor .021 .698** .567** .559** .784** 1
Inde .071 .735** .487** .250** .635** .439** 1
CB -0.081 .0.270** -0.292** -0.517** -0.414** -0.400** -0.153** 1
Payment -0.042 -0.279** -0.182** -0.308** -0.336** -0.317** -0.230** .303** 1
Rel-size .166** .121* -0.009 .068 .116* .075 .125* -0.130* -0.185** 1
ROA -0.103 .432** .332** .185** .382** .429** .442** -0.160** -0.122* 0 1
MKTV -0.131* -0.093 -0.195** .068 .071 -0.088 .052 0 -0.162** .02 .247** 1
Cap .002 -0.187** -0.147** -0.088 -0.039 -0.033 -0.092 -0.188** .113* .107 -0.055 -0.156** 1
Size -0.191** -0.299** -0.270** -0.180** -0.342** -0.250** -0.342** .237** .058 -0.280** -0.170** .088 -0.256** 1
Dep -0.057 -0.432** -0.379** -0.376** -0.415** -0.406** -0.474** .273** .152** -0.107 -0.496** -0.075 -0.103 .470** 1
Net .001 .167** .118* .173** .250** .345** .094 -0.096 -0.046 .08 .482** .023 .788** -0.450** -0.488** 1
Anti: antidirector rights index, Law: rule of law, Ac: overall activities restrictiveness, Sup: official supervisory power, Cor: prompt corrective power, Inde: independence of supervisory
authority-overall
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level.
*    Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level.345
Table 8.6 The cross-sectional regression analysis for combined firms based on the Mkt-Adj
model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 0.131 *** 0.135 *** 0.206 *** 0.174 *** 0.179 *** 0.138 ***
Antidirector rights  i
ndex
0.005 ***
Rule of law 0.002
Overall Activities
Restrictiveness
-0.002
Official Supervisory
Power
0.000
Prompt Corrective
Power
0.000
Independence of
Supervisory
Authority - Overall
0.005
Cross-border -0.021 * -0.017 -0.025 * -0.019 -0.019 -0.019
Cash -0.009 -0.012 -0.015 * -0.014 * -0.013 * -0.012
Relative size 0.033 0.046 0.037 0.039 0.039 0.038
ROA -0.729 * -0.573 -0.433 -0.434 -0.451 -0.642
MKTV -0.004 *** -0.005 ** -0.006 *** -0.007 *** -0.006 *** -0.006 ***
Capital to assets -0.018 -0.039 * -0.043 -0.037 -0.037 -0.033
ln (total assets) -0.004 *** -0.004 ** -0.005 ** -0.005 *** -0.005 ** -0.004 ***
Deposit Money Bank
Assets / GDP
-0.014 -0.025 -0.020 -0.026 -0.019 -0.012
Net Interest Margin -1.852 *** -2.056 *** -1.451 ** -1.514 ** -1.569 ** -1.249 *
Observations 285 285 285 285 285 285
Adjusted R Square 11.26% 9.69% 9.36% 9.12% 9.13% 9.67%
F-value 4.60 4.05 3.93 3.85 3.85 4.04
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Table 8.6 presents the results to explore the impact of investor protection and bank regulation on combined
firms cumulative abnormal returns. The dependent variable is combined firms’ 3-day (-1,+1) cumulative
abnormal  returns  based  on  the  market  adjusted  returns  model.  Investor  protection  is  measured as  the
combination of the antidirector rights index and the combination of the rule of law in a target and bidder
country  from  La  Porta et  al.  (1998).  Bank  regulation  is  measured  as  the  combination  of  the  variables,
including  overall  activities  restrictiveness,  official  supervisory  power,  prompt  corrective  power  and
independence of supervisory authority-overall in a target and bidder country from Barth et al. (2003). The
regression model also includes a number of control variables. Cross-border is a dummy variable that takes
the value of 1 if the target and bidder locate in different countries. Cash is a dummy variable, where the value
of 1 indicates to use the cash payment. The relative size is measured as the relative size of the target to bidder.
ROA is measured as net income to total assets. The market to book ratio is measured as the market value to
book value. The capital ratio is measured as total capital to total assets. Size is calculated as ln(total assets).
The variables of the firm specific characteristics are gathered from the bidding firms at the year end prior to
bank merger and acquisition announcements. The financial data is collected from Datastream database. The
competitiveness of the banking market is proxied as net interest margin. The size of the banking market is
measured as deposit money bank assets to GDP. The country level specific characteristics are aimed at the
bidder’s perspective collected from the World Banks.
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. * Significant at the 0.1 level.346
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    = 0  + 1  (The combination of investor protection in a target and bidder country) +
2  (the  combination  of bank  regulation  in  a  target  and  bidder  country)  + 3  (Cross-border  dummy)  +
4  (Cash dummy) + 5  (The relative size of the target to bidder ) + 6  (ROA) + 7  (The market to book
ratio) + 8  (The capital ratio) + 9  (Size) + 10  (The competitiveness of the banking market) + 11  (The
size of the banking market) + i 
Table  8.7  The  cross-sectional  regression  analysis  for  combined  firms  based  on  the
Mean-Adj model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 0.110 ** 0.114 ** 0.194 *** 0.152 *** 0.152 *** 0.110 **
Antidirector rights  i
ndex
0.004 **
Rule of law 0.002
Overall Activities
Restrictiveness
-0.003
Official Supervisory
Power
0.000
Prompt Corrective
Power
0.000
Independence of
Supervisory
Authority - Overall
0.005
Cross-border -0.010 -0.007 -0.017 -0.009 -0.008 -0.009
Cash -0.008 -0.011 -0.014 * -0.012 * -0.011 -0.010
Relative size 0.035 0.047 0.038 0.041 0.041 0.040
ROA -0.821 ** -0.678 * -0.567 -0.547 -0.592 -0.773 *
MKTV -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 * -0.004 * -0.004 * -0.004 *
Capital to assets 0.006 -0.012 -0.019 -0.011 -0.010 -0.006
ln (total assets) -0.005 *** -0.005 *** -0.005 *** -0.005 *** -0.005 *** -0.005 ***
Deposit Money Bank
Assets / GDP
-0.002 -0.011 -0.009 -0.006 -0.006 0.001
Net Interest Margin -1.156 * --0.873 -0.773 -0.839 -0.947 -0.590
Observations 285 285 285 285 285 285
Adjusted R Square 11.02% 9.58% 9.77% 9.10% 9.15% 9.76%
F-value 4.52 4.01 4.08 3.84 3.86 4.07
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Table 8.7 presents the results to explore the impact of investor protection and bank regulation on combined
firms cumulative abnormal returns. The dependent variable is combined firms’ 3-day (-1,+1) cumulative
abnormal  returns  based  on  the  mean  adjusted  returns  model.  Investor  protection  is  measured as  the
combination of the antidirector rights index and the combination of the rule of law in a target and bidder
country  from  La  Porta et  al.  (1998).  Bank  regulation  is  measured  as  the  combination  of  the  variables,
including  overall  activities  restrictiveness,  official  supervisory  power, prompt  corrective  power  and
independence of supervisory authority-overall in a target and bidder country from Barth et al. (2003). The
regression model also includes a number of control variables. Cross-border is a dummy variable that takes
the value of 1 if the target and bidder locate in different countries. Cash is a dummy variable, where the value347
of 1 indicates to use the cash payment. The relative size is measured as the relative size of the target to bidder.
ROA is measured as net income to total assets. The market to book ratio is measured as the market value to
book value. The capital ratio is measured as total capital to total assets. Size is calculated as ln(total assets).
The variables of the firm specific characteristics are gathered from the bidding firms at the year end prior to
bank merger and acquisition announcements. The financial data is collected from Datastream database. The
competitiveness of the banking market is proxied as net interest margin. The size of the banking market is
measured as deposit money bank assets to GDP. The country level specific characteristics are aimed at the
bidder’s perspective collected from the World Banks.
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. * Significant at the 0.1 level.
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    = 0  + 1  (The combination of investor protection in a target and bidder country) +
2  (the  combination  of bank  regulation  in  a  target  and  bidder  country)  + 3  (Cross-border  dummy)  +
4  (Cash dummy) + 5  (The relative size of the target to bidder ) + 6  (ROA) + 7  (The market to book
ratio) + 8  (The capital ratio) + 9  (Size) + 10  (The competitiveness of the banking market) + 11  (The
size of the banking market) + i 
Appendix B
Table 6.1 The cross-sectional regression analysis for targets with the full 508 sample from
the Market model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 0.304 *** -0.004 0.331 *** 0.319 *** 0.377 *** 0.344 ***
Antidirector rights
  index
0.016 *
Rule of law 0.030 ***
Overall Activities
Restrictiveness
0.010
Official
Supervisory Power
0.006
Prompt Corrective
Power
0.007
Independence of
Supervisory
Authority - Overall
0.018
Cross-border 0.022 0.033 0.030 0.031 0.032 0.018
Cash 0.002 0.010 -0.004 -0.002 0.000 -0.004
Relative size 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ROA -0.022 -0.037 0.000 0.017 0.013 0.017
MKTV -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
Capital to assets -0.069 -0.060 -0.082 -0.073 -0.072 -0.070
ln (total assets) -0.014 *** -0.009 ** -0.015 *** -0.015 *** -0.015 *** -0.015 ***
Deposit Money
Bank Assets / GDP
0.003 0.000 -0.002 -0.003 -0.006 0.009
Net Interest Margin -0.350 0.324 -0.388 -0.467 -0.631 -0.065
Observations 410 409 410 410 410 410
Adjusted R Square 11.20% 14.50% 10.80% 10.80% 11.10% 10.70%348
F-value 6.179 7.902 5.945 5.940 6.083 5.911
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Table 6.1 presents the results of targets to explore the impact of investor protection and bank regulation on
the shareholder wealth in bank mergers using OLS regression analysis. The regression is analysed on the
basis of the full 508 sample. The dependent variable is target 3-day (-1,+1) cumulative abnormal returns
measured from the market model. Investor protection is measured as the antidirector rights index and the rule
of law in a target country from La Porta et al. (1998). Bank regulation is measured as overall activities
restrictiveness,  official  supervisory  power,  prompt  corrective  power  and independence  of  supervisory
authority-overall in a bidder country from Barth et al. (2003). The regression model also includes a number
of control variables. Cross-border is a dummy variable, where the value of 1 indicates the target and bidder in
different countries. Cash is a dummy variable, where the value of 1 indicates cash payment. The relative size
is measured as the relative size of the target to bidder. ROA is measured as net income to total assets. The
market to book ratio is measured as the market value to book value. The capital ratio is measured as total
capital to total assets. Size is calculated as ln(total assets). The variables of the firm specific characteristics
are gathered from the year end prior to bank merger and acquisition announcements. The financial data is
collected from Datastream database. The competitiveness of the banking market is proxied as net interest
margin in a bidder country. The size of the banking market is measured as deposit money bank assets to GDP
in a bidder country. The country level specific characteristics are collected from the World Bank.
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. * Significant at the 0.1 level.
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) 1 , 1 (     = 0  + 1  (Target’s investor  protection)  + 2  (Bidder’s bank  regulation)
+ 3  (Cross-border  dummy)  + 4  (Cash  dummy)  + 5  (The  relative  size  of  the  target  to  bidder)  +
6  (ROA)  + 7  (The  market  to  book  ratio)  + 8  (The  capital  ratio)  + 9  (Size)  + 10  (The
competitiveness of the banking market) + 11  (The size of the banking market) + i 
Table 6.2 The cross-sectional regression analysis for targets with the full 508 sample from
the Mkt-adj model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 0.299 *** -0.018 0.324 *** 0.314 *** 0.373 *** 0.337 ***
Antidirector rights
  index
0.016 *
Rule of law 0.031 ***
Overall Activities
Restrictiveness
0.010
Official
Supervisory Power
0.006
Prompt Corrective
Power
0.008
Independence of
Supervisory
Authority - Overall
0.018
Cross-border 0.018 0.030 0.027 0.027 0.029 0.014
Cash 0.000 0.008 -0.007 -0.005 -0.003 -0.006
Relative size 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ROA -0.036 -0.052 -0.014 0.004 0.000 0.004
MKTV -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
Capital to assets -0.064 -0.054 -0.078 -0.069 -0.067 -0.065
ln (total assets) -0.014 *** -0.009 ** -0.016 *** -0.015 *** -0.015 *** -0.015 ***
Deposit Money
Bank Assets / GDP
0.007 0.004 0.003 0.001 -0.002 0.014349
Net Interest Margin -0.233 0.459 -0.275 -0.353 -0.524 0.064
Observations 410 409 410 410 410 410
Adjusted R Square 10.80% 14.20% 10.30% 10.30% 10.60% 10.30%
F-value 5.943 7.753 5.720 5.706 5.860 5.683
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Table 6.2 presents the results of targets to explore the impact of investor protection and bank regulation on
the shareholder wealth in bank mergers using OLS regression analysis. The regression is analysed on the
basis of the full 508 sample. The dependent variable is target 3-day (-1,+1) cumulative abnormal returns
measured from the market adjusted returns model. Investor protection is measured as the antidirector rights
index and the rule of law in a target country from La Porta et al. (1998). Bank regulation is measured as
overall activities restrictiveness, official supervisory power, prompt corrective power and independence of
supervisory authority-overall in a bidder country from Barth et al. (2003). The regression model also includes
a number of control variables. Cross-border is a dummy variable, where the value of 1 indicates the target
and bidder in different countries. Cash is a dummy variable, where the value of 1 indicates cash payment.
The relative size is measured as the relative size of the target to bidder. ROA is measured as net income to
total assets. The market to book ratio is measured as the market value to book value. The capital ratio is
measured as total capital to total assets. Size is calculated as ln(total assets). The variables of the firm specific
characteristics are gathered from the year end prior to bank merger and acquisition announcements. The
financial data is collected from Datastream database. The competitiveness of the banking market is proxied
as net interest margin in a bidder country. The size of the banking market is measured as deposit money bank
assets to GDP in a bidder country. The country level specific characteristics are collected from the World
Bank.
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. * Significant at the 0.1 level.
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) 1 , 1 (     = 0  + 1  (Target’s investor  protection) + 2  (Bidder’s bank  regulation)
+ 3  (Cross-border  dummy)  + 4  (Cash  dummy)  + 5  (The  relative  size  of  the  target  to  bidder)  +
6  (ROA)  + 7  (The  market  to  book  ratio)  + 8  (The  capital  ratio)  + 9  (Size)  + 10  (The
competitiveness of the banking market) + 11  (The size of the banking market) + i 
Table 6.3 The cross-sectional regression analysis for targets with the full 508 sample from
the Mean-adj model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 0.284 *** -0.038 0.325 *** 0.313 *** 0.378 *** 0.345 ***
Antidirector rights
  index
0.019 **
Rule of law 0.033 ***
Overall Activities
Restrictiveness
0.011
Official
Supervisory Power
0.007
Prompt Corrective
Power
0.008 *
Independence of
Supervisory
Authority - Overall
0.018350
Cross-border 0.017 0.028 0.026 0.027 0.029 0.013
Cash 0.000 0.008 -0.008 -0.005 -0.004 -0.008
Relative size 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ROA -0.032 -0.044 -0.005 0.014 0.010 0.013
MKTV -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
Capital to assets -0.062 -0.053 -0.078 -0.068 -0.066 -0.065
ln (total assets) -0.014 *** -0.009 ** -0.016 *** -0.015 *** -0.015 *** -0.015 ***
Deposit Money
Bank Assets / GDP
0.007 0.003 0.001 0.000 -0.004 0.012
Net Interest Margin -0.486 0.252 -0.525 -0.611 -0.799 -0.180
Observations 410 409 410 410 410 410
Adjusted R Square 11.20% 14.80% 10.50% 10.50% 10.80% 10.40%
F-value 6.180 8.060 5.810 5.798 5.977 5.745
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Table 6.3 presents the results of targets to explore the impact of investor protection and bank regulation on
the shareholder wealth in bank mergers using OLS regression analysis. The regression is analysed on the
basis of the full 508 sample. The dependent variable is target 3-day (-1,+1) cumulative abnormal returns
measured from the mean adjusted returns model. Investor protection is measured as the antidirector rights
index and the rule of law in a target country from La Porta et al. (1998). Bank regulation is measured as
overall activities restrictiveness, official supervisory power, prompt corrective power and independence of
supervisory authority-overall in a bidder country from Barth et al. (2003). The regression model also includes
a number of control variables. Cross-border is a dummy variable, where the value of 1 indicates the target
and bidder in different countries. Cash is a dummy variable, where the value of 1 indicates cash payment.
The relative size is measured as the relative size of the target to bidder. ROA is measured as net income to
total assets. The market to book ratio is measured as the market value to book value. The capital ratio is
measured as total capital to total assets. Size is calculated as ln(total assets). The variables of the firm specific
characteristics are gathered from the year end prior to bank merger and acquisition announcements. The
financial data is collected from Datastream database. The competitiveness of the banking market is proxied
as net interest margin in a bidder country. The size of the banking market is measured as deposit money bank
assets to GDP in a bidder country. The country level specific characteristics are collected from the World
Bank.
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. * Significant at the 0.1 level.
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) 1 , 1 (     = 0  + 1  (Target’s investor  protection)  + 2  (Bidder’s bank  regulation)
+ 3  (Cross-border  dummy)  + 4  (Cash  dummy)  + 5  (The  relative  size  of  the  target  to  bidder)  +
6  (ROA)  + 7  (The  market  to  book  ratio)  + 8  (The  capital  ratio)  + 9  (Size)  + 10  (The
competitiveness of the banking market) + 11  (The size of the banking market) + i 
Table 6.4 The cross-sectional regression analysis for targets controlling for the difference
of investor protection and bank regulation in a bidder and target country based on the full
580 sample from Market model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 0.303 *** 0.017 0.327 *** 0.371 *** 0.362 *** 0.354 ***
Antidirector rights
index
0.015351
Difference
(Antidirector rights
index)
-0.002
rule of law 0.027 ***
Difference (Rule of
law)
-0.019
Overall Activities
Restrictiveness
0.009
Difference (Overall
Activities
Restrictiveness)
-0.069
Official
Supervisory Power
0.002
Difference (Official
Supervisory Power)
-0.084 ***
Prompt Corrective
Power
0.008 *
Difference (Prompt
Corrective Power)
0.209 ***
Independence of
Supervisory
Authority - Overall
0.011
Difference
(Independence of
Supervisory
Authority - Overall)
-0.408 ***
Cross-border 0.014 0.037 0.023 0.021 0.012 -0.024
Cash 0.001 0.011 -0.004 -0.011 -0.002 -0.009
Relative size 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ROA -0.008 -0.052 0.018 0.028 0.037 0.065
MKTV -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
Capital to assets -0.080 -0.072 -0.090 -0.089 -0.072 -0.081
ln (total assets) -0.014 *** -0.009 ** -0.015 *** -0.015 *** -0.014 *** -0.014 ***
Deposit Money
Bank Assets / GDP
0.003 -0.002 0.003 0.002 -0.013 0.002
Net Interest Margin -0.239 0.447 -0.243 -0.218 -0.691 -0.095
Observations 407 406 406 406 406 406
Adjusted R Square 11.00% 14.40% 11.00% 13.30% 15.50% 16.70%
F-value 5.551 7.171 5.565 6.640 7.755 8.397
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Table  6.4  presents  the  results  to  explore  the  impact  of  the  difference  of  investor  protection  and  bank
regulation on target shareholder wealth in bank mergers using OLS regression analysis. The regression is
analysed on the basis of the full 508 sample. The dependent variable is target 3-day (-1,+1) cumulative
abnormal returns measured from the market model. Investor protection is measured as the antidirector rights
index and the rule of law in a target country from La Porta et al. (1998). The difference of investor protection
is  measured as  the  difference  of  investor  protection  in  a  bidder  and  target  country.  Bank  regulation  is
measured  as  overall  activities  restrictiveness,  official  supervisory  power,  prompt  corrective  power  and
independence of supervisory authority-overall in a bidder country from Barth et al. (2003). The difference of
bank  regulation  is  measured  as  the  difference  of  bank  regulation  in  a  bidder  and  target  country.  The
regression model also includes a number of control variables. Cross-border is a dummy variable, where the
value of 1 indicates the target and bidder in different countries. Cash is a dummy variable, where the value of
1 indicates cash payment. The relative size is measured as the relative size of the target to bidder. ROA is
measured as net income to total assets. The market to book ratio is measured as the market value to book
value. The capital ratio is measured as total capital to total assets. Size is calculated as ln(total assets). The
variables  of  the  firm  specific  characteristics  are  gathered  from  the  year  end  prior  to  bank  merger  and
acquisition announcements. The financial data is collected from Datastream database. The competitiveness of
the banking market is proxied as net interest margin. The size of the banking market is measured as deposit
money bank assets to GDP. The country level specific characteristics are collected from the World Bank.
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. * Significant at the 0.1 level.352
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) 1 , 1 (     = 0  + 1  (Target’s investor  protection)  + 2  (The difference  of  target’s  investor
protection)  + 3  (Bidder’s bank  regulation)  + 4  (The difference  of  bidder’s  bank  regulation)  +
5  (Cross-border dummy) + 6  (Cash dummy) + 7  (The relative size of the target to bidder) + 8  (ROA)
+ 9  (The market to book ratio) + 10  (The capital ratio) + 11  (Size) + 12  (The competitiveness of the
banking market) + 13  (The size of the banking market) + i 
Table 6.5 The cross-sectional regression analysis for targets controlling for the difference
of investor protection and bank regulation in a bidder and target country based on the full
580 sample from Mkt-adj model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 0.299 *** 0.002 0.320 *** 0.365 *** 0.357 *** 0.345 ***
Antidirector rights
index
0.014
Difference
(Antidirector rights
index)
-0.003
rule of law 0.028 ***
Difference (Rule of
law)
-0.018
Overall Activities
Restrictiveness
0.009
Difference (Overall
Activities
Restrictiveness)
-0.068
Official Supervisory
Power
0.002
Difference (Official
Supervisory Power)
-0.082 ***
Prompt Corrective
Power
0.008 *
Difference (Prompt
Corrective Power)
0.205 ***
Independence of
Supervisory
Authority - Overall
0.012
Difference
(Independence of
Supervisory
Authority - Overall)
-0.400
Cross-border 0.008 0.033 0.018 0.016 0.007 -0.029
Cash -0.003 0.009 -0.007 -0.014 -0.005 -0.011
Relative size 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ROA -0.024 -0.064 0.006 0.017 0.025 0.053
MKTV -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
Capital to assets -0.076 -0.067 -0.085 -0.084 -0.068 -0.076
ln (total assets) -0.014 *** -0.009 ** -0.016 *** -0.015 *** -0.014 *** -0.014 ***
Deposit Money
Bank Assets / GDP
0.007 0.003 0.008 0.007 -0.008 0.008
Net Interest Margin -0.102 0.582 -0.118 -0.091 -0.566 0.053
Observations 407 406 406 406 406 406353
Adjusted R Square 10.50% 14.10% 10.60% 12.80% 15.00% 16.10%
F-value 5.348 7.022 5.377 6.400 7.474 8.084
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Table  6.5  presents  the  results  to  explore  the  impact  of  the  difference  of  investor  protection  and  bank
regulation on target shareholder wealth in bank mergers using OLS regression analysis. The regression is
analysed on the basis of the full 508 sample. The dependent variable is target 3-day (-1,+1) cumulative
abnormal returns measured from the market adjusted returns model. Investor protection is measured as the
antidirector rights index and the rule of law in a target country from La Porta et al. (1998). The difference of
investor protection is measured as the difference of investor protection in a bidder and target country. Bank
regulation  is  measured  as  overall  activities  restrictiveness,  official  supervisory  power,  prompt  corrective
power and independence of supervisory authority-overall in a bidder country from Barth et al. (2003). The
difference of bank regulation is measured as the difference of bank regulation in a bidder and target country.
The regression model also includes a number of control variables. Cross-border is a dummy variable, where
the value of 1 indicates the target and bidder in different countries. Cash is a dummy variable, where the
value of 1 indicates cash payment. The relative size is measured as the relative size of the target to bidder.
ROA is measured as net income to total assets. The market to book ratio is measured as the market value to
book value. The capital ratio is measured as total capital to total assets. Size is calculated as ln(total assets).
The variables of the firm specific characteristics are gathered from the year end prior to bank merger and
acquisition announcements. The financial data is collected from Datastream database. The competitiveness of
the banking market is proxied as net interest margin. The size of the banking market is measured as deposit
money bank assets to GDP. The country level specific characteristics are collected from the World Bank.
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. * Significant at the 0.1 level.
CAR
et T arg
) 1 , 1 (     = 0  + 1  (Target’s investor  protection)  + 2  (The difference  of  target’s  investor
protection)  + 3  (Bidder’s bank  regulation)  + 4  (The difference  of  bidder’s  bank  regulation)  +
5  (Cross-border dummy) + 6  (Cash dummy) + 7  (The relative size of the target to bidder) + 8  (ROA)
+ 9  (The market to book ratio) + 10  (The capital ratio) + 11  (Size) + 12  (The competitiveness of the
banking market) + 13  (The size of the banking market) + i 
Table 6.6 The cross-sectional regression analysis for targets controlling for the difference
of investor protection and bank regulation in a bidder and target country based on the full
580 sample from Mean-adj model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 0.286 *** -0.008 0.319 *** 0.367 *** 0.362 *** 0.356 ***
Antidirector rights
index
0.018 *
Difference
(Antidirector rights
index)
-0.006
rule of law 0.029 ***
Difference (Rule of
law)
-0.028
Overall Activities
Restrictiveness
0.011
Difference (Overall
Activities
Restrictiveness)
-0.071
Official 0.002354
Supervisory Power
Difference (Official
Supervisory Power)
-0.086 ***
Prompt Corrective
Power
0.009 *
Difference (Prompt
Corrective Power)
0.207 ***
Independence of
Supervisory
Authority - Overall
0.011
Difference
(Independence of
Supervisory
Authority -
Overall)
-0.413 ***
Cross-border 0.007 0.036 0.019 0.016 0.007 -0.032
Cash -0.002 0.009 -0.008 -0.015 -0.005 -0.013
Relative size 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ROA -0.028 -0.073 0.014 0.027 0.035 0.063
MKTV -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
Capital to assets -0.074 -0.067 -0.085 -0.084 -0.066 -0.077
ln (total assets) -0.013 *** -0.008 ** -0.015 *** -0.015 *** -0.014 *** -0.014 ***
Deposit Money
Bank Assets / GDP
0.006 0.000 0.006 0.006 -0.010 0.005
Net Interest Margin -0.345 0.415 -0.371 -0.344 -0.851 -0.205
Observations 407 406 406 406 406 406
Adjusted R Square 11.00% 14.90% 10.90% 13.10% 15.20% 16.50%
F-value 5.572 7.464 5.490 6.563 7.588 8.259
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Table  6.6  presents  the  results  to  explore  the  impact  of  the  difference  of  investor  protection  and  bank
regulation on target shareholder wealth in bank mergers using OLS regression analysis. The regression is
analysed on the basis of the full 508 sample. The dependent variable is target 3-day (-1,+1) cumulative
abnormal returns measured from the mean adjusted returns model. Investor protection is measured as the
antidirector rights index and the rule of law in a target country from La Porta et al. (1998). The difference of
investor protection is measured as the difference of investor protection in a bidder and target country. Bank
regulation  is  measured  as  overall  activities  restrictiveness,  official  supervisory  power,  prompt  corrective
power and independence of supervisory authority-overall in a bidder country from Barth et al. (2003). The
difference of bank regulation is measured as the difference of bank regulation in a bidder and target country.
The regression model also includes a number of control variables. Cross-border is a dummy variable, where
the value of 1 indicates the target and bidder in different countries. Cash is a dummy variable, where the
value of 1 indicates cash payment. The relative size is measured as the relative size of the target to bidder.
ROA is measured as net income to total assets. The market to book ratio is measured as the market value to
book value. The capital ratio is measured as total capital to total assets. Size is calculated as ln(total assets).
The variables of the firm specific characteristics are gathered from the year end prior to bank merger and
acquisition announcements. The financial data is collected from Datastream database. The competitiveness of
the banking market is proxied as net interest margin. The size of the banking market is measured as deposit
money bank assets to GDP. The country level specific characteristics are collected from the World Bank.
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. * Significant at the 0.1 level.
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et T arg
) 1 , 1 (     = 0  + 1  (Target’s investor  protection)  + 2  (The difference  of  target’s  investor
protection)  + 3  (Bidder’s bank  regulation)  + 4  (The difference  of  bidder’s  bank  regulation)  +
5  (Cross-border dummy) + 6  (Cash dummy) + 7  (The relative size of the target to bidder) + 8  (ROA)
+ 9  (The market to book ratio) + 10  (The capital ratio) + 11  (Size) + 12  (The competitiveness of the355
banking market) + 13  (The size of the banking market) + i 
Table 7.1 The cross-sectional regression analysis for bidders with the full 1,424 sample
from Market model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 0.016 0.053 * 0.042 * 0.026 0.036 0.014
Antidirector rights  in
dex
0.004 **
Rule of law -0.001
Overall Activities
Restrictiveness
0.000
Official Supervisory
Power
0.001
Prompt Corrective
Power
0.002 *
Independence of
Supervisory Authority
- Overall
0.006 *
Cross-border -0.004 -0.006 -0.006 -0.004 -0.002 -0.005
Cash 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003
Relative size -0.131 *** -0.135 *** -0.133 *** -0.132 *** -0.130 *** -0.131 ***
ROA -1.006 *** -0.804 *** -0.841 *** -0.903 *** -0.941 *** -0.986 ***
MKTV 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Capital to assets 0.035 * 0.028 0.027 0.029 0.030 0.033
ln (total assets) -0.001 * -0.002 ** -0.002 ** -0.002 ** -0.002 ** -0.001
Deposit Money Bank
Assets / GDP
0.012 * 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.014 *
Net Interest Margin -0.278 -0.291 -0.280 -0.310 -0.431 -0.143
Observations 1296 1295 1298 1296 1298 1298
Adjusted R Square 3.80% 3.50% 3.50% 3.60% 3.70% 3.80%
F-value 6.066 5.703 5.711 5.780 6.040 6.067
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Table 7.1 presents the results of bidder regression analysis. The regression is analysed on the basis of the full
1,424 sample. The dependent variable is bidder 3-day (-1,+1) cumulative abnormal returns based on the
market model. Investor protection is measured as the antidirector rights index and the rule of law in a bidder
country from La Porta et al. (1998). Bank regulation is measured as overall activities restrictiveness, official
supervisory power, prompt corrective power and independence of supervisory authority-overall in a bidder
country  from  Barth et  al.  (2003).  The  regression  model  also  includes  a  number  of  control  variables.
Cross-border  is  a  dummy variable  that  takes  the  value  of  1  if  the  target  and  bidder  locate  in  different
countries. Cash is a dummy  variable,  where the value of 1 indicates cash payment.  The relative size is
measured as the relative size of the target to bidder proxied as deal value to bidder assets. ROA is measured
as net income to total assets. The market to book ratio is measured as the market value to book value. The
capital ratio is measured as total capital to total assets. Size is calculated as ln(total assets). The variables of
the  firm  specific  characteristics  are  gathered  from  the  year  end  prior  to  bank  merger  and  acquisition
announcements.  The  financial  data  is  collected  from  Datastream  database.  The  competitiveness  of  the356
banking market is proxied as net interest margin. The size of the banking market is measured as deposit
money bank assets to GDP. The country level specific characteristics are collected from the World Bank.
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. * Significant at the 0.1 level.
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) 1 , 1 (     = 0  + 1  (Bidder’s investor  protection)  + 2  (Bidder’s bank  regulation)
+ 3  (Cross-border  dummy)  + 4  (Cash  dummy)  + 5  (The  relative  size  of  the  target  to  bidder)  +
6  (ROA)  + 7  (The  market  to  book  ratio)  + 8  (The  capital  ratio)  + 9  (Size)  + 10  (The
competitiveness of the banking market) + 11  (The size of the banking market) + i 
Table 7.2 The cross-sectional regression analysis for bidders with the full 1,424 sample
from Mkt-adj model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 0.013 0.052 * 0.042 * 0.022 0.032 0.009
Antidirector rights in
dex
0.003 *
Rule of law -0.002
Overall Activities
Restrictiveness
0.000
Official Supervisory
Power
0.001
Prompt Corrective
Power
0.002 *
Independence of
Supervisory Authority
- Overall
0.007 *
Cross-border -0.005 -0.006 -0.007 -0.004 -0.002 -0.005
Cash 0.000 -0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Relative size -0.122 *** -0.126 *** -0.123 *** -0.122 *** -0.121 *** -0.121 ***
ROA -0.897 *** -0.695 *** -0.743 *** -0.808 *** -0.844 *** -0.889 ***
MKTV 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Capital to assets 0.037 * 0.031 0.030 0.032 0.033 0.036 *
ln (total assets) -0.001 -0.002 ** -0.002 ** -0.002 * -0.002 * -0.001
Deposit Money Bank
Assets / GDP
0.016 ** 0.014 * 0.013 * 0.014 * 0.014 * 0.017 **
Net Interest Margin -0.271 -0.298 -0.287 -0.325 -0.440 -0.151
Observations 1296 1295 1298 1296 1298 1298
Adjusted R Square 3.30% 3.10% 3.10% 3.10% 3.30% 3.30%
F-value 5.359 5.100 5.103 5.156 5.398 5.432
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Table 7.2 presents the results of bidder regression analysis. The regression is analysed on the basis of the full
1,424 sample. The dependent variable is bidder 3-day (-1,+1) cumulative abnormal returns based on the
market adjusted returns model. Investor protection is measured as the antidirector rights index and the rule of
law  in  a  bidder  country  from  La  Porta et  al.  (1998).  Bank  regulation  is  measured  as  overall  activities
restrictiveness,  official  supervisory  power,  prompt  corrective  power  and independence  of  supervisory357
authority-overall in a bidder country from Barth et al. (2003). The regression model also includes a number
of control variables. Cross-border is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the target and bidder locate
in different countries. Cash is a dummy variable, where the value of 1 indicates cash payment. The relative
size is measured as the relative size of the target to bidder proxied as deal value to bidder assets. ROA is
measured as net income to total assets. The market to book ratio is measured as the market value to book
value. The capital ratio is measured as total capital to total assets. Size is calculated as ln(total assets). The
variables  of  the  firm  specific  characteristics  are  gathered  from  the  year  end  prior  to  bank  merger  and
acquisition announcements. The financial data is collected from Datastream database. The competitiveness of
the banking market is proxied as net interest margin. The size of the banking market is measured as deposit
money bank assets to GDP. The country level specific characteristics are collected from the World Bank.
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. * Significant at the 0.1 level.
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) 1 , 1 (     = 0  + 1  (Bidder’s investor  protection)  + 2  (Bidder’s bank  regulation)
+ 3  (Cross-border  dummy)  + 4  (Cash  dummy)  + 5  (The  relative  size  of  the  target  to  bidder)  +
6  (ROA)  + 7  (The  market  to  book  ratio)  + 8  (The  capital  ratio)  + 9  (Size)  + 10  (The
competitiveness of the banking market) + 11  (The size of the banking market) + i 
Table 7.3 The cross-sectional regression analysis for bidders with the full 1,424 sample
from Mean-adj model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 0.029 0.072 ** 0.054 ** 0.039 0.046 ** 0.022
Antidirector rights
  index
0.004 **
Rule of law -0.002
Overall Activities
Restrictiveness
0.000
Official
Supervisory Power
0.001
Prompt Corrective
Power
0.002 *
Independence of
Supervisory
Authority - Overall
0.007 *
Cross-border -0.007 -0.008 -0.009 -0.007 -0.005 -0.008
Cash 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000
Relative size -0.136 *** -0.140 *** -0.137 *** -0.136 *** -0.135 *** -0.135 ***
ROA -1.054 *** -0.834 *** -0.886 *** -0.945 *** -0.988 *** -1.044 ***
MKTV 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Capital to assets 0.016 0.009 0.008 0.010 0.011 0.015
ln (total assets) -0.001 -0.002 * -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000
Deposit Money
Bank Assets / GDP
0.008 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.011
Net Interest Margin -0.523 * -0.548 * -0.478 * -0.543 * -0.632 -0.329
Observations 1296 1295 1298 1296 1298 1298
Adjusted R Square 3.80% 3.60% 3.50% 3.60% 3.80% 3.80%358
F-value 6.158 5.832 5.750 5.864 6.054 6.136
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Table 7.3 presents the results of bidder regression analysis. The regression is analysed on the basis of the full
1,424 sample. The dependent variable is bidder 3-day (-1,+1) cumulative abnormal returns based on the mean
adjusted returns model. Investor protection is measured as the antidirector rights index and the rule of law in
a bidder country from La Porta et al. (1998). Bank regulation is measured as overall activities restrictiveness,
official supervisory power, prompt corrective power and independence of supervisory authority-overall in a
bidder country from Barth et al. (2003). The regression model also includes a number of control variables.
Cross-border  is  a  dummy variable  that  takes  the  value  of  1  if  the  target  and  bidder  locate  in  different
countries. Cash is a dummy  variable,  where the value of 1 indicates cash payment.  The relative size is
measured as the relative size of the target to bidder proxied as deal value to bidder assets. ROA is measured
as net income to total assets. The market to book ratio is measured as the market value to book value. The
capital ratio is measured as total capital to total assets. Size is calculated as ln(total assets). The variables of
the  firm  specific  characteristics  are  gathered  from  the  year  end  prior  to  bank  merger  and  acquisition
announcements.  The  financial  data  is  collected  from  Datastream  database.  The  competitiveness  of  the
banking market is proxied as net interest margin. The size of the banking market is measured as deposit
money bank assets to GDP. The country level specific characteristics are collected from the World Bank.
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. * Significant at the 0.1 level.
CAR
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) 1 , 1 (     = 0  + 1  (Bidder’s investor  protection)  + 2  (Bidder’s bank  regulation)
+ 3  (Cross-border  dummy)  + 4  (Cash  dummy)  + 5  (The  relative  size  of  the  target  to  bidder)  +
6  (ROA)  + 7  (The  market  to  book  ratio)  + 8  (The  capital  ratio)  + 9  (Size)  + 10  (The
competitiveness of the banking market) + 11  (The size of the banking market) + i 
Table 7.4 The cross-sectional regression analysis for bidders controlling for the difference
of investor protection and bank regulation in a bidder and target country based on the
Market model with the full 1,424 sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 0.011 0.057 * 0.041 0.026 0.036 * 0.010
Antidirector rights
index
0.004 **
Difference
(Antidirector rights
index)
0.000
rule of law -0.002
Difference (Rule of
law)
0.004
Overall Activities
Restrictiveness
0.000
Difference (Overall
Activities
Restrictiveness)
0.001
Official Supervisory
Power
0.001
Difference (Official
Supervisory Power)
0.000
Prompt Corrective
Power
0.002
Difference (Prompt
Corrective Power)
0.002
Independence of
Supervisory
Authority - Overall
0.007 *
Difference 0.001359
(Independence of
Supervisory
Authority - Overall)
Cross-border -0.005 -0.009 -0.005 -0.004 -0.001 -0.006
Cash 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003
Relative size -0.131 *** -0.136 *** -0.133 *** -0.132 *** -0.131 *** -0.131 ***
ROA -0.989 *** -0.769 *** -0.812 *** -0.858 *** -0.879 *** -0.957 ***
MKTV 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Capital to assets 0.041 ** 0.034 0.032 0.036 0.036 * 0.039 *
ln (total assets) -0.001 -0.002 ** -0.002 ** -0.002 ** -0.002 ** -0.001
Deposit Money
Bank Assets / GDP
0.014 * 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.015 *
Net Interest Margin -0.240 -0.288 -0.247 -0.274 -0.415 -0.107
Observations 1257 1253 1259 1252 1259 1259
Adjusted R Square 3.60% 3.40% 3.30% 3.30% 3.60% 3.60%
F-value 5.274 5.038 4.916 4.899 5.239 5.221
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Table  7.4  presents  the  results  to  explore  the  impact  of  the  difference  of  investor  protection  and  bank
regulation in a bidder and target country on bidder shareholder wealth. The analysis is based on the full 1,424
sample. The dependent variable is bidder 3-day (-1,+1) cumulative abnormal returns based on the market
model. Investor protection is measured as the antidirector rights index and the rule of law in a bidder country
from La Porta et al. (1998). The difference of investor protection is measured as the difference of investor
protection in a bidder and target country. Bank regulation is measured as overall activities restrictiveness,
official supervisory power, prompt corrective power and independence of supervisory authority-overall in a
bidder country from Barth et al. (2003). The difference of bank regulation is measured as the difference of
bank regulation in a bidder and target country. The regression analysis also includes a number of control
variables. Cross-border is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the target and bidder locate in
different countries. Cash is a dummy variable, where the value of 1 indicates cash payment. The relative size
is measured as the relative size of the target and bidder proxied as deal value to bidder assets. ROA is
measured as net income to total assets. The market to book ratio is measured as the market value to book
value. The capital ratio is measured as total capital to total assets. Size is calculated as ln(total assets). The
variables of the firm specific characteristics are gathered from the year end prior to the transactions. The
financial data is collected from Datastream database. The competitiveness of the banking market is proxied
as net interest margin. The size of the banking market is measured as deposit money bank assets to GDP. The
country level specific characteristics are collected from the World Bank.
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. * Significant at the 0.1 level.
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) 1 , 1 (     = 0  + 1  (Bidder’s investor protection) + 2  (The difference of investor protection in
a bidder and target country) + 3  (Bidder’s bank regulation) + 4  (The difference of bank regulation in a
bidder and target country) + 5  (Cross-border dummy) + 6  (Cash dummy) + 7  (The relative size of the
target to bidder) + 8  (ROA) + 9  (The market to book ratio) + 10  (The capital ratio) + 11  (Size) +
12  (The competitiveness of the banking market) + 13  (The size of the banking market) + i 
Table 7.5 The cross-sectional regression analysis for bidders controlling for the difference
of investor protection and bank regulation in a bidder and target country based on the
Mkt-adj model with the full 1,424 sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 0.007 0.056 * 0.043 0.021 0.032 0.005
Antidirector rights
index
0.004 *360
Difference
(Antidirector rights
index)
0.001
rule of law -0.002
Difference (Rule of
law)
0.004
Overall Activities
Restrictiveness
-0.001
Difference (Overall
Activities
Restrictiveness)
0.001
Official Supervisory
Power
0.001
Difference (Official
Supervisory Power)
0.001
Prompt Corrective
Power
0.002
Difference (Prompt
Corrective Power)
0.002
Independence of
Supervisory
Authority - Overall
0.007 *
Difference
(Independence of
Supervisory
Authority - Overall)
0.001
Cross-border -0.007 -0.011 -0.007 -0.004 -0.002 -0.007
Cash 0.000 -0.003 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
Relative size -0.121 *** -0.126 *** -0.123 *** -0.123 *** -0.121 *** -0.121 ***
ROA -0.872 *** -0.652 ** -0.704 *** -0.756 *** -0.774 *** -0.859 ***
MKTV 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Capital to assets 0.044 ** 0.037 * 0.035 0.039 * 0.039 * 0.042 *
ln (total assets) -0.001 -0.002 ** -0.002 ** -0.002 * -0.002 ** -0.001
Deposit Money
Bank Assets / GDP
0.017 ** 0.014 * 0.015 * 0.016 ** 0.016 ** 0.019 **
Net Interest Margin -0.237 -0.302 -0.258 -0.282 -0.439 -0.113
Observations 1257 1253 1259 1252 1259 1259
Adjusted R Square 3.10% 3.00% 2.90% 2.90% 3.20% 3.20%
F-value 4.707 4.575 4.421 4.424 4.752 4.728
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Table  7.5  presents  the  results  to  explore  the  impact  of  the  difference  of  investor  protection  and  bank
regulation in a bidder and target country on bidder shareholder wealth. The analysis is based on the full 1,424
sample. The dependent variable is bidder 3-day (-1,+1) cumulative abnormal returns based on the market
adjusted returns model. Investor protection is measured as the antidirector rights index and the rule of law in
a  bidder  country  from  La  Porta et  al.  (1998).  The difference  of  investor  protection  is  measured  as  the
difference  of  investor  protection  in  a  bidder  and  target  country.  Bank  regulation  is  measured  as  overall
activities  restrictiveness,  official  supervisory  power,  prompt  corrective  power  and independence  of
supervisory authority-overall in a bidder country from Barth et al. (2003). The difference of bank regulation
is measured as the difference of bank regulation in a bidder and target country. The regression analysis also
includes a number of control variables. Cross-border is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the
target and bidder locate in different countries. Cash is a dummy variable, where the value of 1 indicates cash
payment. The relative size is measured as the relative size of the target and bidder proxied as deal value to
bidder assets. ROA is measured as net income to total assets. The market to book ratio is measured as the
market value to book value. The capital ratio is measured as total capital to total assets. Size is calculated as
ln(total assets). The variables of the firm specific characteristics are gathered from the year end prior to the
transactions. The financial data is collected from Datastream database. The competitiveness of the banking
market is proxied as net interest margin. The size of the banking market is measured as deposit money bank
assets to GDP. The country level specific characteristics are collected from the World Bank.361
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. * Significant at the 0.1 level.
CAR
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) 1 , 1 (     = 0  + 1  (Bidder’s investor protection) + 2  (The difference of investor protection in
a bidder and target country) + 3  (Bidder’s bank regulation) + 4  (The difference of bank regulation in a
bidder and target country) + 5  (Cross-border dummy) + 6  (Cash dummy) + 7  (The relative size of the
target to bidder) + 8  (ROA) + 9  (The market to book ratio) + 10  (The capital ratio) + 11  (Size) +
12  (The competitiveness of the banking market) + 13  (The size of the banking market) + i 
Table 7.6 The cross-sectional regression analysis for bidders controlling for the difference
of investor protection and bank regulation in a bidder and target country based on the
Mean-adj model with the full 1,424 sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 0.021 0.076 ** 0.052 * 0.036 0.046 ** 0.014
Antidirector rights
index
0.004 **
Difference
(Antidirector rights
index)
0.001
rule of law -0.002
Difference (Rule of
law)
0.004
Overall Activities
Restrictiveness
0.000
Difference (Overall
Activities
Restrictiveness)
0.001
Official Supervisory
Power
0.001
Difference (Official
Supervisory Power)
0.001
Prompt Corrective
Power
0.002
Difference (Prompt
Corrective Power)
0.003
Independence of
Supervisory
Authority - Overall
0.008 **
Difference
(Independence of
Supervisory
Authority - Overall)
-0.001
Cross-border -0.010 -0.015 ** -0.011 -0.009 -0.005 -0.011 *
Cash 0.000 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.000
Relative size -0.134 *** -0.140 *** -0.136 *** -0.136 *** -0.134 *** -0.133 ***
ROA -1.032 *** -0.791 *** -0.842 *** -0.907 *** -0.909 *** -1.020 ***
MKTV -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
Capital to assets 0.021 0.014 0.013 0.017 0.016 0.020
ln (total assets) 0.000 -0.002 * -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000
Deposit Money
Bank Assets / GDP
0.009 0.006 0.008 0.010 0.009 0.012
Net Interest Margin -0.487 -0.559 * -0.444 -0.473 -0.642 -0.285
Observations 1257 1253 1259 1252 1259 1259362
Adjusted R Square 3.70% 3.60% 3.30% 3.40% 3.70% 3.70%
F-value 5.403 5.271 4.955 5.057 5.425 5.366
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Table  7.6  presents  the  results  to  explore  the  impact  of  the  difference  of  investor  protection  and  bank
regulation in a bidder and target country on bidder shareholder wealth. The analysis is based on the full 1,424
sample. The dependent variable is bidder 3-day (-1,+1) cumulative abnormal returns based on the mean
adjusted returns model. Investor protection is measured as the antidirector rights index and the rule of law in
a  bidder  country  from  La  Porta et  al.  (1998).  The difference  of  investor  protection  is  measured  as  the
difference  of  investor  protection  in  a  bidder  and  target  country.  Bank  regulation  is  measured  as  overall
activities  restrictiveness,  official  supervisory  power,  prompt  corrective  power  and independence  of
supervisory authority-overall in a bidder country from Barth et al. (2003). The difference of bank regulation
is measured as the difference of bank regulation in a bidder and target country. The regression analysis also
includes a number of control variables. Cross-border is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the
target and bidder locate in different countries. Cash is a dummy variable, where the value of 1 indicates cash
payment. The relative size is measured as the relative size of the target and bidder proxied as deal value to
bidder assets. ROA is measured as net income to total assets. The market to book ratio is measured as the
market value to book value. The capital ratio is measured as total capital to total assets. Size is calculated as
ln(total assets). The variables of the firm specific characteristics are gathered from the year end prior to the
transactions. The financial data is collected from Datastream database. The competitiveness of the banking
market is proxied as net interest margin. The size of the banking market is measured as deposit money bank
assets to GDP. The country level specific characteristics are collected from the World Bank.
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. * Significant at the 0.1 level.
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) 1 , 1 (     = 0  + 1  (Bidder’s investor protection) + 2  (The difference of investor protection in
a bidder and target country) + 3  (Bidder’s bank regulation) + 4  (The difference of bank regulation in a
bidder and target country) + 5  (Cross-border dummy) + 6  (Cash dummy) + 7  (The relative size of the
target to bidder) + 8  (ROA) + 9  (The market to book ratio) + 10  (The capital ratio) + 11  (Size) +
12  (The competitiveness of the banking market) + 13  (The size of the banking market) + i 
Table 8.1 The cross-sectional regression analysis for combined firms based on the Market
model with the full 388 sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 0.056 0.050 0.094 ** 0.083 * 0.093 ** 0.061
Antidirector rights
  index
0.003 **
Rule of law 0.002
Overall Activities
Restrictiveness
0.000
Official
Supervisory Power
0.000
Prompt Corrective
Power
0.001
Independence of
Supervisory
Authority - Overall
0.003
Cross-border -0.015 -0.015 -0.020 * -0.018 -0.013 -0.017
Cash -0.012 -0.013 * -0.015 ** -0.014 * -0.012 -0.013 *363
Relative size 0.058 0.066 * 0.061 0.062 0.063 0.061
ROA -0.488 -0.371 -0.242 -0.244 -0.422 -0.378
MKTV -0.004 -0.004 * -0.005 ** -0.005 ** -0.004 * -0.005 **
Capital to assets -0.001 -0.014 -0.013 -0.012 -0.010 -0.010
ln (total assets) -0.003 * -0.003 ** -0.003 ** -0.003 ** -0.003 ** -0.003 *
Deposit Money
Bank Assets / GDP
0.024 ** 0.024 ** 0.023 * 0.024 * 0.019 0.027 **
Net Interest Margin -0.949 * -0.731 -0.627 -0.678 -1.150 * -0.548
Observations 354 353 354 354 354 354
Adjusted R Square 7.60% 6.80% 6.60% 6.50% 7.00% 6.70%
F-value 3.892 3.574 3.492 3.456 3.668 3.529
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Table 8.1 presents the results to explore the impact of investor protection and bank regulation on combined
firms cumulative abnormal returns. The analysis is based on the full 388 sample. The dependent variable is
combined firms’ 3-day (-1,+1) cumulative abnormal returns based on the market model. Investor protection is
measured as the combination of the antidirector rights index and the combination of the rule of law in a target
and bidder country from La Porta et al. (1998). Bank regulation is measured as the combination of the
variables, including overall activities restrictiveness, official supervisory power, prompt corrective power and
independence of supervisory authority-overall in a target and bidder country from Barth et al. (2003). The
regression model also includes a number of control variables. Cross-border is a dummy variable that takes
the value of 1 if the target and bidder locate in different countries. Cash is a dummy variable, where the value
of 1 indicates to use the cash payment. The relative size is measured as the relative size of the target to bidder.
ROA is measured as net income to total assets. The market to book ratio is measured as the market value to
book value. The capital ratio is measured as total capital to total assets. Size is calculated as ln(total assets).
The variables of the firm specific characteristics are gathered from the bidding firms at the year end prior to
bank merger and acquisition announcements. The financial data is collected from Datastream database. The
competitiveness of the banking market is proxied as net interest margin. The size of the banking market is
measured as deposit money bank assets to GDP. The country level specific characteristics are aimed at the
bidder’s perspective collected from the World Banks.
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. * Significant at the 0.1 level.
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    = 0  + 1  (The combination of investor protection in a target and bidder country) +
2  (the  combination  of bank  regulation  in  a  target  and  bidder  country)  + 3  (Cross-border  dummy)  +
4  (Cash dummy) + 5  (The relative size of the target to bidder ) + 6  (ROA) + 7  (The market to book
ratio) + 8  (The capital ratio) + 9  (Size) + 10  (The competitiveness of the banking market) + 11  (The
size of the banking market) + i 
Table 8.2 The cross-sectional regression analysis for combined firms based on the Mkt-adj
model with the full 388 sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 0.068 0.063 0.110 ** 0.098 ** 0.114 *** 0.078
Antidirector rights
  index
0.004 **
Rule of law 0.002364
Overall Activities
Restrictiveness
0.000
Official
Supervisory Power
0.000
Prompt Corrective
Power
0.002
Independence of
Supervisory
Authority - Overall
0.003
Cross-border -0.027 ** -0.028 ** -0.033 ** -0.030 ** -0.026 ** -0.030 **
Cash -0.013 -0.015 * -0.017 ** -0.016 ** -0.014 * -0.015 *
Relative size 0.055 0.064 0.059 -0.060 0.061 0.059
ROA -0.493 -0.343 -0.191 -0.209 -0.394 -0.335
MKTV -0.006 ** -0.006 ** -0.007 *** -0.007 *** -0.006 ** -0.007 ***
Capital to assets -0.016 -0.031 -0.031 -0.029 -0.027 -0.027
ln (total assets) -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 * -0.003 * -0.003 * -0.002
Deposit Money
Bank Assets / GDP
0.023 * 0.023 * 0.022 * 0.022 * 0.017 0.026 *
Net Interest Margin -1.396 ** -1.126 * -1.025 * -1.086 * -1.599 -0.922
Observations 354 353 354 354 354 354
Adjusted R Square 10.30% 9.30% 8.90% 8.90% 9.50% 9.10%
F-value 5.041 4.590 4.462 4.446 4.689 4.519
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Table 8.2 presents the results to explore the impact of investor protection and bank regulation on combined
firms cumulative abnormal returns. The analysis is based on the full 388 sample. The dependent variable is
combined firms’ 3-day (-1,+1) cumulative abnormal returns based on the market adjusted returns model.
Investor protection is measured as the combination of the antidirector rights index and the combination of the
rule of law in a target and bidder country from La Porta et al. (1998). Bank regulation is measured as the
combination of the variables, including overall activities restrictiveness, official supervisory power, prompt
corrective power and independence of supervisory authority-overall in a target and bidder country from Barth
et al. (2003). The regression model also includes a number of control variables. Cross-border is a dummy
variable that takes the value of 1 if the target and bidder locate in different countries. Cash is a dummy
variable, where the value of 1 indicates to use the cash payment. The relative size is measured as the relative
size of the target to bidder. ROA is measured as net income to total assets. The market to book ratio is
measured as the market value to book value. The capital ratio is measured as total capital to total assets. Size
is  calculated  as  ln(total  assets).  The  variables  of  the  firm  specific  characteristics  are  gathered  from  the
bidding firms at the year end prior to bank merger and acquisition announcements. The financial data is
collected from Datastream database. The competitiveness of the banking market is proxied as net interest
margin. The size of the banking market is measured as deposit money bank assets to GDP. The country level
specific characteristics are aimed at the bidder’s perspective collected from the World Banks.
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. * Significant at the 0.1 level.
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    = 0  + 1  (The combination of investor protection in a target and bidder country) +
2  (the  combination  of bank  regulation  in  a  target  and  bidder  country)  + 3  (Cross-border  dummy)  +
4  (Cash dummy) + 5  (The relative size of the target to bidder ) + 6  (ROA) + 7  (The market to book
ratio) + 8  (The capital ratio) + 9  (Size) + 10  (The competitiveness of the banking market) + 11  (The
size of the banking market) + i 365
Table  8.3  The  cross-sectional  regression  analysis  for  combined  firms  based  on  the
Mean-adj model with the full 388 sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 0.059 0.055 0.104 ** 0.084 * 0.098 ** 0.057
Antidirector rights
  index
0.004 **
Rule of law 0.002
Overall Activities
Restrictiveness
-0.001
Official
Supervisory Power
0.000
Prompt Corrective
Power
0.001
Independence of
Supervisory
Authority - Overall
0.004
Cross-border -0.018 -0.019 * -0.025 ** -0.021 * -0.017 -0.020 *
Cash -0.013 -0.015 * -0.017 ** -0.016 ** -0.014 * -0.015 *
Relative size 0.058 0.065 0.060 0.062 0.063 0.061
ROA -0.575 -0.449 -0.319 -0.338 -0.501 -0.507
MKTV -0.004 * -0.005 * -0.005 ** -0.005 ** -0.005 ** -0.005 **
Capital to assets 0.008 -0.004 -0.005 -0.002 0.000 0.000
ln (total assets) -0.003 ** -0.003 ** -0.003 ** -0.003 ** -0.004 ** -0.003 *
Deposit Money
Bank Assets / GDP
0.027 ** 0.027 ** 0.026 ** 0.026 ** 0.022 * 0.031 **
Net Interest Margin -0.898 -0.672 0.541 -0.639 -1.091 * -0.436
Observations 354 353 354 354 354 354
Adjusted R Square 9.30% 8.50% 8.40% 8.20% 8.70% 8.50%
F-value 4.619 4.262 4.228 4.154 4.364 4.292
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Table 8.3 presents the results to explore the impact of investor protection and bank regulation on combined
firms cumulative abnormal returns. The analysis is based on the full 388 sample. The dependent variable is
combined firms’ 3-day (-1,+1) cumulative abnormal returns based on the market model. Investor protection is
measured as the combination of the antidirector rights index and the combination of the rule of law in a target
and bidder country from La Porta et al. (1998). Bank regulation is measured as the combination of the
variables, including overall activities restrictiveness, official supervisory power, prompt corrective power and
independence of supervisory authority-overall in a target and bidder country from Barth et al. (2003). The
regression model also includes a number of control variables. Cross-border is a dummy variable that takes
the value of 1 if the target and bidder locate in different countries. Cash is a dummy variable, where the value
of 1 indicates to use the cash payment. The relative size is measured as the relative size of the target to bidder.
ROA is measured as net income to total assets. The market to book ratio is measured as the market value to
book value. The capital ratio is measured as total capital to total assets. Size is calculated as ln(total assets).
The variables of the firm specific characteristics are gathered from the bidding firms at the year end prior to
bank merger and acquisition announcements. The financial data is collected from Datastream database. The
competitiveness of the banking market is proxied as net interest margin. The size of the banking market is
measured as deposit money bank assets to GDP. The country level specific characteristics are aimed at the
bidder’s perspective collected from the World Banks.
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. * Significant at the 0.1 level.366
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    = 0  + 1  (The combination of investor protection in a target and bidder country) +
2  (the  combination  of bank  regulation  in  a  target  and  bidder  country)  + 3  (Cross-border  dummy)  +
4  (Cash dummy) + 5  (The relative size of the target to bidder ) + 6  (ROA) + 7  (The market to book
ratio) + 8  (The capital ratio) + 9  (Size) + 10  (The competitiveness of the banking market) + 11  (The
size of the banking market) + i 